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ANATOMY OF THE RAJ

Russian Consular Reports

SUHASH CHAKRAVARTY



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For Shachi

PREFACE

THE RUSSIAN *Blue Book*, containing secret consular despatches from Calcutta to St. Petersburg between the years 1912 and 1917, was published by the Soviet government in 1918 in keeping with policy of friendship and amity with the peoples of the colonial world. Early in 1908 Lenin saw in the Russian defeat of 1905 by the Japanese, the Russian revolution of 1905, the revolution in Persia and the 'young Turk' revolution in Turkey, the signs of a forthcoming awakening of the oppressed peoples. "The revolutionary movement in various European and Asian states has recently made itself so felt that we are beginning to see emerging a new, incomparably higher, stage in the international proletarian struggle... There is no doubt that the plunder of India by the English, which has been going on for centuries, and the current struggle of the 'advanced' Europeans against Persian and Indian democracy, *will* nerve millions of proletarians in Asia to wage a victorious struggle (like that of the Japanese) against their oppressor." It was maintained after the Chinese revolution of 1911 that the Asian bourgeoisie was capable of historically progressive action even though it was possible for forces represented by men like Yuan-Shi-Kai to succumb to narrow class interests. The empire, Lenin held in 1912, was basically a question of bread and butter for the British nation. He reminded the boastful claim of Cecil Rhodes: "If you do not want civil war, you must become imperialists." The duty of the Soviet government, it was underlined, was "to shatter the centuries-long slumber" of the oppressed peoples of the East and to rouse them to fight imperialism. That obligation was almost mandatory for the East represented the 'inexhaustible' source of supply and the 'most reliable' rearguard of world imperialism.

By 1918 the Indian national movement had reached a significant phase in its development. The contribution of India to the war efforts had stimulated the desires and demands of the nationalists for a matching constitutional response by the British government. The Montagu-Chelmsford declaration had caused a little satisfaction, a touch of frustration and much illusion. Gandhi's new technique of struggle had been experimented on a small scale with amazing success. The Mahatma had already placed himself on a secure and sacred position in Indian imagination. The Lucknow pact and the Home Rule movements had become important signposts of Indian unrest and, together with the anti-Rowlatt Act agitation, were to signal a turning point in India's history in the twentieth century. The publication of the documents at that date was most opportune.

The conquest of India had turned Britain into a continental power and throughout the nineteenth century she was locked up in a bitter conflict with Russia for the possession of the unknown sandhills of Central Asia. The Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 froze the Great Game with cheerful prospects for its eventual termination. The despatches of the *Blue Book* were written under the impact of this remarkable relaxation of diplomatic and military situation. Persia and Central Asia had already become an area of agreement between the two European empires in Asia. There was considerable appreciation of each other's concerns and responsibilities. There was hectic exchanges of diplomatic secrets. There was a marked and disturbing anxiety both in Calcutta and Tashkent with regard to the problems caused by a resurgent Asia. Significantly enough, the despatches are fairly candid and informative. They are indicative of the policy of the Czarist government towards the much publicised British commitments in India.

In a sense, the *Raj* was the playground of an irresponsible civil service. The rules of the game offered adequate room for both ruthless repression as well as skillful adjustments. It was a period of crisis of imperialism: a

global war was being waged to resolve its contradictions with fairly limited success. The British government in India was still very energetic and effective. There was a firm and inflexible determination to hold India. And yet, there was an element of uncertainty with regard to the options and a set of perplexed administrators seemed to be somewhat bewitched by their own exclusive racial propaganda. They stoutly maintained that all members of the ruling race ought to keep their distance. The Russian consuls reflected the attitudes and responses of the civil servants. The reputation of the ICS was steadily waning both in terms of its efficiency as well as its moral credibility. Its confidence was being eroded by the rise of an 'insidious' nationalism with 'mischievous' intent. Although they were few in numbers, the civil servants acted as the real embodiment of the British empire. Public opinion in Britain was far too eager to applaud their services especially in view of the so-called rougher side of life in India. Minto, Dunlop Smith, Reginald Craddock and Sydenham Clark were instinctively allergic to the "Bengali Babus of the worst description" indulging in manners of a "low British gallery" and would have liked to turn a deaf ear to "all the ultra Keir Hardie doctrines put into Bengali mouth". Harcourt Butler, James Meston, William Marris and Malcolm Hailey, more far-sighted and subtle than many others, sought to encourage a conservative landed aristocracy as a buffer between the rulers and the middle class. There was some others, like Hardinge, Fleetwood Wilson, and Carmichael who would have spared no effort to seduce the various segments of nationalist opinion into different levels of cooperation with the *Raj*. Michael O'Dwyer, Montagu Butler and Pentland thought otherwise and decided to lead the official reaction. Publicists and journalists like Valentine Chirol and Stanley Reed were conscious of the ever-growing gulf between the articulate Indians and the British power-elite. Increasingly, Charles F. Andrews, always a crack in official files, became irrelevant to the current political profile despite his sincere ordeal of love. Over the years even E. J. Thompson had gradually altered his conviction and concluded that the Indians and British could no longer be reconciled. E. M.

Forster, the prophet of an emotional understanding with India "beyond a vague jungle of rajas, shahips, Babus and elephants", caught the essence of the self-righteous demeanour of the civil servants: "Intercourse, yes. Courtesy, by all means. Intimacy, never, never. The whole weight of my authority is against it..." India continued to linger on in British sensibility as an inscrutable land. It was undefinable. It was the "country, fields, fields, then hills; jungles, hills and more fields...", without romance and without any pan-Indian entity, where the alienation of the Muslims and the British was complete. Rudyard Kipling's phrase, "half-devil and half-child", bred in the jungle "with tiger who crouches, springs, gambols and devours", was a representative view of an Indian who, it was believed, could be tamed but could never be trusted. A more subtle and, perhaps, more elusive position was adopted by saner minds. The permanent backdrop of Forster's *Passage to India* was the lack of clarity in India as had been in Kipling's *Simla*. That image of India was one of a muddle, a grand chaos. "A mystery", Forster added, "is only a high-sounding term for muddle." Lionel Curtis and his *Round Table* men sought to assist that chaotic India to discover for herself a new equilibrium and a fresh point of harmony within the western civilisation and British empire. It was a futile gesture. In fact, the intellectuals of empire were self-indulgent. The diehard administrators were more forthright. They made no bones about the claim that Britain held India for her own good and that hold was to be a prolonged affair, if not, a permanent one. It was a clear-cut position. It was direct and close to reality. "What I should like to see is tightening up of the administration and making it quite clear", Harcourt Butler confided to his mother, "that there cannot be a British rule without the British. Some people act and speak as if it were possible for the same thing to be and not to be". Racial animosities were growing stronger. The bomb-cult, it was expected, would go on. There was little likelihood of stopping sedition for some time. "If I were an Indian", Butler admitted, "I sh'd dislike the British." The Lucknow pact had already given a fresh spurt to reaction. The tragedy of Amritsar pushed all possibilities

for adjustments with Indian nationalism into the limbo of unreality.

The extensive introduction based on primary sources seeks to present a historical survey of the period highlighting the points of interests of the Russian consuls. Against the background of social, political and administrative parameters of British India, I have attempted an analysis of the various episodes, interests, policies, classes, groups and personalities penned by them in these despatches. The primary object of the introduction is to weave a pattern and discover a meaning in the disjointed narrations of those otherwise lifeless official communications.

The original sources consulted, with abbreviations used in the present study, are listed in the Bibliography at the end. I am indebted to the authorities and staff of the India Office Library, *The Times* archives, the university libraries of Oxford, Cambridge, London and Delhi, the National Archives and the Nehru Memorial Library and Archives, New Delhi for permission to study and consult the various holdings and collections at their possession. In particular, I should like to remember with gratitude the kind considerations that I received from Mr Gordon Philip, the chief archivist of *The Times*.

Late Puran Chand Joshi, revolutionary, scholar and humanist, initiated me on to the present work. I acknowledge my debt to him with humility. Professor Paul Reis and Dr Elizabeth Leedham-Green of the University of Cambridge offered me many opportunities for extensive critical discussions; Professor Robert E. Frykenberg of the University of Wisconsin extended his weighty comments; Dr Percival Spear has been, as ever, most enthusiastic with his refreshing insights; Mr and Mrs U. S. Srivastav favoured me with their effusive affability; my mother provided me with constant encouragements; Amar Farooqui and Prem Bhushan Dewan have been ungrudging with their moral and amoral support. To all of them I offer my sincere thanks. I also thank *People's Publishing House*,

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Delhi, 25 June, 1981

SUHASH CHAKRAVARTY

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ABBREVIATIONS

H. P.	Hardinge Papers
Cr. P.	Crewe Papers
S. R.	Spring-Rice Papers
C. P.	Chirol Papers
S. REED.	Stanley Reed Papers
Sy. P.	Sydenham Clark Papers
B. P.	Butler Papers
M. P.	Meston Papers
S. P.	Seton Papers
W. P.	Wilson Papers
R. T. P.	<i>Round Table</i> Group Papers
G. P.	Gokhale Papers

INTRODUCTION

THE PAPERS which appear in this volume are a selection from the Russian consular reports from Calcutta to St. Petersburg between the years 1912 and 1917. The diacritical marks of the period are clear. The consular despatches were written in the relaxed atmosphere engendered by the convention of 1907; they stretch through the World War I, not continuously but intermittently; they come to an abrupt conclusion terminated by the Russian Revolution. The revolutionary government, for its own reasons of state policy, released this edited Blue Book in 1918.¹ To the English-speaking readers these papers are available for the first time. Much of the freshness of the Russian language is, however, lost in the process of translation and free-editing. And yet, much of the value of the Blue Book in terms of contents remains. Primarily concerned with the period of Hardinge's viceroyalty in India, it covers a good deal of ground. The volume is replete with shrewd and penetrating comments, interesting insights into policy decisions and hitherto unnoticed facts.

I

THE DESPATCHES in the Blue Book reflect a specific international setting, given rise to by the emergence of Germany as a common threat to the British and Russian empires in the East. About forty years ago Salisbury and the British cabinet had discerned the dangers inherent in continuing a pro-Turkish policy in the Near East. The Turkish state had been irreparably damaged; it was no longer desirable to put the patient on a nutrition diet. With the rise of German power and the crystallising

of Christian nation states in the Balkans, British official circles had realised the necessity of minimising tension with Russia in the East and concluding an alliance of sorts.² Curzon had attempted to project the nineteenth century Russophobia into the world of the twentieth.³ Brilliant and impatient as he was, he was apt to overlook the extensive strategic demands of the far flung British empire. From the vantage point of the viceregal establishment in Calcutta, Germany remained a distant though somewhat inconvenient reality and Kitchener was encouraged to propose an elaborate project to effect crippling incursions into Russia's Central Asian ribs.⁴

Once Curzon was withdrawn from the Indian scene the perspective swerved almost overnight. Statesmen in London, St. Petersburg and Simla were growing increasingly alarmed as they caught the echoes of world unrest reverberating ominously round the whispering galleries of Asia.⁵ The theatricals of Emperor William of Germany and his claim to be the only friend of Islam in the West loomed large in their eyes as more than mere empty gestures. They anticipated the ultimate capitulation of Turkey in political and economic bondage to Germany.⁶ The Baghdad railway, designed to reach by easy stages the head of Persian Gulf commanding the resources of Asia Minor and Persia, was seen as the precursor of things to come. In response the course of British diplomacy took some strange turns.⁷ The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 led directly to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. The protracted character of the war strengthened the hands of Hirobumi Ito and his friends in the Japanese government who argued that in the long run it would be most convenient for Japan to come to terms with Russia. Throughout the course of the war the German legation at Tokyo helped to promote that tendency by harping on the point that the exhaustion of both the parties in the war would benefit Britain.⁸ The war landed Japan victorious. The triumph of Japan offered a fresh opportunity to Britain to complete her encirclement of Germany. From the distant outpost of the empire at Peshawar and amidst the

hectic preparations of an energetic Kitchener for a forward policy, Valentine Chirol assessed the significance of the defeat of Russia "The great debacle appears to have set in at last, and what is to be the end of it all? From this remote corner of the world one is chiefly inclined to speculate on the effect it must inevitably have on the whole Asian outlook Eliminate Russia as an active factor in Asian politics and the North-Western Frontier and Afghanistan lose 9/10 of their importance for us As you know full well I am not a 'backward' man, but if ever there was a moment when we could afford to go slow and await developments it is surely now ' A larger game, Chirol emphasised, seemed to have begun 'with a vengeance' "

It was affirmed that the Czar was conciliatory by temperament and a cue that it was a case of 'so far and no further' would help to check 'Russian free-lancers of diplomacy and of the army, who have hitherto imagined that we could be squeezed into impunity' ¹⁰ The sober French politicians, it was added, would at last be able to show their 'more impulsive fellow countrymen the consequences in black and white of blindly following Russia's lead in the Far East' ¹¹ The Germans, Chirol warned his friend in British diplomatic service, "play elaborate comedy for the benefit of pro-German British aristocracy and diplomats and for a time even I was bamboozled by it I cannot help feeling some apprehension that even your greater experience may not be proof against the far lavish efforts that would naturally be made to capture your judgement" ² An impression tarried in London that some British diplomats were much too disposed to lend extravagant weight to the soft words of the German emperor and the friendly private assurances of his officials and "to minimise unpalatable facts which happen to be at variance with them" ¹¹

A rapprochement with Russia, it was maintained, was possible only in conjunction with a fair and conciliatory agreement with Japan The diplomatic atmosphere was

rendered favourably by the Franco-Japanese concord which had been negotiated with full concurrence of Russia. Together, they marked a distinct and significant shift in the trends of Russian foreign policy. It was confirmed by China and the Balkan states. They corroborated that the attitude of Russia was transforming and had already altered substantially as she was being drawn "steadily nearer to us and away from the Germans".¹⁴ It was feared that the virtual desertion of Persia, which the new understanding would mean, might pose a serious question to the Muslim mind. It was, however, noted with satisfaction that the consequence would only have a marginal effect on Indian opinion. Clarifying the point Chirol held: "Our Indian Mohammedans are in the main Sunnis and except for the purpose of agitation, the Sunnis will scarcely, I imagine, get much excited over the fate of such 'sons of burnt fathers' as the Persians."¹⁵ Moreover, the configuration which the unrest in India had assumed underlined the necessity "of rallying the Mohammedans to the Raj as against the Hindus".¹⁶ It was evident that on general grounds of policy it was worthwhile for the British to give Russia a free hand in Persia and "cut our own coat according to our very small piece of cloth".¹⁷ All the same, the foreign office had resolved that it must insist in getting "our *quid pro quo* elsewhere—namely, in the restoration of balance of power in Europe".¹⁸ That was the crucial point and it was professed that "we certainly shan't get it if we play at pretending that we are getting an equitable adjustment of our respective interests in Persia when we are merely adjusting ourselves to Russian exigencies."¹⁹ In fact, British diplomacy was being moulded on the assumption that much might be conceded to Russia as a partner in an Anglo-Franco-Russian *triplice* in Europe. But if Russia desired to have a free hand to reinsure herself with Berlin and to revive the old Three Emperors' Alliance then no concession ought to be offered.

Russia, however, continued to haunt the morning dreams of large number of British diplomats and politicians. Spring-Rice, for example, stressed the immense

possibilities of the *Majlis*-government in Persia and the harmful effects on her public opinion of an eventful partition of Persia which a settlement with Russia would have entailed.²⁰ As Spring-Rice hummed his "Persian Lullabies" *ad infinitum*, Chirol made the position of the foreign office quite unambiguous to his dear friend: "...Anyhow, though you may not like it, the policy of the F.O. is... that it aims at settlement not merely of Persian question, but of a whole series of questions in which there must be great deal of give and take, and if it really does lead to a permanent rapprochement with Russia it seems to me worth our while to give a good deal and take little in the way of concrete advantages. Anyway whatever your opinion may be, you cannot hope to impose them on the F.O. and it would be great pity if you were to convey the impression that you are not pulling in the same direction, or pulling unwillingly."²¹

It was impossible to pooh pooh Russia as an "enemy factor" both in Europe as in Asia. But the situation had transmuted quite dramatically. There was, it was argued, a fair chance of securing her cooperation in restoring the balance of power in Europe especially when "in Asia her power and possibly even her desire to do us mischief has been, to say the least, abated for many years to come under irresistible compulsion".²² It was the duty of the imperial government, Chirol asserted, to spare no efforts to grasp her support. He insisted that the British government ought to be prepared for some concessions to Russia—"concessions which we would not safely have made some years ago, but which we now can safely make."²³ While the diplomats continued to negotiate with Russia and explore fresh areas of understanding the experts on international relations held their breath and also kept their fingers crossed. They were watching gingerly if a pro-German lobby in the British foreign office was in the ascendancy; they felt nervy at the eloquent speech of Joseph Chamberlain advocating an Anglo-American-German alliance; Haldane's visit to Berlin was eyed

by them as one "strange blunder" having sinister implications; they were thrilled to find that the 'memo' drafted by the foreign office on the subject "took the gilt off Haldane's gingerbread"; they felt uneasy at the persistent bellicosity of the military men at St. Petersburg and saw with dismay the attempts of Germany to placate the ill-informed and malleable public opinion in Britain.²⁴ "Whether the agreement comes off or not it should not be allowed to fall through", wrote Chirol, merely "in great deference to military theories. I only wish there were a Morley in Russia upon whom we could reckon, to deal with the Russian military extremists."²⁵ Even if, Chirol added, all the old administrators were dead in St. Petersburg "signs of continued animation—muscular reaction I think it is called pathologically—in the extremists" would be felt in Russia for some time to come.²⁶ If the British government could not reduce its army or defence expenditure in general, he put the case bluntly, "how are we to find 20 or 25 million a year for old age pension, and if we can't throw that sop to the people, how is the Liberal Party to stop the mouths of the Labourites and arrest the revolt of socialism?"²⁷

From purely Indian point of view it was argued that the government had not until "quite recently" realised the magnitude of Kitchener's scheme for redistribution of the Indian army and especially the growth of a permanent expenditure which it would have certainly given rise to. Chirol anticipated Hardinge when he claimed that in the existing political state of India an enhancement of her military budget would only strengthen the forces of disaffection. The paradoxical element in the whole affair seemed to be, Chirol contended, that Kitchener was not in a position to affirm with confidence that his scheme, even if carried out in its entirety, would really ensure the security of India.²⁸ He contrasted this listless feeling of uncertainty prevailing amidst the power-elite India to the endemic spirit of extremism all over India notwithstanding the "skilfull manoeuvring on the part of the temporisers..."²⁹ He would concur with Spring-Rice

that the Russian leopard had not changed its spots. But he hastened to add that it was perhaps too much to expect that he would. What was important, he advised, was that "perhaps we can even afford to let him keep them".⁶⁰

On the basis of information supplied by Nicolson and Hardinge, Chirol maintained that the more he watched the general situation in Europe the more disposed he felt to welcome any understanding with Russia which should offer a fair prospect of permanency on the "one condition that it provides a definite barrier against Russian penetration—peaceful or otherwise—towards our Indian frontiers, which will enable us to reduce the military burdens of India."⁶¹ He learnt from Hardinge and Grey that Russia was prepared to consent to the terms which would fulfill that condition. "If so, the rest is little more than trimmings with regard to which we need not be hypercritical."⁶² Thus the mirage of an irresistible Cossack army marching triumphantly through the formidable mountain barriers evanesced from the enlarged map of the viceroy's foreign desk. Curzon's ardent Russophobia gave way to a set of calculated commitments between the two allies in the East. Minto felt uncomfortable at the fresh, though implicit, responsibility of the Indian administration of keeping the Amir of Afghanistan in command of his militant emotions.⁶³ He kept on nagging against Russia being allowed to devour another slice of the Asiatic cake in Persia. Lansdowne was vituperative against the new treaty. Curzon indulged in a prolonged denunciation in the House of Lords.⁶⁴ But Morley had no patience for such obduracy; he would not allow others to ghostwrite the policies of the home government. A new working partnership between the two traditional rivals in the East had come to stay, and their growing cordiality was cemented by the common threat raised by World War I and Hardinge's sympathetic demeanour.

The opposition of the army headquarters to the treaty was intense. It was but natural. Kitchener, for example,

shared in full measure the bigotry of the traditional Russophobes in India. In May 1904 he had wondered why the Russians ought to have thought it wise to undertake an active policy in Central Asia. They should have kept things, he proposed, quiet instead. Kitchener was not sure whether the Russians were afraid of their own subjects in western Turkistan excited as they were by the news of the reverses in Manchuria. He was inclined to believe that probably they were suspicious of the Amir and the Afghans. He would not rule out the possibility of Russian countermoves in Kashgar in order to offset British moves in Tibet.³⁵ He was perturbed that with such large forces in a state of preparedness the local Russian officials might easily strike the match and set things ablaze,³⁶ It was reported much to his anxiety that the Russians were sending officers to survey railway extensions in Persia and he was nearly convinced that all these constituted a well-worked-out aggressive programme.³⁷ Not long after Kitchener requested Spring-Rice to rub into people at home that "we ought to be ready (to meet the Russians militarily) without delay".³⁸ From Simla he had been doing his best to push his line but over the years he had found it a difficult task to egg politicians on to an energetic policy in defence of distant imperial frontiers. He had already been administered a "very rude rebuff" by the war office for having warned it against Russian activities in Central Asia. He did not think it prudent to repeat it once again because he had a queer feeling that the home government would only cavil at it and do nothing.³⁹ As the British diplomacy shifted closer to the Russian foreign office regarding Central Asia Kitchener found in Spring-Rice perhaps the ablest man to advocate the traditional policy for the defence of the empire. He was not certain, however, if even a circumspect allusion from Spring-Rice would deter the home government from a policy of active alignment with Russia in Asia. "Will they be induced", he pried peevishly, "to pause in their dangerous philandering with the bearded Cossack—or have they already gone too far...?"⁴⁰ Indeed they had gone too far and crossed the Rubicon. Kitchener never-

theless continued to indulge in his dreams that if Russia "twisted our tail beyond endurance her action will, I think, not be received with enthusiasm in France", and John Bull would certainly rise to the occasion.⁴¹

While the Anglo-French *entente* of 1904 had covered a comprehensive area of friction, the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 confined itself to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.⁴² As regards Persia, the agreement divided the country into three zones for commercial development. Russia was allocated the north and centre and Great Britain the south-east, which consisted almost entirely of deserts. The south-west of the country was declared neutral. The two powers, after affirming their respect for the independence and integrity of Persia, stipulated that neither should seek concessions of any kind in regions coterminous with the frontier of the other. Russia undoubtedly got the better of the bargain.

With regard to Afghanistan, Russia undertook to stick to her previous commitments to treat it as being outside her sphere of influence and Britain reaffirmed her desire to sustain her own political ascendancy over Kabul without infringing its independence. Besides, it was agreed upon that the Russian and Afghan authorities might establish direct contact with each other for the settlement of local issues of non-political character. They also reiterated their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan. In the third agreement, relating to Tibet, the contracting parties recognised the suzerain rights of China in Tibet. Great Britain, by reason of geographical proximity, had a special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the internal relations in Tibet and its territorial integrity. She also pledged to abstain from all interference in its affairs. Both the powers engaged not to send representatives into Tibet or poach on Tibetan revenues in any manner. Besides, they avouched to deal with Tibet through China although in conformity with the conventions of 1904 and 1906 direct relations between British

commercial agents and Tibetan authorities were not precluded.

Hardinge entered heart and soul into the spirit of the new arrangements. A professional diplomat he had been one of the principal architects of the convention and, more than anybody else in India, was sensitive to the realities of the contemporary international relations. As the viceroy of India he was solicitous of taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the new diplomatic situations. Surveying the position of the British in the East he postulated that the internal and external situation of India had been significantly altered during the preceding ten years. He was disposed to stress what the military men tended to ignore: that the Russian convention was the greatest event of his time to influence the external relations of India.⁴³ The Anglo-French *entente* in 1904 had signalled the end of the policy of splendid isolation. The Russo-Japanese war had left Russia somewhat ineffective while the Russian convention completed the drawing of the circle round Germany.

Hardinge would not endorse the view of traditional Russophobes in India that the Amir's reluctance to subscribe to the convention was an insurmountable barrier and that the result of the treaty would be but marginal in ensuring British security in the East. He had no faith in such a narrow construction being placed on the treaty. He was confident that so long as Russia agreed to regard the portion of the convention relating to Afghanistan as binding upon her it mattered mighty little whether the Amir approved of it or not.⁴⁴ Similarly, the Persian section of the convention, he maintained, was fully operative although it was still to be recognised by Persia. The existing diplomatic situation did not encourage Hardinge to anticipate any major operation beyond the British frontier in the near future. There was likelihood of insignificant pin-pricks in the Persian Gulf area.⁴⁵ But the achievement of the convention had been fundamental. The Afghan ruler, he asserted, could no longer play off Russia against Britain.⁴⁶ The Amir was aware of the

potentialities of the Anglo-Russian convention which might lead to the partition of his country.⁴⁷ Even so, if a war was forced upon British India by Afghan proclivities, Hardinge was prepared to meet the situation. In such a contingency, he felt, the Amir might be brought to reason if Kandahar was held, the frontier tribes were chastened and the border routes were blockaded.⁴⁸

The viceroy held that since the days of Curzon the situation of India had been reversed. It was the internal condition which was the cause of serious anxiety.⁴⁹ In 1903 Kitchener, responding directly to the increasing tension between the two powers, had carried out a project for launching British military offensives in Central Asia. Its important aspects were concentration of troops on the frontier; strategic military constructions; ammunition columns; reserves of men, horses and guns; and the maintenance of the army for mobilisation at a moments notice.⁵⁰ As a result, the divisional areas of India, it was estimated, would have been left in a dangerously weak position. Hardinge concluded that it was a matter of amazement that a strategic railway centre such as Delhi should have remained vulnerable. It was also patently absurd to station a considerable number of troops at a place like Quetta, where their presence had no significant military importance, specially when they could have been more advantageously placed elsewhere for internal security.⁵¹ With the relaxation of mutual suspicion and the recession of danger since 1907, Kitchener's programme had become dated. "My own opinion is", Hardinge wrote, "that the danger of a Russian invasion having been, for the time being at least, removed, there is no longer sufficient reason for the heavy military expenditure that was necessitated by preparations to meet the armies of a first class power."⁵² All that the British in India could expect was possible inroads from Afghanistan and China, and Hardinge asserted that it was not necessary to retain so large an army involving heavy military expenditure to encounter either of the comparatively "uncivilised powers".⁵³

The core of Hardinge's argument had been that the changed international situation no longer justified the maintenance of a first class army. "Is there any sane person", Hardinge retorted in reply to the opposition of the army high command, "who thinks that with the outlook before us we can continue to maintain this proportion of expenditure on our military budget?"⁵⁴

The convention inaugurated an era of co-operation between the two traditional rivals. There were still some uncomfortable and well-founded moments of doubts. But both the home and the Indian governments made specific efforts to strengthen the spirit of the convention. In September 1912 the British foreign office seemed disposed to consent to the return of Mohammad Ali, the deposed ruler, to Teheran. It would have led to "the final consolidation of Russia's control over northern Persia".⁵⁵ Both Crewe and Hardinge were not pleased with an olive-branch policy. "It is a poor outcome of the convention", Crewe wrote sharply, "if things so end, because it is apparently identical with what would have happened if there had been no convention."⁵⁶ He was distressed by the possible adverse impact of the restoration of the ex-Shah throughout the Middle East. The convention would then appear to be futile, and "we would consequently look such utter fools", wrote Crewe in agreement with Hardinge, "that the step should be avoided at almost any cost."⁵⁷ He believed that the Russians might be persuaded not to press the deposed Shah's claims if anybody else could be found.

The viceroy agreed with the secretary of state that attempts ought to be made to place the British in a stronger position as regards the neutral zone. He was determined to hold out as long as he could against any scheme to pacify the south by occupying it. But if the north had to be annexed by the Russians, Hardinge was unable to reconcile himself to the official assertion that "it should be impossible to build up a buffer... in the south".⁵⁸ On the contrary, Hardinge was keen to devise

a joint plan affecting Persia which would have given Russia a freedom of action in the north in exchange for a formidable barricade in the south. So far as Russia was concerned this would have offered her merely some peripheral advantages while it would have ensured British position in the south-east. Hardinge pleaded that such an arrangement could be effected without the formality of an *entente* or a promise to maintain Persian integrity. Crewe took note of his opinion. He acknowledged that there were good reasons for strengthening Persia and, if such an attempt failed, for "collaring all we can for ourselves".⁵⁹ But there was no satisfactory argument, he was to agree with Hardinge, "for breaking the eggs and then getting no share of the omelette".⁶⁰ He, therefore, proposed that if northern Persia were absorbed by Russia, one might discover the ways of building up central and southern Persia into a plausible autonomous zone. "Must we finally play", Crewe mused, "the part of the carpenter to the Russian Walrus?"⁶¹

Hardinge agreed with Crewe that Britain ought to have a native *Laden la* at Lhasa instead of a regular agent. But he was not inclined to pay a heavy price in Persia for a minor concession in Tibet. Crewe and Hardinge had agreed to keep a high line with the Chinese about it and "threaten them pretty sharply, if necessary".⁶² They, however, contested the overbearing attitudes of Grey and Haldane. They believed that there was no serious difficulty in coming to terms with China. Crewe maintained that it was an error to be stiff over Chinese control over Tibet in view of the regular importation of Russian arms through the northern route.⁶³ In Kashgar, it was believed, Russia did not have any ambition of her own. She was merely determined to keep China out of Siberia. Hardinge was serious about putting a stop to the King of Nepal's ceremonial visit to China. He was not apprehensive about China being a real danger to Nepal. But such visits, he insisted, could be misconstrued owing to Nepal's weakness. In fact, with regard to minor problems confronting the convention Hardinge was fairly pragmatic. He was

eager, for example, to ensure that the Persian complications should be considered separately and that they could not be lumped together or treated as a pawn in a game along with Tibet and Kashgar.⁶⁴

The home government responded favourably to the viceroy's advice. In September 1912 Sazanoff met Crewe leaving a favourable impression on his mind. It appeared to Crewe that the Russians felt quite helpless on Afghan frontier matters and would appreciate any assistance from the British on that account. As a *quid pro quo* Sazanoff was willing to extend concessions in Russian Turkistan. Hardinge took note of "the rather surprising emphasis" with which Sazanoff disclaimed interest in Kashgar. It was equally obvious to him that the Russians did not honestly care about British activities in Tibet.⁶⁵ Both Hardinge and Crewe felt that Sazanoff was apprehensive of the "jingoës at home", who might accuse him of giving the British some advantages without adequate returns.⁶⁶

Crewe would have liked to make the situation easier for Sazanoff. He was also pretty sure about the urgency of restraining the Amir with respect to the constant irritation caused by overzealous Afghan officials on the Russian frontier. "It will certainly be desirable", Crewe urged Hardinge, "if you can (do so) because it would lubricate all the remaining questions." He was convinced that although the Amir was a "spoilt child" his "nursery must not be swept away for fear that he may lose his temper".⁶⁷ "The Russians could not and would not see", he wrote, "why his position differs from that of a Turkistan Khan, and on our side we suffer from not being able to put a sufficient screw on him at need."⁶⁸ But Amir's position, as he saw it, was no longer dovetailed with the Russian understanding, however convenient it might have been in earlier days.

With regard to Chinese Turkistan the Russians gave categorical assurances against interfering with its administration. They claimed that all their interests in that

direction were located along the northern boundary of Turkistan by the Kuldja and Ili rivers in the immediate neighbourhood of the Russian administration. Crewe was assured that the Kashgar and Kashmir frontiers were most inaccessible from Russian Turkistan and the Russians disclaimed all interest there. He, in turn, impressed upon Hardinge that it was merely the ill-treatment of the Russian traders at Kashgar which had led to the concentration of their forces on the frontier and that the Russian government had no intention of leaving them there. "In no part of Chinese Turkistan", Crewe persuaded Hardinge to believe, "there would be any question of a Russian move without informing us before hand."⁶⁹

Even over the status and position of Tibet the agreement had been substantial. Sazanoff had assured Crewe that they had no desire to enter it. As a matching response the British government promised to refrain from doing so. Crewe confessed that posting of a British officer at Lhasa as agent would not be worth the risk. He, however, made it quite clear that the government of India would regard with concern a Chinese encroachment of Tibet. It was, he argued, necessary for them to know that was happening in Tibet from reliable sources. The Russians were inclined to agree with the British in principle. But they emphasised that it was desirable not to introduce any formal change in the convention. Instead, they suggested that the British ought to seek information from Tibet privately.⁷⁰ Crewe rebutted that any action taken by the government of India in order to counter a possible Chinese aggression, apparently contrary to the convention, would excite public opinion in Russia more intensely than "if it were modified in cold blood to a slight extent".⁷¹ The Russians disputed the position. They had made no protest, Sazanoff reminded, at the strong remonstrance of the government of India to China and if, as a sequel to a Chinese advance, the Indian government were to occupy the Chumbi valley, he assured once again, not a word would be uttered. The Russians offered to adopt a similar flexible posture in res-

ponse to a possible rectification of the Nepalese frontier.⁷² Both Hardinge and Crewe were satisfied with the effect of a series of frank discussions with the Russians. Hardinge, in particular, was convinced that Russia wanted to work along with Britain and not against her. That feeling grew stronger and increasingly effective by 1914 when Europe and the Middle East were plunged into the World War I.

There were moments when the convention spirit had to encounter rough weather. Thus, when Meshed was bombarded in 1912 by the Russians, Crewe was eager to impress upon them the strength of Muslim feelings throughout Asia in condemnation of the action. Under his pressure the Russians transferred their restless officer, Dabija, from the Persian frontier while Sykes was removed by the British from Persia primarily to assuage Russian susceptibilities.⁷³ Crewe was considerate enough to accommodate the Russian complaint that the British had failed to discharge their obligation of keeping the Afghan Amir in check.⁷⁴ Hardinge was finicky. He was sensitive about the insistence of the Russians on placing new obligations on the government of India with regard to Afghanistan. Sazanoff had suggested that the British ought to persuade the Amir to act in a neighbourly spirit with the Russians on the northern border. Hardinge, however, thought that this might involve Britain in some pesky problems. The established policy of the Afghan government, he held, had been to maintain a position of neutrality with regard to its dealings with Russia and Britain. He realised that the Russians would not make any concessions to the British elsewhere unless the latter could obtain for them a change of attitude on the part of the Amir.⁷⁵

By November 1912 Russia made attempts to force the hands of the Indian government in adopting a firm stand against a threatened Afghan delinquency. They espied a mischievous intent in the Amir's refusal to cooperate on certain problems connected with locusts, irrigation and

plague epidemic around Herat. Hardinge descried in these protests a fresh move to gain a foothold in Afghanistan. He believed that Russian anxiety was based on flimsy grounds and preferred to recommend, with an air of detachment, that the Amir was not disposed to entertain any interference with the water rights of northern Afghanistan or an invasion of Herat by medical doctors accompanied by armed cossack escorts.⁷⁶ He was convinced that unless the Russians obtained some sort of satisfaction in northern Afghanistan it was futile "for us to ask for any modification of our status in Tibet".⁷⁷

In 1911 the home government had decided to evacuate Shiraz and probably, Isfahan, Yazd and Kerman. Hardinge was quick to prognosticate anarchy in central and southern Persia. "I do not think", he protested, "that we can allow our influence and position in southern Persia to be wiped out by the Kashgais or anybody else without our obtaining compensating advantages."⁷⁸ By March 1912 he was relieved to know that the foreign office was beginning to make out that the policy of masterly inactivity in southern Persia would not pay. His disgust at Persian truculence was intense. "The Persians appear to think a good deal of their own prestige, which I should imagine is quite non-existent."⁷⁹ If the British were to have no participation in the Baghdad Railway, Hardinge underlined, it became all the more necessary for them to obtain a satisfactory *quid pro quo* in the Persian Gulf.⁸⁰ It was, he thought, possible to obtain that price because Turkish interests in the gulf had been of a purely formal nature. Persia, however, continued to remain pro-Russian and Hardinge pulled a long face. He was far from satisfied with the British position there. In order to stabilise British hold in southern Persia he advanced in March 1913 the idea of the formation of a military force officered by British personnel in the service of the Persian government.⁸¹

In summer 1913 a fresh initiative was taken by Crewe to enter into a conversation with the Russians on Tibet,

Afghanistan and other allied subjects. He had agreed with Hardinge that the altered political position of Tibet occasioned by Russian activities in Mongolia and renewed Chinese interest in Lhasa necessitated a new set of relationships in that area.⁸² Hardinge maintained that it had affected British interests adversely because Tibet was coterminous with India and Lhasa was only 160 miles from the frontier of Bhutan and 190 miles from East Bengal. Its proximity, he claimed, entitled the British to a free hand in Tibet. While Britain was to demand preponderant influence in Tibet the Russians were to be skilfully denied even the right to appoint an agent in Lhasa. In return, he was disposed to offer the Russians the right to consult the local government at Herat regarding border disputes.⁸³ Besides, he was convinced that the proposal of a joint commission was worth pursuing and might be considered favourably although Afghan opinion on this question ought to be ascertained.⁸⁴

With regard to Persia, however, Hardinge was opposed to the idea of dealing with Russia's proposal for a modification of the neutral zone. "I need hardly remind you", he held firmly, "that we shall be very sensitive about any increase of the Russian sphere in the north-east corner of Persia."⁸⁵ He was apprehensive that the Russians might be anxious to prolong and extend their sphere somewhere towards the gulf—an attempt which he had determined to resist. On the proposal of the Trans-Persian railway Hardinge agreed with Crewe that the pressure of military advisers against British participation was not irreproachable. He thought that they were short-sighted since the alternative line suggested by them would strengthen the hands of the forward party in Russia who would see in it a renewed impulse of hostility on the part of the Indian government. It was believed that the construction of a line from the Russian to Indian frontier and the institution of a railway system was inevitable unless Persia was destined to remain a "barbarous desert".⁸⁶ Hence, he proffered a suggestion that it would be better to secure a least harmful alignment and,

in this context it was considered desirable to have the gulf and not Karachi as the terminus of this railway connection.⁸⁷

Hardinge's positions in all these matters were faithfully reflected in the Central Asian dialogue which was formally inaugurated in May 1913. The India office desired to concentrate attention on Tibet. In the first place, it was uneasy about the hoity-toity attitude of the Chinese towards Tibet. Secondly, the advanced position adopted by Russia in Mongolia *ipso facto* altered the position of Tibet itself. "The Tibet about which we agreed in the convention", Crewe maintained forcefully, "is not the same country as the Tibet of today. That Tibet was hinged on isolation, which we desired to maintain. This Tibet, with sovereignty claimed by China and with easy access by a high road from Mongolia, is different."⁸⁸ The important question which vexed the British government was whether if it desired to place an agent at Lhasa it should necessarily argue against the Russians doing likewise. Crewe, in particular, was not in favour of being squeamish about it. He was inclined to assert steadily British interests in Tibet primarily on geographical grounds.⁸⁹ There was, however, considerable misgiving in the cabinet. Morley would not touch Tibet with even "the largest of barge poles" and would "almost have a fit at the suggestion of a British representative."⁹⁰ Grey was not favourable to the proposal as it might prompt Russia to ask for a corresponding benefit with unlimited prospects of friction. Under the pressure of the foreign office Hardinge modified his stand and conceded Russia's discretion to appoint her own representative at Lhasa. But the Tibetan situation assumed new dimensions uninfluenced by the diplomacy of the foreign office.⁹¹ Chinese intervention in Tibet compelled the government of India to insist that "we must intervene" and "maintain our special interests."⁹²

With regard to Afghanistan the British government had so far denied all reported frontier incidents although

Crewe believed that these complaints were not unauthenticated rumours. In view of repeated insinuations he insisted that one could not advance in perpetuity the inapproachability of the Amir as a convenient excuse for inaction.⁹¹ In fact, Crewe went a long way to accept and forward the proposal that the Amir ought to be sounded out about the establishment of a permanent tripartite commission of enquiry into disputes and incidents.⁹¹

Thus, despite occasional tensions, misgivings and border incidents the home government as well as the Indian administration managed their way through the mass of Russophobe official agitators. By May 1914 Hardinge was to report optimistically that the Russian government proved to be fairly accommodating with regard to an arrangement respecting Tibet. The Russian proposal regarding a tripartite commission, he thought, was fairly tempting though it had to be explained to the Amir. With regard to the proposed partition of Persia, he believed that it would only bring India increased anxiety and heavy burden. He agreed with Crewe that if the British could effect a slight modification of their sphere, get local police trained by British officers for the protection of oil wells and hold the islands at the entrance of the gulf they would have secured a very strong position in the south.⁹⁵

Persia, Tibet and Afghanistan confronted the imperial powers with extraordinarily difficult questions. The matter was rendered complicated because of the strong objection of the Indian administration to a forward policy into which, it was alleged "Russia apparently is doing her best to push us."⁹⁶ But the viceroy was determined to pursue British interests with circumspection. Hardinge was not oblivious of the implications of the general advance of Russia in Asia undertaken "under the guise of friendship and in agreement with us". He regarded that Russian encroachments had created "really a very serious situation".⁹⁷ Although the Anglo-Russian convention upheld Persia as an independent en-

tity on the map it was impossible to blink at the fact that it was another long step towards partition. It was "absolutely bound to come some day", but he insisted that it was "our duty to do our very utmost to postpone it."⁹⁸ Hardinge did not look forward to welcoming that spectacle at all. But what struck him as essential was the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia and a settlement between Russia and Persia in agreement with Britain and not in opposition to her. "Otherwise, I fear we shall be left in the lurch."⁹⁹

In fine, all through the period of the Blue Book there existed a correct and cordial understanding between Russia and Britain. They made successful strides to gauge and appreciate their mutual interests in Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East. Hardinge took special care to impress upon the Russian consul in Calcutta that every effort would be made to retain the confidence of Russia.¹⁰⁰ The Indian government was sincere in its efforts not to excite the jealousy of the Russians. As the Turks and the Germans sent emissaries to Afghanistan with a view to raising a holy war against Great Britain and Russia.¹⁰¹ Hardinge refreshed the Amir's memory about the propriety of observing strict neutrality in face of complete unity of objectives between the Indian and Russian governments. He was anxious to assuage the apprehensions of the Russian government by backing Habibullah up in his resolution to maintain a policy of non-alignment despite the blatant propaganda by the *mullas* in support of Turkey and to restrain the ambitions of the semi-independent governors of his state.¹⁰² This was ensured by stationing on alert a sizeable section of Indian army all along the frontier, by taking firm action against tribal inroads, by a liberal donation to the *sardars* and an increased subsidy to the Amir.¹⁰³ In 1913 in the face of a serious threat of insurrection on the north-west frontier the Russian consul advised an extension of the Indian frontier in order to incorporate the tribal belt within India and desired that such an extension would help to solve the perpetual law and order problem on the fron-

tier. In any case, he thought, such would be the pattern of things to come in the near future.¹⁰¹

Hardinge reciprocated warmly to the Russian goodwill. He allowed the Russian consul to stay in Delhi during the period of war, accorded him semi-diplomatic status in preference to the other trade representatives and made him a direct means of communication between himself and the Russian government.¹⁰⁵ The understanding between the two powers did not confine itself to Afghanistan. There was extensive cooperation between them against the revival of pan-Islamism and Indian nationalist agitation. They took special care to share notes on possible intrigues and conspiracies against the European empires in Asia.¹⁰⁶ Both the governments were conscious of the presence of a spontaneous reactive tension in their respective foreign departments against each other, still surviving as a bitter hang-over of traditional rivalry. The new relationship called for careful nursing. Both London and St. Petersburg dreaded the probability that the treaty might turn out to be still born. There were some anxious moments but there was no dearth of unfeigned concern to ensure that the treaty developed into a viable compact. It was not to become a procrustean bed either. Their endeavours were fruitful and a feeling of cordiality, sympathy and mutual assistance replaced the sense of suspicion, jealousy and hostility which had marked the relationship between the two governments for over a century.

II

RUSSIA WAS still ruled by the Romanov monarchy. "Its Byzantine autocracy, officially adopted by the Muscovite Czars at the beginning of the sixteenth century, subdued the feudal Boyars with the help of the nobility by making the peasantry their slaves, and upon this foundation created the St. Petersburg imperial absolutism."¹⁰⁷ Its nobility never rose to full heights; its clergy was content with its role as the spiritual menial of the autocratic state; its cities were centres of consump-

tion rather than production; its economy subject to the dominance of foreign financial and commercial capital and its bourgeoisie was politically isolated. The self-contradictory position of the Russian state was manifest as it rushed ahead to associate itself with other powers in the World War I waged for world domination; though not competent in industrial and economic potentialities it joined the scramble of advanced capitalist countries for market and empire.¹⁰⁸

Russia was far from being a European state. Moscow and St. Petersburg had an oriental flavour about them. A perceptive observer in the early twentieth century wrote to his friend in London from the shores of Caspian: "Only 11 days and how far London seems! In fact, ever since Moscow I have been in Asia. It is certainly one of the really wonderful cities I have seen in some respect, and... more barbaric even than Peking. Imagine a great struggling city of brown and green roofs covering an area greater than Paris, out of which emerge more than 2000 churches and convents—each church and convent crowned with from 3 to 9 bulbous shaped domes many of them heavily gilt and almost all others painted in vivid green and blue and above each a shining gilt cross—some 60,000 of them at least in all. Just substitute a Crescent for a Cross and you could not but believe yourself in the heart of Asia. And, one has somehow the feeling that the Cross is merely an accident and fails even to disguise a spirit as alien to our own Western civilisation as the Crescent itself. But what does strike one in Russia is the tremendous uniformity of the vast country—a sort of cast-iron uniformity—upon which the whole Russian system is built up. We must have travelled some 2000 miles from the Polish frontier to the Caspian and except in the Caucasus, every village and every town we passed whether in the west, in the centre or in the south, seemed to be cast exactly in the same mould; every man, woman and child had not exactly the same features, but the same expression and, allowing for differences of class and occupations, wore exactly the same clothes."¹⁰⁹ It was

believed that the "great uniformity" was largely artificial. What intrigued the British observer was whether it could last. The large numbers of prison vans carrying men "not of the ordinary criminal type"¹¹⁰ filled Chirol with uncanny feeling. A mysterious process of change was afoot under the apparently placid surface.

Nabokov and Lisovskii, intelligent observers with insight, represented the social milieu of its ruling class, which in the dawn of a modern history had been "too unripe to accomplish a reformation", and when the time came for leading a revolution it was found to be "over ripe".¹¹¹ Representing the interests of the most autocratic government in Europe, they were emotionally aligned with the ultra-conservative segment of the Indian bureaucracy. The rise of the 'Young Turk' nationalism in Turkey, the *majlis* revolution in Persia, the new militancy of the Indian unrest, the matured self-consciousness of Sun Yat Sen's China, the Samurai resurrection of an industrialised Meiji Japan and the pan-Islamic rejuvenescence reflected to their regiment minds the prospect of an uncertain future having rather incomprehensible ramifications. Valentine Chirol captured the spirit of a bewildered westerner in the wake of these disruptive forces:

"How vastly different is the spectacle which the Orient today presents, from the Atlantic shores of Morocco through Africa and right across Asia to far-off coast of the Pacific. All along that far flung lines its people are being roused from a long, lethargic slumber by masterful impact of the Occident itself. They have begun to question and to challenge western supremacy, economic and material. They are resuscitating memories, something quite mythical, of former greatness and legends of long-forgotten nationhood. They are rallying dormant forces of ancient and deep seated civilisation—sometimes more ancient than our own—and still vital. They are refurbishing the armour of military faiths with a religious fervour which the Occident has long outgrown. They are borrowing new weapons, even from the Occident's own arsenal

and invoking against it its vaunted principles of nationalism and self-determination."¹² In India Butler, Mes-ton, Craddock, Sydenham and others accustomed to the autocratic ruling impulses of an irresponsible governing class, had found the problems presented by new India equally perplexing.

British public opinion with insignificant exceptions had, by the turn of the century, fallen for the charms of jingoism; there was a remarkable euphoria as it applauded Kitchener's audacity at Fashoda, followed with gleeful curiosity the concerted European assault on Peking in 1900 and extended warmly its support for the Uitlanders' cause in South Africa.¹³ In the face of rising militancy in the ranks of the Indian National Congress, the growth of the *swadeshi* and boycott strategies, the ascendancy of political terrorism and the anarchist movement the selfrighteous autocracy of the ICS was imparted with a fresh spurt. What had appeared to be a pure clash of personalities and a tug of war between the civil and military authorities under the two masterful personalities of Curzon and Kitchener, gradually developed into a definite conflict between two ways (though not quite incompatible systems) of ruling the empire. The most conspicuous feature in the controversy was that Kitchener received overwhelming publicity both in the press and parliament and struck a sympathetic chord in the hearts of even some circumspect administrators and ministers both in Calcutta and London. He had continued to correspond with Morley and the war office and was toying with a "plot to invade Indian patronage" much to the discomfiture of Minto and Morley alike.¹⁴ He briefed the influential journalists on the content of the Anglo-Russian convention, felt uncomfortable at the sight of a rapprochement between the traditional adversaries in the East and confuted its exigency through the columns of respectable journals. Kitchener, however, was more than an arch conspirator given to backstair intrigues. He represented the racial arrogance of the ruling community, its utter contempt for liberal democracy at

home, its opposition to all forms of Indian dissent, its annoyance with the prospect of any cordial social relations between the rulers and the ruled, its determination to hold India under military boots, its attempts to frustrate any attempt to offer concession to the limited aspirations of men like Gokhale and others and its general belief in the inefficacy of Hardinge's policy towards the Indians which appeared to it as a series of betrayals of the British cause. Kitchener had a wide audience: racial arrogance and supreme authoritarianism were held on leash by the British power elite, both in Indian and Britain, to bark at and, if necessary, bite the growing forces of Indian nationalism and its hesitant allies in Britain. They were indignant at the increasing extension of democratic aspirations in Britain.¹¹⁵ Even Minto and Hardinge doubted the validity and relevance of ruling India through the British parliament.¹¹⁶ Minto had been compelled to appreciate, despite initial reservations, the pluck, grit and fortitude of military men, and Kitchener found for himself a forceful military lobby to recommend that he succeeded Minto.¹¹⁷ It was not a played-out force and Morley found it difficult to overcome that pressure blessed as it was by the emperor of India.

Self-government, majority rule and legal and political equality between the ruler and the ruled had become somewhat teasing legacies of nineteenth century liberalism especially when the British statesmen were called upon to apply them beyond the confines of western societies. "One thing is certain", Morley recalled an axiom of British political processes, "that I should be guilty of folly if I were to feel bound to apply the catchwords of our European liberalism as principles fit for an Asiatic congeries like India."¹¹⁸ He and his generation were largely influenced by Charles Dilke whose *Greater Britain* had integrated British nationalism with radical sentiments and ideas of racial inequality along with Darwin and Spencer's biological principles of natural selection. India, according to Morley, was a geographical expression, inhabited by various ethnic stocks and held together by British impe-

rial hegemony. "For a score of centuries", he expatiated, "the Hindoos have bribed and taken bribes, and corruption has eaten into their national character so deeply that those who are the best judges declare that it can never be washed out."¹¹ Morley, Minto, Hardinge, Montagu and a handful of British officials, who contributed more than anybody else to the development of British attitudes towards India during the early decades of the twentieth century, believed in the importance of the empire as a necessity "at certain stages of civilisation and the world's progress".¹²⁰ Gladstone had grafted onto this strain of British liberalism an element of a Christian sense of superiority. Thus, while exercise of despotism over the Christian and "civilised" people of Cyprus ought to be resisted, such a form of government could safely be recommended to the people of India, Egypt and Singapore. Christianity and progress, according to the imperial ideologues of the early twentieth century, were inter-dependent as "a universal law, for all times, all states and all societies".¹²¹ They did not approve of transplanting British institutions across St. George's Channel. They detested and summarily rejected the futility of the attempts of the British do-gooders to quench the insatiable thirst of the "constitution mongers" in India. Of course, the rulers would condescend to throw some crumbs from their hallowed constitutional table to the hungry Indian nationalists, especially if such gestures could be helpful in manipulating the loyal opposition of Gokhale in his encounters with the uncompromising militancy championed by Tilak.¹²² British interests were identified with the welfare of the people of India and the well-being and interests of the inarticulate masses of India were to be defined collated, sifted and assessed by the British administrators then becoming increasingly intolerant of the "crisp English accent" of the *Congresswallahs*. Their prescription for Indian unrest was neat and limpid: limited freedom, certain franchises and certain privileges; but no attempt to graft British liberal institutions onto Indian society, which was to be given a constitutional framework

that would churn morbid ancient memories and aggravate inherent traditional hostilities.

It is small wonder that Nabokov and Lisovskii seemed fairly involved with the European mission in Asia. They were seriously concerned about the future of the European empires. The emergence of Japan had adversely affected the supremacy of the white race. "That supremacy", Chirol exclaimed, "when I was young, was as axiomatic as any axiom in England. From the dawn of history, so far as we are concerned with history, the white race had been supreme... The history of civilisation such as we understand it, had been made by the white race only, and the white race having universally accepted Christian forms and beliefs... accepted axiomatically that civilisation, in the evolution of which Christianity had played a very great part, could be appanage only of Christian peoples... In Japan—for the first time, the yellow race—a non-Christian race claimed a share of our western civilisation and the right to be treated on equal terms with the white nations and the Christian nations without changing their colour of skin or surrendering their own religious beliefs and traditions."¹²³ Japan had shaken the faith of imperialism in its sense of invincibility. Its confidence quivered at the sight of a resurgent Asia. Its publicists shuddered at the thought of the liquidation of the empire. Its administrators wobbled on their unsteady legs. India was Britain's chief imperial concern; it was the principal hinge on which the whole imperial system turned. It was its halting place, the springing board and the primary operation theatre. Curzon must have shared the feelings of Lancashire, Whitehall, the Fabians, the pro-consuls, the 'pioneers', 'guardians' and 'politicals' alike when he said:

"If you were to save your colony of Natal from being overrun by a formidable enemy, if you want to rescue the white man's legations from massacre at Peking, and the need is urgent, you request the Government of India to despatch an expedition, and they despatch it, if you are

fighting the Mad Mulla in Somaliland, you soon discover that Indian troops and an Indian General are best qualified for the task, and you ask the Government of India to send them; if you desire to defend any of your extreme outposts or coaling stations of the Empire, Aden, Mauritius, Singapore, Hong Kong, even Tien-tsing or Shanghai-kwan, it is to the Indian army that you turn; if you want to build a railway to Uganda or in the Soudan, you apply for Indian labour. When the late Mr. Rhodes was engaged in developing your present acquisition of Rhodesia, he came to me for assistance. It is with Indian coolie labour that you exploit the plantations equally of Demerara and Natal; with Indian trained officers that you irrigate Egypt and dam the Nile; with Indian forest officers that you tap the resources of Central Africa and Siam, with Indian surveyors that you explore all the hidden places of the world."¹²⁴ The loyalty of that India could not be permitted to be sapped. The British empire in India was essentially based on force and, if necessary, it had to be sustained by force.

The Russian consuls valued the dynamics of the system. They were inclined to view Hardinge's policy 'as going too far' in conciliating Indian interests.¹²⁵ They sympathised with the widespread feeling held in the Indian administration that the efforts of the London government to command the policies of the viceroy of India would certainly lead to a catastrophe and a gradual extinction of the Indian empire. Nabokov dreaded, as did Butler, Meston, Craddock and Sydenham, the disquieting prospects of the 'Young Turks' of the League driving the Muslims to a position of confrontation with the Raj in concord with the dominant voice of 'Hindu' nationalism. He seemed to imply that the old guards of the League ought to be coaxed, cajoled and even wheedled to assert themselves against the self-destructive politics of the young Turks. Even the presence of Indian members in the legislative council, politically and numerically still very innocuous, was viewed with utter contempt.¹²⁶ The viceroy's "deep and burning" sympathy for the Indian cause in South Africa, he

was apprehensive, might paralyse the ruling impulses of the conquerors. The close collaboration between Hardinge and Gokhale was followed with uneasy suspicion.¹²⁷ The viceroy's policy of conceding to the demands of the somewhat obstinate Muslim and Hindu opinion, his friendly overtures to the Indian intelligentsia, his favourable response to the demands for the Indianisation of administration and extension of education to the Indians evoked mixed feelings.¹²⁸ As Hardinge continued to temporise with public opinion, Nabokov complained that 'the pat in the back policy' had gone too far, that the viceroy's attempt to placate native opinion and to gilt his administration with cheap popularity would erode the mystique of the ruling classes and his sympathy for Indian education would encourage an increasingly restless class demanding better positions and greater participation in the administration. Nabokov was to assert that the bulk of the administrators in India were united in their opposition to Hardinge's perspective and the Russian consul was inclined to agree with that majority. Yet there was some confusion in his reaction: he was at once both indignant at and appreciative of Hardinge's moves. His diehard autocratic impulses found a sympathetic affiliation with conservative officialdom in India: his long-term perspicacity approved of Hardinge's statesmanship. Curzon and Kitchener between them represented the position of ideologues of imperialism. Hardinge was to administer it in an age of despair. Imperialism was to adjust itself to the agitations and demands of Kipling's lesser breeds. It had to maintain itself.

III

IT WAS a period in which British imperialism made renewed offensives against the Indian economy. The inflow of British capital swelled phenomenally; new areas of plantation, industry and banking were brought under its control; it demanded favourable considerations from the government for its necessary expansion and prompted London financiers to invest in India. Curzon had encouraged them. The interest which they represented, he

had assured them, were "commensurate with the whole field of economic development upon which the future prosperity of the country largely depends."¹²⁹ The state machinery was periodically geared to meet their requirements. An expensive colonial administration and army, the system of direct transfer to Britain, the 'home charges' and an intricate system of economic contrivances for pumping profit out of India convey only a fraction of what India was called upon to pay for the maintenance of the empire.

Free trade, absence of protection, the linking of the rupee with the pound sterling, the consolidation of the economic power of the landlords and moneylenders, the emergency of a new landlord class, periodical famines and epidemics together with continuous rising prices and shrinking opportunities were some of the parameters of that economy. The tax system was regressive. Land revenue contributed one third of the total revenue, customs and central excise about one seventh, while income tax provided two to three per cent. Despite increasing demand for education and other social services and great concern exhibited by successive viceroys only a nominal amount was spent on it.¹³⁰ In April 1912 Sydenham made the position of the government quite clear on the subject in the face of nationalist clamour for compulsory free primary education. 'I trust', he wrote referring to Hardinge's proposal for enhancing the grant for it, "the increase will not be too rapid otherwise there will be immense waste."¹³¹

The railway programme was becoming increasingly extensive primarily under the influence of the British mercantile community both in Britain and India. In accordance with the recommendations of Thomas Robertson and, then, of James Mackay expenditure on railway construction got a further stimulus. Significantly enough, only a small part of this allocation was spent in India and even that amount was largely consumed by European-controlled firms. Outlay on irrigation, which might have resulted in a net increase in revenue, continued to remain

minimal and, even after the publication of the report of the irrigation commission, public investment in 1913-14 was Rs. 48.4 million in sharp contrast to Rs. 230.6 million on railways.¹³² Despite the Mackay committee's report in 1908 prescribing £ 9 million as the safe borrowing limit for the government of India in the London market the annual average loan raised was much smaller. Hardinge, inspite of being faced with the demands for imperial defence, was debarred from resorting to it.¹³³ The pattern of trade was equally interesting. There was no import duty of any significance that protected the Indian industry. India was the principal market for the cotton piece goods of Lancashire. She, however, continued to retain a substantial export surplus with continental Europe and the United States. Free trade served Lancashire but "it secured the interests of the imperial system as well".¹³⁴ It is the second feature which may explain partially the opposition of the home government to the demands of fiscal autonomy in India.¹³⁵

There was no coordinated industrial policy and the attempt of the Madras government to initiate experiments in various industrial enterprises had met with the uncompromising hostility of Morley. Hardinge realised that technical education could only be relevant if it was related to the policy of industrial development. He even talked about the experience of Japan where pioneer factories, managed by foreign experts and controlled wholly or partially by the government, had preceded by some years the state policy of promoting scientific and technical education.¹³⁶ It was evident that without state guidance, direction and encouragement there was no prospect of Indian capital making fruitful investments in industry.

It is obvious that the attitude of Hardinge towards industrialisation was superficial, and largely a political pretence. The correspondence between Clark, a member of the viceroy's council, and Hardinge amply illustrates this point. The war having stimulated Indian aspirations in many directions, including the economic sphere, Clark

thought that it might be of excellent effect if the government was to appoint a commission to suggest whether, under the existing circumstances, new openings for the investment of Indian capital could be indicated; and if so, in what manner the government could direct and encourage industrial development without modifying the existing fiscal policy.¹³⁷ Hardinge was not favourable to the suggestion. Time, he said, was not suitable for an enquiry on the future of Indian industrial endeavours as the war was liable to continue for long with trade disorganised, the commercial world in a state of panic and doubt, and finance subjected to serious disturbance. But the main argument was that India was an essentially agricultural and not an industrial country and he had serious doubts whether she could ever become the seat of large and important industries. Besides, state aided industries were practically the same as protected industries which, according to the British political economy for India, was a forbidden ground.¹³⁸ Clark was compelled to retreat and was obliged to agree with Hardinge. He was aware that India would never become an industrial country in the sense that the United Kingdom or Germany were. Besides, he doubted whether it would be "to her best interest that she could do so". But all the same, he thought, with state patronage she, as a great producer of raw material, might as well develop a higher degree of mechanisation and specialisation primarily in the field of small scale industry with a view to raising the standards of living and reducing dependence on agriculture and monsoon.¹³⁹ Clark was promptly snubbed. In short, it was a classic case of a colonial economy. All forms of her economic life were subordinated to the interests of Great Britain and the empire.

The government of India would not hesitate, if it was found necessary, to intervene in the economic activities of the Indian people. Necessarily, that intervention was conditioned more by political rather than purely economic considerations. In his advocacy of the removal of the excise duty on cotton, Hardinge was primarily politically

motivated. He had made it quite pellucid to the secretary of state that he together with Fleetwood Wilson and Clark constituted a strong free trade party in the council and that they could always carry the day.¹⁴⁰ But he was piqued by the ever growing and pronounced protectionist tendencies in the country linked to Indian nationalism. Against the background of this trend questions of duties and excise had become delicate issues demanding tender and discreet handling. Otherwise, Hardinge admonished, "we may give an opening to an agitation against us in which we might find all parties united as was not the case in any other question."¹⁴¹

Morley, a confirmed free trader, appraised the value of all that Hardinge had to say about the difficulties of upholding free trade principles in India. He was also confident that it was inevitable for a combination of forces to emerge in India against a free trade policy.¹⁴² Richie, the under secretary of the India office, made no bones about the patent political content of the controversy. He argued that the problem was not necessarily peculiar to a free-trade government. On the contrary, it was characteristic of any colonial economy. He detected that "protective India" had been worked up on the theme for political reasons in the sense that the demands for protection were not pressed upon exclusively on economic grounds. The problem of enforcing free trade in India seemed to Richie, himself a free trader, "a matter of political expediency comparable to a policy of enforcing monogamy".¹⁴³ The intensity of public involvement in the issue was adequately gauged by Richie who concluded that the abolition of the cotton excise would never be permitted as long as Lancashire lasted.¹⁴⁴

The controversy between Bonar Law and Crewe over the application of unbridled free trade in India is an indicator of British attitudes. Reviewing the economic standing of British India, Bonar Law held that British position in India was not based on a consistent set of principles. He argued that the government had been main-

taining that since Britain was a free trade country the Indians ought to levy an excise duty, which they did not want, so that there would not be any "hardship against Manchester goods".¹⁴⁵ He contested the merit of the policy. He was pragmatic and would have liked his government to adopt a more outspoken posture. It should demand candidly, he advised, that it had claims on India because it had rendered her immense services. Therefore, it ought to maintain without any touch of hypocrisy that it was entitled to fair play in the Indian market. If the Indians wanted to levy tariff, he insisted, they might do so against the rest of the world but they must remain a free trade country to Great Britain which, in turn, would reciprocate a similar attitude towards India.¹⁴⁶

Crewe realised that such a policy would be resented and would cause an unprecedented strain on Indian loyalty to the empire. He pointed out that the protectionist demand in India was a claim against the mother country for she was by far the greatest competitor of Indian manufactures. Although the British stand could not be dictated by the demands of the protectionists it should look, Crewe bragged, "logical, consistent and disinterested".¹⁴⁷ He would, therefore, take the stance neither of a romantic ideologue, nor of a practical imperialist and certainly not that of a consummate free trader. "We can point out that we reject the fiscal expedient of protection for our own people at home", Crewe wrote, "because we disbelieve in it and regard it as inexpedient and unjust everywhere."¹⁴⁸ How else, he quipped, would it "be found politically possible to maintain the Government of India's official opposition to the introduction in India of a tariff comparable to the tariff in self-governing dominions"? Bonar Law's scheme, if implemented, he predicted, would lead to the formation of an imperial *zollverein* and India would be asked to take a position in it which, compared to some other dominions having control over their own purse, would appear to her to be both insignificant and servile. Crewe added that if the proposal for free trade, as suggested by Bonar Law, was asso-

ciated with claims on India's gratitude for past services it would tantamount to a political indiscretion of severe magnitude. "Anyone who knows the spirit of modern industrial India will assure Bonar Law of that,"¹⁴⁹

The distinctive features of the Indian tariff system, according to Crewe, were its low scale and moderation of the rates of general import duties; the absence of any discrimination between British and foreign goods, thus making the import tariff imposed for revenue purposes only; the excise duty being equal in amount to the import duty on cotton piece goods when there existed extensive competition between British imports and the produce of Indian mills; and the fact that machinery was admitted largely duty free. These features, Crewe asserted, would not be found in any protective tariff, and were in entire accord with free trade principles. "Incidentally", he underlined though somewhat cursorily, the system was "very valuable to British manufactures."¹⁵⁰ Defending the existing fiscal pattern, Crewe maintained that the British producers supplied the great bulk of imports to India. It was estimated that of the whole import trade nearly two thirds represented products of British origins. Besides, "if we confine attention to those branches of import in which the British manufacturers compete with the foreign manufacturers, the supremacy of the former is found to be overwhelming."¹⁵¹ On the basis of this predominance of British imports, Crewe argued that the Indian revenue would lose heavily if British imports were exempted from duty while foreign goods were still taxed. Bonar Law's scheme, Crewe was eager to establish, would be injurious to the Indian revenues and Indian sentiments and would offer no counterbalancing advantages to Indian entrepreneurs in Great Britain.

The official discussion over the fiscal relationship between India and Great Britain confined itself to these lines. Significantly enough, the positions held by both the groups were located within one strategic consensus: the retention by Britain of the commanding height of Indian

economy. In the face of the growing protectionist demands in India, the government of India time and again grumbled and sought concessions for the Indian entrepreneurs especially in the field of cotton manufactures. But it was obliged to honour the conclusion of Curzon's famous despatch that the government of India had very little to gain in return for fiscal concessions on its part and that it had "a great deal to lose or risk".¹⁵² In short, the problems of India's industrial development and the demand for state patronage met with casual indifference on the part of the government. Its response was, at best, one of tactical *pis aller*.

No attempt was made to bring about an economic integration of the country. In particular, there was no central bank. In the absence of industrial banking in India the commercial banks were allowed to engage in short-term lending which, owing to the extreme variations in the short-term lending rates of the Presidency banks, marginally affected the long-term investment in industry. Besides, the Presidency banks extended their exclusive attention to the well established European houses. The failure of a number of Indian banks such as the People's Bank, the Indian Specie Bank and the Credit Bank of India during the banking crisis of 1913-15 could primarily be attributed to the absence of a banker's bank. Neither the leading banks nor the government stepped forward to provide these with the necessary accommodation or to guide them in their normal business. In short, there was no official direction or even sympathy for such native ventures. In particular, in the Punjab, the crisis hampered trade seriously and a large portion of the urban middle class was hard hit.¹⁵³ It was intelligible to all that the crisis gave a setback to the growing Indian desire to "invest rather than hoard"; yet the government was not prepared to be exhorted. It was preoccupied during the crisis in its attempt to exonerate itself from all chivvying responsibilities. Its attitudes remained cynical and detached. Its assessment of the managerial abilities of Indian financiers and bankers continued to betray a callous arro-

gance.¹⁵⁴ The "brightest gem of British Empire", as Curzon had termed India, had been consecrated by Mayo as "our national character". In a moment of despondency Hardinge betrayed an uncomfortable truth: India was Britain's milch-cow. A serious apprehension was creeping into the official mind. Industrialists, financiers, merchants and politicians alike were discomposed and often anguished by the intriguing question: would Great Britain retain its economic empire? Indeed, the *Raj* was still flamboyant and extrovert: it was making bold adaptations in its imperial policy in response to Indian situations developing fast on inconvenient lines. But the uncertainties inherent in the situation were reflected in Chirol's gloomy forebodings.

"I have been looking into some of the statistics of our cotton exporters and I had not realised to what an extent they are dependent upon the Asiatic markets. It is perfectly appalling—at least for any one who believes, as I do, that within a relatively short time all these markets will slip away from us. We know what Japan has already done. What China is preparing to do and what India would do tomorrow if she were allowed to. The real strain upon the relations between East and West will come, I am convinced, from economic competition—and the West is bound to be beaten in the long run. I ought to have laid more stress on that in my 'Indian Unrest'—but the worst of this wretched Tariff Reform Vs. Free Trade controversy at home is that one cannot talk about economic questions without being suspected of wanting to make capital for one or other of such causes."¹⁵⁵ It was a sombre caveat nailed on the walls of the Whitehall

IV

THE STRUCTURE of the Indian government under the India Act of 1909 contained all the essentials of an authoritarian colonial administration. It was an autocracy of a viceroy who governed directly over three fifths of India's territories and two third of her population, and indirectly, through political agents over the remaining two fifth of her territories under native states with one third

of India's population. The viceroy at the centre and the governors of the larger provinces were assisted by legislative councils. These were merely consultative bodies whose deliberations had no binding authority on the executives. The nominated members, both British and Indian, formed the majority while the minority was elected by restricted franchise. The electorate was obliged to vote according to their religious professions through a system of general and reserved constituencies. Finally, there was the veto of the executive exercised periodically to insure consistency and uniformity in policy-making and also in the legislative processes. With limited franchise, circumscribed authority and the official (i.e., nominated) members orchestrating the debates there was an artificial air about the proceedings of the legislative council of the viceroy. It was a platform of little consequence and the deliberations were marked by a frantic effort on the part of some members to appeal to the galleries and native press. Emphasis on fluent oration was the normal attraction and it excited even more amusement than the comically officious countenance of the nominated members in their formal morning-coats.

The remarkable innovation of the Act of 1909 was the introduction of reserved constituencies for the Muslims in keeping with the "political importance" of that community. It was an accepted creed of the officials that no scheme of reforms could thrive in India if it failed to secure the approval or at least the willing acquiescence of the Muslims. The objections raised by that community, it was admitted, were belated. But they were weighty enough not to be rejected outright. With regard to the machinery of election, Morley observed that their expostulations scanned the problem extensively and raised a wider issue, namely whether even if the electoral machinery proved to be thoroughly satisfactory, the representation of the Muslims as a whole might still prove to be inadequate.¹⁵⁰ An electorate based on numerical considerations, it was held forth, did not really correspond to the realities. It was insisted that if all non-Muslims were

counted as Hindus for the purpose of election it would ignore an essential facet of Indian life that there were millions whom the high-caste Hindus would refuse to touch and to whom "it would therefore be essentially unfair to have represented by highcaste Hindus."¹⁵⁷ There was a wider gulf, it was officially alleged, between the high-caste and low caste Hindus than between the former and the Muslims. To give the Hindus the benefit of an enormous preponderance was therefore to offer them, they seemed to maintain, an unfair advantage over the Muslims. The government was sensitive to the force of the arguments of the Muslim community. The administrators prattled them approvingly on all possible occasions. Minto, Morley, Dunlop Smith, Butler, Hardinge, Sydenham, Montagu, Crewe and Chirol certified the probity of the demands of the minority community, endorsed the official assessment and sanctioned the policy worked out in the reforms of 1909. To some the revamped political formula presented a paradoxical situation and caused a spooky feeling. Chirol wrote: "We cannot possibly base an electoral system on the caste system of India, since one of our chief objects has been to break down the caste barriers. It would be almost equally difficult to find suitable representatives for the low caste Hindus amongst their own ranks."¹⁵⁸ The practical solution which appealed to both Morley and Chirol appeared to be "to reduce Hindu representation in proportion to the numbers which had hitherto been wrongly classified as Hindus and to give the latter nominated representation who would, for the most part, probably be officials."¹⁵⁹ It might lead, it was perfunctorily conceded, to a marginal adjustment of Muslim representation.

The government, however, felt foxed by the alacrity with which the Congress welcomed the reform proposals. The spontaneous positive response of the Congress began to tell on its nervous anxiety. "The leopard does not change his spots in a day", Chirol sneered, "and if the reform schemes have been so cordially endorsed by the Hindus, it may very well be that they see in them just the very

advantages for their own community which alarms the Mohamedans.”¹⁶⁰ The dangers which would “attend any delegation of the powers hitherto reserved for Englishmen in India should it prove to ensure solely to the benefit of one section of the population”, he pontificated, “are obvious—especially when we remember that for the maintenance of our rule and the preservation of internal and external peace in India, we relied mainly upon that community which would, it is argued, find itself placed in a position of inferiority.”¹⁶¹ He reminded that the viceroy had engaged himself two years earlier, “against the very thing which the Mohamedans now declare the reform schemes to be doing”, and such a pledge could not be allowed to go unredeemed.¹⁶² It was also apprehended that the extended power of criticism and possibly of obstruction given to the non-official Indians would render government more difficult than in the past. Chirol stressed the immediate requirement of the services of men of ‘picked ability’ and ‘backbone’ who ought to be requisitioned for the Indian civil services. “If opportunities are to be given to the natives of fully ventilating their real or legitimate grievances in India”, Chirol pleaded, “the Secretary of State ought to set his face absolutely against the system of heckling them in the British Parliament, which has grown up during last few years. . . Continuous collusions between Cottons and Robertsons over here and the *Babus* in India would be simply fatal.”¹⁶³ It was cautioned that the grit of British administrators would certainly be put to a severe test and the India office and government of India would have to stand up for their own men in India with more steadfastness than had frequently been the case in the past.

Hardinge, however, found much to his surprise that the legislature was “very easy to manage, very courteous and very well behaved”.¹⁶⁴ The members of the viceroy’s executive council established cordial relations with some of the important members of the assembly. Persuasion, concession on minor points, constant contact and social intercourse, firmness on essentials and readiness to take

them into confidence were the methods applied to win them over. The non-official members were encouraged to talk "as much as they liked".¹⁶⁵ Even resolutions, not acceptable to the government, were allowed to be introduced in the assembly which was sought to be transformed into a platform to air grievances. The general idea, which was being developed and fostered, was to convince them that they were being listened to.¹⁶⁶ Hardinge hoped that his legislative council was being decorated with some democratic and popular frills. The council would soon, he anticipated, replace the Congress as a public platform, excel it in social importance and sabotage its political legitimacy. Assessing the role of his council, he whispered: "It is a great safety-valve for them to be able to air their views in order that they may be reproduced in the local press of their various provinces."¹⁶⁷ He pshawed at the democratic aspiration of the Congress and continued to deflate the growing idea that the assembly might develop into a parliament. He did not make himself "cheap" during the sessions by continued presence and frequent participation. During the first session of the assembly he spoke only once during the Seditious Meetings Act when intervention became necessary.¹⁶⁸ The viceregal dignity was singularly maintained in all its studied insularity.

The Seditious Meetings Act was a test case of Hardinge's deft handling of his assembly. In view of the probability of an emeute in the country, the re-enactment of the Seditious Meetings Act had become indispensable. The local governments were almost unanimous about the necessity of the bill.¹⁶⁹ There was a firm opinion, however, in favour of strengthening the Police Act as a feasible compromise. Indeed, Hardinge was confronted with three alternative courses.¹⁷⁰ He was convinced that the re-enactment of the bill in its existing form would have produced a "flood of bitterness and resentment". To drop the bill once and for all would be to act against the seasoned opinion of the provincial governments. Thus, he was inclined to introduce an amended bill, the existing Act being

too harsh, for which he made every effort to ensure the support of the Indian members of the assembly. "What I should like to be empowered to do", Hardinge confided to the secretary of state, "would be, in winding up the debate on the bill when it comes before the Council, to announce that the Government of India are ready to meet the Council half way and to place their confidence in the Indian people by withdrawing the application of the Act from the whole of India so long as calm prevails and no seditious meetings are held." Thus the government would be authorised, Hardinge felt, to impose the Act, if necessary, on selected districts. He had consulted Gokhale and Sinha on the matter. Both of them had pledged their support to him.¹⁷¹ There was, nevertheless, a determined opposition against it, and it was decided that the members would be invited to offer amendments, pre-arranged in consultation with the government, which would be incorporated as concessions. "The Indians", Hardinge defended his tactical line, "are a very impressionable race, and I believe that putting them on their trust and taking them into one's confidence would have a very good effect and declaration in this sense would largely remove the general hostility that is now felt, on sentimental grounds, to the Seditious Meetings Act at present in force."¹⁷²

V

THE PERIODICAL *durbars*, where the viceroy surrounded himself with the regalia and pageantry of a feudal past, attended by native chiefs of various ranks and honours, were designed to quicken the heart of a conservative India. The world of the native states provided the spectacle of a frozen medievalism with all its macabre distortions. These principalities varied in their sizes and dimensions and in their wealth and poverty. Apart from very loose supervision by the British agents, largely limited to political control and scrutinising the minimum standards of law and order and public utilities, they were uniformly authoritarian. The proclamation of Victoria had assured them of their integrity in normal circumstances.

and over the years British paramountacy over them was upheld and enforced. Lytton's idea of a privy council of princes had not materialised, but the Indian States had been integrated into the *Raj* as the bulwark of its strength and stability. Some of the rulers were truculent and Baroda gave Hardinge much trouble.¹⁷³ Many showed interest in upgrading the standards of their administration. Bikaner, Mysore, Hyderabad and Patiala excelled others in offering what was considered a humane piece of paternal concern for their people.¹⁷⁴

Curzon had irritated many of them by his constant pedagogy about their responsibilities and obligations. In the Delhi *darbar* of 1903 they had been watched closely and were made to realise their inferior position in relation to the imperial pro-council in India. It was Curzon's *darbar*, and the princes' camps were kept unhonoured by the much coveted royal visits. Minto had retained a sullen distance from them.¹⁷⁵ Hardinge endeared himself to them with warm-heartedness. Bikaner, in particular, could claim his special affection. The viceregal visits to their courts resplendent with feudal gallantry, surrounded by the glittering costumes of the notables and the hectic schedule of elephant march-past, duck-shooting and big-game hunting, enthralled the chiefs.¹⁷⁶ Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kashmir and Mysore became the financiers of the Hindu university movement,¹⁷⁷ while the Nizam was encouraged to provide an alternative Muslim centre to Aligarh.

Trying to rouse their spirits in support of the Emperor on the occasion of the *darbar*, Hardinge conceived the idea of offering the King's commissions to the sons of the native chiefs. "I do not in the least doubt", Hardinge declared, "the loyalty of the Ruling Chiefs as a whole. As a class they are eternally loyal, their interests being extremely bound up with the British *Raj* and there is every reason for their continuing so, as long as we show ourselves strong. When we show ourselves weak, God help us: For every oriental looks towards the rising sun!"¹⁷⁸

The viceroy asserted that the confidence and loyalty of the princes signified the stability of the empire and no one should ever misunderstand or misuse it in the country. It was the failures of the British government in not fulfilling its promise, he claimed, which was regarded by some as a sign of weakness and of mistrust. The experiment of appointing Indians in the civil service and judiciary had more than justified itself. "Are we to advance the theory", Hardinge squibbed, "that the sons of Ruling Chiefs and young nobles are less worthy of our trust and confidence than the native civilians and pleaders?"¹⁷⁹ He decided not to present a disagreeable official countenance. On the contrary, he hoped to encourage a generous spirit to govern his treatment of the chiefs. He was satisfied with the expediency of a friendly and favourable overture to the princes. Such a shift in British policy would have cemented their loyalty.¹⁸⁰ However, despite Hardinge's sincere recommendations, the royal commissions could not be conceded to the Indians. Even so, the Indian royalty responded warmly to the viceroy's impeccable deportment. The Delhi *darbar* of 1911 set a different convention as the viceroy accepted invitations for shooting from native princes. New Delhi offered open space for the palaces of the native feudatories on the periphery of the government buildings giving them a definite place in the imperial scheme of things. A more durable contact between the metropolis of the *Raj*, Hardinge remarked, and the native states could now be maintained.¹⁸¹ The ruler of Mysore was accorded with a much sought-for reward with a higher status.¹⁸² As the World War I loomed on the Indian horizon the states rose spontaneously to the occasion. Guns, rifles, carriages, cavalry, regiments of troops, and even bodyguards, together with financial assistance from the chiefs, lay at the doorstep of the viceroy.¹⁸³ Princes volunteered their personal services in the front. Feudal India overwhelmed imperial India. In an atmosphere of loyalty and confidence, of sacrifices and rewards, a new relationship was being mooted. Ideas had begun to take shape and concrete suggestions were now

made to inspire the chiefs to aspire for a more rational position in the imperial system.

Accordingly, Gwalior convened a conference of the high chiefs in Delhi in March 1913 as the first of the meetings to be held periodically in order to "consolidate the bond between the states and the government" and to strengthen the unity of the empire.¹⁸⁴ The conference recalled the suggestions of the secretary of state of 1908 for an organisation of the ruling chiefs which had received scant attention from Minto. It reiterated that in view of reforms, the rise of "democracy" and the middle class, which was "intolerant of and unsympathetic to the chiefs", the states as "the pillar of the Throne" could not be underestimated. The conference underlined the utility of the Indian aristocracy, which had been respected and revered by the common people. In face of the ascendancy of "new demagogues" the princes felt unnerved as they were exposed to the danger of "being left behind" and "shut out altogether". "We do not wish to become mere puppets", they declared. They were petrified by the prospect of sharing the fate of some of the European counterparts.¹⁸⁵ They claimed their say in the affairs of India. They were critical about the existing practice of dealing with matters regarding native states in the legislative councils without reference to them. They were pricked by the incongruous position in which they were placed: although they commanded one third of the territories of India they were not proportionately represented in the councils. They were sceptical about the credibility of the middle class professionals as a viable political force. The rulers, they reproved mildly, could not sit with the new class because in such a contingency they would be swamped altogether by democracy, and with them would fade away "the true Indian self-government", the product of thousands of years of evolution on indigenous lines.¹⁸⁶ The conference upheld the rights of the chiefs to be heard in imperial matters and it maintained that they ought to be given an opportunity for consultation and discussion. It realised that a sudden announcement of a council of prin-

ces might be impolitic. But it urged that an inception on right lines might be initiated by the creation of a secretariat on a permanent basis at the conference of chiefs' colleges. The secretary might be called periodically for consultation and reference might be made to the chiefs on any matter in the imperial legislative council which concerned them.¹⁸⁷ Although the memorandum of the conference might have contained from the official point of view "a good deal of rubbish",¹⁸⁸ the pith and marrow of the whole paper appealed to the viceroy.¹⁸⁹ The idea was to hold an informal conference among themselves on questions affecting them and their interests. In the following March the chiefs' conference met in Delhi. Hardinge was elated. "It was a great success."¹⁹⁰ He calculated that the procedure of consulting the chiefs on matters affecting their own states could be advantageous and prudent. The princes felt honoured as it was interpreted by them as a recognition of their cooperation in the good government of India. A new personality of the states as a part of a future federation of the Indian empire was being born: the idea of the Chamber of Princes was being forged along with it. As early as 1903 Chirol had recognised, as he travelled through the "gem of Rajputana" appreciating its "white marble palaces floating on azure lakes under stately banian trees and feathery palms," the firm loyalty of some of those conservative chiefs to the British Raj. That loyalty, Chirol commented confidently, "is a singular thing".¹⁹¹ It was secure, safe and stable. Nevertheless, there was another India that Hardinge had to encounter. It was substantially different from the one that he nursed in that romantic "old world bits of India".

VI

THE INDIA of Gokhale and the moderates stood not very confidently on the fringes of an India disturbed by the so-called extremists, the anarchists, the *Ghadar* revolutionaries and the 'Young Turks' of the League. Indian unrest in the twentieth century was more uncomp-

romising than in the nineteenth. *Swaraj* and *pan-Islamism* were fiercely pitted against imperialism. The lower middle class was being gradually drawn into the arena of national politics. They read the *Jugantar*, *Karmajogin*, *Kesari* and *Comrade*. Aurobindo, Pal, Tilak, Kharparde and the Ali brothers provided them with a course of action and an ideology which constituted—despite official crackdown—an undercurrent of militant nationalism. The League and the Congress were veering round to ascertain the necessity of a united front. Middle class politicians took to trade unionism and organised strikes began to paralyse sections of the Indian railways, the textile and jute industries. War raised prices. Japanese competition disturbed Lancashire and Ahmedabad alike. It was still a limited politics. The uncertainties and tensions in the life of the middle class were reflected in the restricted programme and circumscribed horizon of the national movement. In the ultimate analysis the programme of both the moderates and the extremists betrayed a remarkable myopia reflecting their striking class positions.

Income from land provided the means for their western education which was the source of their social status and eminence. Even in the late nineteenth century opportunities for employment were shrinking. Despite the proclamation in favour of equality among subjects, British policy was committed to a programme of scanty rewards and restricted promotions for the Indians. The consequent unrest grew out of a deeply felt sense of injustice. The concern of the early nationalists about the poverty of India was strong. Yet the *Bhadraloks*, the *Chitpawan Brahmins* and the *Arya Samajists* alike continued to view British rule as a progressive phase in Indian history.¹⁹² British liberalism had left, through its educational programmes in India, an abiding impression on the minds of the nationalist leaders. They, as a result, failed to explain the diachotomy between this essentially liberal impulse and the overwhelmingly authoritarian regime in India. Although they were not reconciled to the situation, they had opted for peti-

tions rather than agitations to redress their grievances.¹⁹³ Dadabhai saw in the drainage of Indian wealth the cause of Indian poverty and lamented the 'un-British British' rule of India.¹⁹⁴ Surendranath Banerjee exerted himself selflessly in order to get the age qualifications of Indian candidates in the civil service examination relaxed.¹⁹⁵ There were, however, some new stirrings and the national consciousness was being gradually transformed in a qualitative way. Romesh Dutt had offered a programme of a nascent Indian industrial class; state patronage and protection were his themes. There were a few industries but there was a fairly organised demand for their official encouragement.¹⁹⁶ The Russo-Japanese war was an external impetus while the partition of Bengal was the necessary catalyst. In the wake of this renewed excitement, two groups emerged in Indian political life: the moderates, led by Pherozeshah Mehta, Surendra Nath Banerjee and Gopal Krishna Gokhale, a constitutionalist group of politicians who were opposed to drawing the masses to politics, which, according to them, was essentially an elitist game; and the extremists, led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai and Bipin Chandra Pal, who minced no words as to the futility of a docile evolutionary programme. They had a strong lower middle class appeal which was often drawn from religious and obscurantist emotions.

After the Surat split the Congress platform was brought under the command of the moderates led by Gokhale, who laboured ceaselessly to humanise politics and society, to extend the area of cooperation between the rulers and the ruled, to discover new opportunities for social service and social reform and to hammer out the necessary political compromises to resolve conflicts between the government and Indian opinion.¹⁹⁷ The political reformers in India, according to Gokhale, were the natural allies of the Liberal Party in Britain. "We in India", Gokhale claimed, "are struggling to assert in our country these very principles which are now the accepted creed of the Liberal Party in England. Peace, retrenchment and reform

are our watchwords, as they are yours.”¹⁹⁸ Gokhale was morally outraged by the partition of Bengal. He was inclined to insist that the episode was conducted “in the dark” and was essentially a political blunder.¹⁹⁹ He believed that when the whole matter was brought to the notice of British public opinion they would rise as “one man and put an end to these Russian methods of administration”.²⁰⁰ He would recommend *swadeshi* “as a patriotic movement which had become an “overmastering passion” with the Indian people “as it is in Japan”.²⁰¹ He thought that boycott had been resorted to in “sheer despair”. He hoped that Lancashire would pay “attention to the question” and would exert its influence in favour of the Indian interests.²⁰² He would not agree with any form of boycott adopted as “vindictive desire to injure a nation”.²⁰³ The attempt to extend the economic boycott in Bengal to a national boycott of all things British was not acceptable to him. It meant, Gokhale declared, “not only Swadeshim in the industrial field, but a comprehensive boycott against everything English—English goods, government schools and colleges, government service, honorary offices and so forth, so that the points of contact between the government and the people should be those of violent hatred.”²⁰⁴ The Indian National Congress, Gokhale reiterated, had no aspirations except such as might be realised within the British empire.²⁰⁵

The moderates, though in command of the Congress organisation, were definitely on the decline in political influence. They ceased to offer a political alternative to the much flaunted constructive *swadeshi*. Gokhale deplored the sharp edges of the government's policy which had turned the extremists into a party of “active enemies of the national constitutional movement”.²⁰⁶ He was inclined to admit the fact that the moderates, then placed between the officials and the extremists, did not have “the necessary public spirit and energy of character to hold together effectively for long”.²⁰⁷ Constitutional reform was the only way out of the impasse. Early in December 1908 Gokhale had got a “most kind, ready and patient hear-

ing" from Morley. He had warned the British public that without reform the extremists would take full advantage of the crisis in political life and "confusion, danger and ruin would follow".²⁰⁸ In a sense, the Morley-Minto Act came to the rescue of the moderates. Impatient of the ascendancy of the extremists, Gokhale made a compromise with his firm political convictions. Though a believer in communal harmony he hastened to accept the award of separate communal representations. He had always believed in the necessity of election on a territorial basis. His objective had been to attain a sufficiently durable spirit of cooperation between the two communities. Yet, when the chips were down, he refrained from any movement against the award on the ground that such an agitation would drive the government and the Muslim community into each others' arms. "We must gratefully accept this scheme as it stands", he wrote, "because it must be accepted or rejected as a whole".²⁰⁹

He upbraided the younger generation for being swayed by political extremism. They were prompted frequently that there was no alternative to the British rule "not only now, but for a long time to come", and that attempts, made to disturb it "either directly or indirectly, are bound to recoil on our own heads".²¹⁰ His was a call for an active loyalty which implied a self-imposed restraint against any act of hostility to the established order and, what was more important, "a readiness to rush to its support if its existence is in any way threatened".²¹¹

For years the liberals and the constitutionalists had been awaiting an expanded participation for Indians in the administration. They had been assured that Morley was sympathetic to their aspirations and that representative Indian opinion would be consulted in the formulation of the reform proposals.²¹² The actual bill and its detailed provisions chilled the enthusiasm of many and provoked the dissatisfaction of most of those who, despite their professed extremism, had been functioning within a constitutional framework. To the violent activists of the Pun-

jab and Bengal, the act proved to be fresh example of the insincerity of the British. It underlined their increasing disbelief in what appeared to them a fatuous policy of "mendicancy" in all its various forms.

However disappointed Indian opinion might have been about the nature and content of the legislation, there was no lack of enthusiasm for a critical participation in the new constitutional arrangement. Thus, it was held that in spite of the obvious drawbacks of the scheme it ought to be hailed as a great leap forward.²¹³ In particular, it was claimed that with the expanded franchise of the Morley-Minto scheme "much ground" had been gained, and that it would be of the "utmost value" in practice. They did not think that it was possible to depend "on a defeat of the government for the acceptance of our views".²¹⁴ Gokhale was to rely primarily on methods of persuasion; he thought that these efforts, though they might continue to fail with the officials, would fare better "with our non-official colleagues".²¹⁵ Gokhale yearned to find them all on the side of legitimate Indian aspirations.

But the tenor of politics was moving away from him. Official mischief was afoot and communal feelings in Bengal were ignited both by overzealous *swadeshi* workers and Muslim fanaticism which was nursed by the administration.²¹⁶ Gokhale deplored what was happening in Bengal and in an attempt to draw together his dispirited supporters he helplessly reminded his erstwhile colleagues that the province did not merely belong to the Bengalis. The partition of Bengal, he reiterated, was a national issue. But the rift between him and the extremists was becoming permanent. He was determined that Pal and Tilak should not be conciliated at any cost.²¹⁷ Pal, who had never worked for the Congress, he castigated, was a "very unscrupulous" person and "inordinately ambitious", jealous of Surendranath and "determined to play the role of a leader at all costs". By then Gokhale had become vicious. In sheer desperation he launched his reprobation against his opponents. He saw, for example, behind Pal's

brave words neither "courage" nor "character" nor "judgement" and prophesied that a couple of years would witness the man's eclipse from public life.²¹⁸ Tilak, though a different kind of man, Gokhale, lampooned, was "afflicted with ambition to which there is no limit".²¹⁹ Cruel persecution at the hands of the government, he argued, had made Tilak win the hearts of millions and he had been using his popularity for personal gains. Gokhale continued his tirade with the assertion that Tilak was a born opportunist having a matchless capacity for intrigue and a talent to invest his personal interest with the dignity of a principle.²²⁰ These two men, he lambasted, had been the villains of Indian politics and had been using the name of Lajpat Rai who was "infinitely a better man" and who had been mismanaged by the moderates; otherwise he would have been with him in the hours of India's crisis.²²¹

By the end of the 1914 all interests on the part of Gokhale to work out a reconciliation with the extremists had faded. In a letter to Bhupendranath Basu, he made his position unambiguous. He claimed that he had been rather amenable to the suggestion for the re-entry of Tilak and his men into the Congress. But Tilak had learnt nothing, he complained, during the last few years after the split of the Congress. On the contrary, he had continued to believe in the doctrines of Irish obstructionist policy towards the government to press for his demand for *swaraj*, an object which, according to Gokhale, was impractical, opposed to the accepted policy of the Congress and hence, inimical to the stable development of political forces. He was determined that the readmission of some of the extremists minus their leaders would fall far short of a meaningful compromise while an agreement with Tilak on his own terms would merely unleash official suppression on the Congress itself. Gokhale adhered to ideological unity and organisational effectiveness as the essentials of the Congress movement.²²²

The reign of terror let loose by the government on the

extremists was reprehensible. For the next few years official oppression on the one hand and individual "crimes" on the part of some of the nationalists on the other were to dominate the political scene. The result of the contest was a foregone conclusion and Gokhale had no doubt that eventually crime would be stamped out and the extremists would be exhausted.²²³ Meanwhile, as he was to confess, men like himself could do little beneficial work. There was no option but 'helplessly to look on'.²²⁴ Before long he became an unbridled apologist for the government of India. "You must all realise", he instructed his lieutenant, "that whatever the shortcomings of the bureaucracy and however intolerable at times the violence of individual Englishmen they alone stand today in the country for order, and without continual order, no real progress is possible for our people... It is not difficult at any rate to create disorder in our country..., but it is not so easy to substitute another form of order for that which has been evolved by Englishmen in the course of a century."²²⁵ Recommending the reform proposals, Gokhale concluded that "from this to an Executive responsible to the Legislative Council is only one step, though a long and difficult one, but in ten years or so that question ought to become (sic) within the sphere of practical politics."²²⁶ He viewed them as a wise attempt to meet the "just and reasonable aspirations" of the people and believed that with the exception of a few everyone would have agreed with him. Gokhale was endowed with a quick sense of political realism. He was conscious of the possible outcome of the new experiment. He contended that the cult of violence had already drawn together the better elements of both the educated Indians and the official class. "The number of desperate physical violence party men does not, I am sure, exceed a few hundred in the whole country", and the greatest service, he predicted, that the proposed reforms would render was that "there will be no further accession to their ranks".²²⁷

With Gokhale moderation ceased to remain a policy of least resistance. It was not solely a tactical maneuver of

one faction of Indian politicians in their game of jostling with other factions for position and predominance in Indian life.²²⁸ Gokhale developed it into a definite set of ideas commensurate with an attitude of gradual constitutional development within the empire. He was aware of bureaucratic opposition to the constitutionalists in India. He was haunted by the fear that the local authorities would not cooperate with him.²²⁹ He was apprehensive that the British would put up dummies from among the Indians to undo the effect of the work he was doing in persuading British liberal politicians to appreciate the righteousness of the Indian cause. "One of the curses of foreign subjection", he wrote to a friend in June 1906, "is that it produced among the subject population a class of men who glory in their chains".²³⁰ Self-seeking Indians, he warned, would always be utilised by "unscrupulous" British opponents for their own purpose and one ought to be prepared for continual attacks from within one's own camp. In 1896 he had called for a complete decentralisation of Indian finances and administration as an essential feature of Indian reform, "carrying out Mr. Bright's proposal of a federation" on the model of the government of the United States of America.²³¹ Public opinion in such a large country as India ought to be, he advocated, necessarily provincial. It is only through local authorities that it could be channelised.²³²

Education was another important programme of the moderates. Gokhale looked upon it as an instrument of political reform. The educational system, he professed, was to be geared to impart to the people techniques of administration, principles of public health, sanitation, the skills of advanced technology, communal harmony, social equality, methods of democratic agitation and subordination of caste, religion and communal loyalties to the interests of the nation. The improvement of the conditions of the masses and the conciliation of the educated classes, the moderates maintained, were the two significant issues confronting the British in India.²³³ The success and the failure of their rule, Gokhale propounded, would be de-

terminated by the measure of their achievements in these two fields. The large educated class in India, the moderates urged, ought to be given adequate incentive to act as the "interpreters of the wants and the wishes of their countrymen", and he allowed a "larger voice in the government of their affairs."²³⁴ They were opposed to extravagant military expenditure. India, Gokhale declared, had no interest beyond its territorial borders. "The Indus, the deserts and the Himalayan wall are impregnable lines of defence on the north-west, behind which she can remain in perfect security."²³⁵

The Servants of India Society, which was the repository of the moderate world-view in western India, was to epitomise Gokhale's concern for the promotion among the Indian people of a deep and passionate love for the mother country, a flare for freedom, self-assertion against irresponsible authority and all round development of the welfare of the people within the framework of the British empire.²³⁶ Under the leadership of the moderates the Congress had dropped the boycott resolution and the delicate move had been steered through with great tact in the face of the possibility of Bengalis seceding in a body from the Congress.²³⁷ Thus, despite his optimism about popular support Gokhale could not overlook a growing disillusionment with the British and the increasing decline of the constitutional party as a viable political force.

In a desperate attempt to round up support, he argued that although the partition was a settled fact it was, as declared by the secretary of state, only an administrative measure and that there was nothing sacrosanct about it. He urged the people of Bengal to make it convenient for the government to modify the arrangement by engendering a congenial atmosphere for it. One could not expect the government to consider the suggestion, he added, if the attitude of Bengal remained one of open defiance.²³⁸ But as the administration continued to follow a policy of repression, arrest and deportation, Gokhale found himself and his party in an unfortunate position. "Bengal really

has no leader on our side", Gokhale lamented, "Surendranath is an orator, but has no great courage or backbone, and he cannot keep in hand the unruly pack whom he proposes to lead."²³⁹ Politics in Bengal was drifting towards extremism and it appeared to the Congress high-command that Surendranath could not help going with the current. Gokhale dreaded that if the moderates of Bengal decided to part company of their compatriots in the country it would mean the end of the Congress in its existing form. The party would then no longer remain an all-India movement and its influence would rapidly wane.²⁴⁰ The situation had also been vitiated by communal antagonisms. The moderates had become indiscreet. They were far too eager to seek an adequate government assistance to maintain their position in Indian politics. Some reasonable modification of the partition of Bengal was one of the indispensable palliatives. Besides, it was suggested that if the details of the reform scheme were worked out in a liberal spirit and a fresh channel of communication between the ruler and the ruled was opened, the threatened disintegration of the Congress movement, "though disastrous in itself, may prove less disastrous in practice than at present".²⁴¹ A good deal still depended, the moderates hoped against all hopes, on the spirit in which facilities were offered for raising debates in the council on administrative questions.

The political attitudes of the moderates were based on an approbation of the righteousness of British sense of justice. They did not contest the urgency of political emancipation of the Indians; they did not shirk from their responsibility of opposing justice denied and injustice forced on the people and they were not unconcerned about the lot of their poor countrymen. They, however, failed to examine the British rule as an essentially imperialist system. Its exploitative character, they thought, was essentially related to human failings and inevitable mismanagement. They had faith in the progressive content of British rule and its much publicised rule of law. Nabokov recognised the restraining influence

of Gokhale in Indian politics which "rendered not a little help to the Government in fighting the extremist elements". Aga Khan appreciated the moderating spell of Gokhale on orthodox Hindu opinion. Both Morley and Minto recalled the guidance of Gokhale in formulating their reform proposals. Even Kitchener, otherwise somewhat instinctively hostile to native opinion, grasped and acknowledged the importance of being Gokhale in Indian politics. Upon his death Hardinge gave a rich tribute to the loyal and useful cooperation rendered by him to the government.²⁴²

But Hardinge was to face an India which was more than servile. The partition of Bengal, which had sparked off the *swadeshi* movement, released the pent-up feelings of the restless Indian middle class. The participation of workers and, to a lesser extent, the well-to-do peasantry in the struggle imparted to the movement its distinct democratic character.²⁴³ It was articulate, aggressive, vibrant and confident of itself; it called for the boycott of British textiles and took to picketing of foreign commodities; it desired its extension on a national level and it was coming round, albeit reservedly, to appreciate the dynamics of *swaraj*. Processions, demonstrations and strikes were the new political instruments. It demonstrated the awakening of a national consciousness which extended beyond the confines of Bengal.

Tilak, more than anybody else, had echoed the mood of his age. His primary concern was state power. "Without it", he urged, "Indian industry will not develop, without it we won't be able to give our youth the education it really needs."²⁴⁴ The object of political struggle, he maintained, was the possession of the administrative apparatus in the hands of the Indian people, and until then he would be happy to freeze all movements for social reforms.²⁴⁵ Indeed, if Gokhale and Surendranath Banerjee represented the interests of a section of the bourgeoisie which was still not confident of itself and its potentialities and desired to retain the British protective umbrella with

marginal accommodation, Tilak and his Maratha friends reflected the romantic radical idealism of the petty bourgeoisie in the face of rising prices, shrinking opportunities and continual agrarian unrest against exploitation of the government and the moneylenders.

The extremists acted on a national level and its movement was spearheaded by the Bengali and Maratha intelligentsia backed by various strata of the lower middle class. Its momentum was infused by administrative and political repression with the partition of Bengal as its focal point. The *swadeshi* movement extended its base and, so far as Bengal was concerned, threatened to absorb the moderates within its fold.²⁴⁶ Gokhale complained of the possible extinction of the restraining influence of his moderating hands.²⁴⁷ The extremists believed in the abolition of the colonial regime, in the rapid and uninhibited economic development and in the enhancement of the social weight of the democratic opinion. They protested against the exaction of landlords and moneylenders; they attached themselves emotionally to the impoverished peasantry; they hastened, in some cases, to align themselves with trade unions and the strike movement; they resorted to village development programmes; they offered a novel perspective to the country in the national educational programme.²⁴⁸ In short, they traversed a long way towards a democratic movement. And yet they did not draft a land programme and addressed themselves primarily to the urban intelligentsia. Even in Bengal, they indulged in sporadic militant activities without a comprehensive blueprint for social progress.

The advanced positions adopted by the extremists had a self-righteous ring about them. Their militant pronouncements very often reflected contradictory sentiments. In 1906 Pal found much more affinity between the Indian nationalists of the forward school and the British social democrats, than between the old Congress leaders and the extremists.²⁴⁹ "Let us pay no taxes except to such collectors as are appointed by the president of our

new republic", an illegal pamphlet urged the people in 1907. "Let us have no foreigners in the administration of our country... what right has the English Parliament to dictate laws to the brave people of India?"²⁵⁰ In the same year Pal announced: "The Indian Government was destined to be a republic similar to the United States of America, with the upper chamber of feudatory chiefs and a lower chamber of the people."²⁵¹ Tilak advocated an Indian federation composed of autonomous national units reflecting the distinct personalities of the various regions.²⁵² It was maintained that *swaraj* would not be Hindu or Muslim but would be Indian.²⁵³ Pal called for freedom from the colonial economic bondage, and sought protection and rapid economic development. It was further pointed out that the alien rulers "who are imposing tax upon tax are daily impoverishing both the zamindars and the ryots"²⁵⁴ who were urged to unite. But the projected alliance did not mature. "We zamindars know that government interests and ours are one", a big landlord declared in the imperial legislative council in 1910, "and that we both must stand or fall together. We have nothing to fear while under the aegis of British rule; we shall have much to fear if that power ceases to be dominant."²⁵⁵

There was much confusion in the extremists' appreciation of social objectives. Some denied the claims of both "our old theocratic social economy" as well as "their modern democratic social economy".²⁵⁶ Pal emphasised the old liberal policy of *laissez faire*. Self-help, the necessity of organisation and, if necessary, of tactical combination of disparate political forces were underlined. "This time the awakening will be political with a religious undercurrent", Aurobindo propounded. "It is time that the nation arose above *Swadeshi* to *Swaraj*. It is time that it left the truth of self-realisation through disguises and side issues and fling itself favourably and wholly into the attempt to win *Swaraj*... the ideal of unqualified *Swaraj* has a charm for the rational mind which is irresistible if it is put before it in a rational way by minds imbued with

Indian feeling and free from the gross taint of western materialism."²⁵⁷ The extremist ideology was a hybrid combination of ancient Indian spiritualism, half baked socialist emotions, negation of material civilisation, some positive reformism, an unqualified glorification of traditions and a bitter opposition to the British rule. "Swaraj", Aurobindo explained the metaphysics of the extremist politics, "as a sort of European ideal, political liberty for the sake of political self-assertion, will not awaken India. *Swaraj* as the fulfilment of the ancient life of India under modern conditions, the return to *Satyajuga* of national greatness, the resumption by her of her great role of teacher and guide, self liberation of the people for the final fulfilment of the vedantic ideals in politics, this is the true *Swaraj* for India."²⁵⁸

The religious undercurrent of extremist nationalism provided it with remarkable eclecticism. Its essential Indianness and its Hindu motifs had a charismatic appeal. This "nationalising" of the Hindu religion took place in one remarkable form which was quite unfamiliar to the west. The very soil of India itself had been made sacred and its great rivers had acquired a halo of sanctity which had laid onto divine personification.²⁵⁹ With Bipin Chandra Pal the goddess Durga symbolised a "visible representation of the Eternal spirit of the Indian race".²⁶⁰ In his search for *atmashakti* or constructive *swadeshi* the poet Tagore desired to build the *swadeshi samaj* based on self-sufficient village economy and reinforced by a romantic idealisation of a Hindu past and devotion to Bharat Varsha, "the abode of our Gods, the hermitage of our rishis, the land of our forefathers".²⁶¹ In fact, the extremists scarcely, distinguished that motherhood of the *Divine Nature*, which the Hindu saints and philosophers had spoken about, from the *Bharat-mata* as the object of their devotion. As a sentiment, it coloured poetry and influenced emotions, but could not bind the intellects of all or touch the conscience of the various communities. Indian patriotism striving to become all-embracing and all-inclu-

sive fluttered between eclectic formulations and popular superstitions of Hinduism.

None of the great religions of India underwent even the initial stage of bourgeois-inspired reformation. Thus when in the early twentieth century an acute social conflict was generated by imperialism, a single class-based secular ideology i.e. bourgeois nationalism, could not offer an alternative to the religious world-outlook as an everyday working ideology for the Indian people. Indian nationalism, as a consequence, invariably took a religio-ethical shape. It also reflected the hostility of a petty owner to the foreign big business and incorporated some anti-capitalist ideas. Paradoxically, the arrested ideological positions of the Indian bourgeoisie also served to soften the sharp ideological contradictions between the internal forces of feudal reaction and of capitalist progress as one had observed in Europe. Between the two clear cut alternatives of capitulation to external capitalist expansion and a conciliation with the local conservative reaction the Indian bourgeoisie oscillated in search of an independent identity. It was weak, vacillating and uncertain of itself.

Politics, however, had stepped out of the rarefied atmosphere of the annual Congress and away from the nonctonous petitions but it got stuck in the *baithak khanas* of the *barobaris* of Calcutta. It was emotional and not rational. Both in Bengal and Maharashtra it took to glorification of traditional India, and often, to obscurantism. *Swadeshi* Bengal identified itself with a Hindu mother cult; Tilak's Maharashtra found in Shivaji and Ganesh festivals its self-expression. The *Arya Samajist* Punjab decided to go back to the Vedas. Extremism, the political expression of the radical petty bourgeoisie, was presented at once as an advanced and a reactionary social force: it was suffocated by its own irreconcilable contradiction. The newly awakened consciousness of the people was essentially class contained. But although it sought to

reach out to the masses, it dreaded the advent of mass politics and the intensification of the class struggle.

The limitations of the politics of both Gokhale and Tilak are self-evident. Although moderate politics was a dying creed, it was given a new lease of life, as the extremist political strategy failed to offer a mass programme and got involved in self-righteous revivalism. Communalism, both Hindu and Muslim, discovered for itself militant ideologies and religious riots became commonplace in Indian life. The initial promise of *swadeshi* faded into a heroic, though futile, experiment of individual terrorism. During the period of the Blue Book British rule in India remained harassed but not threatened with extinction. The *Ghadar* movement, the mutiny in the Indian army and the bomb-cult of Bengal kept a cautious Hardinge on his toes. The bomb that hurt the viceroy during the Delhi procession activated the repressive machinery of the state. The moderates rushed to offer the government a renewed pledge of loyalty. Gokhale promised not to oppose the viceroy during the remaining term of his office. The World War I in the initial phase lulled even the extremists into a similar compliant position vis-a-vis the government while the sporadic actions, international planning and individual martyrdom of the 'revolutionaries' were reduced to a determined, though somewhat lonely and ineffective, dissent.

The new consciousness of the Indian people was not, however, mono-dimensional. The fundamental aim of the movement, as the Russian consul from Bombay reported, was the "political emancipation of the country from Britain". Fresh realities began to crystallise below the surface of middle class politics. Class tensions got intensified both in urban and rural India. The *swadeshi* movement of Bengal exhibited the failure of the middle class, though conscious of the strength of the working class, to deal with these realities.²⁰² Tilak's arrest electrified the working men of Bombay but they were inhibited by an ineffective leadership.²⁰³ And yet it was the subterranean

class conflict that gave the movement its democratic character. The scavenger's strike in Tuticorin in February, 1908, the strike of the Parel Workshops of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway in January 1908, that of the messengers and couriers of the Bombay Central Telegraph in early February 1908, the child workers' strike at the jute mills in Hoogly in March 1908, that of the workers of the Kankinara Jute Mills, the sweepers and the lamplighters strike in Tanjore in April 1908 and the six day political strike against the persecution of Tilak were pointers to the shape of events to come.²⁶⁴ Bonaji Petit of the Bombay Millowner's Association was jittery as he instinctively detected the ability of the mill-hands to act in concert with possibilities of ominous consequences for the future. In the face of the growth of militancy in the working class of Bombay the mill owners determined that the "truculence of the mill hands needs to be checkmated in time".²⁶⁵ In 1908 the Labour Commission of the government recognised the new consciousness of the workers and their ability to force the employers to concede to their demands. Even the peasants of East Bengal, despite concerted communal propaganda, did not confine their struggle merely against Hindu *zamindars*; in the district of Mymensingh peasant resistance was directed against the landlord class in general and bloody clashes between them compelled the government to organise its *bandobast* in defence of the *zamindars*. In the Punjab peasants rebelled against the land revenue policy of the government and the new Land Alienation Act altered the perspective of the Punjabi agitation.²⁶⁶ One should say that the Champaran and the Eka movements were being anticipated.²⁶⁷

The rise of labour as a political force in Great Britain had been viewed with suspicion by the Indian civil service. The coal miner's strike in Britain stiffened the attitudes of the diehards who squarely condemned the mischievous extension of democracy and ballot paper to the working class. The rise of an organised labour in politics and the prospects of its paralysing grip on indus-

tries were viewed as a new onslaught on the stable societies all the world over. Sydenham from Bombay was fuming against the new wave of labour unrest in Britain on purely "trivial" pretexts. He was bewildered as he noted with concern the eagerness with which the strikes were being organised. The participation of the engine workers in the strike, the threat of the railwaymen not to handle troop trains, the general light-heartedness of the politicians in their dealings with the resultant social and economic chaos and the ignorance of the masses about the "realities" of the situation offended his sensibilities.²⁶⁸ He and many of his compatriots saw in the general strike a menace of "most formidable character".²⁶⁹ If means were not found to avert it, a depressed Sydenham muttered, minorities might be able to hold the whole community at ransom. He was sullen as he portended that it would mean that civilised government could exist only on sufferance. Sydenham shuddered at the thought that behind the lockouts, strikes and gate-meetings a revolution was haunting his dear old conservative England. He wondered if the "strike fever" would ever lay hold on Indians in the future. "The Indian worker already recognises the attractions of the strike", he wrote, 'but organising powers fail him and in the great diversities of India particularly, a general strike will be unattainable.'²⁷⁰ The strike in the railways in South India alerted the coercive power of the state. On no account, the viceroy was determined, the organised labour would be allowed to paralyse the government. The prospect of the Indian national movement getting linked with the agitation of the working men disturbed the peace of mind even of a circumspect Hardinge.²⁷¹

The radicals and the moderates, however, represented between themselves the opinions and aspirations of Indians as viewed from the vantage point of the Hindu middle class. But by and large the Muslim opinion, dominated by the landed aristocracy and a small group of professionals, had remained aloof from the mainstream of national politics and its primary platform, the Indian

National Congress.²⁷² The policy of divide and rule, so carefully formulated by the administrators since 1858, had achieved its designed objectives. Hunter's *The Indian Muslims* nursed the wounded feelings of the Muslim landed aristocracy of northern India²⁷³ who felt cheated by the rapid advancement of the Bengali *babus* in education, government services and legal profession. What distinguished the Muslim responses at various stages to the British rule since the uprising—whether the Wahabi movement of the 1860s and 70s, or the short-lived Mohamedan Literary Society of Abdul Latif Khan of Calcutta or the National Mohamedan Society of Nawab Ameer Wali Khan—was the desire to win back for the Indian Muslims the leadership of the Indian opinion.²⁷⁴ Over the years one witnessed a striking political metamorphosis. It was a story of the transformation of muslim reaction from a militant challenge to British rule in the form of the Wahabi resistance to the formation of an Anglo-Muslim alliance through Sir Syed and the Aligarh movement. By 1906 the theoretical framework of the new alliance had been drawn up. Maulavi Nazir Ahmed, the ideologue of Muslim separatism, argued that British India was the *dar-al-aman* where the laws of the *shariyat* had been merged with laws of the British government. "You will not, from the one end of India to the other, find a Muslim", he wrote, "who does not love the British administration from the bottom of his heart."²⁷⁵ The position adopted by the Maulavi reflected the trend of the articulate Muslim opinion. It was opportunistic, pragmatic, sectarian and limited. In its desire to regain a part of the lost reality of the so-called "Muslim India" it was almost servile to the British. There was a mixture of common-sense, casuistry and intellectual frivolity in the ideological formulation of this closed group which though proud of its "husk culture"²⁷⁶ had become rather incompetent to meet the demands of modern nationalism.

Its primary emphasis was placed on "the essential difference between the Muslim community and other communities of the world".²⁷⁷ "That difference", Moham-

mad Iqbal underlined, consisted in "our peculiar conception of nationality. It is not the unity of language or country that constitutes the basic principles of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe and participate in the same history that we are members of the society founded by the prophet of Islam."²⁷⁸ Such an outspoken exposition of an exclusive Islamic identity of the Indian Muslims was seized upon by the administration and the Punjab census report proudly proclaimed before long its various attributes.²⁷⁹ The partition of Bengal, the Simla deputation, the formation of the Muslim League and the offer of a separate electorate by the Minto-Morley Act constituted the various contours of that growing cordiality between the Muslim leadership and the government. Together, they represented the impact of a fairly heavy weight package deal.

Nevertheless, if the partition was hailed as a victory its annulment was condemned as a retreat if not a setback. The drastic measure of shifting the capital to Delhi was calculated to neutralise the general disillusionment, consequent upon the unpartition. The establishment of a new capital in the heartland of the empire was an announcement of Britain's determination to hold India threatened by a runaway Bengali upsurge. Imperialism was in a state of crisis. A quite India was a dire necessity; propertied classes needed a much required sedative; the aristocracy was to be lured into an empty, though magnificent, partnership under the colourful umbrella of British paramountcy; benevolent gestures tactfully administered ought to be directed at bringing the movement on to its knees and the time honoured policy of divide and rule had to be given a new orientation. Hardinge fulfilled these objectives.

VII

THE ROYAL visit, the Delhi *darbar*, the un-partition of Bengal and the transfer of capital formed the indis-

pensable features of an imperial policy designed to soothe the nerves of an agitated India. During the period of Curzon's viceroyalty India had enjoyed internal peace. But at the same time it was surmised that "discontent and unrest were latent" and during the time of Minto's administration they acquired full force.²⁸⁰ Minto had to bear the brunt of an unwieldy movement.

In terms of organisation, intensity, mobilisation and consciousness the anti-partition and the *swadeshi* agitations were unprecedented. Together with political terrorism and underground *samitis* the years following the partition saw a qualitative transformation of Bengal's politics. It was a near-revolutionary situation and Hardinge was determined to prescribe an adequate dose of tranquillizer. As a trained diplomat he was aware of the hundred nuances between war and peace. He had planned to scan all the issues of the general complaint against the British and to tackle them, as far as possible, as isolated and independent problems. Hardinge and Crewe brought even a reluctant Minto to acknowledge the possible impact of the emperor "a semi-divine figure", holding an impressive imperial *darbar* in the Mughal capital, flanked by feudatories and princes, upon the credulous imagination of traditional India.²⁸¹ Minto held that the office of the emperor would be made "very cheap" if he were to socialise extensively with the native chieftains.²⁸² Even the sagacity of arranging a spectacular crowning ceremony was queried and questioned.²⁸³ Without formal crowning, Minto funked, the future kings of England might not be held as full-blown emperors of India.²⁸⁴ Such prognostications were illusory, reflecting the frustrations of a strained mind.

Both Hardinge and Crewe had decided to give a hopeful turn to British policy which would, if continued along the existing lines, dry up in an arid waste of recurring repression. The British government had decided to win the initiative back into its own hands. It sought to direct its policy

towards India on a rational plane. It desired to transcend the narrow bounds of make-shift arrangements. Hardinge and Crewe agreed on this point. Clearly they were *en rapport* and over the years they were able to establish for themselves the objectives of British rule in India.²⁸⁵ None of them ever thought of dropping India from the imperial charge. They were conscious of the formidable challenge of the national movement. But they had faith in their ability to manipulate social forces in Indian life. In right earnest Hardinge set himself to the task of discovering a sense of purpose for the British administration. Crewe went along with him with equal zest and vigour. They had identical views on the necessity of the royal visit and the *darbar*. They inclined in favour of an amphitheatre as the venue and not the *Diwan-e-am* so that a crowd might behold it. It must be a great moment, Crewe insisted, "when he assumes the crown".²⁸⁶ Crewe felt exalted by the prospects of the feudal grandeur of the *Raj*. There should not be, he warned, any formal coronation so that crowning at Delhi should not become compulsory for future kings. They had to resolve the lively controversy over the proposed carriage procession instead of an elephant *yatra* which "might appear unmanly, and so unkingly".²⁸⁷ Curzon's refusal to accept invitations from native chiefs had offended the trusted feudatories of the Emperor, and it was decided that the king ought to visit some camps primarily to boost their deflated pride.²⁸⁸

But the significant move awaiting the approval of Hardinge and Crewe concerned with the proposal of offering "some permanent benefit or grant or a boon" designed "to appeal to the imagination and impressionability of the Indian people."²⁸⁹ The proposal for taking over by England of the charge of the Indian establishment in London did not find favour with Crewe. Suggestions regarding remission of taxation were declined on grounds of adverse conditions of Indian finances.²⁹⁰ Hardinge also consulted Crewe on the removal of excise duty on cotton. Crewe had

certain definite views on the subject and he put his foot down. The removal of the excise duty on cotton, he concluded, might put some rupees into already* well-filled pockets, but that would not operate to the benefit of the country generally or even of the cultivators.²⁹¹ In search of a "boon", which would be politically expedient, Hardinge opted for a simple suggestion: a crore of rupees with a matching response from the Indian rich to be spent for technical education.²⁹² The prospect of such a generous grant was exciting. Politically, it would have been most rewarding. It would, Hardinge implored, encourage the moderates to rally to the side of the British and "we shall hear no more of sedition for a long time to come".²⁹³ On the basis of the "best authorities" he was able to claim that the extremists in India, Paris and London were perturbed by the rumour that the king might announce something of this kind in Delhi. It would mobilise, Hardinge was convinced, moderate opinion to the side of the royalists and would dislodge the influence of extremists on the people.²⁹⁴ "It would in my opinion", he insisted, "be a very cheap method of buying loyalty and peace, especially when we compare it to the price of a single dreadnought."²⁹⁵ In keeping with this policy another blessing, proffered by the viceroy, was the King's commission to the sons of native chiefs in order to provide an outlet to their military aspirations.

The priority in favour of technical education and the emphasis on the loyalty of the chiefs signalled the trend of the new policy. The transfer of capital and the unpartition of Bengal constituted the central features of the envisaged strategy. The king had set his heart upon doing something which would mollify the wounded sentiments of that section of opinion in India which regarded the partition as a mistake. To many it appeared to be good politics as well. It was, however, almost universally acknowledged that the recommendation of reverting to the *status quo ante* could not be entertained any longer. Even the Congress was veering to a compromise. It would have been satisfied if the

two Bengals could be placed under a lieutenant-governor with chief commissionerships for Assam, Bihar and Orissa.²⁹⁶ As he viewed the situation strictly from the somewhat unreal detachment of London, Crewe was nonplussed by the proposal to establish a lieutenant-governorship in Bengal close to the viceroy's front door. It would be equally troublesome, he wrangled, to send the governor to the interior of the province to find a home for himself.²⁹⁷ The situation could only be retrieved, Crewe urged, by declaring Calcutta and its surrounding area an imperial enclave.²⁹⁸

Initially, Hardinge was equally opposed to the scheme. He thought that a united Bengal with Bihar and Orissa would be too large and, hence, too unwieldy a province for administrative purposes. The existing agitation against the partition, he believed, was wholly a sectarian movement engineered by politicians and journalists whose influence had been diminished by the divisions. The Muslims of East Bengal on the other hand, Hardinge added, were loyal. They had languished under the exactions of Hindu landlords who monopolised the services and the government offices. They had been assured of new opportunities as a consequence of the partition and the viceroy pronounced that they could not be betrayed as the proposed action would mean a breach of faith. It would be interpreted, Hardinge underscored, as a Hindu triumph and a blow to the Muslim interest on an all-India scale and would alienate the Muslim population as a whole. Concluding his arguments against the annulment of the partition Hardinge reiterated that during the preceding five years India had undergone "something like a revolution on a small scale" and that peace and time were required in order that things might settle down in tune with the new conditions. "If all goes well, there is every reason to hope and believe that in a year's time we may be again in smooth water."²⁹⁹ It would be a mistake to do anything that might meddle with the current of events which was then flowing, according to the official reports, in favour of the British.

Hardinge himself, however, was soon to acknowledge that a careful modification of the partition was indispensable for satisfying the Bengali nationalists and invigorating the flagging will-power of the moderates.³⁰⁰ Gokhale too had been pressing for it.³⁰¹ An uncertain viceroy was beginning to recognise the importance of the scheme of annulment and the significance of the proposed programme. The official formula was worked out by the turn of the year. Bengal retaining a Muslim majority was to be united under a governor; Sylhet was to be merged with Assam under a lieutenant governor; while Bihar and Orissa were to be grouped together under another administration. The appointment of a Muslim to the executive council of Bengal, the creation of a university at Dacca primarily for the benefit of "the Muslim Bengal" and in order to counter the influence of what was termed as the "essentially Hindu University" of Calcutta and the appointment of a special educational officer for East Bengal were designed to propitiate Muslim opinion.³⁰²

The institution of a legislative council for Assam was inspired by the desire to combat Bengali agitation in support of incorporating Sylhet, the most advanced district in Assam, into Bengal.³⁰³ Hardinge was to agree with Bayley that if the district of Sylhet were added to Bengal, Assam would be deprived of its best revenue-producing district, and it would instigate the tea planters "who would at once make a grievance of it". It was of supreme imperial necessity to balance the Muslims and the Hindus in Bengal and possibly to allow a small numerical superiority of the Muslims over the Hindus. The incorporation of Sylhet into Bengal would have disturbed the communal composition of the province contrary to the official policy.³⁰⁴ Similarly, the agitation for the inclusion of the coal-mining district of Chhota-Nagpur into Bengal was to be given no encouragement. "One cannot see such a situation in the future". Hardinge made no bones about his intention, "in which Bihar and Orissa would be cut in twain by a ridge of Bengal

coal-fields right into the Central Provinces."³⁰⁵ Every precaution was to be taken to ensure that the new arrangement did not encourage Bengali political consolidation. The administrative reorganisation, though not quite satisfactory from the point of view of the extremists, was a suitable safeguard and an adequate palliative. Restless and unquiet spirits continued to spurt but Banerjee and Gokhale came forward to welcome the new changes. Samshul Huda and his Muslim friends saw in them a satisfactory face-saving device. It had retained for them all that was essential in their demands.

To the vast majority of Britons in India the restoration of Bengal to one unit was a betrayal and a surrender to organised opposition detrimental to both the efficiency and prestige of the government. Curzon's decision to partition Bengal had undoubtedly been a political move. To some administrators who knew what was on record the repeated declaration by the government that Curzon had no part in any scheme to diminish the political importance of the Bengalis by splitting them up was not particularly amusing. "But so", wrote Jenkins, "history is written."³⁰⁶ Sydenham Clarke advised that nothing be done "which would have the effect of lowering our prestige in Indian eyes". To the people of India, the official creed maintained, "prestige is everything".³⁰⁷

Although some of the "best men" among the European community greeted the administrative contrivance with satisfaction, there was still a good deal of bitter feeling especially among "the sporting and society" people of Calcutta whose influence was somewhat immoderate. The ladies were, it was reported, "against us to a woman" and Jenkins had some disagreeable experiences "in our own camp."³⁰⁸ *The Statesman* was most virulent in its attack on Hardinge. In an article, it maintained that he had misused his high office and misled the king and thereby brought upon his head unpopularity which the viceroy

himself deserved.³⁰⁹ It made a firm demand that whatever might finally be decided on the constitution of Bengal, the person who was responsible for abusing the authority of the sovereign ought to seek some other sphere of influence. *The Englishman* was less impudent but was both impenitent and self-contradictory.³¹⁰

Thus while European opinion, both official and unofficial, was fuming and fuzzing over the annulment of the partition, the viceroy naturally turned to Muslim opinion. It was, in this case, an indicator of significant political importance. The viceroy received with gratification the news that the Aga Khan had accepted the new arrangement with grace. But he was, Hardinge believed, somewhat overrated and a spent force. He conceded that the old guards might still tolerate the Aga Khan as a useful mouthpiece of loyalty, but as something of a political asset, Hardinge doubted if his influence penetrated deep enough.³¹¹ Sulimullah Bahadur of East Bengal, on the other hand, was a trustworthy weathercock to detect the trend of the relevant Muslim opinion. He had accepted the proclamation but desired some special safeguards for the Muslims. It was apparent that Sulimullah deserved attention in view of the fact that the Muslim League was inclined to adopt a position against unpartition of Bengal and the British attitudes towards Persia and Turkey were being mixed up with issues of East Bengal much to the inconvenience of many.³¹² Sulimullah's conditions were mainly directed towards retaining a separate identity for the Muslims in a united Bengal. He would have liked to ensure that the governor of Bengal spend equal time in Calcutta and Dacca; that separate electoral rolls for the Muslims be maintained and proportional representation be accorded to that community in all representative bodies from the legislative council to local boards; that revenue raised in East Bengal be disbursed there even though a separate budget was not desirable; that a Muslim member be appointed to the executive council of the gover-

nor of Bengal; that seats in government services be reserved for Muslims; that there be a special grant for the education of Muslims and some *madrasah* reform schemes be introduced.³¹⁴

The demand for communal representation of the Muslims on municipal and district boards was most ticklish. It was asserted that in view of the repeated pledges given by the government it would be difficult to reshuffle official reactions on this question. Minto had given an assurance that the claims of the Muslim deputation would be estimated not merely on their numerical strength but with regard to the political importance of the community and the services it had rendered to the empire. He had also approved the claims of the deputation that any attempt at granting personal franchise regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities would be a "mischievous failure".³¹⁵ Morley and Hobhouse had underwritten the pledges of Minto.³¹⁵ It is true that Risley had interpreted, in an official note of 25 May 1909, Minto's declaration as conceding communal representation on municipalities and district boards with reference only to local administration and not as a stepping stone to representation on the legislative councils. But Hardinge, who had infinite sympathy for the Muslims, had no intention of going back to the pledges given. He saw through the difficulties resulting from a uniform system of Muslim representation. But of one thing he was certain: the demand for communal representation of Muslims on municipal and district boards was made in accordance with the promise given to them.³¹⁶ He resolved that "some how or other they have to be fulfilled". Explaining its stand the Muslim deputation, which met the viceroy at Dacca, stressed that the priorities were to ensure harmony and peace between the two communities and to safeguard the interest of Muslims in East Bengal. It was, therefore, felt necessary that the Muslims be "brought educationally in line with the Hindus", and "so long as they remain backward" they ought to be allowed to "work out their own salvation."³¹⁷

It was held that in sharp contrast to the Hindu population, the Muslims were by and large poor and illiterate. As a result, their support could only be mobilised by resorting to religious appeals and thus "elections lead to communal feelings".³¹⁸ However, the principle that the composition of the legislature ought to reflect the political and social importance of the Muslims would not be fully realised if it was not extended to the local bodies. In support of the demand Hardinge was reminded that he was committed to ensure that territorial redistribution would conserve the Muslims in a majority in that province.³¹⁹ It was, therefore, claimed that they must reserve for themselves at least as many representatives in the council and the local bodies as were retained by the Hindu community.

Secondly, the Dacca memorandum held that despite millions being spent for education, the Muslims had not been able to take advantage of it since the school system was Hindu-oriented. The memorandum quoted extensively the official maxims on Indian education to hammer out its own case. Hunter had observed, it recalled: "The language of our government schools in lower Bengal is Hindu and the masters are Hindus. The Mussalmans with one consent spurned the instructions of idolators through the medium of idolatry...the astute Hindu has covered the country with schools adopted to the wants of his own community but wholly unsuited to the Mohammedans. Our rural schools seldom enable a Mohammedan to learn the tongue necessary for his holding a respectable position in life and for the performance of his religious duties." Bayley was quoted to establish the genesis of Muslim aloofness from the educational processes of British India. "Is it any subject of wonder that they (Muslims) held aloof from a system which, however good in itself, made no concession to their prejudices, made in fact no provision for what they esteemed their necessities, and which was in its nature unavoidably antagonistic to their interests and at variance with their social traditions?"³²⁰ The demands of the Muslim deputa-

tion included the separate allotment of seats for admission to Muslim students; the institution of scholarships, free-ships, hostel accommodation; the appointment of special Muslim officials to popularise education among the masses and a Muslim assistant director of public instructions with funds and power to initiate policy.³²¹

The viceroy approved of the spirit and the content of the memorandum of the Muslims. He was sincere and sympathetic towards their demands and he affectionately recommended them as 'our future flock'.³²² He upheld that the imperial government recognised that education was "the true salvation of the Mohammedan community".³²³ He sanctioned the proposal of keeping the governor at Dacca as a part of his assignment. He was also inclined to endorse the demand for proportional representation in local bodies. But on this question he found himself restrained by practical considerations. He opined that a separate scheme for the province of Bengal alone might not be a feasible proportion and, to all intents and purposes, it was out of the question.³²⁴ He, however, assured the Muslims of East Bengal that the government of India fully acknowledged its obligations to that community and agreed to offer favourable consideration to any practical scheme on the basis of the reports of the local government. He also proposed to recruit in his executive council a representative of the Hindu and Muslim communities alternatively. Although special allotment to the Muslims of government appointment could not be made, the advancement of education among the Muslims, he held out optimistically, would improve the situation.³²⁵

The government's policy was perceptible only when one viewed the total scheme of unpartition against the background of imperial policy. Butler was amazed to find that in some quarters of Muslim opinion a feeling was afoot that the "reversal of the partition was an after-thought", and that it was, by and large, a concession to the Hindus.³²⁶

He laboured to persuade his friends that the Hindus were the real sufferers. The Muslims were to gain advantages under the new scheme which they would not have got under the East Bengal government for many years.³²⁷ It was maintained that under the new scheme of things East Bengal would not be neglected and it had been ensured by the government's decision to spend two and half months in Dacca every year. In fact, he felt that the consequences of the new arrangements would be very different from what the pessimists were foreboding. He insisted that it ought to be remembered that the East Bengal Muslims and the Aligarh lot were far apart. The Nawab of Dacca, for example, looked down upon Aligarh as the nest of infidelity, and disregarded the Aga Khan as *kafir*. Besides, Hindu-Muslim feelings were so strong that the Aga Khan's conciliation committee could only meet to elect a sub-committee which never met. Butler would concede that the objection to the reversal of the "settled fact" was genuine, but he reminded that it was linked to the question of transferring the capital to Delhi. A vexed and harried Butler rushed to dispell the ill-informed misgivings of his friends. "The thing must be judged", he suggested feebly, "as a whole and by the result, and the result will be good."³²⁸

Recommending the new deal at Dacca the viceroy urged the new governor of Bengal to pay a good deal of attention to East Bengal. He was convinced that the province, especially the Muslims, had been making considerable progress during the preceding six years. Before Curzon's partition, it was held, they were absolutely starved by western Bengal, "who appropriated all funds available at Calcutta".³²⁹ He believed that some of the Calcutta Bengalis, who had a personal interest in Calcutta university, would dislike the foundation of Dacca university. Once the two Bengals were united Hardinge cautioned his lieutenant, "Calcutta will again do its utmost to bleed the rest of Bengal".³³⁰

He instructed Carmichael to see to it that East Bengal received fair treatment. There was a possibility of the Bengalis making common cause with the Europeans then chaffing against the transfer of the capital.³¹ Already they had begun to demand the recall of the viceroy. The government of India, having assuaged the feelings of "Muslim Bengal", decided to overlook and ignore the separatist agitations.

But it could not. The administrative reorganisation of Bengal was related to the establishment of a new capital away from the "pernicious influence of Calcutta baboodom".³² The transfer of capital was an attempt to rectify the inconvenience of the annulment of the partition. Calcutta, as the seat of the viceroy's authority in India, had become a subject of special care for him and the issues of Bengal politics occupied the viceroy's attention to the exclusion of other areas of India. He thought that it was necessary to insulate the seat of Indian administration from the "disproportionate" impact of the most advanced outpost of Indian nationalism. Delhi offered brighter prospects. It had been the capital of many Indian empires as well as the focal point of the uprising of 1857. British rule was in search of legitimacy. Was it not possible to construct the capital of British India, it was argued, amidst the ruins of the earlier imperial citadels? The successor of the Mughal empire fixed its eyes on Delhi in search of continuity. It was considered good politics as the viceroy's entourage would be parked at a distance from the noisy Hindu pleaders of Calcutta and their more malignant literary spokesmen in the Bengali Press. Surrounded by Mahmudabad, Rampur, Darbhanga, the Oudh *Talukdars*, the Aligarh movement, the Benaras orthodoxy and the native princes, the imperial Raj would be more amenable to the needs and aspirations of its erstwhile friends, its present allies and its future defenders.

Paradoxically European opinion in Bengal was most

critical of the decision of departition and the transfer of the capital to Delhi. It saw in it a betrayal of trust, a surrender to "unprincipled agitation", a breach of faith, a decided step against the bureaucracy and hence an unsound confession of weakness in the face of brute force.³³³ *The Statesman* and *The Englishman* were the principal sponsors of the agitation. Their vituperations were unbridled and they resorted to every form of insidious opposition to administrative decisions. Initially, Hardinge had decided to ignore it. But the criticism by the Islington committee of the Delhi project and Ramsay MacDonald's public pronouncements in the British Press gave a new lease of life to the agitation.³³⁴ It found in Minto and Curzon, the two ex-viceroy, its champions in the parliament. Hardinge was incensed at the wily meddling of these men who had little to do with the imperial charge in India.³³⁵ He was scornful of Curzon who had, Hardinge scoffed, almost become a "Calcutta Gramophone".³³⁶ The viceroy recalled that Minto would have himself liked to transfer the capital to Delhi, but he had been diffident to make the suggestion since he would have been accused of being a lily-livered statesman and of "running away from Calcutta".³³⁷ Calcutta made a final effort to work up an agitation against Delhi on financial grounds.³³⁸ It was maintained that money wasted on the construction of Delhi could have been more fruitfully utilised for public services recommended by the Islington Committee. Hardinge contested the suggestion. He countered that the two items did not clash since, whatever its suggestions might be, it was impossible suddenly to enlarge the public services without adequate preparations. In any case, he proclaimed, no final decision would be taken on the proposals during the following three years. The viceroy was most aggrieved by Lord Islington whose commission did everything "to hamper the policy of the Government of India in order to grind their own axe".³³⁹

Early in February 1912 Hardinge had traced in the

agitation over the transfer of the capital the hands of the chamber of commerce and the Anglo-Indian Press.³⁴⁰ It was, he glibed, a question of *amour propre*.³⁴¹ They disliked, he argued, being reduced to the status of provincials. The chamber of commerce sent a feeler to the effect that the headquarters of the government be shifted to Simla and the viceroy and his executive council should become what appeared to a tense Hardinge "a peripatetic circus" perambulating between Calcutta, Bombay and Madras for six months every year.³⁴² In order to soothe their injured feelings he was willing to offer a few minor concessions to Calcutta. He was also inclined to appoint an official of the commerce department at Calcutta to nurse the interests of the chamber. The chamber of commerce gradually began to gauge and appreciate the merit of the new deal. In particular, the decisions of the government, with regard to the establishment of Dacca university and the appointment of Shamshul Huda to the executive council, were noted with satisfaction by the chamber of commerce, it being essentially anti-nationalist in character.³⁴³ They realised that the un-partition was primarily a political move and it involved no surrender of basic imperial interests to popular clamour. Thus emboldened, the government decided to pay no attention to the carping of the two English papers of Calcutta, their sole idea being to crab the government of India in whatever it did. "If the angel Gabriel came down from Heaven", Hardinge commented in disgust, "the Anglo-Indian Press would see in him a Mephistopheles."³⁴⁴ With all their special reservations intact and confirmed, it was believed that there could be no doubt as to the feelings of the Muslims of East Bengal as regards the modification of the partition. They would not care two pence where the capital might be. It was also argued that some of the Hindu agitators against Dacca university had serious misgivings about the nature of the proposed university.³⁴⁵ At last, Hardinge was confident about the future of Bengal for some years to come.³⁴⁶ His confidence was reserved though: "...but as agitation is breath of life to a Bengali I

presume it will assume some new forms in the near future."³⁴⁷

The political temper of Bengal and the sophistication of its political struggle had a very dampening influence on Hardinge and his administration. The viceroy felt relieved once the capital was shifted from Calcutta. Lucknow and Benaras, exclaimed Hardinge, offered a "freer and wider atmosphere than Calcutta". "I felt", he wrote, "that I was in India, which one never feels in Calcutta, and that the people there have a far broader outlook than those *box-wallahs* who think that they are the masters of India."³⁴⁸ Carmichael wrote from Calcutta to add to his comfort that he had met no "Bengali who inspires me into as much confidence as certain Madrasis do".³⁴⁹ Feelings against Calcutta were rampant in British official and non-official circles. Earlier in 1912 when the government of India proceeded to make arrangements for the reception of the emperor in Calcutta, Valentine Chirol had remonstrated with the viceroy. He was worried to learn that the emperor was about to make an excursion to Calcutta. "Probably, Madras is to be cold shouldered", he expostulated, "but this does not mean that Bombay must get a cool shoulder as well. Two wrongs don't make a right and it seems to me extremely unfortunate that the most disloyal city in India should be singled out for the King's entertainment."³⁵⁰ In February 1912 Butler was encouraged to proffer an advice, much to Hardinge's elation, that the Presidency College be removed from Calcutta and shifted to Ranchi so that the students could be allowed to remain "unexposed to the evil influence of the capital".³⁵¹

The administration was no less anxious to strike a *concordat* with the moderate elements of Calcutta's European party. Butler, for one, had sneaking sympathy for those sensitive souls who were suffering from an ominous feeling of wounded pride and lost position.³⁵² The white man, they thought, was left in the cold. Butler suggested affably

that it was contact with the government of India that most of them wanted and he inspired the government to take the initiative. In a despatch to the secretary of state on the transfer of the capital it had been maintained that "the only department which, so far as we can see, might be thought to suffer some inconvenience, would be that of Commerce and Industry, which would be less closely in touch at Delhi with the commercial and industrial interests centred at Calcutta."³⁵³ The chamber was unconvinced. It retorted: "It seems to be particularly unfortunate that the Department which was formed to promote Indian commerce and industry should be thus cut off from all the great commercial centres and sea-ports and, should this part of the scheme be recommended, they would propose the addition of a commercial member to the Executive Council of Bengal."³⁵⁴ It was also mooted that the location of the commerce department ought to be decided in consultation with the commercial community of the country.³⁵⁵ The government responded warmly and it offered to arrange the services of two directors, instead of a director-general of commercial intelligence, posted in Calcutta and Bombay with a director of statistics at Delhi. The directors were to keep the central department well informed about Bombay and Calcutta respectively. Besides, it enjoined that the commerce member of the viceroy's executive council and the secretary of the department ought to undertake frequent tours to Bombay and Calcutta and sometimes to Karachi, Madras, Rangoon and Kanpur.³⁵⁶ Such a scheme, it was expected, would strengthen the hands of men like Stewart, men of moderate opinion, and would stimulate the growing conciliatory tone of the Bengal chamber.³⁵⁷

The chamber of commerce, however, spurned the offer of the government and chose to remain adverse to the transfer of the capital instead. It continued to raise absurd and preposterous demands. It stipulated, for example, that the department of commerce and industry ought to be

maintained at Calcutta; that New Delhi should be financed by special loans; that the commercial interests of Calcutta should have nine representatives in the Bengal legislative council and that the freight charges of the East India Railway ought to be lowered in order to carry competitive traffic.³⁵⁸ Hardinge thought that the first demand was impossible, impractical and unconstitutional and that the second was based on the absurd claim that irrigation and railways might be starved if funds were transferred to unproductive expenditure, more so in view of the limited borrowing capacity of the government. The third demand was rejected as totally impractical, and the fourth was ignored because, if it was conceded, it would have meant the transfer of traffic from competitive lines to the East India Railway. Hardinge was sore with the attempted blackmail on the part of the chamber.³⁵⁹

He was certainly sympathetic towards Calcutta for its loss of prestige and he believed that something might still be improvised to soften the blow. But he was satisfied that it had suffered no material loss and the attitude of the trading companies was simply vindictive.³⁶⁰ By June 1912 they raised a hue and cry over the shortage of wagons in the Indian railways. The situation was becoming tense and the viceroy was exasperated. If the Bengal chamber of commerce continued to press its attitude of hostility, he made up his mind to deal with other chambers in sheer indifference to the Calcutta chamber. Hardinge suspected that the real object of the new movement was to induce the government to accept an enquiry by an outside expert who in all probability would advocate an immediate outlay on railway construction rendering it impossible for the government to divert funds to the building of New Delhi. Hardinge, though pressurised, declined to surrender.³⁶¹ By March 1914 he found Calcutta in an "absolutely isolated position". He was enthused to place credence to a rumour that their attitude had been due to self interest and a certain amount of spite. "If I build a mean capital",

he wrote, "they would protest against my meanness, if I build a good one they would protest against my extravagance."³⁶² The agitation, however, fell flat as the Calcutta chamber failed to foster an uninhibited enthusiasm of other chambers. Hardinge was gratified that all the Indian members of his council "played up in the Budget debate and insisted on the value of the transfer of capital to Delhi and on the new city being built upon a worthy scale."³⁶³ It was a remarkable and a cooperative gesture and the viceroy felt vindicated as "the door was slammed in the face of Calcutta *boxwallahs*".³⁶⁴ By then, he was convinced that the policy of transfer of capital was both judicious and prudent. He felt relieved as he found his government in a "much more accessible and independent position than formerly".³⁶⁵ It was more closely in touch than ever before with the commercial interests of the rest of India,³⁶⁶ viceroy's legislative council was no longer exposed to the deleterious influences and propaganda of Calcutta and the government could at last acquire an appropriate perspective on the situation in Bengal.³⁶⁷ Besides, the native chiefs were already beginning to visit Delhi with pleasure despite inadequate accommodation although they had never been induced to travel to Calcutta. In an air of optimism about him Hardinge could conveniently dismiss Curzon's speech in the House of Lords in defence of the Calcutta agitation.³⁶⁸

In the face of renewed militancy in the Bengali political movement, even the European settlement of Calcutta made an effort to value the need for a new capital. "I do not know what Curzon wants, and I doubt if he knows himself", Hardinge wrote triumphantly, "unless it is to create embarrassment and pander to the voice of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, who now exercise no influence whatever, and are in reality an object of ridicule to the rest of India."³⁶⁹ Crewe from England extended his warm support as he endorsed heartily Hardinge's proposals. He was not prepared "to make squalid what ought to be splen-

did or to sacrifice the dignity which ought to belong to the seat of Imperial Government."³⁷⁰ When funds were short, Crewe added, some economy might be effected by the reduction in the number of apartments, offices, stables, marble columns, mosaic work etc. which could be erected subsequently but "not in dimensions or general plan which is rigidly determined".³⁷¹ Besides, the constructions should permit expansion every year so that the buildings, quite simple in decoration at first, ought to admit, as surplus accumulated from time to time, growth in grandeur for ever. The search for legitimacy for the *Raj* appeared to have succeeded at last. New Delhi was to stand in all its oriental grandeur as the heir of the Mughal Shahajahanbad. "As the buildings rose", the viceroy was ecstatic, "enthusiasm will grow, and when once the Government of India is installed in the new city, the problem will be how to keep the city within proper limits and under suitable control. This will be my successor's task and not mine."³⁷²

The new city of Delhi was to be the heir of the grand Mughals. It was to reflect the majesty of an imperial metropolis; it ought to portray the confidence of a matured authority. Above all it was to possess an Indian air about it. Crewe and Hardinge were unanimous about this. The architects fought intensely among themselves with regard to its planning and design.³⁷³ Ramsay MacDonald polemicized against it.³⁷⁴ But Hardinge surveyed the area across the ridge of the Raisina village and over the ruins of monuments of forgotten glories and decided the norms to which architects, engineers and financiers acquiesced with a sense of participation in an imperial undertaking. New Delhi moved briskly to its completion despite human, financial and material obstacles.

There was intense controversy about the style of architecture to be adopted for New Delhi. The European experts desired to apply western forms and style. The problem, Hardinge pondered, was whether it was possible to assi-

milate the ancient style of Indian architecture which preceded the Mughals i.e. the Pathan style to modern requirements. It was essential, he ideated, that the secretariat and other government buildings should be designed on the broad principles of simple architecture with an "Oriental motif" that should 'blend itself with a government house which was to be conceived as "a dignified and noble monument."' ³⁷⁵ Hardinge was to emphasise that pure eastern or pure western architecture would be quite out of place in the imperial city and that "we have to find a blend"—a broad style of architecture with Indian motif throughout. ³⁷⁶

He did not favour the opinion that his scheme of things would clash with a government house of the Palladian style. ³⁷⁷ He seemed inflexible in his views. Faced with Lutyens's classical expertise he felt somewhat inadequate. But he was determined to stick to his guns and insisted on a government house in Lutyens's plan having a flat gilt dome after the Pathan style; these being the "Oriental touches that should be appreciated in the country". ³⁷⁸ The concept of a gilded dome in the government house was an idea borrowed from what Hardinge had often seen and admired on the big buildings in Russia. ³⁷⁹ He was seriously contested on aesthetic grounds by the experts. Hardinge began to despise them and misprize their advice. He found Lutyens as "obstinate as a mule" with fixed ideas as he would not touch the concept of eastern architecture "with a pair of tongs". ³⁸⁰ Both Lutyens and Baker were slurred as absolute philistines with no regard for Indian sentiments and traditions. ³⁸¹ Lutyens, according to Hardinge, was obsessed with Italian Renaissance architecture having come to India with utmost scorn for all Indian art-forms even calling the Taj "rubbish"; ³⁸² and Brodie, Hardinge derided, had determined only to construct a wider avenue than existed in any other place. ³⁸³

The planning was a laboured exercise involving constant

shuffling of ideas, plans and blue prints and by the end of the initial phase of the programme Lutyens agreed to be exhorted. "Of course, my idea is a compromise between eastern and western architecture", Hardinge elucidated his views, "and the purists who demand entirely western architecture will call it a bastard style, and if I am forced to choose between the two, I would reluctantly have to agree to a purely eastern rather than a western style of architecture."³⁸⁴ Hardinge was anxious to remind his audiences that it was Indian public opinion that had to be considered.

The government would not worry about financing the construction of Delhi. Butler agreed with Hardinge that it was important that the thing ought to be done on a big scale, 'something which will impress India with our determination to stay here and to govern the country on imperial lines'.³⁸⁵ One of the great object of the move to Delhi was to develop the imperial idea, and this was the weightiest reason for the selection of the southern site. Hence the departmental considerations were to be subordinated to the imperial conception. No expenditure could be too high for it. Butler was enamoured by the infusion of a fresh dose of imperial consciousness in the administration. "It is so important in my mind to have these central buildings worthy of an Imperial city that I would agree to this. We have to make New Delhi one of the world's wonders and topics of discussion."³⁸⁶

The government house of Calcutta did not offer the best model for the viceroy's palace. Despite its great entertaining capabilities it was too much the opposite of a residence to be an ideal palace. Crewe wanted to see the atmosphere of Hampton Court and the Louvre reproduced.³⁸⁷ Montagu pleaded for a fine chamber for the legislative council with the appearance of a parliament house. Of course, Montagu did not expect a growth of parliamentary powers for that body.³⁸⁸ But he felt that the council's increasing import-

ance will demand such a recognition. Crewe, however, disagreed with Montagu. He endorsed the view of Hardinge that the names and forms contained subtle significance in politics of which Montagu seemed quite innocent.³⁸⁹ "A number of your advanced politicians", wrote Crewe to Hardinge, "who are the reverse of sedition, (sic) regard a Parliament as the goal of their ambition: and... no colour should be given to any notion that we favour their hopes."³⁹⁰ Thus, "a good council chamber with a separate entrance to go with it" was officially prescribed. "It is going to be the Viceroy's Council", Crewe decreed, "and the circumstances and surroundings should emphasise the fact."³⁹¹

The crucial problem of the planning was the selection of a site. The expert committee for the selection was not bound to a particular site and it was free to look in any direction. After a fairly extensive study of Delhi, taking into account among other things the paramount necessity of health, questions of sentiments, of cost, convenience, civil and military requirements, room for expansion, facilities for internal and external communications and adequate water supply, the committee submitted its report.³⁹²

Beyond the outskirts of the existing Delhi they found what they required. Down south there were seven cities of the earlier days and the land was rich with the crumbling ruins. The construction of a city would mean the removal or incorporation of the relics and the edifices into a modern town. Higher upon the slopes of the hills lying to the right of the road to the Kutub, there was virgin soil. On one side of the ridge the imperial capital ought to be placed dominating the plains and on the other side of the hills was to be positioned the cantonment where would be mustered the power by which that domination could be maintained. Land was primarily agricultural and hence fairly inexpensive to acquire.

There were immense possibilities for expansion to the south and south-west. The Jama Masjid was close by and the approach from the old city, it was believed, would be magnificent. The open space between the two cities would provide ample room for all forms of sports and recreation.³⁹³ The vision of an imperial grandeur dominated the mind of the authorities. "In India we must have space", Butler echoed Hardinge. "We could not breathe with a Champs-Elysees. With something like the Ring at Vienna and a road down the centre with smaller and more graceful trees and provision for large assemblies", New Delhi was to be laid for the future.³⁹⁴ The government house was to retain a good view of Jama Masjid, but the perspective of Indraprastha, Humayun's Tomb, the Lodi tombs and Safdar Jung's mausoleum were incorporated into the scheme with the government house holding the commanding position.³⁹⁵ The imperial city of New Delhi was to draw legitimacy from the remnants of the empires of the past.

VIII

EDUCATION WAS one of the principal instrument of state policy. Over the years the British educational system in India had produced a literate professional middle class. As it happened, however, the Hindu upper classes were the chief beneficiaries while the Muslim community stood by watching opportunities slip away. Syed Ahmed Khan made a bold attempt to retrieve the situation. The Aligarh movement grew in momentum but it was sectarian and uneven. Educational development among the Muslims intensified factionalism within the community. The Simla deputation of 1906 was an attempt to patch up internal infighting by forging a united political programme and, consequently, a common sense of belonging.³⁹⁶ The partition of Bengal and the separate electorate were parts of the official prescription to the process. They were designed to assist the growing crystallisation of a separate Muslim identity not quite compatible

with the objectives of what was known in official circles as an essentially "Hindu" national consciousness. The period between 1905 and 1911 witnessed almost a revolutionary convulsion primarily occasioned by the partition agitation and strengthened by the weakness of so-called moderate opinion giving rise to extremism and violence.³⁹⁷ The problem was complex. The management of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League involved a close scrutiny of the existing social forces, a search for a moderating influence and a sympathetic disposition towards the conservative elements in the society. The educational policy of Hardinge reflected his quest for an effective collaborating stratum and an endeavour to engineer institutional channels to assist this political process. The overriding consideration was to indoctrinate the developing minds with an official *weltanschauung*. Butler was his supreme commander on this front. Intelligent, shrewd and unscrupulous he had a remarkable acquaintance with contemporary Hindu and Muslim opinions. Determined to offer a blueprint for the educational system Butler entered whole-heartedly into the concepts and ideas propounded by Hardinge. As a result, there developed a close official and demi-official correspondence between the two, dealing with subjects which went far beyond the narrow departmental requirements.

Hardinge's perspective of the problem of education was largely conditioned by the compulsion of the security of the state. By June 1911 he had come to the conclusion that the defects of the system constituted a "scandal and a danger".³⁹⁸ Reviewing the existing educational pattern in India, he found that it was a collection of bad teachers, huge classes, overloaded curriculae and wooden examinations which had produced a system of cramming, aggravated rather than relieved by tightening up of standards. As a result, he detected, the rancour and malevolence of the educational staff especially in the aided schools and the rigidity of examinations spelled unrest.³⁹⁹ The courses were still largely literary and paucity of

funds was responsible for the failure to introduce the practical school course recommended by the commission of 1882. What fretted him was the fact that private and uncontrolled institutions had sprung up everywhere. He was daunted to find that the national schools of Bengal, the Arya Samaj schools and the new Sikh schools were to become the "forerunners of other uncontrolled institutions".⁴⁰⁰ There was still time for the government to regain control and to lead a movement of national education. "But if we delay", Hardinge was apprehensive, "we shall find control slipping through our fingers".⁴⁰¹

In view of the meagre resources available to the government and the improbability of fresh taxes Hardinge felt inhibited. A programme costing ten crores of rupees was nevertheless worked out and released. Financed primarily by existing resources it involved primary, secondary, technical and university education. Hostels, fellowships, residential universities, preparation of a national catalogue of manuscripts, a central library and oriental institutions formed the various wings of the new educational policy. Hardinge was in complete agreement with Butler regarding the necessity of associating Indians "with us in discussing and deciding upon schemes for educational reforms".⁴⁰² He was naturally disappointed to find that the proposal for a grant from the British exchequer towards technical education in India as a boon associated with the royal visit was rejected by the cabinet. He was, however, fortunate to be presented with the "opium windfall" of which one third was to be devoted to education and sanitation.⁴⁰³ The object of the new educational policy, it was maintained, was "to consolidate solidarity with Indians and ourselves".⁴⁰⁴ Examining the details of the policy more candidly Hardinge was to lay bare his preferences.

Technical education, Hardinge maintained, was his first priority. His purpose was to direct young men to industrial and commercial lines and not to swell the ranks of pleaders and journalists. Hardinge was critical of the free

and compulsory education demanded by Gokhale. He was positive that the primary concern of Gokhale was to create educated-discontent in rural areas amongst a class of ryots which has hitherto been impervious to the agitators and without whom they felt that no movement in the country could acquire any serious proportion.⁴⁰⁵

Gokhale's demand caused universal indignation in official quarters. Sydenham, for example, was sceptical of the benefits of free elementary education even without compulsion. It would only please the people, he portended, who were well aware of the power the native press would be able to exercise when the masses could read.⁴⁰⁶ It was argued that the reason for the neglect of primary education and disproportionate development of higher education was the fact that all clamour, till recent years, had been directed towards an increase of the latter. This meant that the poor had been taxed to provide education for the comparatively well-to-do. It rendered the educational pyramid top-heavy. Sydenham believed that the educated class, having vociferated and secured significant advantages at a very small cost, discovered that they could not wield influence as they desired because of the illiteracy of the masses. The agitators, he attempted to comprehend the situations, ought to have realised that their power to stir up discontent would be immensely increased if the cultivators could read.⁴⁰⁷ Such elementary education as it was possible for the British to impart during the following fifty years, it was maintained, would have still left the bulk of the population illiterate. "We cannot teach the great masses of the people long enough or thoroughly enough to make them permanently able even to read or write", Sydenham concluded, "but we can, and we shall, do much to promote general discontent." In that part of their alleged diabolical calculation, it was argued, "the Gokhales are perfectly right".⁴⁰⁸

The grant of elementary education, it was held, would be interpreted by Gokhale and others, who had been

working against the British, as a great triumph. Sydenham was alarmed by the prospect. He voiced the opinion of the vast majority of civil servants when he reiterated that "a handful of noisy people without any mandate are seeking to restrict the liberties of the vast majority".⁴⁰⁹ Hardinge had been in complete agreement with his men. But he took stock of the situation and calculated that the grant of free primary education without any compulsion might take the wind out of Gokhale's sails.

The original proposal of Butler had been to offer free compulsory primary education. In advancing the programme he maintained that it was the only way to undermine and eradicate inferior private schools and that cheerful prospect must be brought about in a few years' time. He contended that it would be a serious political error to let the Sikh and the Arya Samaj schools get a stronghold on the people, not to mention the national schools of Bengal, "languishing, at present, owing to the inveterate inefficiency of the Bengalee, but able to rise again with fresh vigour at any time on a new impulse". The administration was determined to save a loyal and traditional India from falling into the "pernicious influence" of modern nationalism.⁴¹⁰

The changing face of Sikhism, for example, was viewed with serious concern by the government of India. In its civil aspects, it was maintained, Sikhism "inculcates unquestioning loyalty", and in its military aspect the administration saw into it elements of "highest heroism and self-sacrifice."⁴¹¹ It was feared that without government patronage the Sikhs would shortly lose their distinctive character, revert to "gross superstition and social deterioration", and also divest themselves of their celebrated feeling or loyalty under the influence of two proselytising religions, "Arya Samajism" and "Mohamedanism." The government was relieved to find that the traditional Sikh leadership, scornful of the B.As. and M.As. who had their heads full of political ideas and anti-British senti-

ments, insisted on state intervention.⁴¹² The only way to do so, Creigh proposed, was to keep true orthodox Sikhism alive and to check the spread of the explosive "Tat Khalsa" propaganda under the guise of free education. Thus, it was decided that the programme for the education of Punjab chiefs at Lahore be shifted to the Khalsa College at Amritsar in order to preserve their Sikh identity and Gurmukhi could be introduced as the alternative language of the Punjab despite bitter opposition of the Muslims.⁴¹³

Hardinge was to commend and welcome the core of official arguments. He ratified the opinion of the civil servants that the existing schools "were thoroughly bad" and "nurseries of sedition", and that a discontented underpaid, malcontent and restive Brahmin teacher "finds the inculcation of dislike of the British government a more grateful task than that of grinding in the three Rs."⁴¹⁴ Sydenham argued that although it might be expedient to meet popular demand half-way the official gift might soon be turned into a stick with which to belabour the government.⁴¹⁵ But the viceroy had decided to offer something spectacular in order to fire the imagination of India. He had recognised the mischievous motivation of Gokhale's bill and discerned its popular base. Without conceding to Gokhale's demand, Hardinge persuaded himself to believe that it would be possible to knock the bottom out of his bill by an official proposal in favour of technical education. It would, Hardinge wrote in defence of his policy, direct young men to industry and commerce and it might thus even sharpen the inherent contradiction between the professional and commercial classes and exacerbate the existing tensions. Strict government control of schools backed by a number of small residential universities under official supervision catering to the need of mushroom elites based on religious, linguistic or traditional loyalties of the localities were to constitute the various aspects of the new policy.⁴¹⁶ It was subtle. It desired to fecundate the Indian literati with latent regional

particularisms and local antagonisms. Hardinge blessed the promoters of the Aligarh and the Benaras university movements; Patna university was contemplated; another university in Rangoon and one in Poona were considered urgent future probabilities.

An examination of the history of the Aligarh university movement during this period would reveal the complexities of the problems faced by the Indian government and its flexible responses and postures. The most striking characteristic of the Muslim politics, Butler concluded, was its factionalism. The young generation in the Muslim League was being increasingly alienated both from the British rule and the old guards. The conflict between the younger party and the traditional leadership reflected something more than cold comfort or even strained misgivings arising out of an irreconcilable generation gap. It was one of attitudes, perspectives and ideologies. The cleavages within the League focussed on all major issues of the contemporary world in which the Indian Muslims had any interest.⁴¹⁷ The steady but gradual weakening of the Turkish empire, the lukewarm attitude of the British government towards what appeared to them as a Christian conspiracy against Islam, the threatened partition of Persia, the servile attitude of the Aga Khan towards the Indian government and the rise of pan-Islamism had a direct impact on Muslim opinion and, on all these issues, the younger party held diametrically opposite views to those held by their revered predecessors.⁴¹⁸

A prominent feature of the politics of the angry young men was their desire to free themselves from British patronage. The rift between the old guard and the Young Turks manifested itself in the Aligarh movement especially around the controversy concerning the founding of an independent Muslim university.⁴¹⁹ Butler and Hardinge had blessed it. Money was being raised all over India for the establishment of a centre of Islamic studies. It was more

than a social or an educational endeavour; it was a political movement. The government was not certain if the university would develop into an affiliating body extending its tentacles all over the country. In such a contingency it would have been left with little leverage to manipulate Muslim opinion. In all probability, it would then be confronted with a Muslim platform organised on an all India level which, if controlled by a militant party, might turn out to be a Frankenstein.⁴²⁰ Butler, who was conducting secret negotiations with the Aligarh party, felt that the younger element desired the university to develop its personality and its various faculties independent of government control. He was, however, quite optimistic and expected that they would eventually be outclassed by their seasoned adversaries. It was believed that as a sop some places of honour without authority might be offered to them in the Aligarh Trust. Butler felt comfortable in the company of the older generation who, though sulky and somewhat uncertain of their future, had no serious objection in accepting official guidance and direction.⁴²¹

There was, however, some opposition to the Aga Khan's movement in Bengal owing to the fact that the Bengali Muslims wanted money spent on Muslim education in their own province rather than on a university elsewhere.⁴²² It had been pointed out to Hardinge by them that the movement in favour of Aligarh university was only supported by a certain section of the Muslim community of northern India. The viceroy was to indulge himself that he had but to hold up his little finger to encourage the Muslims of Bengal to declare that they had nothing to do with it and to wreck the Aga Khan's scheme.⁴²³ Of course, Hardinge would have never contemplated to pursue such a course of policy for the fear of alienating "from us the largest and the most important section" of the community.⁴²⁴ He had resolved to placate them in every possible way. The "loyal bearing" of the Muslims of Lahore had been taken into account.⁴²⁵ He had urged the lieutenant-governor to pay adequate atten-

tion to the *Anjuman* and the Islamia schools. In particular, he had determined not to give the impression that he was a partisan to the already "swelled (sic) headed Sikhs".⁴²⁶ Hardinge was positive that the Muslim university would be followed by a counter Hindu demand and he had made up his mind to establish firm government control over both the institutions. He had, however, some practical difficulties in working out a proper *modus operandi*. A satisfactory settlement with the Muslim movement, he apprehended, might provoke the Hindu leadership to react sharply and resist state control. He thought it judicious to strike an agreement with the Hindu movement and to use it to pressurise the Muslims into submission. Leaderless, without an iota of statesmanship and under attack from the younger crowd, the traditional Aligarh party, it was noted with satisfaction, would certainly be a more manageable group.⁴²⁷ A confident Butler continued his pressure tactics. At a meeting with the Muslim deputation over the formation of the Muslim university he lectured and upbraided them on the desirability of British connections concluding with a threat that they would be left with no option but to accept governmental control. It was, he thundered, all "our terms or no university".⁴²⁸ Butler got his way and the deputation gave in on all points but the one concerning the previous approval by the chancellor to the appointment of professors. Butler was certain that a determined official effort would compel the Muslims to surrender that point as well and the Hindus, then demanding a university of their own, would eventually come round.⁴²⁹ The movements for separate universities had remarkable possibilities for the future. If properly guided, they would turn out to be important rallying points for the orthodox opinions of the communities. They would offer institutional frameworks for the consolidation of separate and distinct political identities of the Hindus and the Muslims. And, in all probability, they might be utilised to checkmate the threat of closer cooperation between the nationalistic forces which were then driving the Congress and the League to a joint action against imperialism.⁴³⁰

Hardinge accepted without reservation Butler's formulation that "we must lead movements now and not be led".⁴³¹

Butler was at his work earnestly. Rivalry between Mahmudabad and the Aga Khan was played upon; no concession was to be made on the question of professionship; they were encouraged to look forward to the appointment of the chancellor of the university by the government "not as a critic or controlling force" but one who would be active only in times of crisis; the Aga Khan was induced to accept government supervision by a vague suggestion of an offer of the vice-chancellorship with pro vice-chancellorship going to Mahmudabad.⁴³² But although the Aga Khan was reasonable he was under insistent pressure from the extremists who were ready as ever to disregard and disown him. The ascendancy of the Young Turks unnerved the government and the traditional leadership alike. Sydenham thought that Muslim opinion was being led by political adventurers and the new elective system was only helping them in their struggle for power within the League.⁴³³ The only safeguard against any malignant transformation of the character of the League was the absence of an effective leadership.

As the protracted negotiations continued to hang fire Hardinge moved a step forward. He offered them the power of affiliation with "adequate safeguards".⁴³⁴ But the India office adopted a callous and unmalleable line that the right of affiliation could not be extended to the university. On this rock the scheme foundered.⁴³⁵ The government of India felt let down; Hardinge grumbled and Butler growled. Mahmudabad was cautioned that it was his duty to remain a responsible leader, to contain agitation and to make the best of the unalterable facts. In case there was a political agitation, he was warned in plain words, they would never get a university.⁴³⁶

The deadlock over the question of affiliation forced the government to reshuffle its cards. It argued that it was pos-

sible to compensate the threatened loss of Aligarh loyalty by inspiring Islamia colleges all over India with a view to organising a more exclusive and stable Muslim support. Hardinge made it abundantly clear to all Islamic institutions that no outside college would be affiliated with either Benaras or Aligarh.⁴³⁷ Under the changed circumstances the best plan, as it presented itself to the government of India, would be "to increase our subvention, if necessary" and undertake to patronise Muslim education all over India. The Young Turks led by Mazharul-Haque and Mohamed Ali had clinched the issue in the Aligarh movement. Hewett reported from Lucknow that the ascendancy of the extremists in the movement had become practically unbridled.⁴³⁸ They recalled the agitation over the partition of Bengal and the subsequent concessions made to the agitators as a proof of the inadequacy of moderation as a political line and the need for activist politics.⁴³⁹ There was bitterness over the fact that an Aligarh without the right of affiliation would never be able to accommodate all the Muslims requiring Islamic education and religious influence. It was, therefore, viewed with dismay that the object of the fund raising, i.e. spread of the faith and spirit of Islam, had been lost.

The whole affair was whipped up by them with an intention to give a new direction to Muslim politics.⁴⁴⁰ In the subsequent meeting of the central committee of the Muslim university which met in Lucknow in the following October, attempts were made to organise an agitation on a national scale.⁴⁴¹ The situation was ominous. There was a general apprehension in government quarters that the Hindu and Muslim radicals were gradually being drawn together and this trend in Indian politics might lead to some uncomfortable political results for the British. *The Comrade* under Mohamed Ali's editorship advocated that the loyalty of the Muslims could no longer be taken for granted.⁴⁴² The Muslims were exhorted to demand a price for their assistance and to claim as rights all existing favours and future privileges. Pan-Islamism found a new

breeding ground, the Khilafat agitation of 1918 was being heralded, the Lucknow pact of 1916 was being anticipated and the objective conditions of Congress-League unity were being carefully nurtured.

The spectre of a united front of both communities haunted the government. Butler, as cool as ever, discounted such a probability. Amir Ali had dealt with the offer of cooperation by the Hindus with cool detachment and Butler believed that the Muslims would behave with self-restraint.⁴⁴¹ The deep seated antagonism between the two communities, he asserted, would prevent any meaningful rapprochement between them.⁴⁴⁴ On the contrary, he presumed that the Hindus might as well try to demonstrate that they were more faithful and trustworthy and he sought to elicit an extravagant display of loyal sentiments from Malaviya and others. Yet, despite his optimism, he was not oblivious to the implications of the kaleidoscopic political scene and looked askance at the shortsightedness of the home government.⁴⁴⁵ The only silver lining in Indian political life was Carmichael's report from Bengal to the effect that pan-Islamic arguments did not cut any ice in that province. To the Bengali Muslims, both Turkey and Aligarh were remote realities. As the Aga Khan left India and young Muslims everywhere continued to talk "big and bitterly", Butler was definitely rattled.⁴⁴⁶ Many of them probably did not understand what affiliation meant, but there was no denying that the Muslims were incensed. There was a "pan-Islamic" flavour about the idea of a central university having branches all over India. It was certain that the Young Turks would have their way in the annual sessions in December and subsequently, in the course of the year, the old ones would merely try to regain their position. But, as the Aga Khan had confided to Chirol, one could not minimize the intensity of the anti-British feelings which British failure to help Turkey coming on the top of Morocco, Tripoli and Persia had engendered.⁴⁴⁷ The Indian Muslims, as a result, were being

swayed to join hands with the Hindu politicians against the British. It seemed to the Aga Khan that some of the Hindu leaders had been working very actively to this end and one of them had been trying to get a telegram from the *Sheikh-ul-Islam* to the Indian National Congress thanking the Hindus for their sympathy over Turkey.⁴⁴⁸

Hardinge and Butler worked relentlessly if only to freeze the situation. Recommending a non-affiliating residential university to Darbhanga Hardinge adopted tactfully a somewhat conciliatory posture. Darbhanga had undertaken to guide the Hindu university movement with the viceroy's "hearty countenance and support".⁴⁴⁹ He was casually assured that the question of affiliation was not a closed book and that it might be reviewed if necessary. A similar strategy was earmarked for Aligarh and an equally freakish promise was floated for the consumption of the conservative Muslim leadership.⁴⁵⁰ Hardinge endorsed the Aga Khan's solicitude about the growing anti-British feelings; but he would insist that it was expedient to assess the reality of the situation and make the best use of it. He admonished Rampur that nothing would be gained by agitation and it would only harden the government's attitudes. "I hinted that if they behaved nicely", Hardinge reported in confidence, "we shall look after their special interests."⁴⁵¹ Butler was encouraged to renew his personal contacts with the members of the Foundation Committee to canvass for government's views.⁴⁵² The young Muslim party was still underrated in official circles. It was disregarded as a political light weight, and yet no one could afford to ignore it because of the harm it was capable of doing.⁴⁵³

An explosive complication in the Muslim politics was being engineered by the Ali brothers who sought to link the Turkish question with Aligarh with a heavy dose of pan-Islamism injected into it. The quick and unexpected defeat of the Turks at the Balkans intensified Muslim alie-

nation. Hardinge thought that it might instil some realism into the minds of the Indian Muslims who needed to put a "good deal of water in their wine". The government of India, nevertheless, found itself somewhat awkwardly placed. It was uncertain about its ability to tap the advantages of the altered situation. Asquith's unstatesmanlike excursion in foreign affairs in the Morrison House speech emphasising that the victors were not to be "deprived of their spoils" in order to placate the supporters of "the bag and baggage" policy dealt a serious blow to the loyalty of Indian Muslims.⁴⁵⁵ A much disturbed viceroy bent forward and backward to retrieve the situation. To Ali Imam, a member of his council, he expressed his sincere sympathy for the sufferings of the Turks and the heroic stoicism with which they bore them.⁴⁵⁶ "After all", Hardinge, following the footstep of many viceroys before him, claimed quite extravagantly that "Britain is the greatest Mohammedan power in the world, and the Government of India is the greatest safeguard of the Mohammedan religion".⁴⁵⁷

Such official palliatives were of little consequence. Sydenham was to convey from Bombay that the Aga Khan, the best bet of the government, had gone over, "horse, foot and artillery, to the Congress", although his real views were against the Congress.⁴⁵⁸ Amir Ali had been undermining his position in the League.⁴⁵⁹ Outwitted and somewhat dated, having little contact with the realities of Muslim politics in India, the Aga Khan decided to sail with the rising tide.⁴⁶⁰ A baffled Sydenham lamented the lack of moral courage in his old friend. The government had been working on him quite seriously.⁴⁶¹ Chirol had guided him to face the music of political Islam in the annual Christmas meet in 1912. Both on Aligarh and the Balkan war the Aga Khan had been goaded into backing the government's horse to the hilt. Now that he opted for virtually the Congress line on the simultaneous examinations, Chirol was visibly distressed. The Aga Khan's stand, he

complained, was a complete surrender of the position adopted by him and the Muslim League at the Simla deputation and throughout the struggle for special Muslim representation on the enlarged councils. "I did not see how in view of your present attitude and that of the Muslims towards the Congress platform", a demoralised Chirol reproved a dejected Aga Khan, "in matters of simultaneous examinations and of self government, the Mohammedans could uphold their demands or expect to obtain the support of others such as myself in upholding their demand for communal representation."⁴⁶² Sydenham regretted that ignorant, young and impetuous men were in command of the Muslim movement. The moderate men were nowhere. "I imagine that the Aga Khan is dead as a leader."⁴⁶³ Butler had threatened his friend, Mahmudabad, not to do anything foolish. "It is perfectly childish", he affirmed, "to run up against a brick wall. There is not the least chance that the decision will be rescinded. We had, as you know, done our best for you."⁴⁶⁴ None of the custodians of the *Raj* could, however, freeze the political situation which was steadily moving away from them. In an atmosphere of sheer desperation the government of India reviewed the situation, made necessary adjustments in its attitudes and formulated the broad features of its new strategy.

Once again Butler was to take the lead. He contested seriously the assertion made by many that the so-called splendid loyalty of the Muslims, which had once existed, had been mismanaged into opposition. He had been intensely involved in the foundation of the Muslim League which had been formed at the initiative of Mohsin-ul-Mulk and others who had sought Butler's advice.⁴⁶⁵ The immediate impulse for the formation of the League had come because of the ascendancy of the younger men.⁴⁶⁶ He had extended his helping hand to them but gradually he realised that the movement had ceased to have any effective leader. The Aga Khan was "clever" but a wavering "weather cock"; Mahmudabad was "weak as water" and so

was Rampur who was "unreliable to boot."⁴⁰⁷ The Nawab of Dacca hated Aligarh and all its works "as much as he hated the Agha Khan". Wazir Hasan, the secretary of the League, "was a born intriguer", a "mischievous fellow", and a "Shia, who played on Mahmudabad's religious weakness", having great influence on him.⁴⁶⁸ At Allahabad, Nawab Abdul Majid, though not quite pleased with the follies of the Young Turks desired to start a rival body to the League.⁴⁶⁹ "Currimbhoy Ibrahim at Delhi asked me to intervene", Butler was to indulge himself, "as all Moham-medans were becoming discredited for the faults of a few." An Oudh Muslim notable implored him to get Mahmudabad out of the existing political *cul-de-sac* as the Young Turks were merely squandering his wealth with the least desire to follow him.⁴⁷⁰ They had decided to have an "incompetent old gentleman", Vicar-ul-Mulk, "who does not know English", as the first chancellor of the university.⁴⁷¹ The Begam of Bhopal fulminated against the Aga Khan whose flight from India was generally criticised. Butler would ascribe his downfall in north India to his attempt to reconcile the Hindus and the Muslims—"an object", he taunted, "as to which it can only be said *opposuit natura*."⁴⁷² In Bihar, Butler wailed, the Muslim lawyers relied on the munificence of Hindu clients and hence, had always been "lukewarm separatists".⁴⁷³ Ali Imam, the viceroy's councillor, Butler whispered, was mistrusted by the Muslims of the United Provinces and the Punjab and his brother, the judge, "still more so".⁴⁷⁴ Aligarh was falling into general disrepute.

The complete map of the Indian Muslim world, as drawn by Butler, followed an interesting pattern. In the frontier and eastern Bengal Muslims had little sympathy with the Turks and disliked Aligarh. The Punjab Muslims were strongly provincial. In a private meeting about Muslim education, Butler had found it difficult to keep peace between Mahmudabad and the Malik, who represented the Punjab Muslims. He demanded that the subscription to the

Aligarh fund by the Punjab university be returned for the development of the Islamia college, Lahore. In Bombay, Muslims were equally jealous of Aligarh and wanted a college of their own. Butler trod across an unreal world as he is his effusive enthusiasm reported that there was not much excitement among the Muslims regarding Turkey. Even in Aligarh district, he indulged in wishful thinking, Muslim reaction towards Turkey was minimal. "There is a tendency", Butler made his best efforts to detect, "to isolate Aligarh", and he thought that it would be wise to foster this trend. He was concerned that things might not improve while Theodore Morison was at the India office and with Hewett and Meston mismanaging affairs at Aligarh.⁴⁷⁵ Examining the proposed policy in greater detail, Butler put it bluntly that if the government agreed to subvene the Islamia colleges in Peshawar and Lahore, the projected colleges at Bombay, Dacca and perhaps also at Calcutta, "Aligarh will cease to hold the position it has got now".⁴⁷⁶ All this would be done, he suggested, in furtherance of Muslim education drawing the plaudits of the Indian Muslims in general.

In addition, the government should settle with the Hindu University movement and it was calculated that the Hindus would not offer any substantial resistance. Butler thought that the Muslims would then have no *locus standi*. They were riddled by too many divisions. Even the influence of Mohamed Ali and Mazharul Haque, Butler held optimistically, was declining. Roos-Keppel transmitted from the frontier that the Islamia school at Peshawar was being nourished by loyal traditions and the new college would prove a valuable barrier against Indian nationalist sentiments especially against Aligarh.⁴⁷⁷ By the end of April 1913 Butler watched gleefully the Muslim imbroglio and sized up the acute dissension amongst them especially between those of Lucknow and Bombay.⁴⁷⁸ He was informed that the Young Turks were fast falling into discontent, that Mohamed Ali seemed repentant, that Mahmudabad was

inclined to believe that people would turn round to moderate views within three or four months, and Amir Ali had been accused of embezzling Red Crescent funds.⁴⁷⁹ The attitude of the government towards the young Muslim leadership, as a consequence, became increasingly tough and determined.

The government fumbled, faltered and finally limped into a sort of symbiotic relationship with the Muslims. Early in February 1913 Mohamed Ali and Abdul Latif of the Indian Civil Service met the secretary of the viceroy. They were uneasy about Muslim feelings in North India and urged that the government should seek to neutralise Muslim sulkiness. They insisted that viceroy must do something to sympathise with them especially over Tripoli, Morocco, Persia, Turkey and Aligarh. The Muslims of India, they represented, were hurt by the concerted European pressure on Turkey and felt chagrined by the speech of Asquith in support of the allies.⁴⁸⁰ In fact, Latif had been working on Mohamed Ali, with uncertain prospects, to use his influence to moderate rising passion.⁴⁸¹ The situation, from the British point of view, looked awkward and murky as a section of the Bengal Muslim League was even prepared to push through a boycott resolution. The viceroy desired to know if Asquith could be made to eat his own words.⁴⁸² He had entreated the governments of the Punjab and the United Provinces to lecture the Muslim editors in British policy and to use the influence of the *ulamas* and *Mullas* to publicise the overflowing emotions of the British government in favour of the Muslim cause.⁴⁸³ The viceroy took comfort from the fact that the Muslim League had made "a very poor show at Lucknow".⁴⁸⁴ He complained against Muhamad Shafi who "seemed to have talked a lot of nonsense", having proposed increased power of interpellation and the creation of a non-official majority in the viceroy's legislation council.⁴⁸⁵ There was a familiar ring about his arguments. Advanced politicians from the Congress platform time and again

expressed similar ideas. "I need hardly say that so long as I am Viceroy", Hardinge resolved, "I will take very good care that there is no increased power of interpellation in my Council, and that any Government would never agree to a non-official majority in it either."⁴⁸⁶ He approved of Butler's suggestion that the government ought to foster the tendency to isolate Aligarh.⁴⁸⁷ The envisaged strategy would have meant a significant shift in British policy. It would have entailed a generous assistance to the Islamia college at Peshawar and Lahore and the projected colleges of Bombay and Dacca and a fresh official encouragement to the Hindu university. He was, as a necessary adjunct, eager to let the Aligarh movement stew in its own gravy. He characterised the League as a flock of sheep without a shepherd. It wanted to do something but it did not know what to do or how to do it and it had nobody to advise. The Aga Khan was a spent force and the government prayed and looked forward to welcoming some even-headed men pushing their way to the front to assume its leadership.⁴⁸⁸

As the Muslim university got a cold shoulder, it was time for the Hindu university to get an official recognition. The Muslim university movement was at a low ebb; it crashed headlong against the proposed official control. The discomfiture of the Muslim university encouraged the promoters of the Hindu university. The main obstacle had been governmental control which in the changed circumstances might, it was assured, prove less intractable. Butler was aware of the difficulties. "If you know what has been going on recently at Calcutta University and places like Aligarh, Central Hindu College and the Sikh Colleges at Amritsar", he wrote to enlist support for his cause, "you would realise the grave danger that exists in these universities" if they were converted into "cheap degree shops."⁴⁸⁹

The opposition against government supervision and control came primarily from the "Bengalis and Besant's

party".⁴⁹⁰ In contrast, Malaviya appeared very "reasonable" while Rash Behari Ghose most amenable.⁴⁹¹ Darbhanga, Bikaner, Mysore, Gwalior, Scindia and Holkar were eager to launch the university at the earliest convenience and Jaipur had also joined the company of the royal educationists. The Hindu orthodoxy was eager to score a point over the Muslim counterpart.⁴⁹² It was indignant about the Bengalis and Beasant's party. "The Bengalis", Malaviya groused, had "ruined India over the partition and they are doing their best to ruin our University."⁴⁹³ He and his friends had closed their ranks. Butler, persuasive as ever, worked on them. He had italicized the conditions under which the university movement might be considered and recognised by the government. He had instructed that the Hindus ought to approach the government as a body; that a strong, efficient and financially viable college with an adequate European staff should form the nucleus of the scheme; that they should promise and work for the foundation of a modern university, primarily teaching and residential, offering religious instructions and that the proposed university must accept some measure of government control and supervision.⁴⁹⁴

In defence of official direction Butler rationalised that the university, being an all India institution with a theology department as the pan-Indian core, state control for guaranteeing standards was indispensable. "These Hindu professors of an autonomous university will be charged with the working of a western idea." Butler philosophised: "We must, therefore, put it into a shape in which it can be worked; a university is not an Indian institution, which Indians will naturally hammer into shape. It is a western institution and the University of Benaras, in particular, owes its genesis to the existence of Oxford and Cambridge. When the Bill is in Committee, it will be the business of Oxford and Cambridge men to make sure that they have effectively enabled Hinduism to express itself in English academic terms."⁴⁹⁵

Hardinge was resolute to get the university going for he believed that it might ultimately soften the determined obstinacy of the Muslims if merely out of jealousy. He instructed Butler to carry the committee with him and to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. That the India office's terms for the creation of the Hindu university had not met with a very favourable reception in the press, he considered, might assist Butler in the process. He apprehended that the question of chancellorship with strong centralising pulls might become the most difficult nut to crack. In view of the possible adverse turn of events the viceroy had mixed feelings about the India office's decision on this point.⁴⁹⁶ As an apparently innocent way out of the intractable question of affiliation, Hardinge hinted softly that it could be safely postponed till the new university proved itself worthy.⁴⁹⁷

There was, however, another problem related to the office of chancellorship and the extent of control to be exercised by the government. While a government official was to be nominated as chancellor of the new university it was envisaged that the balance of advantage lay on the side of making the head of the province rather than the viceroy, the chancellor. The arrangement would not be an ideal one, Meston certified, as there was bound to be much unpleasantness and "national" aspirations, both Muslim in the case of Aligarh and Hindu in the case of Benaras, were likely to resist governmental intervention or restraint.⁴⁹⁸ But the government had an unshaken belief that for a long time to come constant vigilance and general control of the universities would be necessary.⁴⁹⁹ It was, therefore, considered desirable that the chancellor ought to be someone with authority to advise and power to insist, if need be, on his advice being accepted. Thus anyone other than the head of the province could not suitably be put in the position. The government, therefore, decided to take a firm stand on it and fight along the whole ground and get it over in one engagement rather than "to

have guerilla warfare over a long period and a scattered field."⁵⁰⁰ Meston thought that the Hindus would not seriously cross swords with the government although they would like the viceroy as the chancellor, "in accord with that universal tendency to fly as high as possible which is incidental to one of the most persistent and insidious features of the Nationalist programme."⁵⁰¹ With the Muslims, the all India conception was at that moment very strong but it was anticipated that a satisfactory settlement with the Hindu movement might induce them to come forward.⁵⁰²

Meston and Butler continued their negotiations with Darbhanga, Bikaner, Sunder Lal and Malaviya. By July 1914 the first draft of the terms was finalised. The proposal to make the lieutenant-governor of UP the chancellor was not acceptable to the Hindu promoters. Thus a compromise was struck to the effect that the chancellor would be elected and vested with only ornamental powers while real authority would be held by the government, the viceroy enjoying emergency power as the patron and the lieutenant-governor ordinary power as ex-officio visitor.⁵⁰³ The Hindus had not got, Butler chirped, all they had asked for but they had got a lot more than many people would have given them.⁵⁰⁴ The viceroy, in his turn, was anxious to take advantage of the Hindu obsession with forms rather than content. "In this way", he giped, "they are willing to give up all the substance of power while getting rid of the feature of the Lt. Governor as Chancellor to which they are strongly opposed since they say it will rob the University of its All-India character."⁵⁰⁵ Butler was equally eloquent about the merit of the bargain. The government had met the university committee, he commented with an air of condescension, more than half-way and "after all, ours is a world of comparisons and compromises".⁵⁰⁶ Hardinge recommended the terms of settlement to the India office warmly urging its immediate acceptance. "It will have a great effect in this country amongst the Hindus", he wrote, "and it is very desirable to placate them as much as possible

during the course of the present war."⁵⁰⁷ The formula did not contain, he made it clear, any feature sufficient to condemn it and if pushed through quickly the tiresome question would be "cut of the way".⁵⁰⁸

The whole scheme for university education in India, as designed by Butler and Hardinge, had a sharp bureaucratic flavour about it. There was a determination to introduce well-marked features of control. Small residential universities reflecting the social, traditional or religious prejudices of the region under the effective control of the government were the distinctive features of the new scheme. Academic standards and values were discussed in a very general way. Examining the inadequacies of the existing educational system Ramsay Muir, who in March 1914 produced a remarkable memorandum⁵⁰⁹ on university education in India, concluded: "In India... with the object of maintaining the value of the degree, an attempt has been made to standardise the work of the colleges by entrusting the prescription of courses and the conduct of examinations to five central bodies called (incorrectly enough) Universities." This tended to develop a shrewd instinct for "the kind of things likely to be asked". Ramsay Muir added: "It is a little surprising that the graduates produced by the system are seldom men of independent minds. They have only been taught to remember not to criticise or understand. Spoon-fed on text books they are the slaves of the printed words, and having never been trained to examine the evidence for assertion, they must, when they find two assertions in conflict, be left by their prejudices in choosing between them." He believed that Butler's scheme reproduced the existing system "in a modified and slightly improved form".⁵¹⁰

Viewing the schemes as a whole, Muir was regretfully driven to the conclusion that though it marked an advance in the generosity of provision for teaching, it did not in any sense constitute a solution to the problem. It was a very

*costly scheme but much of the money was wasted on the provision of elaborate residences, playing fields and a large number of ill-qualified teachers for a mass of unsuitable students. "It is", Ramsay Muir wrote, "a great opportunity lost."*⁵¹¹ The official committee had begun by accepting the aim of a university as being the production of innumerable B. As, trained on a fixed curriculum which could be handled in the weakest colleges, and the only advance that they made was that of foisting upon India an entirely unsuitable and ludicrous reproduction of Oxford, "in the hope that this improved plant and machinery will increase efficiency of the B.A. factories". Even the appointment of permanent chairs in Calcutta, Madras and Allahabad and the "cold weather lecturers" from England in Calcutta and Punjab as a means of earning for the universities a reputation for the conduct of research "might be compared to the tying of purchased branches of grapes to the branches of unfruitful vines"⁵¹² with superficial effect.

But Ramsay Muir was of little consequence to Butler, Hardinge or Crewe. The whole scheme was a political dodge and not a step in educational policy. The object of new policy, Hardinge did not mince words, was "stringest governmental control, not on account so much of the Mohammedans as on account of the Hindus",⁵¹³ so that effective governmental constriction could be extended over the universities, if and when, they are established. The ultimate goal, as Crewe expounded, was the creation of residential universities at important centres all over India "taking their colours from the religious and other traditions of their provinces", inspiring educated Indians with competitive, religious and regional loyalties.⁵¹⁴ This would be supplemented by reducing the size and importance of the existing universities and enforcing strict government supervision. The political objective would be obtained by an open recognition of distinct national characteristics of the various small centres of higher education. A Muslim Oxford at Aligarh, a Leeds at Dacca for Muslim Bengal, a Hindu

Liverpool at Benaras and probably a Bihari London at Patna or a Maratha St. Andrew's at Poona could be, both Hardinge and Crewe seemed to concur with Butler, an effective prescription to the political problems of India caused by the rebels in the godowns of the universities.

IX

GOKHALE'S COMPULSORY primary education bill laid bare the inherent contradiction between Indian nationalism and British imperialism, the in-built weakness of the British government in the face of genuine national demand and the attitudes of its reactionary core in the Indian civil service. The administration was terrified by the prospect of a mass movement. It had become increasingly inflexible over the years; its responses to the Indian demands were spontaneous and necessarily in the negative. The immobility of the official mind was complete as the home government decided to send over to India a royal enquiry commission to report on the public services.⁵¹⁵ The Islington committee, as it was known, struck panic into the hearts of the civil servants in India. In particular, they were infuriated by the impolitic interference of the home government and parliament in the problems confronting the autocratic government of British India. The presence of Gokhale and Ramsay MacDonald in the committee cast a gloomy spell over them.⁵¹⁶ They were convinced that the primary function of the royal commission would be to suggest means to curb their monopoly of power.

Hardinge sympathised with their sentiments. Early in January 1912 he hastened to offer suggestions to the cabinet about the terms of reference of the commission. The viceroy thought that the royal commission ought to examine and report on the following matters in connection with the Indian civil and other services: the method of recruitment and the system of training and probation; the conditions of

service, salary, leave and pension; the admission of competent Indians to a larger share in the appointments; and the working of the provincial system.⁵¹⁷ The viceroy's recommendations were accepted by the cabinet. It was agreed that Islington was to investigate partly in public and partly in camera in order to enable British officials to discuss controversial matters without any restraint and the Indian officials to speak their mind without being intimidated by the opinions of their countrymen.⁵¹⁸ The home government was however, both inattentive and sluttish about the whole scheme and Hardinge complained of its being perfunctory as he noted helplessly that his government was not being taken into confidence.

The hostility of the civil service to the members of the commission was vehement. Sydenham dubbed Islington, much to the amusement of Hardinge, "quite second-rate in ability",⁵¹⁹ Ramsay MacDonald, "a self-proclaimed enemy of the Imperial idea", who "should never have been allowed to touch India officially",⁵²⁰ and Morison, "an authority on India and education in a limited sense", whose judgment on general questions was "worthless."⁵²¹ In any case, "the encounters of an English university educationist with the Indian civil servants would be perfectly useless and probably dangerous".⁵²² Sydenham said ditto to Hardinge that Gokhale ought on no account be appointed and should not be "forced upon you".⁵²³ In fact, Sydenham put up the most stubborn resistance on behalf of the civil service which, he prescribed, required delicate handling at the time. He was distressed to discover that the ICS had been losing popularity, and if Ramsay MacDonald and Gokhale were turned loose upon it, there would be serious unrest "Unless we carefully maintain the ability, the social status and the morale of the ICS", Sydenham stressed, "I do not see how India is to be governed. There is already the danger of gradual decadence. It is madness to inspire the service with distrust."⁵²⁴ He disliked paying MacDonald out of Indian revenues to come to India for the purpose of

causing trouble for the India government.⁵²⁵ The civil servants were vehemently opposed to the idea of increasing importance of parliament in Indian affairs.⁵²⁶ In this respect, they thought that the Morley-Minto regime had left behind a "legacy of trouble" having sanctioned the precedence of the India office over the government of India.⁵²⁷ They were frightened by the prospect of a possibility that evil customs in a great office, such as the India office, might drift and persist for ever and, as a consequence, the governor-general might be reduced to the position of a servile servant of the secretary of state.⁵²⁸

Chirol, a close associate of the viceroy and the representative of the ICS in the commission, was struck by the cavalier manner in which the commission was given to conduct itself.⁵²⁹ He caluminated that all the members from Britain "were in a desperate hurry to get through as quickly as possible".⁵³⁰ Sly, MacDonald and Morison were the only three men who were at work in earnest. He was startled by the ambivalent attitudes of the other members. The only idea that dominated the proceedings, he dissented, was "to work the thing through at a gallop".⁵³¹ Chirol was indignant with the scheduled programme of the commission. Even the important provinces, he maintained, would be disposed off in a fortnight, "with the civil and provincial services successfully cooked, eaten and digested".⁵³²

Hardinge himself shared the Indian services' distrust of the members of commission. Islington, the chairman, he maintained, was "not blessed with too much brains". Gokhale was "forced upon him as a Hindu" and he was regarded by Hardinge and his council "as the most dangerous enemy of British rule".⁵³³ MacDonald was credited with a perfidious intent to destroy the civil service. It was generally assumed that the sole purpose of the commission was to deprecate the Indian civil service which after all was believed to be the backbone of the administration.⁵³⁴

Hardinge was apprehensive that the commission had a morbid streak "of destruction rather than construction". "I fear that what they will attempt to destroy will be the executive branch of the Indian Civil Service."⁵³⁵ He was committed to an unimpaired executive authority for the bureaucracy. He saw no harm in employing Indians in the educational and public works departments. But he was concerned about the efficiency of the ICS and the strength of the European personnel in the executive branches of the government which appeared to him to be already "dangerously low".⁵³⁶ Hardinge anticipated with dismay that Gokhale would do his best to destroy it as his ultimate aim was the elimination of the British element entirely from the services.⁵³⁷

Chirol detected three major defects in the proceedings of the commission. The first was the indiscriminate use of statements without any guarantee to ensure the legitimacy of the claims made before the commission. The second was the publication of vague and ambiguous questions calculated to encourage exaggerated and erroneous views of the scope of the enquiry. Finally, there was the absence of any provision for taking evidence in camera.⁵³⁸ As a result, the Indian government was disquietened and the viceroy's council was irritated by the "utter irresponsibility" with which the commission was being conducted.⁵³⁹ It was alleged that Islington had been "under the thumb of Butler", who had made the blunder of impressing upon the chairman that Chirol was of no importance. Butler himself was obsessed by a paralysing scare of antagonising Gokhale and MacDonald.⁵⁴⁰ As a result, Hardinge murmured, the commission "was playing Gokhale's game admirably".⁵⁴¹ Racial feelings had been stirred up and the viceroy considered that such matters as the relative value and importance of the Indian and European members of the services ought not to have been discussed in public. He also contested the proposal of simultaneous examination in Britain and in India with a view to increasing the Indian element. Accord-

ing to him the best form of the enhanced membership of the Indians in the Indian civil service was the promotion of the ablest men of the provincial services into the ICS.

The Islington commission had also revived the question of granting commission to Indians. The viceroy squelched the pompous commander-in-chief who associated the claims for commission with the ruling princes. Such a demand by the princes could be politically ignored.⁵⁴² But it had been made by the new middle class, and a discreet Hardinge insisted that "we ought to devise a means to appease them".⁵⁴³ The viceroy thought some members of the commission were not taking things seriously and regarding it as "an opportunity for globe-trotting".⁵⁴⁴ He did not entertain the claim that new facts were brought to light in the evidence. On the contrary, it was clear to him that as a consequence of the proceedings of the commission the country had been seethed with racial feelings. It was, however, more than evident that the unwise denunciation of the executive and administrative capacities of the Indians by British civil servants before the commission enraged the Congress. Consequently, it was asserted, "the Indians rather overstated their case while the British somewhat minimised theirs".⁵⁴⁵ Hardinge crabbed that the commission was in the hands of MacDonald and Gokhale. He had always feared this and felt mortified. "I can imagine", he thought, "that Chirol must be simply boiling over with rage."⁵⁴⁶ Willingdon sympathised with him. The commission, he reported, was doing "a lot of harm and absolutely no good at all".⁵⁴⁷ The members were divided in their views and Islington was desperate to strike a compromise. He flustered; Chirol felt grumpy and Hardinge exhilarated himself by prognosticating the inevitable doom of the commission. "He (Islington) will, in the end, satisfy nobody, and his compromise will probably be rejected by the local governments and finally, by the government of India and that will be the end of their famous commission."⁵⁴⁸

The tension came to a head at the Madras session. MacDonald was scrupulously fair and, much to the surprise of Chirol, he remained arm in arm with his conservative colleague, Ronaldshay, Gokhale and Abdul Rahim seemed very anxious, Chirol grumbled, "to run both the Congress hound and the Mohammedan hare",⁵⁴⁹ which engendered bitter racial feelings. The atmosphere was charged with latent antagonism. As to the efficiency of Gokhale as a committee-man no one had any doubt.⁵⁵⁰ Chirol thought that he was "quite irreproachable" and that he combined brevity with alertness and precision, which could be contrasted with the long-winded and muddled-headed performance of the other members of the commission.⁵⁵¹ The proceedings were full of allegations and counter allegations and in such circumstances, a set of neat and useful recommendations could not be made.⁵⁵² An embittered Chirol urged Hardinge to talk frankly and informally with the commission about the future of British rule in India and the importance of the ICS.⁵⁵³ The united front of the civil servants had been weakened by factional in-fightings. Sly was in close correspondence with Montague; Butler's clique operated against Craddock while considerable Anglo-Indian animosity worked against Sydenham.⁵⁵⁴ "Ill-conceived, ill-constituted, ill-directed, the body can only do harm to India", declared Sydenham. "The attitude which it has permitted itself to take up towards its task is fatally wrong."⁵⁵⁵ Instead of seeking for facts, Sydenham concurred with Chirol, it had sought to extract opinions that suited the pronounced views of individual members. Repeatedly the official lobby complained bitterly of their importance in the face of Gokhale and MacDonald who succeeded in scoring their point in disparaging the ICS and the government.⁵⁵⁶

One of the important issues which disturbed the peace of the Indian civil service and to which the Indian educated opinion was, by and large, committed was the demand for the separation of the executive from the judiciary. What

irked them most was the obsession of the Islington committee with this idea. Meston believed that the question was going "to be the most troublesome legacy of the Commission".⁵⁵⁷ He pressed on behalf of the Indian civil services that if any alteration was contemplated in the existing status of the district officers he ought to be permitted to withdraw and reconsider his official recommendations regarding the larger employment of Indians in the civil services.⁵⁵⁸ Islington, it seemed, was working out a compromise, but the civil servants feared that even a half-way adjustment was not acceptable to the nationalist party.⁵⁵⁹ The officials, on the other hand, were not willing to budge from their position. They saw in the Congress demand for the separation of the judiciary from the executive an attempt to dislodge the hold of the Englishmen over the administration.⁵⁶⁰ Writing to Craddock, Meston assessed the Congress demands in most emphatic terms: "Their programme is simple and intelligible: remove the judiciary from all executive control, fill the judiciary entirely with Indians, and then paralyse the British executive government. Nothing short of that will satisfy the nationalists, and no amount of academic arguments need obscure their objectives."

Craddock was in tune with Meston. The separation of the executive functions from judicial at the district level, he warned, would accelerate the gradual process of disintegration of executive authority which had already begun to set in. He observed that the courts were slowly succumbing to the influence of the Bar and the Press. Such a process, he cautioned, was fraught with danger to the whole fabric of British rule in India.⁵⁶² He emphasised that good intentions for the protection of the people were not sufficient. "We must have", he reiterated, "the powers also."⁵⁶³ He advocated that all the members of the viceroy's executive council must be invited on the theme.⁵⁶⁴ He was suspicious of Ali Imam's credentials and he condemned Imam's expression of "extreme views" on the subjects in his

official note written as it was under "the quiet protection of his position as a member of the executive council."⁵⁶⁵

Hardinge held firm views on the subject. He informed Islington that it was a difficult question upon which there was a good deal of excited feeling in certain parts of the country and, especially, in Bengal.⁵⁶⁶ Daljit Singh, whose opposition to the Congress was notorious, developed the official case carefully. He thought that in the existing circumstances, when political crimes were on the ascendant, the government should not disturb the prevailing system of administration. He believed that the existing arrangement worked well and was perfect in itself, and the government should be firm in the face of a demand "which has only been one of the long-standing ambitions of the shrewd nationalists and is not actually wanted by the country".⁵⁶⁷ From the point of view of the administration, the district officer constituted a pivotal position in the government. He performed in his small local sphere, Daljit Singh maintained, all that the home secretary superintended in Britain and a good deal more for he was the representative of a "paternal", and not a "constitutional" government.⁵⁶⁸ The item of the separation of the judicial and executive functions had remained for more than a quarter of a century, "a conventional resolution on the Congress cause list", and any concessional step in this direction, he held, "would be headlong and disastrous."⁵⁶⁹ The viceroy's council was almost unanimous in its desire to resist the demand and the only exception was Ali Imam, and Craddock sought to explain away Ali Imam's obduracy on account of his being "an old Calcutta lawyer, and a glorified representative of his own profession".⁵⁷⁰ The time had come, Craddock urged, to take a firm stand. "If we give in now, the next demand will be to fill the Magistracy from the Bar and to leave the Civil Service for administration only. The ultimate outcome of this will be a miniature Calcutta High Court in every district with results that will be absolutely fatal to law and order."⁵⁷¹

Hardinge shared the views of his colleagues and impressed on Crewe that the separation of authorities, if conceded, would only weaken the administration and the chief beneficiaries would be the class of people who were interested in it—the pleaders and the *vakils*, who hoped to obtain some of the appointments. Hardinge repeated that there was no real demand for it apart from the *Congress-wallahs* of Bengal.⁵⁷² The matter had been rendered complicated and somewhat awkward by the assurance given by Henry Adamson who had promised to experiment with the scheme in at least two districts.⁵⁷³ But even in Bengal, it was felt, this experiment could not be carried out because the administration needed to be tightened up.⁵⁷⁴ Crewe sympathised with Hardinge. He was not in a hurry to see the report rushed through. He believed that on administrative matters it was not possible to be logical.⁵⁷⁵ The government had decided to wriggle out of the situation.⁵⁷⁶ It was also eager to minimise the differences of opinion on administrative reforms between the Indian and the British members.⁵⁷⁷ Hardinge was keen to freeze racial animosity which separate reports by the members of the commission would have certainly ignited and provoked. Gokhale seemed agreeable to a single report but his death deprived Hardinge of the opportunity.⁵⁷⁸ The government thought that the report contained little that could receive early effect without thorough examination. It consisted, Craddock maintained to the satisfaction of the viceroy's council, "a set of pernicious anomalies" which had grown up because of gradual grafting of issues and items. Besides those who had expected "a new heaven and a new earth" would be thoroughly disappointed.⁵⁷⁹ It would, in all probability, not satisfy anybody and there would be plenty of energetic people who would vilify it. Hence, Hardinge nudged the secretary of state, the best course to follow would be "to pigeon hole it for as long as possible".⁵⁸⁰ In any case, he requested, "whatever you do or decide upon, I trust that I shall not receive any reply to our despatch for at least a year and that then it will be of such a nature as to require

much consultation and discussion and reference to local governments".⁵⁸¹ He tactfully suggested that were the question taken up as to the cost of the application of such measures as the separation of the judiciary from executive in the whole of India, the result would be found to be prohibitive. The India office concurred.⁵⁸² The report of the commission was carefully lodged in the India office shelf to accumulate dust. The ICS heaved a sigh of relief. Hardinge chuckled as MacDonald and Islington were persuaded to maintain a discreet silence. The middle class in India was compelled to learn to live in peace with another broken pledge.

X

WEDDERBURN WAS one of those who sought to revive the faith of the British government in the National Congress. It was under attack from two distinct positions. It was disfavoured by a section of officials as an extremist organisation and assaulted by the "ultra nationalists" as an ineffective organisation paralysed by its own moderation. Wedderburn was anxious to strengthen the position of the Congress as the moderate and constitutional supporter of the government reforms.⁵⁸³ Thus he persuaded the Congress to prepare an address couched "in very respectable terms" stating the immediate demands of the organisation, such as, the separation of the judiciary from executive, increased grant to education and reduction of military expenditure. The Congress, Wedderburn pleaded, was not interested in asking for definite promises but only a sympathetic reply indicating generally the views taken by the government so as to show that the Congress was regarded as "a friendly and legitimate organisation".⁵⁸⁴ He tried to convince Hardinge that in the Congress there was a sincere desire to co-operate with the government, a feeling which would be much strengthened by the viceroy's sympathetic reply to that national organisation.

His advocacy made no impression on the civil services. Sydenham dismissed him as "rather dodderly", who was responsible for the rise of an unfounded accusation in Britain against "the blood thirsty government of India".⁵⁸⁵ He had failed to persuade Wedderburn to acknowledge the fact that India had completely changed since he had retired twenty three years ago and that the effect of the enlarged councils and the new powers conferred upon them had put an end to their grievances. He agreed with the views held by some of his colleagues that the Congress had no *locus standi* any more and had better die a natural death.

The Indian civil service, by and large, stood at this end of the spectrum. To them Indian nationalism was anathema. Sydenham surveyed the situation from the position of an administrator. He carefully assessed the nationalist movement as a whole. The real sedition, he propounded, was deeply rooted in the semi-educated class and, if its manifestation was masked by the misleading tranquillity in the society, it was still at work.⁵⁸⁶ "The so-called repressive measures", he added, "had had the effect of checking the spread of sedition which was proceeding steadily when I came to India."⁵⁸⁷ He deplored any attempt to adopt a policy of leniency. If ever, he reasoned, actions against seditious books, papers and plays under the Press Act or the Penal Code were suspended, active and open propaganda would promptly resurface. He would consent to approve Hardinge's perspective that the long and languid trials of political crimes, indiscriminately conducted, would constitute a threat to the political stability. Thus seditious cases must be taken to the courts only upon a most careful consideration.⁵⁸⁸ He concluded that in view of the king's visit supreme caution ought to be taken in prosecuting an alleged political criminal. He would, however, insist that this should not be a regular rule, that security from newspapers ought to be taken and that a general suspension of controls should not be ordered.⁵⁸⁹

The visit of the King and the prospect of a general relaxation of rules disturbed the law and order consciousness of the civil servants. If there was a drought the following year, they tried to raise a bugaboo, it would be impossible to arrange the visit though much money would have been spent in advance. "And in any case", Sydenham wrote in sheer desperation, "the effect will be to put back progress in many native states and to some extent in British India, while the jealousies, heart burnings, disappointments which it must create will rankle for years."⁵⁹⁰ The British journalists, he added, would proclaim to the whole world that the visit had been a magnificent success with permanent political results of the most beneficial kind. But those behind the scene', Sydenham noted cryptically, "would be aware that exactly the opposite had occurred."⁵⁹¹ The very idea that the king's visit to India might raise confident hopes of a "great general boon which he cannot possibly give"⁵⁹² dispirited him. He was alarmed by the demands of the nationalist press calling for a fresh extension of representative institutions, "which is not to be thought of".⁵⁹³

Sydenham represented the feelings of a substantial section of the British power elite in India which was uncompromising in its opposition to the nationalists. It believed that democratic ideas should not be disseminated among the Indian people and, under no circumstances, be allowed to gain currency. Further, it also opposed the King's visit because of the possibility that the authoritarian regime in India would be exposed to international publicity with its attendant embarrassments.⁵⁹⁴

Hardinge himself entertained fairly strong feelings against the nationalists. Early in his India career, he had taken exception to the statement of Henry Cotton recommending Savarkar as "our unfortunate friend".⁵⁹⁵ In conformity with his unmediated perception he believed that Lajpat Rai was not the "harmless enthusiast that Mr. Mackarson honestly believed him to be". On the contrary,

Hardinge characterised him as "bitterly and unreasonably hostile to the British rule". He contended that there "was not a word of truth" in the statement of Lajpat Rai that he was being persecuted by the police.⁵⁹⁶ An associate of Sunderlal, Har Dayal, Aurobindo, Barendra Ghose, Krishnava Rao, Bipin Chandra Pal and Madame Cama, Lajpat Rai aimed, according to Hardinge, at some revolutionary outburst. Even his scheme for famine relief in the United Provinces was inspired, Hardinge suspected, by an intense hatred of British rule.⁵⁹⁷ Malaviya, a member of the legislative assembly and the promoter of the Hindu university, was singled out as "very hostile, very fanatical and anti-British in his views"⁵⁹⁸ and with remarkable skill the viceroy was able to supplant him by Darbhanga whose supplication to Hardinge had become increasingly notorious over the years.⁵⁹⁹ The viceroy regarded Tilak as more than a mere newspaper editor and recognised his great organising ability. To him Tilak was probably the only really dangerous man in India requiring constant watchfulness. "Every day that he is kept out of way of doing mischief is so much to the good. It would be a fatal mistake", he reiterated, "to release him before the end of his term."⁶⁰⁰ The granddaughter of Dadabhai was found in correspondence with Madame Cama and the viceroy was positive about her involvement in an outrageous conspiracy. Thus, when Dadabhai Naoroji was recommended for inclusion in the annual honours' list, Hardinge put his foot down. It was undesirable to give the Naoroji family any prominence in the world.⁶⁰¹ The Young Turk party of the Muslims was becoming increasingly restless. Its sole purpose, according to Hardinge, was to enlist Muslim support for the Hindu politicians who were critical of and bitterly hostile to the British rule. He had resolved to act firmly in the face of a grim political situation. He was keen to make certain that the Muslim League maintained its identity and that the Aligarh movement, then drifting towards the Young Turks, be retained under the effective charge of the older generation of loyal Muslim leaders.⁶⁰² Butler, in particular, was

entrusted with a special task to come to terms with "some solid sections of the Muslim opinion". The Nawab of Rampur, the Raja of Mahmudabad, the Aga Khan and Hakim Ajmal Khan, the exponents of various segments of moderate Muslim opinion, were to be kept in constant touch and the wisdom of a firm grip on the proposed Aligarh movement by the government was to be widely disseminated.⁶⁰³

As for the anarchists the opinion of the administrators was unanimous. They were particularly concerned about the ideologues of the bomb cult. They had concluded that it was only a narrow fence that divided the extremists from the revolutionaries.⁶⁰⁴ Considering the potentialities of the anarchists and their influence, the lieutenant-governor of Bengal, who more than anybody else bore the brunt of their activities, adopted a very stiff line. With regard to Aurobindo, for example, the governor thought that he was not "a mere blind and unreasoning tool but an active generator of revolutionary sentiments" and that he was "imbued with a semi-religious fanaticism", which was a powerful factor in attracting adherents to his cause. "I attribute", he diagnosed, "the spread of seditious doctrine to him personally in a greater degree than to any other single individual in Bengal or possibly in India."⁶⁰⁵

It was believed that Aurobindo's attitude was one of irreconcilable enmity towards the British government. The administration was most susceptible to the persistent propaganda indulged in by him. Aurobindo preached the "doctrine of political boycott" with the intention of making government impossible.⁶⁰⁶ In the issue of the *Karmajogin* of 31 July 1909 Aurobindo enunciated his views of the "boycott" movement thus: "We sum up this refusal to co-operate in the convenient word 'Boycott'—refusal to co-operate in the industrial exploitation of our country, in education, in government, in judicial administration, in the details of official intercourse."⁶⁰⁷ Interpreting the official position the advocate-general upheld that Aurobindo's doc-

trine necessarily involved "disaffection", "disloyalty" and a "feeling of enmity." It followed that this was seditious and that it would amount to causing enmity and hatred between different classes of His Majesty's subjects.⁶⁰⁸ Under these circumstances, the government of India snapped its fingers at the softness exhibited by home government in dealing with Aurobindo. In 1910 the home government insisted that the proceedings against Aurobindo in connection with the Alipore bomb case be withdrawn.⁶⁰⁹ The Bengal government promptly remonstrated with the secretary of state. It would afford, it reacted sharply, a most indulgent encouragement to those whose object it was to spread sedition through the Press, and who were only deterred from doing so by the fear of penal consequences.⁶¹⁰ The advocate-general detailed the course of action it would be desirable for the government to pursue in similar circumstances. He maintained that while criticisms of governmental measures and expressions of disapprobation, if couched in moderate language, were permissible, the imputation of malignant or wrong motives would ignite disaffection and promote hatred and contempt. Besides, the state of political temper at the time of publication ought to be taken into consideration. In other words "if it were then in a state of unrest it would be mischievous to add fuel to the flame of discontent".⁶¹¹

The attempts of the home government and Hardinge to impede and possibly ban the official programme of political prosecution on the eve of the royal visit were sneezed at by the civil servants in general and the Bengal government in particular. Efforts were made to pressurise Hardinge to exert all the influence at his command to dissuade the home government from taking any step in this direction.⁶¹² The officials had decided to thwart any measure to the authority of the local government within prescribed limits. They urged Hardinge to rise to the occasion and recognise the truth of the official assertion that the prevailing condition of Bengal had been improving primarily due to the repressive policy of the government during the preceding

two years. "In my humble judgment", Baker impelled Hardinge, "to do what the secretary of state first suggested would be merely to play into the hands of the revolutionary party."⁶¹³ The unrest in East Bengal could no longer be contained by political action; it could only be stamped out by police suppression. Chirol was equally despondent. The policy of moderation, he commented, was to tread the primrose path with dalliance and it had already given rise to a widespread impression that it was sedition and disloyalty that paid.⁶¹⁴

Hardinge hesitated but ultimately endorsed the opinion of Crewe about the desirability of a policy of pacification "which is in the air". He realised that the royal visit presented an opportunity for a truce which might not occur again. He dictated to the Bengal government that political prosecutions ought not to be sprung unawares upon the government of India and that the viceroy ought to be at least informed before trials and prosecutions were planned and decided.⁶¹⁵ Emphasising the importance of the new climate Crewe urged Hardinge to mobilise a stable public opinion at Calcutta.⁶¹⁶ "I am far from desiring to follow the example of my predecessor", Hardinge wrote as he developed his policy, "in producing an impression of *couleur de rose* atmosphere. In fact, nothing could be worse in my opinion than the condition of Bengal and East Bengal."⁶¹⁷ In the latter province the situation was grave. Overhauling of the police administration, reorganisation of the intelligence department, the establishment of a river police on launches and improvement in the means of communication, he expected, would bring order in a year or two. Meanwhile, he was determined to prosecute any offender with utmost rigour within the permissible bounds of ordinary law.⁶¹⁸ In the face of parliamentary difficulty, a number of unsuccessful prosecutions, the reckless persecution of men like Aurobindo, regarded in Britain as a "high souled enthusiast", "averse to crime", who ought not to have been attacked without the clearest proof;⁶¹⁹ and the prolonged

trials with long accounts of cross-examination caused unforeseen restlessness in the daily Press. The uncertainty, in most cases, of a favourable verdict, an extra-ordinary, evidence-conscious Calcutta judiciary operating amongst the pleader-politicians, and the blaze of glory surrounding the heads of the accused unnerved the administration. Both Hardinge and Crewe were earnest in their endeavours to ensure reason dawn upon a jumpy government of Bengal.⁶²⁰ But Hardinge felt hamstrung by a Baker, who was "as obstinate as a mule and could not see farther than the end of his nose".⁶²¹

Jenkins disagreed with the proposed official policy. He demurred. He was to agree with Chirol. They were somewhat cynical and were inclined to appreciate the position of those who were saying "what is the use of being loyal when it pays best to oppose government".⁶²² Evidently, they could not comprehend the complex reality. It was not owing to an emotional impulse or the utter necessity of buying a truce that compelled Hardinge and Crewe to opt for a policy of suspension of political persecution. It was the larger interests of the empire and the quest for political credibility that impelled the viceroy and the secretary of state to stand firm against the dangerous mixture of weakness, obstinacy and an illusory self-confidence that had virtually immobilised the Bengal government. The bomb-cult, Hardinge offered an alternative, was to be dealt with maturity, dignity and firmness. The hysterical over-reaction of the Bengal government reflected its nervous exhaustion and betrayed the lack of a definite direction. The responsibility of the viceroy in the evolution of a policy for the whole country, and for Bengal, in particular, was final. The government of India, as Crewe emphasised in agreement with Hardinge, ran the risk of becoming implicated in what "occurred in and about the seat of the Government in a way which did not apply to troubles elsewhere".⁶²³ Even in a centralised state such as obtained in France, Crewe maintained, an outbreak in Paris

affected the credit of the government more than one in Marseilles. This was the reason why even in a decentralised system as in Britain the metropolitan police had been kept under the home office instead of being handed over to the London county council. Crewe insisted that this fact gave the Indian viceroy "a peculiar interest in the Calcutta prosecutions or any within your immediate ambit".⁶²⁴ The viceroy had his way.

XI

HARDINGE CAME to India at a time when Hindu-Muslim feelings were tense and critical especially in north India. People had begun to ask for separate courts of justice and special schools for the two communities. Most municipal elections turned on this question.⁶²⁵ The Hindus, in particular, complained that the Muslims had got too much and they were determined to get back a bit.⁶²⁶ Ali Inam and people in Calcutta, where the Muslims were not politically strong, wanted reconciliation.⁶²⁷ But in northern and western India things were difficult. The Aga Khan's acquiescence in Wedderburn's proposals for conciliation was an ephemeral gesture.⁶²⁸ The Peshawar riots had vitiated the atmosphere and even the Amir of Afghanistan "wept" over Muslim sufferings.⁶²⁹ The Muslims were exercised over both the language classification in the census as well as the categorisation of the depressed classes as Hindus after the withdrawal of Gait's circular. Communal tension was assiduously nursed. The two incidents, which shook the politics of the United Provinces during this period affecting communal relations, were the Kanpur mosque episode and the Ayodhya anti-cow-slaughter agitation.⁶³⁰ In both the cases, Hardinge was to supersede the provincial government, compromise with the demands of "law and order" and show considerable lenience much to the agony of the civil servants. Ironically, in both the incidents Hardinge emerged as the darling of orthodox opinion and politically much strengthened with a stronger base to deal with an India disturbed by the war, sedition, rebellion and pan-Islamism.

Amidst the growing alienation of the Muslims under the leadership of the so-called Young Turks, the Kanpur mosque incident acted as a catalyst. An energetic municipal operation leading to the demolition of a part of a live mosque in the historic town of Kanpur sparked off an agitation having dangerous consequences. The incident inflamed the sentiments of the Muslim population of the whole of north India.⁶¹ The atmosphere was already tense. The successive humiliations of Turkey, the schism in the Muslim League, the ascendancy of pan-Islamism and the disenchantment of the Muslims from the policy of loyalty had caused the objective conditions for a possible political protest. Thus an otherwise not so serious incident could be easily whipped up to an excited communal frenzy.⁶² Indeed, what could have been settled by mutual consultation became a matter of religious pride and led to unprovoked firing, police excesses, strikes, riots, propaganda, newspaper campaigns and public meetings. It could not be ascertained whether it was a pre-planned agitation by the Young Turks operating from outside, but one thing was certain: that the militant young generation of the Muslim League and its national Press did not allow the episode to be contained as a local issue.⁶³ Kanpur became the symbol of Muslim resistance to bureaucratic autocracy and a test case to vindicate the righteousness of the new strategy.

The incident was faced by the militant Muslim party as a challenge. Following the change of policy of the government towards Aligarh, a show of strength had become almost indispensable. The party contrasted the attitude of the government towards Benaras where the university movement was inclined, it was believed, to accept or consider favourably all forms of governmental control. Meston, the lieutenant-governor of UP, detected feelings of isolation and frustration among the young Muslims who were, as a result, ready to fly into a temper at any grievance, real or imaginary.⁶⁴ The bureaucracy was equally unimaginative. The only way to deal with the Young Turks, Meston under-

lined, was to remain perfectly unmoved by their clamour and it would be a mistake, he warned, to let them imagine that the government treated their "antics" seriously. In their extreme self-righteous posture Meston, Craddock and their compatriots tended to obfuscate the fact that the new political positions of the Muslims were more than antics and the administration could not but treat them seriously. Thus, although the civil servants would have liked to make each other believe that neither pan-Islamism, nor the Muslims' "ludicrous advances to forward Hindu parties" could possibly do them any harm,⁶³⁵ they were all the same apprehensive of the new stirrings and combinations.⁶³⁶

Once the agitation had started Meston tried to placate moderate Muslim opinion by instituting through the viceroy a general enquiry into the sanctity of the appanage of the mosque and raising the question of compensation.⁶³⁷ But he was mortally scared of such *fatwas* as would render town-planning in Muslim areas practically impossible in the future. The Hindus, it was feared, would invariably follow suit and the position would become awkward.⁶³⁸ He began to give credence to the propaganda that the decision to refuse compensation, which had been officially offered, and to start a row had been ordered from Delhi the object being to rebuff the local authorities and thus to establish a precedent for a "hands off" policy in the case of the Muslim shrines on the site of the new imperial Delhi.⁶³⁹ A strained and tired Meston sought to explain away the whole episode by this relatively simple formulation. As he began to lose his nerves he steadily betrayed a shortsightedness of vision so typical of his stratum.

The government of the United Provinces maintained that the entire Muslim machinery for agitation was being "dishonestly" mobilised by a false cry of religious sentiments in order to show that the "demagogues", who aspired to lead the Muslim community, could immobilise the govern-

ment and wring concessions from it.⁶⁴⁰ It became increasingly conscious of the fact that the interests of professional agitators ran counter to those of good government. To Meston the whole question had offered an agonising choice between the domination of false leaders who were gradually paralysing the best instincts of the Indian Muslims and the erosion of the traditional reliance of the community on the British government. "It is our clear duty", warned Meston, "to discriminate between religious feelings that are spontaneous and religious fanaticism that has been stirred by the lies and misrepresentations of facts by persons who are playing for their own hand and against the true interests of the Mohammedan Community."⁶⁴¹ But the viceroy advised moderation and Meston acquiesced. He was persuaded to perceive ample scope for clemency to be shown to the culprits. He was, however, inclined to work out his own *modus operandi*. He favoured that trials ought to continue and conclude, followed by unconditional remission of sentence for most while two or three persons who had instigated the riots ought to be punished forthwith.⁶⁴²

Craddock, however, hardened the position by insisting that the order of clemency must emanate from the local government. If it appeared, he argued, to be solely the personal intervention of the viceroy the face of the lieutenant-governor "would be blackened before the whole of India". It would be inferred that the lieutenant-governor, having passed an unpopular order, had been deaf to all petitions prosecuting and punishing the people who resisted the authorities, while the viceroy stepping in and undoing the scheme of official repression registered a slap in the face of James Meston whose authority, as a result, in that turbulent province would be weakened for the whole of his term of office.⁶⁴³ This alleged misplaced leniency of the viceroy evoked considerable indignation. Craddock read Hardinge's note with grave concern. He thought that the viceroy had not given adequate weightage to the concept of

"acquisition" which was a lawful action. Besides, he drew the attention of Hardinge to the point of law that it involved no obligation on the part of the government to restore the *status quo*. To throw over the local government, Craddock thundered in defence of Meston, even though the time and method selected by the provincial government might have been unwise, would be a "very extreme step" taken in response to Press clamour and "doubly dangerous if taken in the face of force and mob violence".⁶⁴⁴ The officer in charge of the operation, Craddock carried the trend of thought to its logical conclusion, ought also to be protected for he had merely carried out an order from the lieutenant-governor. Besides, it was pointed out that the viceroy overlooked the fact that the agitation was a total frame-up. The destruction of the washing place of the mosque had taken place on 1 July while the riots took place on 3 August. The people of Kanpur had not been excited by the demolition. It was necessary, Craddock opined, for outside instigators to make a thorough preparation requiring a few weeks. "This is the young Mohammedans' first essay in rousing the populace", Craddock prognosticated, "and if that essay is allowed to be successful, it will be followed by others."⁶⁴⁵ To yield to this unseemly clatter would be, Craddock added painfully, "to bestow a triumph on the young Mohammedan party, who will have one more jibe to throw at the fatuity of Mohammedan loyalty, as compared with Mohammedan agitation".⁶⁴⁶ The whole affair became a "scandal" and the civil servants felt that they were being miserably let down by the viceroy. James Meston, it was held everywhere in officers' clubs, ought to be defended and the Muslims ought to be warned against the treacherous leadership in their own camp. "We have not yet", Craddock noted forcefully, "recovered from the shock dealt us when Sir Bampfylde Fuller was thrown to the wolves to appease Hindu sentiments. God forbid, that a second sacrifice should not be made to appease not loyal, but disloyal, Mohammedans!"⁶⁴⁷ Craddock mocked at the suggestion of a compromise offered by the viceroy. A

compromise, he reminded caustically, involved that each party gave up something. If the demolished building was restored what would the Muslims had given up? "Nothing"; Craddock sneered. "It is not a compromise, but a surrender." Such an obsequious gesture to men like Mazharul Haque and Mohamed Ali, he remarked, would not only mean a permanent embarrassment to the government but also a serious "setback of the upward progress of Islam".⁶⁴⁸ Chirol added another point in the charge-sheet against the viceroy. The mismanagement by the local government of a situation having necessitated the intervention of the viceroy, he claimed, was a serious problem. Chirol nevertheless raised his accusing finger. Such an intervention, he quipped, as "*deus ex machina*—a part which, with all due deference, I hold, it is very dangerous for him to play frequently".⁶⁴⁹

The viceroy had agreed with Meston that the agitation was organised from outside Kanpur, that the restless spirits of the Young Turks were bent upon picking a quarrel with the government, that pseudo-religious grievances were taken up as a rallying point for Muslim fanaticism and all forms of agitational activities were adopted to associate Kanpur with Turkey and pan-Islamism. Meston's uncompromising position, however, had left no room for manoeuvre and sharpened the positions on both sides. Hardinge had frequently advanced Meston suggestions to freeze the situation.⁶⁵⁰ By September 1913 he had decided that the Kanpur mosque episode could not be allowed to drift indefinitely in its existing position as a perpetual source of grievance to the Muslims and an object of general unrest. The viceroy moved ahead to make an alternative solution based on a compromise and a face-saving device. He thought that the washing place could be built above an arcade in the same place while the Kanpur authorities should continue to build their pavement below.⁶⁵¹ He had viewed the matter as an imperial problem and first Andrews and then Mahmudabad, were encouraged to con-

fer with the leading Muslims to develop favourable conditions for a formal reception of Hardinge and his personal intervention.⁶⁵² The viceroy agreed to make an unscheduled sojourn to Kanpur provided a preliminary discussion between Mahmudabad and Kanpur leaders had assured him before-hand of the success of his mission and the local leaders expressed regrets for lawlessness and riots and agreed to accept any compromise.⁶⁵³ Besides, as a further sop the viceroy expressed his inclination to review the demands for the release of prisoners. The reason for opting for these proceedings was that there were certain defects in the conduct of the local officials in requisitioning that part of the mosque. Besides, the unnecessary bad blood created between the government and the Muslims had been exploited by petulant young men to sway the traditional allies away from the government. The advantages of his intervention, he propounded, would be immense "if this trial could be avoided".⁶⁵⁴

The whole affair was stage-managed. The unexpected visit of Hardinge to Kanpur and to the mosque despite Craddock's warning to the contrary, the acceptance of the arcade formula and the release of the prisoners took the wind out of the *Comrade's* sails. "The more I learnt at Cawnpore, the more convinced I was of the absolute necessity of having prevented the trial taking place. It appears that all sorts of accusations were going to be made against the local authorities, and whether they would be proved or not, much would have stuck. Further, I find that the feeling was so strong against the local government and even against Meston, that nothing on earth would have induced the Mohammedan community to accept any compromise whatever from the local government, and that I was the only person through whom any compromise had any likelihood of being accepted."⁶⁵⁵ The greatest satisfaction of Hardinge was that peace had been brought to the Muslim community. He would wait for the final word as he regarded that in this case "time will be the last judge".⁶⁵⁶

If the feelings of the Muslims of the Punjab were any realistic indicator, Hardinge was justified in his policy of intervention. The chief secretary of the Punjab had found the political situation in that province sufficiently explosive. The Balkan war and the Kanpur mosque incident had harnessed the disparate Muslim sentiments into a political force and crystalized the nebulous pan-Islamic ideas. There was a general cry: "Islam in danger", which afforded the extremist section of the community, mainly composed of "young and hotheaded" literati, editors, school masters and journalists, with an opportunity to denounce the European powers including Great Britain and Christianity in general. The situation took a turn for the worse after the Kanpur incident which was initially viewed as a stray communal incident. Violent articles and pamphlets from Lahore, Delhi and UP, the secretary reported, flooded the Punjab and this fresh influx of inflammable material helped the extremists to storm the party machine. Mosques were converted into political platforms. When the trustees of the Badshahi mosque at Lahore sought to prohibit political discourse in the prayer meetings they were denounced as traitors. Old criticism against the demolition of religious buildings in Delhi was revived and recapitulated; appeals for funds for Kanpur victims were made and half a dozen "mosque-incidents" were carefully planned and organised.⁶⁵⁷

The government looked askance at first, and then, established contacts with the moderates who were goaded into action, mortified as they were of the unpredictable course of action on the part of a vituperative minority. Emboldened by the support of the organised moderates, the government resolved to take some bold steps. *Zamindar* and *Faigham-i-Sulah*, the two articulate papers, lost their security deposits, and other papers, *Sikh*, *Hindu*, *Arya* and *Muslims*, were admonished and then, "a futile attempt to form a combination of Hindu and Muslim extremism" was scotched.⁶⁵⁸ It was believed in official cir-

cles everywhere that the suppression of the agitation backed by a well considered policy of clemency encouraged the moderates to reassert themselves. They had been inflicted by a morbid fear of losing their privileged position to the extremist party. They apprehended that "the solid advantages they were beginning to reap by promoting healthy and constitutional development" had been threatened with extinction.⁶⁵⁹

In view of the gradual ascendancy of the moderating political influence the government felt no longer inhibited to revise its administrative policy. It was urged that in future local governments ought to sympathise with local sentiments, that decisions should be taken with a long-term perspective in view, that there should be some restraint in dealing with such agitations as that in Kanpur which had been aggravated by wanton cruelty and unnecessary bloodshed thus playing straight into the hands of the opposition and all possible endeavours ought to be made to come to a negotiated settlement with a view to isolating the extremists.⁶⁶⁰ Even Craddock, the most vociferous critic of Hardinge's Kanpur rendezvous, altered his position and approved of Hardinge's action. "From an Imperial point of view it is a great thing to have quietened Mohammedan opinion throughout India, and I hope and believe that this will be the effect" of his decision.⁶⁶¹

Despite the success of Hardinge's personal intervention in the mosque incident and its satisfactory finale, Kanpur was, at its best, a fire-brigade operation. Pan-Islamism continued to linger fed by the increasing humiliation of Turkey, her involvement in the war against Great Britain, the threatened violation of the sanctity of the sacred Muslim shrines and finally, the possible liquidation of the institution of Caliphate and with it the Islamic brotherhood or *Millat*, which had for centuries bestowed on the Muslims an extra-national sense of belonging. The annexation of Tunis in 1881 by France, of Egypt by Britain in 1882, of

Eritrea by Italy in 1885, of Sudan by Britain again in 1898 and her aloofness during the Graeco-Turkish war in 1897 and the outcry in Britain in 1894-96 over the so-called Armenian massacre provided the pan-Islamist propagandist with a bogey of an irresistible Christian combination against the Islamic world.⁶⁶² But by its very nature the new-found Islamic solidarity was tenuous. Anti-imperialism was dovetailed with Islamic *Millat* and the abolition of the Caliphate after the World War I removed the very foundation of its short-lived euphoria. "Secularism", Mohamed Ali, the most *avant garde* exponent of pan-Islamism wrote, "is a western notion which cannot be applied in the East... In West politics had set the limits of religion whereas in the East politics was still determined by religion."⁶⁶³

Paradoxically, the radicalisation of Muslim politics which underlined its developing sense of identity with the national movement also meant a firmer grip of Islam's international religious ideology and fraternity over the Muslim mind. Pan-Islamism, the appeal of the new middle class of the Muslim community, was the necessary instrument to drive that community from a position of stark separatism and studied aloofness to the centre of Indian nationalism. In its ideological formulations it was contradictory; its priorities between nationalism and Islamic internationalism were undecided and often lopsided; its agitational issues could be peripheral and even trivial; its idealisation of the objectives was extremely nebulous while its symbols and political illusions too metaphysical. Its political actions were circumscribed by the compulsions of religious priorities. But its impact was overwhelming.

Theodor Morison, whose connections with Aligarh were long standing, gave the most sympathetic appreciation of pan-Islamism.⁶⁶⁴ He observed that the Muslim law prescribed to its followers loyalty and obedience to a government which offered liberty and opportunity to practise their religion. The much publicised debate on this pro-

blem between Sir Syed and W. W. Hunter had settled this issue once and for all. It was believed that the Muslim affiliation with Turkey was confined to both spiritual spheres and to temporal affairs. Such an allegiance, it was advanced, was not a matter of law but one of sentiments and passions. Turkey was the greatest Muslim state; it was the official head of the Islamic world, "the bulwark of Islam" so to say. Pan-Islamism, according to Morison, was not religious fanaticism, but a special kind of patriotism having no analogy. "Islam was", wrote Morison, "more than a religious belief. It is a *Kultur*, a civilisation, a society conscious of its separate existence. It is a civilisation with social usages and intellectual traditions of its own, and it is distinguished from other civilisation by outward and visible differences in dress, architecture etc. To this civilisation or society the Mohammedans feel an attachment which is very like patriotism and similar to what Western Europe in early days felt for Christendom..."⁶⁰⁵ Morison argued that the Muslims had been drawn more closely together as they watched Muslim states succumbed before the Christian powers and lived in a perpetual fear of witnessing the final collapse of the temporal power of Islam. Morison acknowledged that their apprehensions were well-founded and could become dangerous. He was inclined to approve the demands of the Muslims that Britain and its allies concluded a separate peace with Turkey, guaranteed its independence by international agreement and restored all its territories.⁶⁰⁶ Morison was fully aware that such a scheme hinged primarily on the attitude of Turkey and, hence, almost impracticable. The second best solution acceptable to the Indian Muslims, Morison pleaded, would be the preservation of the sanctity of Mecca and Medina and the creation of a separate state of the Muslims comprising of Arabia, Mesopotamia and Syria "having common social, linguistic and historical elements conducive to the development of a nationalism", in which the Muslim patriotism "can take a legitimate pride."⁶⁰⁷

Morison, however, was somewhat dated; his Muslim friends in India, the Aga Khan and the rest, were a spent force; pan-Islamism in India had developed distinct political overtones; and Mesopotamia could no longer be allowed to drift away from a British protective umbrella. The altered situation called for a singularly ingenious solution. One thing, however, was certain, British attitudes towards the Muslims required the utmost watchfulness as the moderates were being dragged into the extremist camp and the political loyalty of the community could prove to be ephemeral. The government of India could no longer count on the proverbial allegiance of the Mohammedan community as a whole.⁶⁶⁸

Hardinge was conscious of the departure in Muslim politics. Butler, Craddock, Meston and others recognised the potentialities of this alleged aberration in their sober moments despite their optimistic official pronouncements to the contrary. They eagerly awaited the arrival of an effective leader to huddle the moderate men together once again without which the Aligarh college would, they prophesied, be deflected on to a wrong track for good.⁶⁶⁹ As Crewe declined to meet Mohamed Ali and Wazir Hasan, the viceroy was thrilled at the spectacle of this public snub.⁶⁷⁰ It would, he hoped, strengthen the moderate party-in-the-making. Had they been given an audience, Hardinge almost snickered as he commented, they would have made much of it and it would have fortified their position as the representatives of the Indian Muslim community "which they are not" and would never become.⁶⁷¹ The knowledge of this rebuff would have the effect of thoroughly discrediting these "agitators" in India and of giving an opportunity to the moderates of coming forward. It was impossible, Hardinge was at pains to describe, to estimate the harm that the Ali brothers had done. They had, he regretted, absolutely debauched Aligarh college. It was in a very sad state and Hardinge forecasted that it would have to grow worse before it could grow better.⁶⁷² At the same

time, he persuaded himself to believe that Mohamed Ali would not be able to create much mischief in India for long since the Muslims were really grateful for the Kanpur settlement and decided to return back to their sheltered nest. The government had stopped them from slaughtering cows at Ayodhya at their festival and they obeyed without protest.⁶⁷³

The situation looked favourable even to Ali Imam. He was cheerful to find that the Turkish question was being settled in an imaginative manner which was likely to produce minimum unrest among the Indian Muslims. He was looking forward to welcoming the growth of an Arab nationalism which was, by its very definition, to turn against Turkey. Besides, the assurances of Grey and Crewe regarding the sanctity of Muslim shrines, Ali Imam urged, ought to be widely publicised. He had himself established contacts with Abdur Rahim and also with Mahbub Alam, the influential editor of *Paise Akbar* of Lahore and initiated a frank dialogue with them.⁶⁷⁴

There were serious misgivings in some quarters about the capacity of the moderates to stage a comeback. In the hour of crisis these leaders, according to Meston, had proved to be impotent. There was no evidence of their desire to disapprove of the extremist tactics; they had allowed "Mohamed Ali and his gang" to rule Aligarh, "wreck the Muslim university scheme and lead Muslims to indignity."⁶⁷⁵ Andrews requested Hardinge to offer them a fresh opportunity. Meston was irritated. He was cross with Andrews' almost "pathetic anxiety to be a successful peace-maker".⁶⁷⁶ "What guarantee have we" he wrote, "that they will behave different from what they have done?"⁶⁷⁷ The moderates had lost control over their own flock and Meston was not sure whether they represented a credible political force any longer. He would have liked to make out for himself if they could do anything tangible as a necessary proof of their willingness and ability to lead. "Let them, for example, purge that turbulent body of trustees", Mes-

ton made his stand explicit, "which is doing so much harm to the college of Aligarh. Let them get the University Committee together and send a deputation to the Viceroy which His Excellency can receive and deal with instead of an amorphous crew which has no power to negotiate, and which it is absolutely disrespectful to ask the Government of India to listen to. Let them take the *Comrade* into their hands and check the unscrupulous flow of abuse and lies in it and other representative Muslim organisations. Let them do anything which will show their own people that the demagogue is dethroned, and that the natural leaders are now going to stand by the community."⁶⁷⁸ There were some half-hearted attempts by the moderates to take a stand and some feeble efforts to organise a united front. For example, the Rampur meeting of October 1913, where four uninvited fire-brand Young Turks tried to create trouble, was organised to condition a suitable atmosphere for a compromise settlement on Kanpur, and another meeting was called in December attended by both the Aga Khan and Jinnah.⁶⁷⁹

The government's policy towards the Muslims, however, continued to waver and it drifted along unpredictable *ad hoc* measures. It vacillated between an encouragement to the moderates as the primary hinge on which its attitudes towards the Muslims would turn and an utter lack of faith in their ability either to stand together or to lead the Muslim movement. Nawab Ishaq Khan, the secretary of the Aligarh college and a determined critic of the Ali brothers, was given enough encouragements to cheer him up in his encounter with the Young Turks for the maintenance of the traditions and the prestige of the college.⁶⁸⁰ The viceroy would not accept any invitation to visit Aligarh, it was decided, unless "the trustees made up their minds to purge themselves of certain magnetic attractions which were then bringing them into discredit".⁶⁸¹ Mohamed Ali and his *Comrade* were the radiating centres of this influence, and the administration was keen to see them restrained.

In the case of the *Comrade*, Craddock found that the paper was being protected from firm official action by what appeared to him to be an incongruous legal nicety. When the Press Act came into force it was stipulated that in case a newspaper was registered, security ought to be demanded for its good conduct. The act, however, did not permit the demand of security, if it was not taken at the time of registration. When the act was passed security was waived in various cases where no offence was apprehended and the paper seemed innocuous. The *Comrade* was one of those papers which were registered after the promulgation of the Press Act when Muslim feelings were exceedingly loyal. When Mohamed Ali transferred the *Comrade* headquarters from Calcutta to Delhi it still continued to enjoy "innocuous" status with the government and no security was demanded of it. With the change in its tenor and editorial policy the government decided to make Delhi too hot a place for the *Comrade*. The district magistrate revised his previous order but there was a serious doubt whether the action was legitimate although the act undoubtedly had given him the authority to revise an order demanding security.⁶⁸² The government had determined to discipline the *Comrade*, and if it was established beyond doubt that the district magistrate's order was illegal, they would amend the act and modify the executive instructions to enable the magistrate to cope with the unforeseen situation. Otherwise Craddock felt hamstrung as he was "precluded from taking security at all from the *Comrade*, however, violent it may become. . .".⁶⁸³

Meston had supported Craddock and he diagnosed that the danger centre was the Press. His Muslim friends agreed with him that the Press must be muzzled.⁶⁸⁴ Three of these "pernicious" newspapers in the United Provinces alone had been suppressed to satisfy the demands of the moderates; but Calcutta and Lahore, Meston complained, "flood us with poison", especially through *Al Hilal* and *Habl-ul-Matin*. "We must encourage a reaction by the

more respectable members of the community", Meston postulated, "who freely express themselves as disgusted with the excess of fire-brands" and induce them to come forward and "establish old relations."⁶⁸⁵

The intemperate tone of the Muslim unrest reflected a more deep-rooted antipathy than a petty irritation over the demolition of a washing place in an unknown mosque at a remote UP town. If the Kanpur incident had not occurred Muslim aversion would have led to an eruption of violence in another form somewhere else. There had been a deliberate campaign to stir up excitement among the Muslims. The demand for separate representation on all local bodies, originally raised under the general patronage of the government, was subsequently adopted "in an aggressive form by the younger party, as a first war cry".⁶⁸⁶ It was followed by widespread friction with orthodox Hindu communalism. The annulment of the partition of Bengal was presented both as a great betrayal by the government as well as a triumph of Bengal revolutionary methods and the Muslims were incited to adopt them. Trouble in Persia and British endorsement of Russian designs together with the Italian attack on Tripoli became the subsequent focuses of attention. The long tale of Turkey's disasters, reverses in the Balkan war and the speeches of British ministers indicating hostility to Turkey inflamed their recently acquired spirit of solidarity. The Ansari mission to Turkey sent back emotional accounts of Muslim sufferings and strengthened the belief in a war between the Cross and the Crescent. It presented British diplomacy as anti-Muslim.⁶⁸⁷ Meston witnessed remorsefully that all energetic measures to resuscitate "the large and solid element of good Moham-medans" from their frightened silence were neutralised by an articulate Press and the professional agitators.⁶⁸⁸

The desperate administrators toiling amidst a hostile environment sought to invigorate their attempts to assist the moderates "to resume their position as counsellors and

leaders".⁶⁸⁹ Officers were instructed to use their personal influence in persuading the respectable Muslim landholders, professional men and officials in their districts to controvert "the spread of untruth and disloyalty" and to animate the loyal services of Muslim district officials.⁶⁹⁰ Attempts were made not to permit mosques to become centres of political meetings and seditious harangues. The Muslim honorary magistrates operating at district levels were to be employed not as passive spectators but as active agents and informers of the government.⁶⁹¹

As official measures moved briskly from suspicion to repression there were moments of self righteous exhilaration on the part of some bureaucrats. The Kanpur settlement, Michael O'Dwyer was to indulge himself, "has knocked" the bottom out of "the marked tendency to bring the extremists of the two religions together" and hoped that "the natural line of cleavage will soon begin to reappear."⁶⁹² By December 1913 Morison reported that Mahmudabad was to overthrow his arch enemy, Mohamed Ali, from power.⁶⁹³ Meston related with glee that Hindu-Muslim relations had become very bitter; Muharram disturbances in Agra and scattered infightings in Oudh, Aligarh, Rai Bareilly were quoted as evidence. He had decided to release some of the Hindus accused of the Ayodhya riots of the previous year in recognition of the good behaviour of the Hindus in general.⁶⁹⁴ "The promised rapprochement is farther off than ever; and I fancy that this Congress plank will not be prominent in the platform when the All-India ML (Muslem League) meets this month in Agra."⁶⁹⁵ The official optimism was deceptive. Nothing could camouflage a frantic search for security. It was half-hearted and melancholy. The government was fully alive to its weaknesses. Was it not possible, a desperate Hardinge pleaded with Ali Imam, to publicise amongst influential Muslim circles in India that Abdur Rahim and his friend had a private interview with two cabinet ministers and that they had received satisfactory assurances from them with re-

gard to Turkey.⁶⁹⁶ The viceroy was aware that British policy in the event of the disruption of Turkey in Asia could not be anticipated. But British interests in the security of the holy places and their freedom from foreign influences other than that of Turkey ought to be given extensive coverage. He suggested that Abdur Rahim could write to some of his Muslim friends, but in the absence of any recognised Muslim leader he was doubtful about the success of his friendly overtures.⁶⁹⁷ An uncertain viceroy persisted nevertheless that "there is no harm in trying". Muslim agitation got stabilised at a point where it remained distressing but not quite dangerous.

Morison, who had firm connections with Aligarh, tracked down a struggle that was going on between the moderates and the active party in the Muslim community. The moderates seemed to him more likely to come out on top. He recommended that the Muslims be left *en bloc* alone for any support given by the government to any section would be made use of as an excuse for indictment against them.⁶⁹⁸ It was even decided to withhold honours or decorations from the moderate class lest they should be charged with being own over by the government and consequently, lose influence with their community.⁶⁹⁹ As the Indian army made its way to the various theatres of the worldwide conflagration and the declaration of war against Turkey became imminent, the concern of the government about a general Muslim rising became more immediate. By March 1914 the moderates, under government inspiration, regrouped themselves and the Aga Khan organised a delegation to the viceroy to affirm publicly their profession of loyalty to the British empire.⁷⁰⁰ There was a concerted attempt to induct the more sober minded of the youngmen back to the older traditions of servile political identity of the community.⁷⁰¹

It was impressed upon them that their true salvation consisted in following the advice of Sir Syed. Oscillating

between two antagonistic positions of prospects of rewards in terms of patronage and concessions on the one hand and uncertainties of sedition, persecution and political extinction on the other, the Muslim movement was in a disarray.⁷⁰² Factional in-fighting replaced the political agitations of the elder statesmen and the Young Turks alike. By June 1914 Butler reported heartily that the "Muslims are quarrelling more than before amongst themselves"; that Mohamed Ali and Zafar Ali were losing influence; that their enemies were demanding accounts of war funds; that the circulation of the *Comrade* and the *Zamindar* was falling and that the editors were very near a rupture between themselves.⁷⁰³ In East Bengal and the West Punjab, Muslims were, the government was informed, strongly opposed to the deputation to the viceroy.⁷⁰⁴ The Aligarh party was more or less isolated and Mahmudabad was laughed at, while Muhammad Shafi had tumbled down completely on the government side of the fence and was anxious to break away from the Muslim League which had been enfeebled enormously.⁷⁰⁵ By September 1914 O'Dwyer seemed somewhat extravagant in his equanimity while narrating Muslim feelings in the Punjab. He was convinced that but for a few demagogues, who might be forcibly quietened, the great body of Muslims was genuinely loyal. "I may perhaps explain that, in the Punjab, at least one result of the war has been to redress the political balance, to bring to the forefront the really big men who, though they say little, count for most in an emergency, the landed aristocracy, the yeomen and such like, and to set back to their proper place the specious talkers and the glib men of the pen who push themselves forward in time of peace."⁷⁰⁶

Meanwhile, the viceroy worked out the strategy to contain and harness Muslim opinion in favour of the British in the event of a war with Turkey. A full statement from Rampur declaring loyalty to the British crown and pressing upon the Muslims the urgency of disassociating themselves from the hostile disposition of Turkey; a similar

declaration from the All India Muslem League; publicity to the viceroy's assurance not to interfere with the holy places together with steps, if necessary, to suppress all forms of disobedience and resorting to measures "other than persuasion" constituted the various aspects of the strategy.⁷⁰⁷ Rampur, Hardinge believed, with his Shia bias, "would support us in almost any measure of coldness towards Turkey".⁷⁰⁸ Butler was to ensure and retain Sunni loyalty.⁷⁰⁹ With careful planning and a systematic coordination of operations at various levels, "we could get a powerful section of the League", Hardinge wrote optimistically, "to make the necessary declaration in terms which would render it impossible for the dissenters to produce any alternative statement without touching the borders of open sedition".⁷¹⁰ He proved to be correct. Pan-Islamism, nevertheless, continued to flow but at a level far below the danger mark. It was to be rejuvenated when the tide of the Khilafat movement overflowed the banks of the Muslim world once again.

XII

IF KANPUR threatened to rock the bases of Muslim loyalty, South Africa seemed for a moment to overwhelm India's uncertain faith in British justice. It was the personal intervention of Hardinge that saved the situation.

The Indian problem of South Africa had originated in the middle of the nineteenth century when the experiment of introducing Indian labour into Natal as a cheap agricultural force was first adopted.⁷¹¹ Two streams of Indian immigrants made their way into Natal: the principal one, consisting of indentured labour who brought their women and remained in the country when their indentures expired; the second, much smaller one of Indian traders and merchants, chiefly Muslims from Bombay. From Natal number of Indians moved on to the Cape Colony, and a much larger number, since the development of the Rand, to Transvaal.

The Indian question, however, became acute only when Indian traders and pedlars, which included some of the descendants of ex-indentured labourers, began to compete with white shopkeepers. Commercial rivalry embittered race feelings and restrictive legislations were refurbished and extended over every aspect of Indian life.⁷¹² The position of the Indians in 1909, when South African colonies were united, was that the Transvaal in practice admitted no Asians except those who had been resident before 1899 and their wives and children; the Orange Free State admitted none; the Cape only such fresh immigrants as would pass an education test together with their wives and children of minor age; while Natal imposed the same restrictions as the Cape on fresh immigrants but continued to import "coolies" as agricultural labour and allowed them to remain permanently in the province on payment of a special annual tax. In 1911 the government of India put an end to indentured labour to Natal where the Indian population had out-numbered the Europeans.⁷¹³

In 1913 a comprehensive immigration act was passed by the Union of South Africa. It made a departure from the existing legislation in that it added, following the model of the Canadian experiment, a new provision to the education test prohibiting the immigration of "any person or class of persons deemed by the minister on economic grounds or on account of standards or habits of life to be unsuited to the requirements of the Union, or any particular province thereof."⁷¹⁴ The act excluded from the description of "prohibited immigrants" all persons born in South Africa of parents of lawful residents, or domiciled in any province "including the wife or child of a lawful marriage duly celebrated according to the rites of any religious faith outside the union."⁷¹⁵ There was also a requirement of an ex-indentured registration fee of £ 3.⁷¹⁶ The act was most repugnant to the Indian community.

Gandhi launched his last campaign in South Africa against the act which had become an inflammable issue in

Indian politics. The Indian National Congress at Karachi in December 1913 "expressed its warm and grateful appreciation of the heroic struggle carried on by Mr Gandhi and his co-workers",⁷¹⁷ and Tagore congratulated Gandhi for "the steep ascent of manhood, not through the bloody path of violence but that of dignified patience and heroic self-renunciation."⁷¹⁸ Even the British Press sympathised with the Indian cause.

Andrews urged Hardinge that the spirit of dignified self-confidence of the educated Indians should be fostered as the best preventive to anarchy. The most satisfactory way of harmonising Indian nationalism to the interests of empire, according to Andrews, was to opt for a "strong pro-Indian foreign policy" in the colonies. This, Andrews recommended, would have a wholesome impact in the country. It might, he suggested, assist the middle class to develop its personality away from "petty domestic troubles which they magnify".⁷¹⁹ Andrews was confident of the significant political advantages in making them recognise the desire of the government of India to defend their interests. 'I cannot tell you how strong the resentment is about the treatment of Indians in the Transvaal and other colonies.'⁷²⁰ Andrews advocated a firm line against South Africa in defence of Indian interests. "The credit for championing them, which ought to go to the viceroy, now goes to Lord Ampthill." This was an extremely valuable asset and ought not thus to be squandered away. "I know personally", Andrews added, "that at one critical time Mr Gokhale so resented the apparent indifference of the Government of India on this very question that he was on the point of resignation."⁷²¹ His quest was simple: whether the government of India could evolve some way of dealing with South Africa and similar problems, "more directly, immediately, drastically and publicly".⁷²² His solution was neat. Silence, he cautioned, would be a misunderstanding. The situation had become quite serious. Chirol also highlighted that the imperial government ought to step in firmly in

"this wretched South African business" which looked like "causing ultimately much more serious trouble than even the Cawnpore Mosque."⁷²³ It was realised that the viceroy of India was powerless to act as the *deus ex machina* in the case of South Africa.⁷²⁴ The cabinet at home could alone intervene effectively. If the imperial government was to instruct the Union government that there ought to be a truce and a suspension of the most objectionable measures, Chirol thought, the South African government would not venture to reject the command from London off hand.⁷²⁵ "The refusal to recognise the validity of any Indian marriage because polygamy is tolerated by the laws of Islam and the customs of Hinduism, is I think", Chirol remarked in disgust, "one of the most monstrous things I have ever heard of, and especially cruel to Indian Mohammedans."⁷²⁶ He urged that the government of India should shape its own policy and show that, inspite of its autocratic character, it could voice the interests and wishes of the peoples of India. It was reported that Gokhale was anxious to extend his helping hand to promote a settlement. Evidently, Andrews and Chirol, men of two different vintages, had arrived through dissimilar arguments to analogous, if not identical, conclusions.

Hardinge, always tactful and diplomatic, hastened to make political capital of the situation. But the home government could not be stirred. It was far too eager to confirm the freedom of action of the government of South Africa, a white colony protected by its constitutional autonomy.⁷²⁷ Crewe, though sympathetic to the Indian cause, had already begun to appreciate the complexities of the situation, then confronting the South African government.⁷²⁸ He minuted that Fisher, a South African minister, examined the Indian case admirably. He was, Crewe felt, not far off the mark in maintaining that if South Africa's public opinion had its way, instead of trying to alleviate position of the Indians, the ministers would have to sit down and exercise their minds to devise

plans for making their lot intolerable in the hope of driving them out of the country.⁷²⁰ It was an age of acute racial arrogance. All around the world problems connected with indentured labour, contract labour and immigration regulations raised bitter wrangles and tensions resulting in racial discrimination. "One cannot say it in public", Crewe wrote, "but my experience—a fairly large one—of colonial feelings everywhere in regard to coloured races is that there is very little in the way of persecution that people will not stick at. So that I honestly think that the South African ministers deserve some credit."⁷³⁰ Crewe considered that the repeal of the £ 3 poll tax and relaxation of the entry rules both in the Cape and the Free State would suffice to comfort the Indians. Hardinge wavered but concurred with the opinion. The whole affair seemed to both of them to be a case of "mismanagement and stupid bungling" by the government of the Cape which ought to have given up the £ 3 poll tax.⁷³¹ That would have been sufficient, Crewe thought, to conciliate public opinion in India. But the problem was one of a more serious nature than people imagined, Hardinge maintained exhorting Crewe gently, for educated Indians could not conceive that, India being an important part of the empire, the Indians could be treated with harshness in other parts.⁷³²

Soon *Reuters* brought news of inhuman treatment to the striking labour which was corroborated by other sources.⁷³³ Hardinge rose to the occasion. In Madras he voiced the deep and burning sympathy of India and all lovers of India for the struggling compatriots in South Africa "in their resistance to violence and unjust laws" and demanded an impartial enquiry commission with members representing Indian opinion.⁷³⁴ To Gladstone, the governor-general of South Africa, he telegraphed emphasising the danger inherent in the situation from an imperial point of view. Hardinge's Madras speech caused flutters in London and in defence of his stand he argued

that it was absolutely necessary to scotch a possible all-India agitation. For more than three years, he prodded, India have been very patient while the Indian question had been used in South Africa as a political shuttle-cock.⁷³⁵ He was not interested in going into the question whether it was Gokhale or Smuts who was telling the truth about what had passed between them in relation to the £ 3 poll tax. He was more concerned about the political implication of the opinion held in India that Gokhale had been duped by Smuts.⁷³⁶ He also held that the poll tax served as a means to reindenture and it had thus become an instrument of oppression. He was somewhat embarrassed about one passage of his speech in Madras where he had expressed his personal sympathy with the passive resisters which might have been regarded as an expressed incitement to lawlessness.⁷³⁷

The secretary of state took no exception to the viceroy's espousing the cause of the South African Indians even if he exceeded the limits of what the government deemed practicable.⁷³⁸ "As you say, you hold their brief... The Cape and Natal Indians are your own people not merely co-religionists like the Turkish Mohammedans."⁷³⁹ Nationalist India was overwhelmed by the viceroy's stand; but the British Press was stunned and sore. "Indians, they said, started with a delusion", reported a young Hridayanath Kunzru, "that they could compel the Imperial Government to intervene by veiled threats of rebellion, and the delusion became a gospel when Lord Hardinge forgetting his present responsibility and his diplomatic past endorsed the demands which are the stock in trade of Gokhale and his bands."⁷⁴⁰ In fact, in view of the delicate position held by the viceroy, it was all the more difficult for the Indian secretary to sit still and "repeat a parrot call that there can be no interference with the self-governing colony".⁷⁴¹ He was in a dilemma. The stand of the British government could not be swallowed *ad infinitum* by the people of India.

The viceroy had earned a certain degree of credit at the

expense of the home government but he could no longer be allowed to traverse on the edge of a precipice for the British public opinion was not inclined to believe the allegations about the reported torture of strikers by the South African government. Thus Crewe was obliged to discover an adequate room for differences of opinion with regard to the nature of the official measures.⁷⁴² He was keen to impress upon Hardinge the paradoxical position in which the ministers had found themselves. They wished "to be just and humane", he wrote with an uneasy conscience, but with "Zulu thunder-cloud on its horizon there is a tendency to panic" and in Natal panic accompanied harshness in its trails.⁷⁴³ Besides, the tenor of the viceroy's direct communication with Gladstone was considered impetuous and condemned. Reprimanding the viceroy Crewe suggested that "if I had determined to telegram direct to Gladstone at all I would have adopted a less official tone and addressed him rather as a fellow proconsul from Britain, also harassed by the special troubles affecting those *in partibus infidelium* and presumably glad to consult on the best method of tackling them."⁷⁴⁴ The government of India had demanded an "impartial" commission with Indian representative;⁷⁴⁵ the secretary of state modified its stand and asked for an "unofficial" enquiry;⁷⁴⁶ the South African government condescended to appoint an "official enquiry without an outsider".⁷⁴⁷ Negotiations continued. Finally the South African government agreed to accept an observer of the Indian government and Robertson was selected for that position.⁷⁴⁸

Meanwhile, Hardinge had established contact with Gokhale and spurred him on to assess the mind of Gandhi and ascertain his minimum demand. Gokhale's note on the South African Indians detailed Gandhi's priorities. It included the removal of official discrimination against the Indians from the immigration act of 1913; the restoration of the right of the South Africa-born Indians to enter the Cape freely; the recognition of the validity of the *de-facto*

monogamous marriages, according to Hindu and Muslim laws; the removal of the £ 3 tax and a more generous and sympathetic administration of the existing laws.⁷⁴⁹ It was maintained that the third and fourth demands were indispensable but first, second and fifth might be referred to a commission having an Indian and an imperial representative. If these steps were taken, Hardinge reported back to Crewe, Gandhi might be managed and persuaded to terminate the strike and abandon passive resistance and as a *quid pro-quo* prisoners ought to be released and allegations about ill-treatment would not be pressed.⁷⁵⁰ The threat of the renewal of agitation by Gandhi over the composition of the enquiry commission, which included a few anti-Indian colonials to sit in judgment on the Indians, disarranged the situation once again. Even the presence of Robertson as an observer would not satisfy the community.⁷⁵¹

All these days Gokhale had been working behind the scene to help evolve a compromise. He had been to South Africa the year before and had lived in the Tolstoy Farm. Gandhi and Kallenbach had served him as his personal attendants. The former "nursed and cooked for him and patiently ironed his scarf with his own hands".⁷⁵² In his farewell message to the Indian settlers Gokhale had invoked God entreating "that such a struggle you found it necessary to wage in Transvaal during the last three years may not have to be waged again".⁷⁵³ But, in case the movement had to be resumed against "justice denied", the success of their efforts would depend, he had cautioned, on their ability for a combined action and their readiness to sacrifice for their just cause. He had been touched by Gandhi's mind which was absolutely free from any bitterness against the Europeans. Gandhi, in turn, had trumpeted Gokhale as his political guru. An ailing Gokhale toured India to espouse Gandhi's cause; raised generous contributions for his struggle; wrote profusely in his paper; came forward to assist the viceroy in his admirable stand.⁷⁵⁴

Finally, he offered himself as an intermediary between Gandhi and Hardinge.⁷⁵⁵ He had sent Andrews to advise Gandhi to accept the commission and Robertson as a friend. Gandhi's answer was an oath and an ultimatum. The Indian community, as Andrews reported, had grown desperate. It had no trust on or consideration for the government's position. It was seemingly an impossible situation. The government of South Africa was equally uncompromising. Its back, wrote Andrews, was up as high as possible with what it called Gandhi's ultimatum. "Military tactics here are the order of the day in politics": commented Andrews, "Smuts is a born soldier and so is Botha and the Boers only know the military weapons of political armoury. As you can understand there is nothing more irritating to such a spirit than to have religious vows and threats of passive resistance etc... The Indian community, in its desperation, was daring and reckless of the consequences to an amazing degree."⁷⁵⁶

Robertson reported that one of the chief obstacles on the way of a settlement had been the apprehension of the government that if it conceded one point to the Indians, the latter would promptly start a fresh agitation on another. Robertson was authorised to assure to the commission that the government of India, just as much as the government of the Union, would not favour any fresh outbreak of agitation.⁷⁵⁷ He was also empowered to convey to the Indians plainly that "this is what they may expect".⁷⁵⁸ The Indians were to be told that if they backed out again, they would be held responsible for the consequences, "which may mean the despatch of the ring leaders of a fresh agitation from South Africa". Robertson was cautioned that this might not be explained openly.⁷⁵⁹ It was also believed that the only chance of influencing and intimidating Gandhi was that he should understand without any misconception that, if the Indians did not accept the commission they would forfeit the support of the government of India.⁷⁶⁰ Upon persuasion Gandhi promised to postpone the renewal of the struggle

till Robertson had had one week in South Africa after arrival.⁷⁶¹ An exhausted Gokhale went one step further. On the basis of his acquaintance and knowledge of Gandhi he was convinced that no power on earth could goad him into recognising the commission if he had taken an oath to the contrary. He depended on the goodwill of the government of India almost helplessly. It might be able to negotiate with the government of South Africa, Gokhale hinted in sheer frustration, through Robertson "even independently of the community" and, if necessary, over the head of Gandhi.⁷⁶²

Robertson and Andrews worked on Gandhi and Smuts. Crewe and Hardinge continued to pin their faith on them and, in particular, on Robertson's personal equation with Smuts and others and his friendly disposition. They held that Gandhi and some of his friends were unpredictable and needed "the tenderest handling",⁷⁶³ and Crewe was confident that Robertson was "quite the man for this."⁷⁶⁴ Against the background of a general strike of the European employees of the Union Railways Gandhi met Smuts. It was difficult to anticipate what the effect of the labour outbreak would have been upon the Indian question.⁷⁶⁵ Crewe thought that if the strike led to sharp orders directed against the white workmen the Indians might then realise that their trouble had not been racial in origin at all.⁷⁶⁶ In particular, he was concerned that the two struggles were to be kept altogether distinct and "that the Indians did not get a chance of being involved in the general row".⁷⁶⁷ The railway strike and the administration of martial law, Andrews was to report, helped the situation materially. He got Gandhi "at once without waiting for things to develop" to declare openly that he would stand outside the labour strike altogether and not embarrass the government at all while it was on and there should be no passive resistance in any shape or form so long as it continued. Gandhi's declaration and Gladstone's influence altered the personal attitudes of the adversaries and "the old

...of respect between them and the British...
Gandhi decided to drop the...
and accepted the commission. He would not...
the government in the hour of its crisis. "We are bound to
limit our ambition", he declared, "by local circumstances,
we are bound to recognise the widespread prejudice, how-
ever unjustified it may be and, having done so, we have
declared and I venture to declare... that my co-workers and
I shall not be party to any agitation which has for its object
the free and unrestricted immigration of the British Indians
into the Union or the attainment of the political franchise
in the near future."⁷⁶⁹

Crewe was disposed to ascribe "the sweet reasonableness
of the Union Ministers", to the emergence of "these bigger
troubles." "When a formidable gang of poachers is devasta-
ting your coverts", he wrote with satisfaction, "you cannot
waste time over a labourer who is suspected of having
snared a rabbit."⁷⁷⁰ Hardinge had his own share of glory.
"I hope that those who criticised me last November will
remember that the breakage of a little crockery in a china
shop can have a very useful effect sometimes, and that
they will realise that without a crash of china probably
nothing would have happened."⁷⁷¹ And Andrews had his
own story to tell. Gandhi was, Andrews reported to an
anxious Gokhale, "in high-strung nervous exhaustion. His
work in South Africa is done-nobly done; and this time it
was very near to a collapse. Everyone here says he is
played out. Polak, Kollenback, Ritche etc.—all say the
same—He must go, both for his own sake and for the com-
munity. Yes! for the community's: for if he stays on he
will dwarf everyone else and, there will be no leaders
here for at least another generation. It is painfully, pal-
pably evident already; and it will be more evident still in
a year's time, if he does not go. Let this honorable settle-
ment be reached and then immediately without a moment's
delay let him go to India and be with you or at least the
President of India House. It is plain to see that he will

He does everything—he will do everything; and people simply get to lean on him more and more and the selfish ones take advantage of his goodness. He gets into the way of giving hasty orders without careful thinking (having to settle so many affairs) and when it comes to big things on which the whole issue is staked, again and again, lately he has acted and thought hastily—as what I have said above will partly show. He is one of the best men in the world. I love him as I love Rudra or Mahatmaji. He has made the noblest fight for truth that has been made for years, and I cannot bear to think that it should all end in some great and huge mistake made in haste and repented at leisure, or not repented at all but persisted in because of mind distracted or outworn. So call him home with every authority you can. He regards you alone as his *guru* and implicitly trusts you. What I am afraid of is that he will stay on after these grievances have been righted just long enough for something else to crop up; or that he will regard one last tiny point, ungranted, sufficient cause for starting on further. What he has to do is to return forthwith as soon as the marriage question and the £ 3 tax are settled. The community can settle the other questions without him. I do not think even the Cape country question sufficient by itself to start passive resistance again..”⁷⁷² Crewe, Hardinge, Smuts and Gokhale agreed with him. They thought that the best possible outcome of the whole episode would be for Gandhi to return to India. Gandhi was persuaded to believe in it. A “quite astonishingly hopeless and impractical person for any kind of deal”, observed Crewe, “Gandhi was endowed with a sort of ardent, though restrained, honesty which became the most pig-headed obstinacy at the critical moment.”⁷⁷³ Gandhi returned. A strange man with his stranger armoury was to enter, as an uncomfortable outsider, the backwaters of India politics. No one, not even Crewe, Hardinge, Gokhale or Andrews, grasped the significance of this momentous event.

XIII

WORLD WAR I meant much to India. It was an unprecedented event in history. The state of being at war all the world over, which had not happened since the 18th century, led to the experience of a variety of emotions almost at the same time. It was a thrilling moment for various sections of Indian opinion as the Indian troops found themselves along with the British for the first time in different theatres of the war fighting for the empire. For many, history was being made. The Sikhs, the Pathans, the Gurkhas and the Rajputs withstood splendidly the new environments and circumstances of war in distant and unknown lands in Africa, on the banks of the Euphrates and in France receiving special mention from the field-commanders and establishing claims to the coveted Victoria Cross. A relatively quiet India supported its soldiers' sacrifices by an almost servile loyalty.

War efforts in India had been geared up speedily. Recruitment offices remained active all through despite heavy casualties; the personal failures of general Atken during the assault on Tanga in East Africa, when he walked into a 'surprise blind-fold',⁷⁷⁴ did not effect troop movement; the Mesopotamian operation, marked by the failure of generals and the department of commissariat, was braved by men without adequate sanitary conditions, medicines and without any hope of reinforcement.⁷⁷⁵ On the French front the Indian troops encountered significant racial prejudices.⁷⁷⁶ The entry of Indian soldiers in the world stage made many hearts burn. The massive contribution by a non-white colony in defence of the empire called for a matching response from the British. The diehards scornfully ignored it and the politicians slighted it. Before long all of them began to chant a monotonous and somewhat outlandish fable.⁷⁷⁷ Stories were spread in Britain and were gradually filtered out to India deprecating the value of the services of the Indian troops in France.⁷⁷⁸

Hardinge was distressed by this lack of chivalry. He would have welcomed a generous appreciation in Britain of the contribution of India. There might have been cases of failings, imperfections and weaknesses on the part of some units, Hardinge maintained, but "it should not be forgotten that India supplied the first organised reinforcement from Britain or any other part of the Empire and that India filled a void which could not be filled by any colony or even by the mother country".⁷⁷⁹

The demand for imperial defence on Indian resources was heavy and ever increasing. As early as September 1914 Hardinge felt the pinch of the depleted Indian resources. "It strikes me, however, that we in India are now nearly at the bedrock of any military assistance", he wrote, "that we can give the Empire."⁷⁸⁰ He calculated that during the early months of the war, India had given little short of 200,000 men to fight in Europe and Africa. "We shall have no more guns, nor rifles, nor ammunitions to give. We shall endeavour to continue to give drafts to the Indian regiments so long as the war lasts, but beyond that I do not see that we can do anything more."⁷⁸¹ There was, Hardinge grumbled, hardly anything left in India for Kitchener "to demand from us".⁷⁸² By the end of the year, he complained that the government would retain in India only nine British regiments out of fifty-two, sixty-nine native regiments out of one hundred and thirty-eight and eight batteries of artillery out of fifty-two. "When you consider", Hardinge reminded, "that India and Burma together are about the size of Europe, it should be realised, in spite of the few territorial regiments that are coming, that this garrison is infinitesimal."⁷⁸³ India should by then have sent overseas more than eight divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry without taking into account the imperial service troops bound for Egypt and East Africa.

Hardinge complained that there was a good deal of risk attached to the military situation in the country. But owing

to the grave emergency situation he was willing to take the risk "believing as I do that I have the people of India as a whole behind me".⁷⁸⁴ He was aware of the fact that it was possible to instigate an agitation amongst the Muslim and Sikh communities leading to dangerous developments. Faced with the Kamagatamaru flare up, resentment of the Sikh immigrants, the chronic bomb-cult in Bengal; the sporadic revolts in the Indian army and an international conspiracy Hardinge had reasons to complain that the situation was critical. The failure of the British advance on Baghdad in October 1915 and the military reverses in the Near East, it was feared, might react unfavourably on the hold of the British in India.⁷⁸⁵ It was apprehended that the Germans had been engaged in extensive plots with Indians throughout the Far East.⁷⁸⁶ Hardinge urged Crewe to resist any further demands that Kitchener might make upon India. The viceroy complained that Kitchener had been dealing with India in a casual way. He was secretive about giving the government of India the necessary military intelligence even with regard to the performance of Indian troops;⁷⁸⁷ he was reluctant for long to employ them on the front;⁷⁸⁸ he would lock them up in Egypt in unfavourable hygeinic and climatic conditions instead of allowing them to move forward.⁷⁸⁹ Worse still, he attempted to establish direct communication with the commander-in-chief over the head of the viceroy.

Hardinge was pretty ruffled with his treatment at the hands of Kitchener, an old rival for the viceroyalty of India. He groused. The cabinet, he grumbled, had come under Kitchener's complete domination.⁷⁹⁰ In view of the weak military situation in India the viceroy maintained that his government was willing to meet all imperial requirements provided three conditions were fulfilled. He was determined to take a firm stand against weakening the 1st, 2nd and 4th Divisions of the Indian army either in number, personnel, or material as they constituted "the bedrock of your military security in India". Secondly, he thought that

it was essential that for every British battalion that left the country an Indian battalion should also be sent overseas, for after all it was only the Indian troops that were in a position to become a military danger. Thirdly, a fair and adequate proportion of territorial regiments in exchange was to be provided to India. If these conditions were approved, "I feel quite satisfied", he wrote confidently, "with the prospect of internal security and am ready to assume full responsibility for it."⁷⁹¹

By October 1915 in the face of the adverse military situation in the Near East and uncertainties in Greece, the imminent intervention by Bulgaria, renewed attack on Serbia by Austro-German forces and the peril in which these developments would have placed British forces in Gallipoli, it was decided to take full advantage of Nixon's campaigns by seizing and holding Baghdad.⁷⁹² "It seems to me", Crewe wrote, "that we have within our reach a real and striking success in Mesopotamia which would do much to counterbalance our failure in Gallipoli and throughout the Far East" and to render British position both in India and beyond the frontier more secure. Hardinge agreed with him about the importance of this theatre of the war. Kitchener hesitated to send troops to Mesopotamia while the cabinet insisted on Indian troops being sent out instead.⁷⁹³

The pressure on the Indian government was considerable. It had mobilised every ounce of its military strength.⁷⁹⁴ Indian resources had been utilised for the empire and "not for Indian responsibilities". "We cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact that improvisation has practically reached its limit", Hardinge added, "and as matters now stood, we have nothing in hand with which to meet fresh responsibilities either in Persia or Mesopotamia."⁷⁹⁵ So far as India was concerned he could count only on the slender and sporadic good will of a spoony Amir and the sly Afridis on the frontier. He wondered how long he could depend on these if Persia became hos-

tile.⁷⁹⁶ On the other hand, the political situation in India was slowly and surely deteriorating, and as long as the war lasted it was likely to continue to do so. The frequent tribal depredations, the sulkiness of the Muslims, the plots hatched outside with ramifications in India and the cases of sedition in the native regiments—all tended to show a steady decline of morale. What disturbed him most was that at the same time the military strength of British India was being whittled away.⁷⁹⁷ Constant calls were being made on the government for batteries of artillery, troops and heavy drafts to suppliment wastage in British units in Aden, Mesopotamia and on the frontier.⁷⁹⁸ These had to come from the territorial battalions all of which were below the standard strength having little military value.⁷⁹⁹ Drafts preserved for British regiments in Mesopotamia and for territorials in India had been countermanded. "Nothing comes to India", Hardinge complained, "while India is paying out all the time. We shall soon be in an absolute helpless condition if this goes on."⁸⁰⁰ He conceded that everything possible ought to be done to secure military success in Flanders and the Dardanelles. The condition of India, however, might become explosive and Hardinge was seriously exercised about the future. But the calls were made at regular intervals; the government of India continued to look blue; conscriptions were ordered; troops moved; gaps, caused by casualty, were filled; tensions within country mounted and, as a consequence, the internal security system was being increasingly strained.⁸⁰¹ The Congress and the League hopefully awaited the conclusion of the war. India ought to be rewarded, they hoped, for the splendid services rendered to the *Raj* in the hours of its crisis.

Both Indian and home governments were unanimous that although an advance on the Tigris might be impossible, the holding of the Karuna and the command of the river had rendered the occupation of Basra indispensable.⁸⁰² The small force at the disposal of Basra had been outflanked in a dangerous manner primarily from the

Euphrates across the desert and the British position in the area had become somewhat critical. Hence Crewe concluded that reinforcement from Egypt and India was called for. "This is what", Crewe wrote explaining the final decision of the cabinet, "my colleagues in the Government expect, and indeed demand; and although I hold that Kitchener underrates the risk you have to encounter I am prepared to say that it must be taken, and that His Majesty's Government must shoulder the responsibility for it"⁸⁰³ His colleagues, he added, were not ready to admit that during the period of crisis any part of the Indian army, British and Indian, could be regarded as especially belonging to India or as ear-marked for services there, and they thought that "you put this claim too high in your last telegram"⁸⁰⁴

When another brigade was demanded of India an exasperated Hardinge protested vehemently. He doubted whether the home government had realised that although at the commencement of the war the government of India declared its readiness to send not more than three divisions of infantry and one cavalry brigade, in actual practice by February 1915 it had sent in all nine divisions of the best troops of the Indian army and two and a half divisions of cavalry together with 360 guns of the latest pattern. In return the three divisions of territorials including the Wessex Reserve Division, which "cannot be counted as troops at all", constituted a very meagre replacement. The Wessex Reserve Division with their "gas pipe" rifles, all marked "DP" or for drill purposes and their batteries with fuses dangerous to themselves was merely better than nothing and meant only to impress the Indians who did not realise their trifling military value.⁸⁰⁵ Most of that division had never had a rifle in their hands till their arrival in India and they were composed of "raw boy-recruits" armed with unserviceable rifles, without clothes, boots and shirts. It was regarded by Hardinge as an additional war risk.⁸⁰⁶ "We feel", he lamented, "we have not been treated fairly, that no effort is being made by the military authori-

ties to meet our needs. It is the old story of treating India like a milch cow, and this creates such a deplorable impression out here."⁸⁰⁷

Hardinge knew his limitations far too well. He was aware of the inherent weakness of his constitutional position as compared to that of the governors of self-governing dominion. But the parliamentary control of India, he argued, did not absolve the government and himself from protesting energetically when he considered that the safety of India and the lives of loyal British and Indian subjects were imperilled "by constant and dangerous demands on India's military resources".⁸⁰⁸ He was indignant at the blank refusal to all his requests and incensed by the fact that the security of Egypt and East Africa had been considered more urgent than that of India. The only exception, an irate viceroy complained, to the general trend of imperial policy was made with regard to the despatch of an Indian brigade to Mesopotamia from Egypt and that was owing solely to the fact that the war office realised the necessity.⁸⁰⁹ The despatch of cavalry regiment for the protection of oil pipe-lines was a wrong move, he protested, but the war office was bent upon it and it was possible only when the Begum of Bhopal made the regiment of Bhopal Imperial Service Lancers over to the government for garrison duty in India.⁸¹⁰ In November 1914 the war office made a proposal to place the whole of India's military resources under the direct orders of the secretary of war. "I am quite certain", Hardinge was wild, "that had the proposal been put into force, the situation would have been absolutely impossible."⁸¹¹

In September 1915 the viceroy was disturbed to hear that further financial contributions were expected of India towards the expenditure of the war.⁸¹² Such a demand from Kitchener was imminent and it surprised nobody in India. Kitchener had all along held that "India did not matter as it could be reconquered afterwards".⁸¹³ But Hardinge was surprised to find such views being sympa-

thetically entertained by members of the India council and attentively listened to by some ministers of the cabinet. He protested forcefully. The Indian contribution to the war, he recapitulated, ought not to be estimated merely by its financial commitment. "I doubt if anybody realises", he wrote emphatically, "the enormous quantities of guns, rifle, shells, small arms, ammunitions, cavalry etc. that we have sent from India to England during the past year to say nothing of troops and unattached officers...nor even the contribution of Ruling Chiefs..."⁸¹⁴ There were serious financial difficulties in India and the only way to contribute a modest amount to war fund would have been to either abolish excise duty on cotton or promise to do so, plus to make a substantial increase in the import duties. Loyalty of the ordinary tax payer, a diffident Hardinge foreboded, would be seriously strained by any substantial tax increase except on foreign imports. Since Lancashire was opposed to it Hardinge was disposed to procrastinate the decision during the course of the war and borrow a lump sum to tide over the situation. Only if Mesopotamia became a province of India he would have happily acquiesced to pay for its campaigns.⁸¹⁵

The theatre of the war which concerned India most was Mesopotamia where the British, with their predominant position in the Persian Gulf and the remarkable development of oil reserves centred around Kuwait and Abadan, had acquired special interests.⁸¹⁶ Early in his Indian career, Hardinge had examined at length British interests in the Persian Gulf and in South Persia as far as Basra and had importuned the secretary of state not to allow the Baghdad railway to advance towards the Persian Gulf without obtaining an adequate countervailing advantage and a commanding voice over the destiny of the Gulf.⁸¹⁷ He had also entreated the home government to recognise the economic and strategic importance of the neutral zone in Persia.

The disintegration of the Turkish empire after the war

had become almost certain. Both the Indian and the home governments were ill at ease about the future of the existing Asiatic possessions of Turkey. By and large two distinct sets of opinion on the future of Mesopotamia dominated the discussions in London. The first, based primarily on military considerations, concerned itself with the creation of a strong Asiatic Turkey as a buffer between Russia and Britain; the second set of opinion, essentially political, was designed to create "a new Arabian Imperial Khilafate".⁸¹⁸ Hardinge seconded Kitchener's proposal to the effect that nothing could be less welcome than continuing the Turkish Caliphate at Konia entirely under the thumb of Russia. The repercussions of such a scheme on Indian loyalty, he debated, might be corrosive although he would concur with the view that Konia would be a suitable site for the Turkish Sultanate provided the Muslim world consented to hand the Caliphate over to the Sheriff of Mecca.⁸¹⁹

The war continued to be waged on the Mesopotamian front as elsewhere and Hardinge made a formal visit to Basra through the Persian Gulf and Shat-el-Arab passing by Musandin Point, Linga, Jask, Kishm and Bushire to Kuwait where he was joined by Cox, Chirol and the Shaikhs of Kuwait, Mohammerah and Bahrin.⁸²⁰ His visit to the Persian Gulf was prompted by the need to encourage the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Mohammerah, Bin Saud and the Sultan of Muskat to go for the Turks in Baghdad and to counter the pan-Islamic propaganda against the British.⁸²¹ It was also designed to foster and extend British imperial idea in the Middle East.⁸²²

Persian Gulf had always fascinated Hardinge and appealed to his ebullient imagination. The negotiations with Turkey in 1913 had, to all intents and purposes, turned it into a British lake. The Russians had recognised the preponderating influence of Britain in that part. The supply of troops in that front, however, was restricted and Hardinge was distressed to find the strength of the British army being

dissipated in small groups as they were stationed at various points to protect British interests of insignificant importance.⁸²³ To him the overriding consideration was to hold Basra and protect Mohammerah and Abadan because they were on the British line of communications with the sea.⁸²⁴ He maintained that all other interests were really of secondary importance for even if the oil pipeline from Ahwaz were cut it could easily be repaired later and the loss would only be financial, and hence temporary. Kishm and Henjam had been acquired in exchange for over a million pounds to Persia primarily for their strategic importance, "otherwise they were sandy waterless wastes hardly worth a pound of tea".⁸²⁵ The Shaikh of Kuwait, "a grand old man of over eighty", was extremely loyal to the British and the recipient of an annual subsidy of £4000 for the foreshore, "which needed crores of expenditure to make it accessible for anchorage."⁸²⁶ Hardinge recommended its continuance during the life time of the Sheikh.

At Abadan, he reassured himself with regard to the prospects of British oil interests in the area. When the acquisition of Abadan had been first mooted by the admiralty Hardinge had been critical of the proposal. He had condemned the move as a fresh extension of British commitments without any corresponding and compensating gain for India.⁸²⁷ The optimism of the admiralty had over the years been more than fulfilled. Hardinge was overwhelmed by the remarkable growth of oil interests and thought that it would be quite impossible for the British "ever to leave Basra, if only on account of our great interests in the oil works and the necessity of our protecting them".⁸²⁸ He was equally excited by the prospects of the river, the Shat-el-Arab and the country around it, which with proper irrigation would become a "veritable Garden of Eden". In order to consolidate British interests in the area the Shaikh of Mohammerah was invested with the KCSI. The British position in Basra had a salubrious effect on the political climate of the gulf. The chiefs were reassured by the vice-

roy about the fixity of British tenure in Basra.⁸²⁰ Recommending the permanent occupation of the *Vilayat*, Hardinge maintained that with a little money spent on it Basra would "become a sort of Venice with its canals and with the additional advantage of beautiful date-groves".⁸²⁰ In Muskat, a weak ruler was obliged to accept Hardinge's suggestions to make peace with his rebels and to organise a common front against the Turks.

His visit to Basra and the Persian Gulf corroborated his impression regarding their importance to the Indian empire. Cox admirably summed up the reasons for the retention of Basra. He avowed that the possession of Basra would settle the question of British supremacy in the Persian Gulf. It would ensure the security of the oil interests of Abadan and would facilitate their development. It would secure the position of the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Mohammerah and also of the site of the Baghdad-Berlin railway terminus. It would pay for its administration and military defence as Basra and its surroundings had enormous commercial possibilities. Finally, Cox avouched that to abandon Basra after a short occupation would be to betray "all those Arabs and tribes who are now in friendly cooperation with us and would shake the confidence felt in us by Bin Saud and the Shaikhs of the Persian Gulf".⁸²¹ In view of these salutary and conspicuous political, economic and strategic considerations, Basra, Hardinge was convinced, ought to be retained despite the apprehensions of Crewe that it would encourage Russia to park parallel stations in Asia and Europe.⁸²²

British Near Eastern strategy during the war displayed an exhaustive revision of the traditional policy. It was inevitable that Russia was to occupy both Constantinople and the Straits in the near future. There was no possibility of avoiding such a contingency although it would certainly turn out to be unacceptable to the Indian Muslims. The British foreign office conceded that Russia had a just claim to take steps to prevent the recurrence of a situa-

tion by which her exit to the open seas from the Baltic and the Black Seas could be regulated by rival powers.⁸³³ "I do not see", Hardinge wrote, "how such security can be obtained except by her possession of Constantinople and the Straits."⁸³⁴ He was convinced that the Straits should become an international highway for trade. It was believed both in London and Delhi that Turkey would have to quit Europe. There were, however, ten million Turks in Turkey who ought to be assisted to come together and form a state in Asia Minor.⁸³⁵ Thus even after the annexation of Van and Erzeroum by Russia and the creation of an autonomous province of Armenia it was possible, under suitable guarantee, to establish a Turkish state in Anatolia of a respectable size stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and roughly comprising the area between two lines drawn from Trebizond to Adana and from Ismidt to Basra and Smyrne.⁸³⁶ "If I can show our Indian Moslems that we have done", Hardinge claimed, "something to prevent the Turkish Empire being wiped out, our position with them will become exceedingly strong and I should like to see a Turkey in Asia purified and rejuvenated under our control and protection."⁸³⁷ With regard to the question of the Caliphate, Hardinge was inclined to go by the official policy. He was, however, not confident if it would be judicious to interfere with the religious aspect of the question. He would do all in his part to encourage the Sheriff of Mecca to throw off the Turkish yoke and to guarantee the inviolability of the holy places against attack by non-Muslim powers. Once the Sheriff of Mecca set himself up as Caliph and had the effective control and possession of the holy places, Hardinge was hopeful that there could be but little doubt that in course of time he would be generally recognised in India as such.⁸³⁸

Kitchener's arguments regarding the redistribution of Asiatic Turkey after the conclusion of the war displayed a remarkable continuity in British calculations in the Middle East. The thaw in the Anglo-Russian relations engendered by the convention of 1907 was being gradually eroded

under the pressure of the war.⁸³⁹ The traditional rivalry of the two empires in the East had resurfaced. They were aware of the possibility of a renewed scramble for empire, strategic areas and spheres of influence. Mesopotamia and the Euphrates valley were the focal points of British interests. Kitchener was apprehensive that Russia might secure Constantinople commanding the Dardenelles and the Bosphoros while France would establish her hegemony over Syria.⁸⁴⁰ Thus, with Russia as a Mediterranean power and France in close proximity to the Nile delta the British strategic position in Egypt would be adversely affected. "Should we at any time find ourselves in opposition to either or both of these two Great Powers", wrote Kitchener, "our communication with India by the Suez Canal might be seriously endangered and Egypt itself might be placed in considerable jeopardy."⁸⁴¹ The way out of the situation, according to Kitchener, was the occupation of Alexandretta whose future, in its turn, depended upon Mesopotamia. If there was no intention on the part of the British of acquiring the Euphrates valley as a result of the war, Kitchener maintained, the occupation of Alexandretta would mean the establishment of a dangerous outpost involving them in responsibilities with no commensurate advantage.⁸⁴² But if the acquisition of Mesopotamia was contemplated it would at once become a necessity to hold Alexandretta with a British force.⁸⁴³ Kitchener argued that so long as the Ottoman empire controlled the lower valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris, British interests in the Persian Gulf and Baghdad could only be retained by maintaining her dominant influence in that area.

But if the Ottoman empire was to be broken up it would be imperative that Mesopotamia ought to become British. In this context, he underlined the necessity of creating an Arab state with the Muslim holy places of Mecca, Medina and Karbela as its nucleus and bounded on the north by the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, and established under British hegemony.⁸⁴⁴ The possession of Mesopotamia would secure all the approaches to the Muslim holy places through

the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and Egypt. It was further suggested that Mesopotamia, which controlled the land route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean and commanded the strategic oil-fields of Persia, could easily be colonised by the surplus population of India.⁸⁴⁵ Dwelling on this point, the secretary of the political and secret department of the India office maintained that the proposal to colonise Mesopotamia was sufficiently weighty to warrant serious consideration. It was suggested that the British government should encourage colonists from the Punjab and Sind to immigrate to Mesopotamia which was admirably suitable for agriculture. This policy would offer India a tangible reward for her services in the war and remove some of the resentment which the Indian Muslims might be expected to feel at the British share in the dismemberment of the Turkish empire.⁸⁴⁶ Besides, the creation of an Indian colony would remove the excuse for emigration of Indians to the white men's colonies.

After a serious consideration of the various proposals for the disposal of the dominions of the Turkish empire Hardinge made up his mind that the British ought to remain in permanent occupation of Basra *Vilayat* and that the Baghdad *Vilayat* should also be ceded by Turkey and retained by a native administration under British protection.⁸⁴⁷ Although it would be premature and fatuous to speculate on the distinct forms of a permanent administration of these areas, Hardinge thought that a temporary arrangement could be initiated with the formation of a council of Sunni and Shia *ulemas* under the direction of a British resident.⁸⁴⁸ He was careful not to indulge in excessive and dispensable extension of military commitments in the Middle East. But since an unfriendly government at Baghdad might jeopardise British political, military and commercial interests at Basra it was desired that the proposed Baghdad protectorate ought to include Khanikin in the North along the trade route to Persia.⁸⁴⁹ The rights and privileges of the Baghdad railway on British territory were to be adjusted accordingly.⁸⁵⁰ Hardinge contested the

opinion of the war office and admiralty in favour of incorporating Alexandretta into British possession for this would mean the annexation of the hinterland up to Aleppo as well. He maintained that from the military point of view the railway from Jerablus to Baghdad should never be built. He set down, instead, that in case of general reallocation of territories of the Turkish empire Russia ought to be allowed to annex Erzeroum, Van, Constantinople and a strip on the shores of the Bosphorus; that France might occupy Syria and Palestine; that the *Vilayat* of Kharput, Bitlis and Diarbeker might be encouraged to become autonomous; and that Turkey, cut off from Mesopotamia and Syria, would have, in all probability, its seat of government in Konia and might even evolve into "a respectable Turkish state".⁸⁵¹ Hardinge enunciated that the future of the Caliphate and Arabia should be allowed to settle itself "with a benevolence on our part, but with as little outside interference as possible".⁸⁵² With regard to Persia, Hardinge held that if Russia could be induced to relax her control, "it might suit us better than a partition".⁸⁵³

Crewe was largely in agreement with the viceroy. He concluded that the attempt to trace the boundaries of British acquisitions after the war should be guided less by what "one hopes to obtain than by what we are determined that others shall not obtain".⁸⁵⁴ In other words, Crewe is formulating the broad outlines of British commitments in the Middle East inclined to adopt a practical view. The overriding question, which disturbed the cabinet and was somewhat underestimated by Hardinge, was whether one would retain in Asia a strong Turkey or be prepared to see Turkey dismembered and put "out money upon a new Arab Empire or confederation to which it may be assured that the fiat of the Muslim world will attach the Khilafate".⁸⁵⁵

It was reported that Russia wanted to denude Turkey of the Caliphate and desired to offer it to an Arab state. The British cabinet felt uneasy and both Crewe and Hardinge observed: "Islam must do this for itself if it is to be done at all."⁸⁵⁶

Jacob, the assistant resident at Aden, supported the claims of the Sherif of Mecca.⁸⁵⁷ "I suppose that the Moslem magnates of India might be more easily reconciled to such a plan", Crewe minuted, "than the transfer of the office of the Sultan of Turkey to some other purely mundane potentiate not of the Koreish tribe."⁸⁵⁸ Crewe summed up his scheme for the distribution of Turkish dominions on the following lines: British annexation of Basra *Vilayat* and a close control on the *Vilayat* of Baghdad were inevitable; Ottoman Turkey was to become an independent Asian state with capital at Konia, no longer to be treated as a serious factor in international politics; a free Arabian state or a United States of Arabia should be set up; and no definite successor to Germany's ambitions in Baghdad railway should be decided before hand.⁸⁵⁹

Hardinge from India, however, continued to harp his views on Baghdad. He desiderated a direct control over it which was coveted as a prize possession commanding the trade, prosperity and tranquility of Basra. It was the principal commercial and distribution centre of the Middle East controlling the trade routes to Kurdistan, Persia and Syria. It was the headquarters of Manchester piece goods in the whole of Arabia and with a large infusion of Jews, Persians, Syrians and Arabs it had always been resentful of Turkish rule. The development of irrigation of Basra and even the exploitation of the oil fields of the upper valley of the Karuna river could not be permanently effected if Baghdad was allowed to be retained in foreign hands.⁸⁶⁰ As regards the administration of Basra, Hardinge craved that it should be governed from India and occupied by Indian troops.⁸⁶¹ Besides, irrigation of the area being an immediate problem and it being sparsely populated it was imperative, Hardinge argued, that colonisers ought to be introduced. The advantage of such field for Indian colonisation was obvious, Hardinge underlined, "and once this has been realised it should prove more attractive than emigration to British colonies". The development of a system of irrigation and Indian colonisation of the Basra *Vilayat*, he

dreamt, would open up a vista of endless prosperity and wealth in the not far distant future.⁸⁶²

By May 1915 Holderness was nominated to represent the India office on the imperial committee to review the fate of Turkey. Holderness seemed in full agreement with Hardinge over the issues involved. They believed that it was not possible to avoid a direct control of Basra *Vilayat* which would entail an extension of British sway over Baghdad.⁸⁶³ India's responsibilities, Hardinge reiterated, were already heavy. He was earnest in his desire to shed off the complicated commitments in Persia. It was possible to undertake the acquisition of Basra, he stated frankly, only if relieved of responsibilities in Persia.⁸⁶⁴ He endorsed the view that the partition of Persia might, in the long run, be inevitable. But he would have liked to postpone that contingency as long as possible and held that if the Russians were allowed to have their own way in the Near East they would be willing to accommodate British views on Persia. Apart from territorial adjustments, Hardinge would have favoured to work for an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia in Europe and Asia. With such safeguards, he was confident, there would be no need for more military expenditure in India.⁸⁶⁵

While the authorities, both in Britain and in India, were ruminating over the spoils of the war which was still being waged all over the world with savage intensity, the Russian consul in Calcutta was feeling increasingly uncertain and confused about the significance of the new turn in international relations. The prospects of British influence being firmly entrenched as far as Baghdad, the establishment of a British sponsored Arab state or confederacy and, possibly, the inauguration of a new Caliphate backed by French influence in Syria alarmed the Russians. The new alignments in the Middle East, if realised, they apprehended, would confine the Russian empire merely to northern Persia and adjoining Turkish territories while the advantages of her future possession of Constantinople

would be minimised by the overwhelming ascendancy of British influence in Baghdad and Basra. The Russian consul was somewhat incensed by the unconcealed intention of an extrovert Indian government to integrate Mesopotamian *Vilayats* into its Indian possessions duly colonised by Punjabi Muslim agriculturists. The prospects of this phenomenal enlargement of the eastern possessions of Britain inspired a game of charade dwelling on the possible British motives in the Russian foreign office. The diplomatic profile of the Middle East began to disquieten the strained nerves of the lonely Russian generals in their distant Asian outposts. The spirit of cordiality that had characterised the relationship between St. Petersburg and London, since the convention, gradually evaporated; a sense of uncomfortable suspicion of each other's motives began to blur the visions of statesmen on either side. The threat of Bolshevism was soon to be superimposed on a revived Russophobia.⁸¹⁶

XIV

AGAINST THE background of the depleted military strength of India, the growing stress on an anaemic security system of the north-west frontier loomed large. Persuasion, civility, intimidation and a bounteous subsidy had managed to ensure the neutrality of Afghanistan during the war. But no one could wink at the fact that the Amir had no centralised administration worth the name, that his governors were semi-autonomous and that public opinion in his country was flexible and flimsy. It was responsive to the discourses of priestly class at prayer meetings while the court had to take into account the prejudices and rivalries of the *sardars* in formulating the official policy.⁸¹⁷

From Constantinople to India, Muslim opinion was in a state of ferment as the Caliphate had been faced with the concerted offensive of a so-called devious conspiracy of

christian powers. Rumours, fed by Turkish and German propaganda, were rampant.⁸⁶⁸ All forms of apocryphal stories, tittle-tattle and canard were spread dwelling on the invincibility of Germany, allegedly the only friend of Islam in the West, its striking military successes and the certainty of the defeat of the *entente* powers, bogged down as they were in the quagmire of the Persian Gulf, Dardenelles and Bosphorus and the quicksand of East Africa and Egypt. The triumphant resistance of the Green Flag on the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris was given immense publicity. The object of the campaign of tall talks was to excite the religious fanaticism of the Afghans. Reporting on the situation in March 1915 George Roos Keppel catalogued the fanciful stories of Turkish "victories" current in border districts.⁸⁶⁹ Turkish failure on the Suez Canal, for example, was not credited. On the contrary, it was believed that Turkey had achieved its objective and that an offensive led by Enver Ghazi and the ex-Khedive was in the offing which would signal a general Egyptian rising against the British. It also went round that a Turkish army of 400,000 strong along with German troops and officers was on its way to Kabul where it would be accompanied by the Amir and tribes on its invincible march to India and that it would be welcomed by the Muslims, Sikhs and Bengalis.

Roos Keppel and his men were bidding their time to witness the fall of Constantinople which would have imparted the tribesmen the lesson that Turkey "was a broken reed on which to lean". They foreglimpsed that it would put "a stop to fantastic stories of Turkish victories which are current".⁸⁷⁰ Roos Keppel did not underrate the strength of the pan-Islamism. It had, he recorded, revived old memories of the grandeur, loftiness and eminence of Islam. It had excited universal enthusiasm although, he maintained, the cause of the effervescence on the frontier might have been more material than religious. To the tribes of the north-west borderland the loot of Hindustan had become a tempting proposition. To the Afghan anti-court party, led by the

king's brother, the situation offered an opportunity for *badshahgardi*. In the court it seemed to many that the time was opportune for the settlement of old scores with Russia. To Habibullah, a calm and shrewd ruler determined to perpetuate his personal rule at all costs, it was a period of tightrope walking balancing the diverse elements of the society in a state of suspended expectancy.⁸⁷¹ To the officers posted on the Indian side of the frontier with debilitated striking power the time was rough enough. Russian intrigue was not forthcoming. But constant tribal depredations across the frontier became a daily routine pressing their nerves much too heavily.

The frontier problem in a sense reflected the political and military situation in Afghanistan. A common Pathan sense of belonging and a set of intricate tribal loyalties, institutionalised through their associations and codes of behaviour, had established various customary contacts between the tribes and factions of Afghan politics.⁸⁷² Frontier restlessness found its echo in the Kabul *darbar* which, in its turn, responded to the turbulence of the border. It was a matter of concern for the British to explore all possibilities to ensure the neutrality of Afghanistan. The military realities on the frontier, it was feared, would be entirely altered if ever the Amir decided to take the Turkish lessons to heart. A struggle for power was afoot at Kabul between the Amir and his brother.⁸⁷³ Nasirullah, the brother of the Amir, was pro-Turk and pro-German. In September 1915 it was reported that a German band of conspirators had moved into Afghanistan from Persia.⁸⁷⁴ British warnings deterred the Kabul *darbar* from entertaining the German adventurers who had been operating against British interests. The Amir kept the Germans in surveillance in Kabul but did not expel them.⁸⁷⁵

Hardinge was aware of the constitutional and political delicacy of the Amir's position. Constant watchfulness and reliance on the Amir's promise not to turn against the

allies were entertained as adequate safeguards. Roos Keppel kept his faith alive on the pacific disposition of the Amir. In April 1915 Ayub's son, Ghias-ud-din Khan, failed to carry out a rebellion to overthrow the ruler who had been given prior information about the attempt by the British.⁸⁷⁶ The conspiracy was organised with the assistance of the frontier tribes. Hardinge believed that information from Peshawar underwrote the sure possibility of its success. He tried to take advantage of the abortive coup. In the first place, he believed, the Mangals would behave themselves and remain amenable to the British pressure owing to the threat of the Amir's vengeance. Secondly, the Amir would know that if he abandoned his neutrality "we have two youngmen whom we could at any moment let loose in Afghanistan and raise some of the tribes against him".⁸⁷⁷ In case Habibullah was assassinated by Nasirullah, who was quite "capable of going with the crowd and in the direction of his own inclination by declaring war", Hardinge might find in Ghias-ud-din Khan "a big man thoroughly well-affected towards us" and ever ready to enter the troubled waters of Kabul.

The uncertain possibilities of Afghan politics, direct communication with the Amir and a heavy annual subsidy formed the essential parameters of Hardinge's Afghan concern. An invasion of India by the tribes with the official or unofficial assistance of the Afghan army was not contemplated. Constant counter-propaganda and a liberal flow of financial assistance kept tribal inroads to a minimum level.⁸⁷⁸ These were sporadic and irksome demanding continuous vigilance. But they posed no formidable military threat to India's security.

Surveying the situation on the frontier George Roos Keppel found no reason for anxiety.⁸⁷⁹ In the north, the *mehtar* of Chitral was quite a steady person, transformed as he was from a weak, "vicious and irresponsible youth addicted to wine and women to an improved and matured

man".⁸⁸⁰ Next in turn were Dir, Bajour and Swat. The *nawab* of Dir, grateful as he was for British assistance, meant well and would, Roos Keppel was convinced, keep his people steady and guarantee the safety of the road to Chitral, "which he commanded throughout the greater portion of its length".⁸⁸¹ Swat and Bajour had been "hot beds of fanaticism", but it was believed that the terrible lessons of 1895 and 1897 were still fresh in the memories of the *mullas* there.⁸⁸² In any case, Dir was fully equipped to protect the strategic Panjkora bridge. Next, the Black Mountains and Indus tribes, who rose in 1888 and 1891, had been subjected to punitive expeditions and although there were signs of unrest a detachment of Gurkhas at Oghi at the foothills was an adequate deterrent.⁸⁸³ Roos Keppel felt that the grant of the title of *nawab* in 1911 to the ruler of Asab together with a fresh gift of one hundred rifles had achieved the desired objective of inducing him to preserve peace. The *nawab* had been steadily improving his position over the tribes of Buner who were closely linked with the "professional Hindustani fanatics" down the Indus. The Mohamands were in an uneasy and restless condition but the redeeming feature in that part of the frontier, Roos Keppel thought, was that this tribe was internally divided and subsidy paid to a section of Mohamands had caused considerable jealousy amongst the others. Below the Kabul river the Mullagories had been impressed so enormously by British occupation and protection against their stronger neighbours that they would always lend their support to the British.⁸⁸⁴

The central feature of the tribal relations was the attitude of the Afridis once noted for their hostilities towards the British and frequent raids on the Peshawar villages. The improvement of relations between them and the British since 1908 had yielded rich dividends. During the war the friendly overtures by the Afridis did much to mitigate the hostility of their neighbours. Roos Keppel affirmed that the Afridis were the most important frontier tribe

and he proposed to deal with them as the "key stone of his frontier arch".⁸⁵⁵ They were strong in numbers, well-armed and had organisation which motivated the "surrounding tribes to look on to them for leadership in any movement on the frontier". It was, therefore, taken for granted that if the British could retain the confidence of the Afridis throughout the war, they would prevent any frontier raid from becoming a general conflagration. With this view in mind the government of India increased their allowances. Recommending this pro-Afridi policy Roos Keppel wrote. "I dislike anything in the nature of prophecy, but I believe that the favours conferred upon the Afridis will also be taken to heart by other tribes as a proof that the days of successful blackmailings by acts or threats of violence are past and that good conduct and loyal services are promptly rewarded. I hope, that in the difficult times which are upon us, I shall find the Afridis my best weapon upon the frontier, and that they will prove themselves worthy of your Excellency's kindness."⁸⁸⁶

The frontier, however, was far from quiet. The Tochis, Mashuds and Wazirs were active; they indulged in sporadic raids. The nature of this confrontation was significant. Roos Keppel was disposed to interpret that the British were practically at war with an Afghan province the war being overtly one-sided. The enemy could prepare a strike at leisure safe from British observation and could assault when and where he liked in great force while the British were constrained by circumstances to be very defensive as they were debarred even from adopting tactical offensives much to their disadvantage. As a result, the upper outposts of Datta Khohel, Spina, Kaisora and Tut-narai, where assistance from Bannu could not arrive at ease, remained throughout the period exposed and vulnerable to tribal inroads. The paradox of the situation consisted in the fact that these posts could not be evacuated because the political effect of such a retreat, would have been more disastrous.

If the Afridis became under the new policy an instrument for the extension of *Pax Britannica* in the frontier, the Mashuds, by far the most savage and backward of the tribes on the frontier, offered a determined resistance to the British. There was little doubt that until they were entirely subjugated, assassination of British officers at the instigation of fanatical *mullas* would continue. As the Mashuds stuck to their defiant and reckless obstinacy it was felt indispensable to punish them but without going into their territory and annexing their country. It was obvious already that sooner or later the occupation of the country would have to be considered. But it was concluded that the government could not possibly agree to an expedition into the Mashud country unless steps were taken to open up the country with roads and to place posts at various points. It was felt desirable that the British should take the opportunity of making things thoroughly disagreeable to the Mashuds by blockade operations rather than to walk into the country and then walk out again. Even tribal conversations and discussions with the Mashuds were found to be essentially futile.⁸⁸⁷ It was confirmed that so long as the British remained outside the tribal country and exercised their control by a system of reward and punishment they would lack the power of protecting those who assisted them. In spite of contact with British officers and acquaintance with their administration the racial and religious bonds lost little strength. "It is only when we go in" a perceptive frontier official wrote, "assume direct control of the country and establish an administration of some kind on the spot that this tribal hostility gives way. British domination is accepted and we are able to deal satisfactorily with individual offenders"⁸⁸⁸ The case of the Mashuds was one of constant annoyance to the British administration. They were distinguished by their singular intractability, their lack of cohesion for the purposes of government, their want of respect for *maliks* or grey beards and their "unreliability" both as a tribe and as individuals. The most striking feature of their social

life was the lack of communal system known amongst the trans-border people as *Sirishta*. The only permanent solution to the Mashud question, the government concluded, would be the occupation of that country.⁸⁸⁹ Any expedition without that result, it realised, would be ineffective. But the time was not as yet propitious for a forward policy.

XV

INTERNALLY, HARDINGE repeatedly complained, India was in a state of near explosion. It was his constant refrain. As the military strength of India was being sapped and undermined in fulfilling her imperial obligations, Hardinge was often given to wild outbursts. He had reasons to be sensitive. In Bengal and the Punjab politics had drifted away from constitutional agitation. The bomb cult, political dacoities and terrorism saturated Bengali mind: its animosity towards the government was neither attenuated nor appeased by the decision for unpartition. In the Punjab, the *Ghadar* movement had eroded the loyalty of the army, the most stable foundation of the British rule.⁸⁹⁰ The spectrum of an international conspiracy, with ramifications all the world over and having close links with German programmes, haunted the guardians and politicals of the Indian empire. German agents had moved into Afghanistan whose neutrality seemed a matter of convenience retained only by a strange mixture of generous subsidy and open threat.⁸⁹¹ Indian revolutionaries reached Tashkent in search of aid and assistance—a move which was rendered innocuous by Russian indifference.⁸⁹² The equilibrium of the official mind had been rudely unsettled. Threatened and agitated, the British ruling class in India directed its attention to the elimination of German commercial activities.⁸⁹³ It was insecure and unbalanced in its responses. Often it over-reacted. In sheer desperation, it fixed its wrath on the innocent German bandmaster of the viceroy's orchestra.⁸⁹⁴ It was an anxious hour of the *Raj's* trial. Har-

dinge stood firm through the troubled years from 1914 to 1916 despite a series of personal tragedies.⁸⁹⁵ But a lack of confidence marked the administration; the events of Bengal and the Punjab had shaken its self-righteous flamboyance. It emerged triumphant but the mystique of the *Raj* was irreparably damaged. The Montagu-Chelmsford declaration of 1917 was an attempt to resuscitate it with new confidence.

The administration of Minto had witnessed almost a revolutionary convulsion in Bengal. The unpartition was a tactical move to meet the situation half-way. The whole scheme of the royal visit together with a series of administrative sedatives were designed to concretise the policy of pacification which was carefully formulated. They were expected to produce a tranquillising effect on Indian politics.⁸⁹⁶ A touch of relaxation in the government's stiff attitude was calculated to fire the imagination of the tired moderates and Hardinge had hoped to seduce them into active cooperation. Due care was taken to cement the achievements of the administration of East Bengal; a university in Dacca was promised and the proposal for the establishment of a high court was sympathetically considered. There was practically no government in either part of Bengal worth the name. In East Bengal, in particular, "chaos and anarchy" prevailed. Hardinge resolved to restore order. Baker, the lieutenant governor, "a dangerous mixture of weakness and obstinacy with immense self-confidence", was censured.⁸⁹⁷ Hardinge found him absolutely useless, but happily he was to relinquish his assignment in August and Bayley, the successor, was expected to invigorate the demoralised administration.⁸⁹⁸ The advocate-general was a wet-blanket and he was reprimanded for his failure to carry out precise instructions of the government on important occasions.⁸⁹⁹ The immobility of the Bengal administration, it was believed, was a legacy of Minto and "the whole thing leaves an unpleasant after taste".⁹⁰⁰ But the new

sense of direction that Hardinge was trying to inject into Bengal's panic-stricken government did not ring a bell in Calcutta's Writers' Building.

Moderation, Baker urged, would merely play into the hands of the revolutionary party.⁹⁰¹ There was much sympathy in viceroy's council for the government of Bengal. Jenkins made no bones about it. Craddock, hurt and irked by the official 'betrayal' of Fuller, adopted a scrutinising posture.⁹⁰² There were justifiable causes, he argued, for official willies. The *dacoities* and the *samities*, accompanied by political assassination organised by the members of revolutionary conspiracies, had been designed to "strike terror into the public" and "to collect funds for their schemes".⁹⁰³ This new trend in Bengal politics had commenced in 1908 in the wake of the *swadeshi* movement and had sufficiently wrecked the existing law and order machinery. Jenkins reviewed the whole problem from the vantage point of a jurist. Legal processes, he wrote, was necessarily dilatory in a land where the help of an interpreter was needed by every judge and advocate. "It is the thought underlying this", he added, "that makes me speculate at times, whether after all the proverbial tree is not the proper hall of justice."⁹⁰⁴

Hardinge did not repudiate the official assessment of the situation in Bengal. On the contrary, he was largely in agreement with it. But he did not approve of the defeatist attitudes of the Bengal government. He had determined to revamp a dazed administration then responding on an *ad hoc* basis to certain isolated episodes. In any case, Hardinge decided to underplay the importance of Calcutta, the nerve centre of Bengal. Early in November 1910 Maharaja Pradyot Kumar Tagore of the British Indian Association had been curtly informed that the decision to hold *darbar* in Delhi at the exclusion of Calcutta could not be reconsidered.⁹⁰⁵ In January 1911 the viceroy, in an attempt to deglamourise Calcutta, was inclined to tilt his support whole-heartedly in favour of Butler's proposal for the

removal of the Presidency College to another city. "The Rajas are of no account", wrote a sympathetic friend, "it is the *Vakil* and the *Baboo* who sit in the seats of the mighty."⁹⁰⁶ Hardinge had made up his mind to contain the *babus*.

In the wake of an agitation in Calcutta over the creation of a new university at Dacca, Butler had come in touch with Ashutosh Mookerjee, the vice-chancellor of Calcutta University. He had found Ashutosh able, strong and competent who "wants to help us".⁹⁰⁷ If it was decided, Butler argued, to reappoint him after the expiry of his term he ought to endorse the idea of the Dacca University and also to applaud the possibility of new universities both at Patna and Rangoon.⁹⁰⁸ Ashutosh was unhappy with the management of the Calcutta University over-burdened as it was by its extensive jurisdiction. But he did not seem frightfully jubilant with the prospect of a university at Dacca which continued to carry with it, in popular imagination, a special flavour of divide and rule.⁹⁰⁹ Ashutosh was, however, goaded into an agreement on the new university. Besides, in conformity with the official policy, he was obliged to disentangle the Calcutta University from the responsibilities of supervising the schools. The Calcutta University, thus diminished in jurisdiction, was encouraged to develop its teaching and research wings.⁹¹⁰ Ashutosh had yielded to the persistent pressure of Butler. Indeed, willy-nilly Mookerjee emerged as an eloquent spokesman of Butler's new educational policy. His support, it was appreciated, would be quite helpful and in times of crisis might be useful to meet a hostile senate.⁹¹¹

It was suspected that the anti-Dacca campaign was confined to the Hindu community alone and that some of the opponents were "malcontent agitators led by the *Bengalee*" while others opposed it because of their misapprehensions with regard to the nature of the proposed university. They thought, it was assumed, that Dacca would merely become a replica of Calcutta. If its teaching and residential charac-

ter was publicly professed, Butler advised, the opposition would disappear because "the Hindus of East Bengal", Butler confessed, "were interested in the progress of education in Bengal".⁹¹² R. K. Das had insisted in a private communication to him that it was the element of "secrecy" about the proposed university that was giving rise to speculations and it was necessary to allay them. The government was over-jealous to characterise the opposition of Surendranath Banerjee, whose students came largely from East Bengal, as being purely personal. So was that of Bhupendranath Bose and others whose landed property had hitherto been used as boarding houses for students from East Bengal.⁹¹³

Butler, however, managed to enlist the support of a substantial section of the educated Indians. Gokhale maintained that a residential and teaching university with rights to affiliate colleges would meet the objections of everyone outside Bengal and that he himself welcomed the university. "But you know the Bengalees", Gokhale was amused as he patted Butler on his back, "and how a few conciliatory words satisfy them."⁹¹⁴ The viceroy's counsellor begged to differ. Butler was adamant as he emphasised that the Bengalis, "will agitate and go on agitating".⁹¹⁵ Nevertheless, by February 1912 he decided to conclude that the university agitation was dead although he apprehended that it might get a new lease of life if the "Dacca agitators" joined hands with the Europeans of Calcutta. But it was a remote possibility. The European agitation was *ipso facto* anti-Bengali and the promoters of the movement appreciated the viceroy's courage and his conviction over the Dacca University and the appointment of Shamsul Huda in the executive council. Duke admirably summed up the position of Bengal from the official vantage point: "Agitation of some sort is perennial in Bengal; but so long as it does not touch things vital to our existence we can accept the condition."⁹¹⁶ Although he felt confident about the future of Bengal at least for some years to come Hardinge was aware of the unpredictable twists and turns

of her unique political pattern. As "agitation is the breath of life to Bengal, I presume it will assume some new form in the near future".⁹¹⁷

Hardinge took a firm stand against Bengali agitation. Early in January 1912 he agreed with Bayley that in order to stop all agitations then going on about the boundaries of Bengal and the counter-agitations that were likely to be provoked, it would be advisable that the government should say quite candidly that "for the present we intend to maintain the existing administrative boundaries".⁹¹⁸ If the Bengal agitation did not ebb he would recommend that the population of Sylhet ought to be encouraged to counteragitate for remaining with Assam. "It is a great mistake", he advocated, "to allow all the agitations to be on one side only."⁹¹⁹ The stubborn policy of the viceroy engendered a spirit of optimism in the administration. Political prosecutions, it was agreed, could not be initiated without the viceroy's prior consultation.⁹²⁰ The monthly report from Bengal was declared to be superfluous. Hardinge would not take serious note of the Dacca agitators because ostensibly his educational schemes were on safe grounds in keeping with the policy of the multiplicity of teaching and educational universities all over India. The growth of the university, he added promptly to assuage official misgivings, would be gradual.⁹²¹ He recommended that it was as well to let the extremists blow off a little steam at times. "As long as the students do not become impregnated with extreme ideas", he reasoned, "there is no cause for alarm."⁹²²

The atmosphere of confidence was to last a few months. By mid 1912 the climate of official opinion became somewhat heavy. Hardinge could foresee the gathering clouds in Bengal politics. He drew little comfort from the optimistic note of Carmichael to the effect that the Muslims of Bengal were not excited over either Persia or Turkey, that they were reconciled to the fact that Constantinople would be lost some day, that even Aligarh cut no ice with them and that they looked upon the

proposed Dacca University with marked satisfaction.⁹²¹ Bengali feelings, on the contrary, Carmichael added, irrespective of religion were very strained over Midnapore. The governor found that it was very difficult to contain it. In fact, he had been found utterly misfit to face the dialectics of Bengali politics and to comprehend the dynamics of a desirable British response towards it. Carmichael discovered much to his surprise that Calcutta and Bengal stood as a special category in the list of official priorities. He was puzzled to find that the Maharaja of Kasimbazar was denied the title of Maharaja Bahadur because of his generous donation to the Congress while in Madras, in sharp contrast, Krishnaswami Iyer, a staunch supporter of Congress, had been installed as a member of the governor's executive council without a murmur in official quarters and Darbhanga of Bihar was presented to the public as the most favoured child of the supreme government.⁹²⁴

Politics had become tense. The press had been active; public criticism of government policy had become "unbridled" and the government had relapsed into a spell of nervous inertia once again. Craddock, forthright, "honest but reactionary to the core",⁹²⁵ felt provoked and he turned round to criticise the policy of conciliation commonly held in contempt by the civil servants in general. They were indignant over the desertion of Bampfylde Fuller's cause; they were incensed by the policy of keeping well with the agitators while being barely civil to men like Darbhanga or Burdwan; they decried the absolute licence given to the press; they condemned the vacillation of the government with regard to the application of the Seditious Meetings Act and the delay in enforcing the Press Act.⁹²⁶ Craddock refuted and rejected Adamson's weak statement in support of the separation of the judiciary from the executive. He complained that the government's policy had been encouraging the opinion that the native Press would count for everything and the opinions of the masses for nothing.⁹²⁷ The unpartition, it was maintained, "took away as much as it gave" and was

interpreted as a concession to Bengali agitators.⁹²⁸ "Since that date", wrote Craddock in sheer despondency, "they were openly preaching that loyalty does not pay but agitation does."⁹²⁹ Every such instance, he added, was an "encouragement to those who resist our authority and belittle us and discouragement to those who loyally support us".⁹³⁰

Craddock had reacted sharply to a note by the governor of Bengal proposing certain alterations in the electoral rules returning the university men in the legislatures. "It would be a good policy", Carmichael had recommended cheerfully, "to do something to meet the demands made by the educated middle class of Calcutta for some direct share in the representation."⁹³¹ If the government of India accepted it, he wrote confidently, "it would go a long way to stop agitation". He had even advocated that personally he sympathised "a good deal" with the aspirations of the Indian middle class and hoped that some day probably much would have to be done to meet it.⁹³² He had agreed that the grievances, which the educated middle class felt, might be fanciful; but he sought to remind a tardy administration that they felt them most intensely. However, the significant observation of Carmichael, made in his characteristic casual and indolent style, was conveniently disregarded by both Hardinge and Craddock. It concerned a new qualitative change in the temper of middle class politics. "As far as I can judge", Carmichael expostulated that the educated class "is becoming a strong link between Hindus and Mohammedans who are inclined to be discontented."⁹³³ Emphasising his position still further Carmichael referred to paragraph 5 of the Resolution No. 4213 of 15 November 1909 which promised special provision "for the representation of the professional classes" on the provincial councils by the representatives of the universities. Failure to fulfil this commitment, he asserted, would be loudly denounced as a breach of faith.⁹³⁴ Carmichael was jittery as he prognosticated that in such a contingency not only Surendranath Banerjee or Bhupendranath Basu but even

such "respectable" men like Ashutosh Mookerjee would be inclined to sympathise with the agitation.⁹³⁵ He was unhappy with the facile pontification of the government of India that the university men represented "the educated classes" and not the "educated". He doubted if this view could be enunciated *ad infinitum* in public in the face of that official resolution.⁹³⁶

Butler was seriously alarmed by Carmichael's alleged pusillanimity. There was, he feared, a tendency in the Bengal government and the Calcutta university to combine against the government of India. Ashutosh Mookerjee had already become an uncertain factor.⁹³⁷ Hardinge, who had agreed with Craddock that the question of the separation of the executive from the judiciary was "exclusively a Bengali demand, that too that of a Calcutta lawyer", also approved of the view that the Bengali journalists "are a set of wholly irresponsible chatterers without either logic or honesty."⁹³⁸ He reminded a timorous Carmichael that Surendranath Banerjee and his ilk are "poisonous creatures", "absolutely dishonest", "inconsistent and impervious to arguments", who could "not keep quiet" and must "always have an agitation to keep alive."⁹³⁹ He seemed to share Craddock's cynicism about the Bengali agitation. He made it fairly unambiguous that Bengal meant, after the transfer of the capital, very little to the government of India which could no longer be expected to take note of the continual cacophony of Calcutta High Court. "We are quits of Calcutta now"; Craddock gaped, "and the sooner they realise that their chatter is appreciated by us at its true worth, the better for them, for us, and rest of India."⁹⁴⁰

The government decided to apply its gimlet on Bengal. The principal target of the cleansing process was inevitably the university of Calcutta. Butler concluded that the best way to serve Bengal was by initiating a university at Dacca and strengthening the colleges in the *mufassils* so as to drain off the university of Calcutta.⁹⁴¹ But "that

augean stable" ought to be wiped clean by the government and not by its Senate which "is swayed by popular and racial feelings."⁹⁴² The dicey bravado of the government of Bengal was typified in the personality of its governor. Craddock cribbed that Carmichael was "in a state of detached irresolution".⁹⁴³ His Midnapur speech of 13 January 1913, delivered at the heels of the violent outrage of 17 December 1912, extending hands of friendship to the Bengalis was interpreted by the home member as more than a mere "foolish indulgence".⁹⁴⁴ Sydenham thundered as he saw in it a renewed impetus to disloyalty.⁹⁴⁵ Fleetwood Wilson, himself "very, very anxious about Bengal", pronounced his judgment that government had ceased to operate there and demanded the Carmichael "would have either to do his work or go".⁹⁴⁶ Ashutosh was no longer trustworthy and Craddock was of the opinion that he should not continue as the vice-chancellor of the university. Even so, it was not certain whether he, as a member of the Syndicate, would allow any other vice-chancellor to function.⁹⁴⁷

The government of India continued to maintain that the solution of Bengal's problems was only a question of efficient administration and of providing a strong European agency for district administration.⁹⁴⁸ The provincial government held that the seat of Indian anarchy was in Bengal, that lawlessness had overwhelmed the process of ordinary law and that the only way of suppressing endemic political violence was to have an extraordinary statute. There was no serious contradiction between the two views. But there was a divergence of outlook. It was axiomatic that the repressive measures would not work alone.⁹⁴⁹ The problem was how to introduce efficiency and a sense of purpose into the administration. Craddock thought that neither the partition of Bengal by Curzon nor the unpartition by Hardinge had been accompanied by substantial administrative reforms.⁹⁵⁰ The viceroy was in agreement with Craddock that the district of Mymensingh, as it stood then, could not be retained intact and division and redistribution of the districts from the point

of view of law and order was essential.⁹⁵¹ Meston from the United Provinces consented to the general official assessment of Bengal's problems. "There can be no question that organised crime, such as is now rampant in Bengal, is extremely contagious; and we have a very turbulent and difficult element in our population in these provinces, which it would require very little encouragement to kindle into flame."⁹⁵²

Hardinge moved. Carmichael needed an official jolt. On the basis of the report by Craddock, who had been sent to Bengal to bring information about East Bengal and especially with regard to the organised *dacoities*, Hardinge concluded that the disturbance was not merely economic.⁹⁵³ It appeared to him that the movement was the result of a conspiracy extending to schools stretching over large areas. The object of the movement was to render the government paralytic "so as to promote a revolution".⁹⁵⁴ In a curt letter to Carmichael Hardinge sought his opinion on Craddock's note.⁹⁵⁵ While still in complete agreement with the view of Craddock Hardinge skilfully added that Bengali discontent was also a product of "reasoned racial feelings", largely due to the influential Anglo-Indian press which "scarcely concealed the contempt of the English commercial classes for Indian sentiments and Indians generally."⁹⁵⁶ The speeches of N. Macleod, for example, in the Bengal council did an "incredible amount of harm all over India".⁹⁵⁷ Fleetwood Wilson agreed with him on this point.⁹⁵⁸ Wilson contended that the task of governing India, especially Bengal, was growing more difficult every-day.⁹⁵⁹ But no one in the administration was disposed to condone Carmichael's alleged weakness. Hardinge remarked cryptically that Carmichael probably thought that he could overcome sedition "by coquetting with it and by using soft words", when drastic measures were necessary.⁹⁶⁰ The viceroy was somewhat caustic with the governor who was dealt with in a cavalier manner. "Carmichael must by this time have exhausted all his soft words and given enough dinners, and it now remains to be seen how he proposes to deal with his present difficulties."⁹⁶¹

Hardinge ordered Carmichael to take a resolute stand. The governor, in response, maintained a mysterious silence and, in exasperation, the viceroy expressed sharply his lack of faith in one who could imagine that "he can be on friendly terms in Bengal with Loyalists, Extremists and Dacoits at the same time".⁹⁶²

The state of affairs in Bengal had been reviewed by the viceroy's council in May 1913. A variety of measures were suggested. Closely following Craddock's report the council maintained that it was superfluous and futile to go on piling up repressive measures ⁹⁶³ which might push the moderates into the arms of the extremists. As the most immediate step the council recommended a system of supervision of unrecognised schools, the whole school system in Bengal having become "a web of conspiracy".⁹⁶⁴ The council felt that one could not be deterred by the fact that control would be unpopular. It tried to impress upon a reluctant governor that it has become necessary and unavoidable. Besides, the new policy envisaged divisions of unwieldy districts and the appointment of more officials. It was asserted that owing to prevalence of the permanent settlement there had been a remarkable lack of contact between the officials and the people and, in this context, the Benaras system of district administration was advanced by Meston as a possible experiment.⁹⁶⁵ Besides, seditious teachers, especially the two teachers of the Calcutta university appointed by Ashutosh, were ordered to be dismissed forthwith;⁹⁶⁶ the provincial government was induced to control the press as had been done by Sydenham in Bombay;⁹⁶⁷ two regiments of native infantry were to join Bengal police force in order to enable the coercive apparatus of the state to stretch its arms into districts and villages;⁹⁶⁸ the existing police force was to be enlarged with better emoluments and finally, a large troop-movement in East Bengal was sanctioned. In short, it was decided not to trifle with sedition.⁹⁶⁹ "I am perfectly convinced", wrote Hardinge, "that by the firm application of the weapons in our hands, an end could be put to the prevailing lawlessness,

but it is necessary that whatever is done should be done consistently and continuously. We have got to show that sedition must be treated firmly and fearlessly, and that we have our eyes open and take note of what is going on. In my opinion the safest and surest means to control sedition is by the steady and firm control of the press in accordance with the Press Laws. An unbridled press does an incalculable amount of harm especially among the people like Bengalis."⁹⁷⁰

There was an air of unreal optimism in the council. Hardinge, Butler, Craddock and even Wilson had mixed feelings about the measures suggested. An element of desperation underlined an uncertain future. A bewildered administration felt it necessary to have concentration of troops in East Bengal during the following drill session in the vicinity of Dacca and Mymensingh.⁹⁷¹ It was a political expediency that troops ought to be seen in East Bengal. British units should proceed deep into East Bengal by route-march so as to be witnessed by people in as wide an area as possible.⁹⁷² The proposed exhibition of British might, it was added, ought to include batteries of artillery and regiments of infantry. The *nawab* of Dacca, an asset to the British in East Bengal, was on his death-bed and the Muslim community had been left with no leader worth the name. If the Muslim peasants refused to pay rent to Hindu *zamindars* the situation would become very critical indeed.⁹⁷³ "This military demonstration", wrote Hardinge, "will, I am sure give confidence to the loyal, and will convince the rest that we have the means of maintaining order if we wish to apply them."⁹⁷⁴

Apart from the university, the other radiating centre of disloyalty was the Calcutta High Court which had become "a very difficult factor in the administration of Bengal".⁹⁷⁵ The pivot of disaffection and opposition, Craddock held, "were the Court and the Bar Libraries in the various districts. They are the places where mischief is always hatched, but they bask in the sunshine of the High Court's favour".⁹⁷⁶ The clamour of the Bar libraries,

Craddock maintained, had been allowed to become an obstacle to administrative reforms. He was vehemently opposed to the attitudes of the High Court. He thought that it had been the chief impediment to the pacification of Bengal. The prosecution and the police were hectorred and bullied; real and honest explanations were viewed with suspicion and contempt; any absurd statement made by the accused was regarded as possible and reasonable.⁹⁷⁷ Jenkins, the chief justice, was accused of relying on third-hand hearsay and approaching the trials of political cases with a firm animus against the prosecution.⁹⁷⁸ "Had a judge in England", Craddock was ready as ever to pass his judgment, "behaved like this, there would have been a petition in the Parliament against him."⁹⁷⁹

Hardinge approved and approbated Craddock's appraisal of the situation. He sought to ensure that Jenkins' successor in the Calcutta High Court ought to be a man who could be absolutely relied upon to do "impartial justice" and to hold to his own against the baneful political influence that surrounded the High Court.⁹⁸⁰ The administration was conscious of its own high-handedness and apprehended that even the best man coming from Britain might be overcome by high-strung lawyers about him. Bayley had put it more bluntly. It was very essential, he maintained, that the chief justice ought not to be a Calcutta man and that he ought to be strong and capable having plenty of Indian experience.⁹⁸¹ "A sound knowledge of law is obviously a desirable qualification", Bayley added, "but shrewd commonsense will be more valuable still."

The viceroy took strong objection to the inefficiency of the Calcutta High Court. He maintained that during his own experience Jenkins had always followed the traditional policy of that court "in opposition to the Executive".⁹⁸² In no other high court in India, Hardinge continued, such an attitude of opposition thrived. Unlike Jenkins, it was held, Fletcher was not even a good lawyer. In sympathy and in attitude, however, both Jenkins and

Fletcher were in the same boat and always ready to accept Bengali evidence in preference to that of the British officials.⁹⁸³ The viceroy thought that the high court of Calcutta was largely responsible for the embarrassing law and order situation which prevailed in Bengal. "They have succeeded", Hardinge complained, "by the standards of evidence that they demanded, which I understand has to be far more direct than is the case in England, in making it extremely difficult to obtain convictions, even in the most flagrant cases."⁹⁸⁴

It seemed to Hardinge that the High Court was very keen to prevent the application of the Press Act. Thus, despite the criticism of Lawrence Jenkins in the case of the *Comrade* and subsequent demands for the modification of the Indian Press Act, no move in this direction was encouraged. Hardinge maintained that the press in India was absolutely different from the press in Europe. "We have taught the Indians much", he wrote, "but we have not taught them journalism." He was convinced that the "flames of sedition" was being fanned by the press, and any weakness on the part of the government in restraining and regulating the press "would be misunderstood by the population, of which the great overwhelming numbers were credulous and ignorant."⁹⁸⁵ There were sufficient pressures to relax control.⁹⁸⁶ But Hardinge would not. The native press, according to him, was given to extreme self indulgence and licence and, if unchecked, unfair criticism of the government would be "slavishly believed by all the youngmen of the student class" of whom "the neurotic ones" might imagine that they would be serving their country by committing outrages.⁹⁸⁷

The government of India was turning to some extent allergic to all forms of popular dissent and even to the legitimate demands of the moderates. Craddock believed that political forces inimical to the British had a plan of campaign designed to attack the government from all sides.⁹⁸⁸ They were a determined lot and were inclined to adopt

various insidious methods for gaining their ends. "One is to get the education of the youth of the country into their hands and to train it up to an attitude of hostility to Government, biding their time until the opportunity is favourable to them to strike home."⁹⁸⁹ Another of their methods, wrote Craddock, was to encourage sedition in the guise of religion. The government of Bombay had held that the worship of *Ganapati* was a serious political movement and it found it difficult to confine the festival to agreeable limits by the ordinary processes of law. Sydenham reported as he retired from active service that he was no longer so hopeful as he had been about the future. He found large masses of people alienated,⁹⁹⁰ although Sydenham was still able to trace "plenty of real loyalty left", based on reason and knowledge. But few Indians, he maintained, had "real courage", and "open avowal of loyalty will become rarer."⁹⁹¹ He was singularly disturbed by "democratic tendencies at home" making strong government in India difficult.⁹⁹² In an atmosphere of uncanny uncertainty he was to suggest that British newspapers should not "sound the tocsin of alarm" about the Indian peril which might encourage sedition.⁹⁹³

With the advent of 1914 the situation in Bengal saw no substantial improvement. The Calcutta university resented the policy of review and inspection exercised by the government; it protested against the right of the government to impose restrictions on the appointment of its professors. "I am not afraid", Hardinge wrote, "of the lecturers going to the High Court, since not one of them would dare to face the ordeal of cross-examination."⁹⁹⁴ He was determined to retain a firm hold on the university. "I am confident", he added, "that all moderate minded people will be on our side when they understand the real facts of the situation."⁹⁹⁵ As long as the Calcutta university had jurisdiction over Bihar, Orissa, Burma and Assam, he maintained, it was not possible to give up governmental supervision. Hardinge went ahead with his plan. Recognition of schools was handed over to local government. "If it is placed in the

hands of your Educational Deptt.", he wrote to the governor, "Bengal will not be the only province where the university did not have the necessary staff to supervise the schools; and moreover until a student joined a college, he really ought not to come under the supervision of the university."⁹⁹⁶ The Calcutta university would have plenty of work to do, he recommended, and would be invested with sufficient importance if they controlled the colleges. He instructed the governor not to allow political latitude to students and teachers. "There could be no two opinion" that "students of High School should have nothing to do with the temptations and distraction of politics."

The government seemed up-in-arms against the people of Bengal. Even Rash Behari Ghose's gift to Calcutta university endowing professorial chairs for Indian scholars drew a sharp rebuff. His "munificent gift" for the benefit of Indian scholars, Hardinge twisted the object of the scheme and twitted sharply, was a direct encouragement to racial differences.⁹⁹⁷ On a second thought, he approved of the gift since it always remained "with us if the proportion of Indian Professors becomes too great to say that we must have a few English Professors to leaven the mass".⁹⁹⁸ His object was to stand up for the students and their parents "and to 'down' A. Mookerjee, R. Behari Ghose the agitators and others".⁹⁹⁹ Yotish Chandra Ghose, a journalist engaged by the *Bengalee*, was appointed in September 1913 in Ripon College as a lecturer.¹⁰⁰⁰ Pat came the order from Delhi demanding a thorough "dressing down" of the gentlemen and urging Carmichael to see to it that all such anarchists were removed from academic positions.¹⁰⁰¹ The government was perturbed by the political ascendancy of Ashutosh and was distressed to discover that the university had become "Mookerjee and Mookerjee alone", who "controls the Senate and takes objection to government control, encourages the Senators to criticise the government and allows resolutions against its professed policies."¹⁰⁰² The reaction of the government was prompt, ready, and simple. Mookerjee ought to go, his final convocation address ought

to be scrutinised closely and an official vice-chancellor was to succeed him.¹⁰⁰³ The alienation of the government from the people was complete. An exhausted viceroy lost all sense of proportion as four and a half British infantry regiments, six Indian infantry regiments, four batteries of field artillery, three squadrons of native cavalry offered the people of East Bengal a spectacle of brute terror, "that they have never seen".¹⁰⁰⁴ It was expensive, the viceroy tittered, "but worth it, with good effect".¹⁰⁰⁵

The response of the administration to Bengal politics had become macabre. The government was increasingly losing grip on the situation. It was jittery, apprehensive and restless. It lacked a policy. It was impulsive and impetuous. Even a British cabaret artist was forbidden to perform the *salome* dance to be ogled at by an open audience of inscrutable Bengali *babus*.¹⁰⁰⁶ The police went one step further and declared poet Tagore an anarchist, and hence, unfit for the reception of an honorary degree of the university and only the viceroy's testimonial—"thoroughly loyal"—enabled a harrassed government to avoid an embarrassing situation.¹⁰⁰⁷ The government's policy towards Bengali unrest, however, was at best a collation of *ad hoc* measures tuned to repression. Its arms were long enough to catch a slippery haddock in an almost inaccessible Barisal village, but its mind under the direction of a determined Craddock had become claustrophobic. With limited vision it failed either to gauge the intensity of the problem or to thrash out a solution.

By February the government of Carmichael agreed to be exhorted: it decided to put a stop to the anarchist situation. It was now believed that the Bengal movement was spreading its tentacles all over.¹⁰⁰⁸ The secret *samities* had despatched teams to Benaras, Patna, Delhi and Lahore. These little known malefactors, the government spokesman argued, had been working in secret and thanks to the high standard of Calcutta's judiciary which refused to convict unless the accused had been caught red-handed

or made confession, "the Bengal movement had been adopting almost a national character".¹⁰⁰⁹ Lajpat Rai was believed to be in league with them. "We are very much concerned about the anarchical movement in Bengal", reported a battered Hardinge, "they are making a dead set against the police who have really behaved like heroes."¹⁰¹⁰ In order to circumvent the hurdles raised by the High Court a committee of three judges was set up to examine cases of anarchy in Bengal and to recommend measures to ensure conviction. It was also decided in advance that they would unanimously conclude that the situation was grave and would prescribe the necessary criteria of evidence—sufficiently weightily but below the standards prescribed by Calcutta—as would convict the accused.¹⁰¹¹ The whole matter probably appeared distasteful to Hardinge, who argued nevertheless: "It is impossible to turn a deaf ear to the appeals of the Government of Bengal for assistance, and it seems to me that the only remedy is to put into execution what is already the law of the land."¹⁰¹²

It was felt that the law was inadequate to strike a deadly blow at anarchy. "I feel concerned", wrote Hardinge, "as to what the situation will ultimately become in Bengal, if the campaign of police assassination goes on unchecked."¹⁰¹³ The alternative would be to behave like "an Assyrian monarch or like a West African Chief". Probably the alternatives provided Hardinge with a dilemma of an unreal choice but he was sure "that an Assyrian monarch would have a very quick and ready means of dealing with questions like that which are before us".¹⁰¹⁴ Existing laws, he argued, would have undoubtedly dealt a serious blow to the anarchist movement. But in a year or two the effect of that law would have worn off and anarchy would become rampant again.¹⁰¹⁵ Demonstration of the impotency of the law, Hardinge upheld, only served as an incentive to crime.¹⁰¹⁶ Thus he desired to put an obsolete law—the Regulation III of 1808 empowering the government to deport undesirable elements—into operation "which excited great howls" both in Bengal and England.¹⁰¹⁷ He was

sorry to find that resorting to the regulation encountered a solid body of "pre-existing dislikes and prejudices" both in India and Britain nullifying all administrative advantages.¹⁰¹⁸ Carmichael, therefore, preferred the enactment of a surveillance law by the Indian government while Hardinge insisted on it as a provincial measure. If enacted by Bengal with an official majority rather than by the imperial council the act would be favourably regarded.¹⁰¹⁹ He further stipulated that the life of the act ought to be for a term of one year, the commission should have at least one Indian and the accused ought to be given at some stage the right to be interrogated and be offered a counsel. The regulation, if reinforced, would be attacked in the Parliament as an affront to British justice and civil liberties. As a consequence, the moderates, not in sympathy with terrorists, might, in deference to the British appeals to abstract principles, revise their public estimate of individual victims of deportation, "so that, men, whom they began by regarding as scoundrels of no importance, would finally be elevated in Indian public opinion to the position of martyrs and patriots".¹⁰²⁰

The situation of Bengal had been creeping into other areas. Besant had her flag for home rule unfurled. Tilak, released after a prolonged sentence, though lying low, was surveying the scene around and groping to grasp the Indian syndrome.¹⁰²¹ Already, the Besant's followers were very hostile to the controls to be accepted by the Hindu university although Malaviya appeared very reasonable.¹⁰²² The war was on and there was also some genuine loyalty. Dadabhai termed the war as a "struggle for liberty, honour and righteousness".¹⁰²³ Even Bengal came forward with profession of loyalty much to the embarrassment of Carmichael himself.¹⁰²⁴ Willingdon reported with almost juvenile excitement that Tilak "made advances to me" saying that "he would like to declare his desire for the success of British arms at this juncture."¹⁰²⁵ Proposals were made for an Indian volunteer regiment.¹⁰²⁶ Craddock, as cynical and diehard as ever, saw in the display of loyalty an anti-

pation of favours to come, "if not actually calculated at that point of time, at least to become hereafter, the basis for inconvenient political claims".¹⁰²⁷ Carmichael continued to vacillate. He sulked and dilly-dallied; he was desperate to shift the responsibility for the enactment of a surveillance act on to the centre. Hardinge yielded at last. He agreed not to introduce controversial legislations the time being not opportune. They had agreed to deal with the anarchists summarily.¹⁰²⁸ A year ago Hardinge had been delighted to note that "the enormous country with the exception of Bengal was very quiet". "That wretched province (Bengal) never seems to be free from trouble and agitation", he wrote with an air of despondency, "and the Bengalis are a constant source of anxiety. They are born agitators: and as soon as one question is settled, they seem to feel bound to raise another. However, they do not gain much by it."¹⁰²⁹ Punjab was now to add to his anxiety. Kamagatamaru, *Ghadar* and mutiny followed in quick succession. An exasperated Hardinge became bewildered as well.

XVI

KAMAGATAMARU, a chartered passenger ship, sailed into the port of Calcutta from Canada where the immigration laws had prevented its embarkment.¹⁰³⁰ It consisted of immigrant Sikhs from South-East Asia and the United States under the leadership of one Gurdit Singh. It was suspected that they were cadres of the *Ghadar* movement, which had its headquarters in San Francisco. The Calcutta administration, already harassed by local revolutionaries, lost its nerves and mismanaged the whole affair. The immigrants were herded into a train ostensibly bound for the Punjab, but it was widely rumoured and believed that the destination was a tea garden in Assam.¹⁰³¹ The resultant row led to police firing. According to official reports twenty of them were killed, some were interned and many absconded. They established contact with Bengali revolutionaries and reach-

ed the Punjab primarily to organise a general rising taking advantage of the weak military position of India.¹⁰³³ The officials initially did not attach much importance to the incident. Hardinge agreed to appoint a commission but he played safe deciding beforehand that evidence was to be taken *in camera* and only an official version of collated material could be published.¹⁰³³

The situation altered dramatically by November. The viceroy was to inform the home government in distress: "...although outwardly things in India are going well, we have nevertheless serious anxieties. During the past few weeks there has been an incursion of Sikh revolutionaries from San Francisco who... arrived with the intention of raising the whole of the Punjab. Happily owing to the Ingress Ordinances we were able to seize the leaders and we have most of them in prison, but the others are going about the Punjab and forming gangs of dacoits, their object being to rob the local treasuries, to create a state of panic and to upset government."¹⁰³⁴ Soon he baffled Crewe with more sensational news. He reported the desertion of *sawars* from the 28th Cavalry at Lahore, who had been caught and summarily arraigned for court martial; about the arrest of 1400 revolutionaries who were being severely dealt with; the knowledge of another gang of 100 whose activities had been contained; the immense harm affected by them in the Punjab; the instability among the Sikh regiments; about Sikhs, as a whole, being restless and in a sulky state, and regarding a definite proof of a close compact between the anarchists of Bengal and the Sikh revolutionaries.¹⁰³⁵

"One cannot pretend", wrote O'Dwyer from the Punjab, "that Sikh feeling is likely to be satisfactory, so long as a witches' cauldron keeps on brewing in America".¹⁰³⁶ It was held that although there was no absolute disaffection among them there existed a widespread dissatisfaction. There were various reports of discontent at the front confined to Sikh regiments.¹⁰³⁷ O'Dwyer wondered whether the wounded heroes who had been returning from the front

would make efficient sergeants enlisting fresh troops in India. The impact of the new conspiracy was felt with increasing intensity in the ensuing months. Although the recruiting machinery was active among the Punjabi Muslims and the Jats, it was extraordinarily slow with the Sikhs. There were some disquieting symptoms among the trans-border troops, primarily among the Pathans, Afridis and Mohmands. Cases of desertions were reported from Basra and Egypt and also from the regiments posted on the frontier.¹⁰³⁸ A more serious incident occurred when the 130th Beluchis shot an officer in Bombay while embarking for Basra. That Mashud company was disarmed, the ring-leaders were kept under arrest and the company was subsequently sent to East Africa.¹⁰³⁹ Three companies of Afridis and Pathans refused to go to East Africa and there was an open mutiny. The companies were disarmed, their leaders were sentenced to death by military court and severe punishment was meted out to others.¹⁰⁴⁰ It was anticipated that if Persia was driven to join Turkey, a *jehad* would be declared by Kabul which would excite the whole of the north-west frontier of India.¹⁰⁴¹

The loyalty of the Indian army was seriously questioned and Hardinge began to doubt its integrity. He was no longer fastidious about the Indian battalion leaving the country but he pleaded relentlessly that it would be madness to allow a single British soldier to leave India.¹⁰⁴² But for timely information at the disposal of O'Dwyer, Hardinge was about to face a major catastrophe. A conspiracy had been afoot and an attack on the armoury and magazine of the 23rd cavalry at Lahore with simultaneous assault on Pindi and Ferozepur cantonments had been organised for the 19 February 1915. An isolated sally on Ferozepur on 19 February and one, the next morning on Lahore stupified the government although it was not taken by surprise. The plot did not materialise in its entirety.¹⁰⁴³ It was believed with some modicum of certainty that the Sikh revolutionaries had some support in the native regiments. Strict measures were sanctioned to deal with the situation

without causing panic.¹⁰⁴⁴ The Ingress Ordinances enabled O'Dwyer to deal drastically with the returned Sikhs and the Regulation III of 1808 was put in force throughout the country without undue publicity.¹⁰⁴⁵ Besides, special tribunals were established both in Bengal and the Punjab to expedite the disposal of cases avoiding any unnecessary fuss about their legality and "those abstract notions of justice".¹⁰⁴⁶ "Every whiteman, however infirm and however worthless his rifle may be", Hardinge recommended as a desperate remedy, "is a distinct asset in case of an internal disturbance."¹⁰⁴⁷ From 14 October 1914 to the end of February 1915 there were at least thirty two cases of organised assault on government property, emergency services and military installations in the Punjab. The principal object was to capture and hold significant railway stations and to paralyse the telegraphic communication system.

The primary instrument of unrest was the *Ghadar* campaign. Starting on the west coast of America, the *Ghadar* movement made no bones about its objectives. It was revolutionary in its content and had its own newspaper, pamphlets and other forms of ideological literature.¹⁰⁴⁸ Its channels of communication extended from America across the Pacific, through the Far East to India and to Egypt and Europe. Taking advantage of the war it desired to create unrest in India through emissaries consisting of immigrant Sikhs. The efforts of the immigrants' activities were largely confined to the Punjab. Tampering with the troops, it was found, was a cardinal item in their propaganda and the event at Singapore was a significant pointer to the future course of events.¹⁰⁴⁹

The connection between Bengal and the Punjab sectors of the revolutionary party was unearthed in the Delhi-Lahore conspiracy case. The police believed that the prime-mover of the plot was Rash Behari Bose who was at large.¹⁰⁵⁰ The outbreak of the war had been followed by a recrudescence of violence in Bengal with fourteen cases of

dacoities in the early months of 1915 to its credit.¹⁰⁵¹ The situation in Bengal was incredibly demoralising. "Lawyers like Sinha and Mitter were threatened for becoming government counsels."¹⁰⁵² The pan-Islamic party, it was suspected, was in league with Sikhs. The President of *Khiddam-i-Kabba* society resisted an officially inspired move to issue a *fatwa* favourable to the British.¹⁰⁵³ Zafar Ali, the editor of *Zamindar*, was restricted to his village and Mohamed Ali of the *Comrade* was confined to Rampur for his pronounced pro-German, and pro-Turkish views.¹⁰⁵⁴ Fifteen students of a Lahore college disappeared.¹⁰⁵⁵ Raja Mahendra Pratap found his way to Afghanistan and Tashkent in search of support.¹⁰⁵⁶

An "executive action of the least judicial character" had become necessary. The **Act for the Defence of the Realm** was introduced and applied by an ordinance. The defunct Resolution III of 1808 was enforced without a murmur in London.¹⁰⁵⁷ The declaration of proscribed districts and surveillance order and the establishment of special tribunals were some of the immediate measures adopted in a state of panic to meet the situation.¹⁰⁵⁸ By 23 March 1915 three out of five divisions of the Punjab were declared disturbed areas to be dealt with by speedy tribunals.¹⁰⁵⁹ One third of Bengal was under the Defence of India Rules.¹⁰⁶⁰ Hardinge had set the tribunals on to work. Even the administration of Bengal under Carmichael, notorious for its laxity and inefficiency, was galvanised with new vigour. "It must be a novelty to the political criminal of Dacca or Mymensing", wrote Holderness from London, "who has been accustomed to a year or two's interval between his arrest and the final decision of the courts and who had three chances to one in favour of acquittal, to find himself before a court which hears the case within a week and passes a heavy sentence from which there is no appeal."¹⁰⁶¹ Holderness was certain that he would soon find that the courts and their procedures were being condemned as retrograde and barbarous but the effect of the legal action on young men, he wrote approvingly, of respectable families who were inclined to regard

dacoity as a safe and fashionable pursuit should be salutary.¹⁰⁶² By the end of June more than 4000 suspects had been sent for trial to the special tribunal; 3000 were discharged, 622 were still under trial and 538 were convicted.¹⁰⁶³ About the same time, it was claimed that twenty one newspapers in the whole country were clamped down.¹⁰⁶⁴

It appeared to the viceroy from the proceedings of the Lahore conspiracy cases that the original idea of the rebellion by the Sikhs of the Punjab was to strike a blow for self-government taking advantage of the absence of troops from India.¹⁰⁶⁵ Adamson reported from Burma that the Burma Military Police had been infiltrated by Sikhs and German agents with a view to organise a rising in the near future. A number of Sikhs at Siam made a futile attempt to cross over to Burma to incite rebellion. A party of twenty three non-Indians had arrived in South Shan State to raise a rebellion and was led by a woman. Conspiracy was unearthed in Shwegyin sub-division of the Youngoo districts. Fire arms were smuggled into Yunnanfu by German agents. As a result, the frontier with Siam was sealed by June 1915 and officials were alerted.¹⁰⁶⁶ Roos Keppel reporting from the north-west referred to the 4th Militia Corps, the Khyber Rifles, the Kurram Militia, the Northern Waziristan Militia and Frontier Constabulary as badly paid and overworked and warned that they might turn hostile if the political situation altered adversely for the British in Persia.¹⁰⁶⁷ A typical example of British anxiety may be gathered from the following extract of a letter from the governor of Burma:

"So far as can be judged at present there is no danger of internal disturbances from the Natives of the Province. Our chief source of anxiety has been the disproportion of numbers of the British troops in the Native army and the Military Police. We have 16,000 military police and five Native regiments against two battalions of British territorials. Of the native regiments one battalion of Gurkhas is the only regiment that can be pronounced safe from such

incidents as occurred at Singapore with the 5th Light Infantry, and at Rangoon with 130th Baluchis.”¹⁰⁶⁸

By December 1915 the government had conclusive evidence to claim that the projected German plot of simultaneous insurrections at various places would mature during Christmas. Consequently, all officers were ordered to stay put. The policy was to feign inactivity till 15 December in order to encourage the persons involved in the plot to organise themselves followed by a sudden spur of activity calculated to take them by surprise. A list of 300 names had been prepared and they were to be detained under the Defence of India Rules providing for provisional detention not exceeding one month. Precautions were taken especially in Bengal, Rangoon and Andamans against German conspiracy.¹⁰⁶⁹ All ships passing through the Straits of Singapore were to be watched. A regiment of Gurkhas in an armoured train was kept in preparedness to go to any spot in Bengal at a moment's notice.¹⁰⁷⁰ By the turn of the year Hardinge breathed a sigh of relief as he discovered that internally everything was quiet and that the German plot for a merry Xmas in India has been scotched.¹⁰⁷¹ In Burma, the government was inert in its “usual sleepy condition”, and the province, as a result, had become a happy hunting ground of seditionists and conspirators. Butler was to succeed Adamson to awaken the government from its deep slumber.¹⁰⁷²

Hardinge was disgusted by the weak and “hopelessly disunited” government of Bengal under a snooty Carmichael always with an air of detachment about him. It seemed to the viceroy that the governor of Bengal could never “grasp the fact that he is not a Colonial Governor with a constitutional parliament behind him”.¹⁰⁷³ The Bengalis, he believed, with a hundred year of tradition of dacoities had “sympathy for crime” and displayed an intense hatred for police. The only redeeming feature was that Bengal did not any longer stand at the centre of the Indian political scene.¹⁰⁷⁴ “Bengal is not really a potential danger like the nor-

thern provinces of India." It would therefore, he thought, be judicious to let it stew in its own juice.¹⁰⁷⁵ In the Punjab, as in other provinces, the government took necessary action to check the spread of seditious influence in the colleges.¹⁰⁷⁶ The lieutenant-governor of the Punjab collected ample evidence to establish that persistent attempts were being made by the anarchist organisations to capture the imagination of the students in the colleges.¹⁰⁷⁷ "The Government has no desire", O'Dwyer declared, "to initiate the method of autocratic Governments, such as the Russian, which, when the Universities were being made centres of political agitation, did not hesitate to close them altogether for a year or more and to deport their leaders."¹⁰⁷⁸ A strict code of conduct, close supervision and periodical assessment of teachers' qualities other than academic were to be enforced by the universities with a right to withdraw affiliation of defaulting institutions.¹⁰⁷⁹ These measures were to be supplemented by frequent inter-college communications and discussions between heads of various institutions.¹⁰⁸⁰

The bureaucracy was becoming alarmingly brutalised while India was being prepared for the days of the Rowlatt Act and the massacre of Amritsar. Barisal, Maulavibazar, Ferozepur, Delhi, Chandannagar, Bangkok, Lahore, Tokyo, California, Berlin and Paris, Constantinople, Tashkent and Kabul entered the intelligence records as discomfoting centres of a worldwide conspiracy threatening the British empire with a violent upheaval. The uncertainty of the possible approach of the secret movement had stupified the Indian government and shaken its self-indulgent complacency.¹⁰⁸¹ It became flustered, ruthless and desperate. The bureaucracy was being increasingly cloistered in its artificial world of make-believe. Its isolation from the people was complete.

Hardinge, nevertheless, retained his sensibilities though battered over the years. He had always recognised the problems of the self-centred bureaucracy and often sympathised with its conspicuous over-reaction to the Indian

demands. But his response to the Indian problem was different: it was marked by the tact of a seasoned diplomat attempting to balance the different forces of society. As the personality of the Indian Civil Service got sharpened under the strains of sedition and the war, Hardinge found himself in a not-too-happy position of trying to reconcile the views of the civil servants to his own flexible bearings.

The India Council Bill of 1914 sought to propose representation of India in the secretary of state's council.¹⁰⁸² It was suggested that a wide panel of twelve names, nine from the provincial legislatures and three from the central legislature together with the discretion of the secretary to insert new names, should have been an adequate measure.¹⁰⁸³ The alternative suggestion of the Congress proposing one third ex-official, one third representing British political and commercial interests in India and one third elected by legislative councils was rejected by the secretary of state outright.¹⁰⁸⁴ Crewe welcomed limited participation of Indians in the council. He would prefer that the legislative councils might be responsible for drawing up a panel from which the experts might be selected, but he insisted that care ought to be taken to ensure that "an obnoxious individual" should not be foisted upon the government.¹⁰⁸⁵

In this context a delegation of the Congress desired to meet Crewe in a deputation. Craddock countered sharply: "The existence of this body cannot be ignored, though any claim on its behalf to represent the whole of India can be repudiated."¹⁰⁸⁶ It did represent, he asserted, a certain section of Indian opinion who was vocal in the press and who took part in politics, but it did not represent all of them. For example, Chitnavis, who had been once a regular member, "has now severed his connection with the Congress".¹⁰⁸⁷ Craddock recommended that the deputation might meet the secretary only as Indian gentlemen and not as delegates of the Congress. It was necessary, he thought, to deprive them of any representative capacity as delegates and, instead, invest them with a status of "a group of Indians of some

distinction in public life who wish to have a private audience with the Secretary of state".¹⁰⁸⁸ He could think of no half-way home between a formal and public recognition of these men "as delegates of a Congress (which miscalls itself National)" and "a curt refusal to receive them at all."¹⁰⁸⁹ Hardinge would agree with him but he was not as yet prepared to make the recognition of the Congress as a national body either a *casus belli* or a prestige issue.¹⁰⁹⁰ Explaining the Congress position, as he understood it, he claimed that the Congress proposal was not meant for co-operation or participation but for criticism and for pressing on Crewe their own particular pet nostrums.¹⁰⁹¹ Steady and honest work, he added, which did not meet public eyes, was not what they wanted. Jinnah gave himself away, Hardinge argued, when he wanted the dissent note in the council to be placed before parliament. Evidently, the Congress (and Hardinge seemed to have detected the point correctly) wanted the India council as a platform for wider publicity of its case.¹⁰⁹² He would have agreed with Craddock that "were the Congress to get it, all confidence between the Secretary of state and Viceroy and between the Government of India and the India Office would be destroyed".¹⁰⁹³ The secretary of state took cognizance of the opinion of Indian officials. He divided the Congress's suggestion that the India council was increasingly becoming an administrative body. He would do nothing, he assured, to saddle the government of India with an unofficial cabinet. "I suppose one third Calcutta merchants, one third Vakils and one third bomb-makers from Chandannagar", Crewe squibbed, "you would have great fun with them, no doubt!"¹⁰⁹⁴

The bill, however, was formulated with caution. But it was thrown out of the parliament by a combination of Tory lords.¹⁰⁹⁵ They did not realise, Hardinge protested, that India was a child that was slowly growing into youth and manhood. He apprehended that there "would be rude awakening some day if Curzon's policy towards India is indefinitely pushed".¹⁰⁹⁶ He was convinced that the House of Lords could not comprehend the meaning and scope of

the proposed legislation.¹⁰⁹⁷ He pleaded that the election of two members by means of a panel was perfectly sound for it would only mitigate the responsibility of the viceroy. It would have rendered the selection both popular and effective as the viceroy would be empowered to select one out of a panel of twelve members than one out of the whole of India. The argument that the proposed arrangement would lead to an election of the Indian members was squarely rejected by him as comical.¹⁰⁹⁸

The India Council Bill originated with the initiative of Montagu whose *Note for Reconstituting the India Council* had become the basis of an official discussion in 1912. Considering the weakness of the existing constitution and the role of the India office, Montagu noted that the powers of the council were enormous and "might possibly be dangerous".¹⁰⁹⁹ It constituted a check on the cabinet, the secretary of state and the parliament. As a remedy, Montagu recommended drastic reduction of its powers in order to make it a "purely advisory body".¹¹⁰⁰ Commenting on the proposal, Sydenham held that all Labour-men and most Young radicals firmly believed that India needed nothing but a revised and liberal electoral system to produce contentment and prosperity.¹¹⁰¹ "This idiotic belief will certainly grow in force and volume as more and more Indian politicians go home and deceive Members of Parliament and others by their extreme plausibility and studied moderation."¹¹⁰² The time might not be far distant when a government, Sydenham feared, depending largely on Labour votes and impelled by Radical extremists might work to impose on Indian conditions some democratic institution which would be fatal.¹¹⁰³ In such a situation the government of India and the India council ought to provide two essential checks on the powers of an unbridled parliament.¹¹⁰⁴ To make the council a purely advisory body, he wrote, would be most unwise, if not dangerous. "India is more likely to be lost by the action of the House of Commons than by any other means."¹¹⁰⁵ Recommending the views of the government of India on this issue Hardinge was to parrot Syden-

ham. Parliamentary control over the government of India, he maintained, had to be but in theory. It should be as little as possible in practice.¹¹⁰⁶ He felt assured that as long as Crewe and Morley were in office no rash experiment would be attempted.¹¹⁰⁷ "But who will say", he asked, "what might happen if a Socialist Government were in office?"¹¹⁰⁸ The coach ought not to go too fast, he argued, "but the advance must be steady and continuous". "I am the last person in the world to deprecate the close scrutiny of Indian affairs in the Commons."¹¹⁰⁹ But he would certainly be extremely sorry, "if the policy of His Majesty's Government of India were to depend on the views of a few Parliamentary faddists with no real knowledge of India and the Indian empire".¹¹¹⁰

This tactical difference between Hardinge and few of his men had become apparent early in his Indian career. In the paragraph five of his Delhi despatch, Hardinge used the expression that the object of British rule is to go for "progressive decentralisation".¹¹¹¹ It became the subject of a prolonged acrimony in Britain and India. The controversial paragraph of the despatch maintained explicitly the "supremacy of the Government of India" in any future constitutional set up. It held that gradually a large measure of self government, "autonomous in all provincial affairs", would materially facilitate the growth of "local self government on sound and safe lines."¹¹¹² This was merely an echo of Curzon and an expression of "established policy".¹¹¹³ In any case, the government of India had no faith in any "promised land" and it was prepared to follow Robert Peel's rule of politics that a statesman should not prescribe until he is called in.¹¹¹⁴ "I do not see", Butler wrote in defence of Hardinge, "that we are called in."¹¹¹⁵

The Calcutta chamber of commerce lapped up these expressions and Curzon and Minto in the House of the Lords raised an alarm about the progressive liquidation of

the empire by a conscious endeavour of Hardinge.¹¹¹⁶ So far as the Calcutta Press was concerned, Butler was to advise that there was no need to correct "the malignant falsehood" indulged in by it.¹¹¹⁷ "The dogs bark", he added, "but the caravan goes on."¹¹¹⁸ But there were very serious dissensions in the viceroy's council itself.¹¹¹⁹ Craddock, for example, took strong objection to the expression of self-government.¹¹²⁰ He argued that the idea of colonial self-government had been inspired by Dadabhai Naoroji; that it was adopted by the Congress in 1905 and had been trotted out ever since.¹¹²¹ He believed that of all the plans for the future of India it was the most undesirable. The colonies which were independent republics, had remained within the empire because it was recognised that the position of the dominions was more dignified inside the empire than if they stood alone.¹¹²² "An Indian Republic (or Republics)", wrote Craddock disdainfully, "occupied in civil war and intrigues, but with its coasts and frontiers held forth by G. B. while it was working out its own destruction is a plan which no politically intelligent Indian would listen to for a moment."¹¹²³ He was anxious for the admission of more Indians into the various branches of the administration but the real difficulty, as he saw it, was to find Indians "as competent, as energetic and as unprejudiced as Europeans for posts under Government".¹¹²⁴ Sub-standard employments would only impair efficiency and would gain unpopularity for the British. The appointments, which would gradually be thrown open, were drops in the ocean compared with the number of the aspirants. "This the agitators", he wrote, "quite understand, and their real object is the grasp at the ultimate power which it is vital for us to retain."¹¹²⁵ Sydenham supplemented the views of Craddock. No one, even for a moment, he wrote, could suppose that India was ripe for colonial self-government. In fact, he would go to the extent of asserting that it was not fair to talk of self-government even in relations to the native states. "If there is anyone who really thinks of Swaraj for India", he wrote,

"apart from the one third which is under native rule, he must be particularly idiotic."¹¹²⁶

One thing was more or less evident: that Hardinge and his men while assessing the same problems arrived at more or less similar conclusions but they travelled through different corridors. The flexibility of the policy of Hardinge was based on a more advanced perspective than the men around him. Examining the controversial paragraphs of the despatch of 25 August 1911 he upheld that there were three essential programmes of the British in India: the principle of decentralisation, an increase in the number of Indians employed in the Indian administration and the perpetuation of the British rule in India.¹¹²⁷ When the despatch was written, he argued, the fifth paragraph was intended rather to highlight the question of the transfer of capital to Delhi than that of the future constitution of the government of India. "It may have been a tactical mistake to partially lift the veil", he wrote, "but nobody can with any confidence say what the future situation in India will be 50 years—or even 25 years—hence."¹¹²⁸ The bulk of India was still wholly non-political. The reforms of 1909 had not yet been tried. Even Gokhale was reported to have held that the top and the centre of the administration had been sufficiently liberalised and the fullest possibilities of these changes ought to be worked out before "the necessary momentum is gathered for a further advance".¹¹²⁹ All the world over the executive government was growing stronger because the people wanted things to be done, and in the context of "modern conditions", Butler maintained, "experts only can do things and experts must come sooner or later under the executive."¹¹³⁰ As a result, Butler asserted, representative institutions had been played out even in the west. The expression "autonomy" was not a new term to apply to the government's policy, Curzon having used the term in the budget speech of 30 March 1904 and again in his farewell dinner speech on 30 September 1905. On the basis

of the settled policy of the government of India it meant power of the local administrations consistent with a strong centre.¹¹³¹

Hardinge made it amply clear that whatever might be the future of political development of India, colonial self-government on the lines of the British dominions was absolutely out of question. "When I read of clever men advocating the policy, I wonder whether they really understand", he wrote, "what is the connection of Great Britain to her colonies, and by what slender threat she is bound to them... Community of race, blood and religions, with a knowledge that the connection with the Imperial Government affords to them a certain amount of protection from encroachment by other Powers, has had the result of maintaining the British connection."¹¹³² Hardinge's was a bold and an effective answer to Craddock's pedestrian and angry outburst. It was necessarily imperial. It was proud and steeped in a consciousness of superiority and racial arrogance. He wondered if Indians, who aspired to be placed in a similar position as Canada or Australia, realised that with the exception of governors-general and governors there was not a single British official in these countries and that there were no British troops to maintain order.¹¹³³ In the absence of a homogeneous community and without permanent ties of blood, race and religion it was unconceivable, Hardinge argued forcefully, that a dominion status for India would last for even twenty-four hours. Thus, he believed, that in order to ensure progress and development in India "there can be no question as to the permanency of British rule in India. Colonial *Swaraj* on the lines of colonial self-government in our Dominions must be absolutely ruled out".¹¹³⁴ With this Hardinge had made his position sharp, plain and distinct; but his stand was continually misunderstood by the singularly one-track minds of the civil servants who rarely saw any shade between black and white.

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By his public criticism of the Lords, Hardinge endeared himself to the injured nationalists of India. The moderates felt that there was still some sense in their profession. His action, however, was condemned in official circles both in India and Britain. Austen Chamberlin, the new secretary of state, deprecated the public criticisms by the viceroy of the action of a house of the parliament. He would sympathise with Hardinge's disappointments at the rejection of the council bill and he had no doubt that Hardinge's speech was "directed to reassure Indian opinion". But he impressed upon the viceroy the great difficulties in which a public criticism by the viceroy would place the secretary of state.¹¹⁶⁸

The problem of adjustment of imperialism to the altered situations in an age of crisis was Hardinge's chief concern. It meant not a whole scale surrender to nationalists opinion; it called for a fresh appreciation of historic forces and new equilibrium in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. It aimed at winning the initiative back for the Raj and dressing it with a fresh lease of legitimacy to rule. The difference between him and men of Craddock's vintage was not one of alternative strategies, irreconcilable

and antagonistic. It was one of tactical difference within a single strategic consensus. This disagreement in opinion was blown up into dangerous proportions in face of the concrete realities of administration threatened by the war, sedition and rebellion and was sharpened by political bargainings in a society having diverse social, political and religious pulls and pressures.

XVII

NINETEENSIXTEEN WAS a significant year for modern India. The two factions of the Congress, which had parted company about a decade earlier, were coming round to unite with cheerful prospects for the future. The complementary Home Rule Leagues of Tilak and Annie Besant, with their distinct spheres of influence, had been extending political consciousness in areas which had hitherto been distinguished by the absence of it and to those people who had so far been meandering only on the periphery of the Congress's restrained platform.¹¹⁶⁹ The 'Young Turks', the 'barristers' and 'editors' of the League scored a resounding victory over the old guards as they concluded a programmatic alliance with the Congress in the Lucknow session.¹¹⁷⁰ The concord was based on the recognition by the latter of the former's special interests. Thus pressure was being put on the government for concessions. Gandhi had already entered the Indian stage as a respected and an inscrutable exponent of a moral world-view. Regarded "almost as a saint", he was yet to become a dangerous Bolshevik in the official files.¹¹⁷¹ Champaran was restive. The Russian Blue Book, terminating in February 1917, throws little light on the period. Its primary concerns are Afghanistan, its internal situation, the future of its neutrality, the status of its existence as a reluctant buffer, the creation of its own defence forces and the possibility of an active alliance between Russia and India upon the conclusion of the war.¹¹⁷² Chelmsford had suc-

ceeded Hardinge much to the apprehension of the outgoing viceroy about a possible conservative reaction in India.¹¹⁷³

The new viceroy underlined in his first speech the necessity of an ambitious programme for India after the war. It was couched in suggestive indefiniteness.¹¹⁷⁴ A hectic exercise for thrashing out a credible proposal for constitutional concessions had seized upon the minds of the Indian administrators. The principal blessings to be offered to India after the war were being decided off-stage. The Russian observer had identified time and again the nub of the problem in the form of a fresh dose of reforms. The Congress, the Home Rule and the Muslim Leagues had been awaiting attentively and anxiously the arrival of a new set of reforms with its near-delusive appeal. Chelmsford must have been turning the pages of back-records to trace the faded lines of a remedial prescription. The official declaration of August 1917 was yet to be formulated. Montagu was still out of office. But the official consultations had been initiated in the cloistered secretariats. Hardinge had already worked out the essentials of a set of talking points.

The contribution of India and her sacrifices to the imperial war efforts had raised eyebrows all over. "We shall be told hereafter", Craddock sneered at the display of loyalty by India during the war, "that the poor ryot was made to contribute his pice to relieve distress in wealthy Britain and Great Britain was glad enough to take India's money at the time of stress, but forgetful of these favours when the stress had passed."¹¹⁷⁵ Craddock, like many others, dreaded that the grant of something like colonial *swaraj* would be pressed upon by the nationalists as a reward. He contrasted this "morbid" self-indulgence of the Indians to the "unselfish charity and patriotism" of the British people.¹¹⁷⁶ Hardinge would not like to find himself on the same pedestal as Craddock. Since the beginning of the war he had been increasingly drawn towards the Indian demands for enhanced participation in the administration.

Even Roos Keppel, accustomed to raids and punitive expeditions on the frontier, detected the importance of this political issue although he was fairly sore to find the moderates, the extremists, Annie Besant and the League "talking nonsense about the programme of concessions after the war" ¹¹⁷⁷

In Bombay during the Christmas of 1915 the officials had taken note of the growing ascendancy of the extremist school and the decline of the influence of the moderates both in terms of thought and action.¹¹⁷⁸ The citadel of moderation had been successfully assaulted from all directions. The door had been opened wide for the re-admission of the extremists, such as Tilak, into the Congress fold.¹¹⁷⁹ The moderates were immobilised. They saw no reason either to battle their way into the Congress or battle out of it. Even the cautious diplomat in Hardinge felt despondent. He reported remorsefully that by the adoption of radical resolution on the question of self-government the Congress has been converted "into an Extremist League" and that it was likely to cause trouble in the near future.¹¹⁸⁰ He was looking forward to seeing that "it lose caste throughout the country". Probably, he would have loved to preside over its liquidation.

Moderate opinion, Hardinge preferred to believe nevertheless, "though less vocal, predominates in India".¹¹⁸¹ He was eager to extend his helping hand to it. Of course, there were not a few grumblers among the moderates who whispered loud enough to add credibility to the official illusions. D. E. Wacha, for example, from the UP fired the unrestrained imagination of an impatient Meston, himself somewhat intrigued by the new spirit of India and its uncertain future. "I have never known in my public life of 40 years here such a volcanic agitation and eruption", wrote Wacha, "as has been going on in the United Provinces for the last two years. I suppose this is the new spirit which is the forerunner of the home rule of the Besantine order

which has been temporarily hypnotising the unthinking flock of sheep of which the United Provinces is the stronghold. Anyhow, my flesh creeps as I daily read the bombarding organs of opinion. And heaven knows to what heights abysmal, or rather depths, speaking correctly, these will reach at Lucknow during the Christmas Week. I had an inclination to attend the Congress, but I have finally determined to hold aloof from it, as I foresee the storm, which is threatened by the united phalanx of the Besantines and Tilakites. The so-called 'compromise' of last year, in which I took no part, having been a strong opponent of it... is now doing all the mischief which I had forecast. I am quite sure that all this babbling and babbling, with all its political hysteria, would receive its own quietus with the safe internment for some years of the pretentious leaders of the movement."¹¹⁸²

Among the Muslims, Mahmudabad was the most propitious catch of the government. Lovett found him embittered with the existing politics. It appeared that Mahmudabad desired a firm unity amongst all sections of moderate opinion within the Congress and the League. He derided Jinnah who was, he giped, no longer hesitant to raise religious matters on foreign affairs as a 'gallery player' of Besant.¹¹⁸³ He had urged Bhupendranath Bose to establish direct contact with Meston.¹¹⁸⁴ He prided himself as an exalted *talukdar* and yearned to be installed as the president of the *Talukdars'* Association. Lovett recommended Mahmudabad to Meston as "a valuable opening" to the conservative Muslim opinion and as a reliable intermediary.¹¹⁸⁵ There were many more like him. Thus emboldened some over-confident officials fumbled and were led into indiscreet course of actions. Willingdon, for example, thought it necessary to ensure that the meeting of the Muslim League in Bombay in the Christmas of 1915 broke up in pandemonium as he hoped to ride merrily on local feelings against the national leadership.¹¹⁸⁶

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An embittered Hardinge spoke up without reservations. He condemned the ignorance of the House of Lords of the progress made by the country during the proceeding ten or fifteen years. It was a very serious matter, he maintained, that a small cabal of forty-seven peers could throw out a measure that had been proposed by the governor-general-in-council, the secretary of state-in-council and His Majesty's government.¹¹⁶⁴ He suggested that some "modification in procedure" was necessary to prevent a repetition of such incident. "It is all wrong that the administration of India", he wrote, "should be at the mercy of a party clique in the House of Lords. It is particularly unfortunate that this

should have happened at the present time."¹¹⁶⁵ Council-government, he advocated, had come to stay in the country and it was no use blinking that fact, while the talk of a chief-commissionership as the best form of government was "simply to excite laughter".¹¹⁶⁶ It was a serious matter for the creation of the council would have given immense satisfaction to the progressive forces in India especially in view of Indian sacrifices during the war. "What fills me with apprehensions", he wrote, "is the probability that a conservative government will come into office when the War is over; and if the views of the party for Indian progress are to be governed by those of Curzon and MacDonnel, it is likely that a very serious state of affairs will supervene."¹¹⁶⁷

By his public criticism of the Lords, Hardinge endeared himself to the injured nationalists of India. The moderates felt that there was still some sense in their profession. His action, however, was condemned in official circles both in India and Britain. Austen Chamberlin, the new secretary of state, deprecated the public criticisms by the viceroy of the action of a house of the parliament. He would sympathise with Hardinge's disappointments at the rejection of the council bill and he had no doubt that Hardinge's speech was "directed to reassure Indian opinion". But he impressed upon the viceroy the great difficulties in which a public criticism by the viceroy would place the secretary of state.¹¹⁶⁸

The problem of adjustment of imperialism to the altered situations in an age of crisis was Hardinge's chief concern. It meant not a whole scale surrender to nationalists opinion; it called for a fresh appreciation of historic forces and new equilibrium in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. It aimed at winning the initiative back for the Raj and dressing it with a fresh lease of legitimacy to rule. The difference between him and men of Craddock's vintage was not one of alternative strategies, irreconcilable

and antagonistic. It was one of tactical difference within a single strategic consensus. This disagreement in opinion was blown up into dangerous proportions in face of the concrete realities of administration threatened by the war, sedition and rebellion and was sharpened by political bargainings in a society having diverse social, political and religious pulls and pressures.

XVII

NINETEENSIXTEEN WAS a significant year for modern India. The two factions of the Congress, which had parted company about a decade earlier, were coming round to unite with cheerful prospects for the future. The complementary Home Rule Leagues of Tilak and Annie Besant, with their distinct spheres of influence, had been extending political consciousness in areas which had hitherto been distinguished by the absence of it and to those people who had so far been meandering only on the periphery of the Congress's restrained platform.¹¹⁶⁹ The 'Young Turks', the 'barristers' and 'editors' of the League scored a resounding victory over the old guards as they concluded a programmatic alliance with the Congress in the Lucknow session.¹¹⁷⁰ The concord was based on the recognition by the latter of the former's special interests. Thus pressure was being put on the government for concessions. Gandhi had already entered the Indian stage as a respected and an inscrutable exponent of a moral world-view. Regarded "almost as a saint", he was yet to become a dangerous Bolshevik in the official files.¹¹⁷¹ Champaran was restive. The Russian Blue Book, terminating in February 1917, throws little light on the period. Its primary concerns are Afghanistan, its internal situation, the future of its neutrality, the status of its existence as a reluctant buffer, the creation of its defence forces and the possibility of an active alliance between Russia and India upon the conclusion of the war.¹¹⁷² Chelmsford had suc-

ceeded Hardinge much to the apprehension of the outgoing viceroy about a possible conservative reaction in India.¹¹⁷³

The new viceroy underlined in his first speech the necessity of an ambitious programme for India after the war. It was couched in suggestive indefiniteness.¹¹⁷⁴ A hectic exercise for thrashing out a credible proposal for constitutional concessions had seized upon the minds of the Indian administrators. The principal blessings to be offered to India after the war were being decided off-stage. The Russian observer had identified time and again the nub of the problem in the form of a fresh dose of reforms. The Congress, the Home Rule and the Muslim Leagues had been awaiting attentively and anxiously the arrival of a new set of reforms with its near-delusive appeal. Chelmsford must have been turning the pages of back-records to trace the faded lines of a remedial prescription. The official declaration of August 1917 was yet to be formulated. Montagu was still out of office. But the official consultations had been initiated in the cloistered secretariats. Hardinge had already worked out the essentials of a set of talking points.

The contribution of India and her sacrifices to the imperial war efforts had raised eyebrows all over. "We shall be told hereafter", Craddock sneered at the display of loyalty by India during the war, "that the poor ryot was made to contribute his pice to relieve distress in wealthy Britain and Great Britain was glad enough to take India's money at the time of stress, but forgetful of these favours when the stress had passed."¹¹⁷⁵ Craddock, like many others, dreaded that the grant of something like colonial *swaraj* would be pressed upon by the nationalists as a reward. He contrasted this "morbid" self-indulgence of the Indians to the "unselfish charity and patriotism" of the British people.¹¹⁷⁶ Hardinge would not like to find himself on the same pedestal as Craddock. Since the beginning of the war he had been increasingly drawn towards the Indian demands for enhanced participation in the administration.

Even Roos Keppel, accustomed to raids and punitive expeditions on the frontier, detected the importance of this political issue although he was fairly sore to find the moderates, the extremists, Annie Besant and the League "talking nonsense about the programme of concessions after the war" ¹¹⁷⁷

In Bombay during the Christmas of 1915 the officials had taken note of the growing ascendancy of the extremist school and the decline of the influence of the moderates both in terms of thought and action.¹¹⁷⁸ The citadel of moderation had been successfully assaulted from all directions. The door had been opened wide for the re-admission of the extremists, such as Tilak, into the Congress fold.¹¹⁷⁹ The moderates were immobilised. They saw no reason either to battle their way into the Congress or battle out of it. Even the cautious diplomat in Hardinge felt despondent. He reported remorsefully that by the adoption of radical resolution on the question of self-government the Congress has been converted "into an Extremist League" and that it was likely to cause trouble in the near future.¹¹⁸⁰ He was looking forward to seeing that "it lose caste throughout the country". Probably, he would have loved to preside over its liquidation.

Moderate opinion, Hardinge preferred to believe nevertheless, "though less vocal, predominates in India".¹¹⁸¹ He was eager to extend his helping hand to it. Of course, there were not a few grumblers among the moderates who whispered loud enough to add credibility to the official illusions. D. E. Wacha, for example, from the UP fired the unrestrained imagination of an impatient Meston, himself somewhat intrigued by the new spirit of India and its uncertain future. "I have never known in my public life of 40 years here such a volcanic agitation and eruption", wrote Wacha, "as has been going on in the United Provinces for the last two years. I suppose this is the new spirit which is the forerunner of the home rule of the Besantine order

which has been temporarily hypnotising the unthinking flock of sheep of which the United Provinces is the stronghold. Anyhow, my flesh creeps as I daily read the bombarding organs of opinion. And heaven knows to what heights abysmal, or rather depths, speaking correctly, these will reach at Lucknow during the Christmas Week. I had an inclination to attend the Congress, but I have finally determined to hold aloof from it, as I foresee the storm, which is threatened by the united phalanx of the Besantines and Tilakites. The so-called 'compromise' of last year, in which I took no part, having been a strong opponent of it... is now doing all the mischief which I had forecast. I am quite sure that all this babbling and babbling, with all its political hysteria, would receive its own quietus with the safe internment for some years of the pretentious leaders of the movement."¹¹⁸²

Among the Muslims, Mahmudabad was the most propitious catch of the government. Lovett found him embittered with the existing politics. It appeared that Mahmudabad desired a firm unity amongst all sections of moderate opinion within the Congress and the League. He derided Jinnah who was, he giped, no longer hesitant to raise religious matters on foreign affairs as a 'gallery player' of Besant.¹¹⁸³ He had urged Bhupendranath Bose to establish direct contact with Meston.¹¹⁸⁴ He prided himself as an exalted *talukdar* and yearned to be installed as the president of the *Talukdars'* Association. Lovett recommended Mahmudabad to Meston as "a valuable opening" to the conservative Muslim opinion and as a reliable intermediary.¹¹⁸⁵ There were many more like him. Thus emboldened some over-confident officials fumbled and were led into indiscreet course of actions. Willingdon, for example, thought it necessary to ensure that the meeting of the Muslim League in Bombay in the Christmas of 1915 broke up in pandemonium as he hoped to ride merrily on local feelings against the national leadership.¹¹⁸⁶

And yet, things took shape as they did. Not long after Willingdon presaged that the future was very gloomy.¹¹⁸⁷ Meston had moments of uncertainty. Writing to a friend in Britain he sounded almost a defeated man. "What we in India want to know is the intention of His Majesty's Government. Is it to be Colonial Self-Government for India within any calculable time, or is it not? If G. B. would announce this, we should know what to work for and much of the noise and froth out here would subside. Things are changing very rapidly, and the big landlords and the great middle class are not to be kept out of the vortex very long. We should have a few anchors for our Indian administration: and one of these should certainly indicate how far we are to go—and no further—with those who demand India for Indians."¹¹⁸⁸ By December 1916 it was clear that nothing could stop the League from becoming an appendage of the Congress.¹¹⁸⁹ Lovett and Meston had been watching the ascendancy of extremism in the League and had concluded that one would gladly have nothing to do with it and its "frothy and unreal rhetoric" devoted to a doctrine of self-government.¹¹⁹⁰

Hardinge's memorandum of 1916 sought to anticipate the course of British policy after the war.¹¹⁹¹ The conclusion of peace, he wrote, must find the British prepared to consider the problems of Indian administration with sufficient flexibility. He was eager to promote mutual understanding and good will between new India and "the mother country" by giving full scope "to the generous impulses of the English people." "Nothing should be refused to which", he wrote, "India can fairly justify her claim." Were the faith of the people of India shaken, he remarked, and their legitimate aspirations and ambitions denied the aftermath might be far-reaching and disastrous.¹¹⁹² India, filled with "conscious pride", desired to occupy a prized place in the councils of the empire. Hardinge reiterated forcefully that the educated class ardently craved for some tangible political concessions after the war. He would not miss an oppor-

tunity to create the conditions for "a complete readjustment of relations between India and England"¹¹⁹³ and, in all probability, to carve out in Indian history a romantic niche for himself.

Examining the essentials of the proposed concessions he took into account that some organs of the press had been adopting extreme positions demanding, for example, self-government within the empire, fiscal autonomy, increase in the number of the Indian members on the executive councils and other measures of an advanced nature "for which the political situation is, at present, hardly ripe".¹¹⁹⁴ But these were not likely to be advocated, he assumed, by the more moderate section of the educated community, "who realise that progress, though sure, should be gradual".¹¹⁹⁵ After a prolonged and careful consideration the viceroy drew up his memorandum. He classified his proposals into three categories: military, political and privileges to the ruling chiefs.

The first category of "boon" ought to include pension and increased pay of the Indian army, commissions for Indians in the army, the creation of Indian volunteer units, collegiate school for the sons of Indian officers and provision for the education of the orphans of Indian soldiers. Politically the proposal for commissions for Indians in the army and the creation of Indian volunteer units were most explosive ideas. The grant of commission had become indispensable because of the prominent part played by the Indian army during the war. There were two reasonably sound objections to this scheme. The commander-in-chief was keen to avoid it because he thought it would be confined to the ruling chiefs and there would be difficulty in enforcing orders by the Indian officers among the British troops. Hardinge, however, felt that strict selection procedure, proper training and examination, provision of a military college, option of weeding out undesirable elements at all stages, a period of probation and the posting of Indian

officers primarily to Indian regiments would provide adequate safeguards. In short, he made adequate arrangements to ensure that except during the probationary period it would not be possible for Indian commissioned officer to find himself in direct command of British soldiers.¹¹⁹⁶

In the category of political changes Hardinge included modification of the arms act, abolition of Indian excise duty on cotton goods, liberalisation of the composition of imperial and provincial legislative councils, improvement of position of India within the empire, abolition of indentured labour, state aid for Indian industries, appointment of Indians in the privy council and increased employment of Indians in the public services.¹¹⁹⁷ Improvement of India's position within the British empire and the abolition of indentured labour were essential features of a programme to rehabilitate the imperial idea.¹¹⁹⁸ India was part of the empire although it was not an equal member with the other units. South Africa, Canada and Australia, bound by ties of blood, race, language and history with Britain, had a special position which the "dependencies" could not aspire to achieve. This anomalous situation persisted despite the fact that India was almost central to the concept and the reality of the empire. Curzon had concretised it. Hardinge experienced it. He felt that all through the war India had filled the breach in Europe at a moment when no colonial or auxiliary British force was ready to do so. And yet, in South Africa, Fiji, West Indies and Canada, Indians, even of the educated classes conscious of their dignity, were subjected to discriminatory, invidious and unjust laws.¹¹⁹⁹ More than an affront to their national consciousness it also, as both Andrews and Chirol had impressed upon Hardinge, provided the Indian nationalists, especially the extremists, with an issue for agitation and a tangible proof of the essential British hypocrisy and deception.¹²⁰⁰ Hardinge was sincere in his attempt to improve the position of India in the empire. The viceroy of India, he seemed to think, ought to be recognised as a mighty pro-consul on the same par as Glad-

stone, the governor-general of South Africa. The acceptance of his proposal of a commission by the south African government with an Indian observer was interpreted as a triumph of that principle. "What is eminently satisfactory is that this is the first time that we have been able to get at the Union Government, and to make him (the governor-general) realise that India and the Indians are not negligible quantities to be utilised as pawns for the exigencies of their internal politics."¹²⁰¹

Commenting on Andrews' paper on the indentured labour in Australia and Fiji, Hardinge reasserted his position: "Indentured labour really stinks in my nostrils as a form of slavery that we ought really to be ashamed of."¹²⁰² The colonial office was rather disturbed by the proposal to do away with recruitment under indenture. The affected colonies, Holderness reported sympathetically, had made their voice heard having seen "bankruptcy staring important industries in the face".¹²⁰³ The planters of Fiji and those of West Indies were planning to make a concerted retaliation. The right of India to refuse to let her labour go abroad under conditions deemed degrading and unfair was not questioned. But it was held that the existing system had been established with the consent of India on the strength of which interests vital to the prosperity of the colonies had grown up. Since the colonies were prepared to improve the administration of the system, the colonial office desired that it should be consulted on the issue and a gestation period ought to be allowed to enable an alternative system to evolve. In view of the opposition Hardinge was merely authorised to make an announcement about the desirability of its abolition. The viceroy, however, insisted that the substitute ought to be developed within three years.¹²⁰⁴ He was adamant that after the war the abolition of the system should be offered as a spontaneous boon.¹²⁰⁵ The Kamagatamaru incident had underlined India's problems with other dominions over the question of immigration. Hardinge was not favourable to unrestricted movement of

Indians within the empire. He urged that the Indian Public might be expected to express its opinion on the proposition that India ought to limit immigration.¹²⁰⁶ He was convinced that the proposal would be accepted by the Indians. "I can assure you", he wrote to the secretary of state, "that the Government of India are more than ready to modify the *non-possumus* attitude which they have hitherto adopted in regard to cooperating in restrictive regulation..."¹²⁰⁷ But this ought to be brought about, he insisted, as a result of negotiation and could not be forced upon. The public opinion in India, he emphasised, preferred to accept any term that the government considered to be fair and just. "What we have to remember", he wrote, "is that we have to save the face of the Indians and there would be no difficulty in satisfying Indian public opinion in this respect by adopting a policy of reciprocity."¹²⁰⁸ For him it was purely a question of India's self respect and if his conditions were accepted in principle "no more would be heard about it and it would be a dead letter".¹²⁰⁹ What he was interested in was that there ought to have been the right of free, though regulated, movement within the empire. The secretary of state had agreed with him that India's representation in the imperial conference with the Indian secretary as the chief representative must be insisted upon. Both were keen to emphasise that India could not be grouped with Nigeria, West Indies or the Mediterranean islands. "If we ever came to preferential tariff within the Empire, the self-governing Dominions", Hardinge wrote, "would have to recognise India's special position."¹²¹⁰

In the political sphere the most striking anomaly that existed under the Morley-Minto Act was the inability of the Indian elected members of the legislative councils to secure a majority in the division list even if they were united. As regards the imperial legislative council the official stance was most rigid. The administrators were unanimous that for the maintenance of British supremacy in India an official majority was essential.¹²¹¹ On this point Hardinge intro-

duced a fresh insight in the official debate. The reforms of 1909 had enhanced both the influence and the importance of the elected and non-official members of the councils. He argued that if the government desired to raise India from the position of dependency to a more respectable place having some resemblance, however remote, with the self-governing dominions then some measure of popular control, especially in provincial matters, ought to be given to the people of India. He would recommend no structural change in the Act of 1909 but only marginal adaptations and suitable alternations involving relaxation of control especially in financial affairs of the home government and a carefully manipulated elected majority in provincial councils. Such improvements while "removing the atmosphere of unreality", wrote Hardinge, "that now pervades them, would not result in any real weakening of the authority of British rule." With regard to the central legislature only such renovations were contemplated as would give greater scope for debate and discussion to the representatives of the people and enable them to influence indirectly its activities.¹²¹²

Another measure suggested by Hardinge was the adoption of a stronger line for the promotion of Indian industries than what had hitherto been the case. The war had destroyed even in Britain the policy of non-intervention in economic life and state aid or state-aided industry had become the tenets of a new political creed.¹²¹³ It appeared to Hardinge that there was considerable demand in India for state guidance, direction, encouragement and impetus through credit and capital flow. The educated Indians felt, he wrote, that their prospects were confined to clerical and administrative employment whether government or private.¹²¹⁴ It was largely among the ill-paid but busy-brained clerks, school-masters and the intelligentsia of India that political discontent had its origin. "Restless Calcutta where the educated classes can see nothing before them", he diagnosed, "but the helotry of clerkdom, tempered only by the slender expectation of

one or other of the few prize appointments under Government", might be contrasted with Bombay, "where the Indians are commercially in the ascendant, and where their contentment and self-confidence steady and control the unstable elements."¹²¹⁵ In particular, he pleaded for the reversal of the *laissez-faire* policy, introduction of a definite programme of industrial development, establishment of experimental factories, an effective distribution of products and a reduction of freight charges in state railways.¹²¹⁶ Hardinge had his eyes fixed on the demands of the nascent Indian bourgeoisie. In the third category he sought to draw the attention of the home government to the question of improving the status and security of the native states.

Concluding his memorandum the viceroy urged for a sympathetic treatment of Indian aspirations. Wisdom and experience dictated, Hardinge pleaded, that all the proposed concessions ought to have a character of "spontaneity on our part".¹²¹⁷ In order to make his conclusion more effective he asserted that concession offering commissions for Indians in the army ought to be delayed till the end of the war. To grant this benefit immediately, as suggested by the C-in-C, would only fritter away the proposed package deal and would whet the appetite of Indians for further demands of immediate concessions.¹²¹⁸ The troops who had borne the burden and the heat of the day, Hardinge argued convincingly, had to be considered first. Accordingly, he was clear in his mind about the expediency of keeping the army contented. This fundamental imperial objective, he insisted, ought to be ensured by the grant of commissions, an increase in their pay and pensions and a few minor privileges.¹²¹⁹ A loyal army, he reminded, was essential in India.

The abolition of the cotton excise duty, which had attracted Hardinge's attention all through his term of office, was the major concession in his list. Andrews had written profusely on the subject. The viceroy had more than once given his serious consideration on the burning issue. Chirol, his friend, advised him on the desirability of the

abolition of the duty as a pragmatic step of creative statesmanship. Over the years Hardinge had gradually relaxed his initial rigid opposition to the proposal and saw the merit and political expediency of assuaging the feelings of educated Indians who considered this as an evidence of servitude. It was the most effective argument of the nationalists against the British.¹²²⁰ Japan had emerged as a rival of India and Lancashire alike and made a serious dent into the whole structure of trade. The British economy was being thoroughly reorganised. Lancashire had ceased to be the pivotal hinge on which the traditional economy turned. This was more than apparent to a preceptive observer. Andrews had pointed out that the excise duty did not materially affect the interests of Lancashire.¹²²¹ He had stressed that a determined effort by the Indian government to transcend the time-honoured prejudices of British economic thinking would earn the gratitude of the educated classes and inflict an effective blow to the roots of anarchy.

Though a confirmed free-trader, Hardinge had begun to sympathise with such views. The excise duty, however, had become a part of the tariff reform controversy at home and the viceroy was not allowed to air his opinion.¹²²² "We have to accept the views of the Government in Office at home in connection with this controversy and the Government dare not risk the loss of the Lancashire vote."¹²²³ Chamberlain as well as his predecessor agreed with Hardinge.¹²²⁴ The Indian office maintained that a 3½ per cent cotton duty on imports by Indians could reasonably be regarded for revenue purposes but not as a protective measure. On the contrary, a compulsory imposition of an excise duty of 3½ per cent on manufactured Indian cottons would certainly be held, with a modicum of authenticity, as a measure of protection for British textiles imposed by the parliament on Indian industries.¹²²⁵ Hardinge controverted Chamberlain's idea of sweeping away the excise and the import duties on cotton goods and making out the deficiency by taxing non-British imports.¹²²⁶ It would mean,

he argued, sacrificing a large portion of revenue, a necessary readjustment and retaliation by other power igniting Indian indignation. If the excise duty was to be swept away at the cost of letting Manchester goods in absolutely free, it would be denounced "simply as a concession to the Manchester vote".¹²²⁷ Economic feeling in India, as Hardinge observed, was frankly protectionist and it was recognised that in order to build up Indian industries imports from Britain should undergo heavy taxation.¹²²⁸ The demand had a fairly extensive popular base having the support even of the lower ranks of government servants, petty landlords and the like who along with the advanced politicians were quite ready to press for a heavy duty on British imports.¹²²⁹ Keeping in view the opposition from the home government, the prolongation of war and the lack of borrowing facilities, Hardinge offered a solution as a temporary measure: to increase the import duty to 5 per cent keeping the excise duty as it had been at 3½ per cent and for "the sake of the political effect" to make a public pronouncement to abolish it eventually.¹²³⁰ Recommending the proposals he pointed out that almost every class of Indians resented the duty and they believed that its imposition at the behest of Lanchashire was an evidence of the popular accusation that Britain's rule over India was primarily conducive to her own interest. In view of the favourable position of Britain in Indian financial system and the immense potentialities of native cotton industry Hardinge failed to condone the undue pressure of Lanchashire on India. He was vexed by the stubborn obstinacy of the British political parties on this issue. "Why then refuse a concession", an inflamed Hardinge put it bluntly, "that will be extremely popular among all classes; that does not involve in any way the stability of our rule; that will abolish a purely adventitious piece of injustice, and that will possibly, in the long run, be found to affect Lanchashire interests little, if at all?"¹²³¹ As a viceroy of India he would not allow himself to be confined to the limited vision of a green grocer.

There was a growing unrest in India against aliens largely owing to commercial jealousy. The merchants, particularly of Calcutta, nursed an illusion that by eliminating aliens and shutting up their business they would succeed in preventing foreign houses from competing with them at the end of the war.¹²³² This view was confirmed by a conversation that the viceroy had with the president of the Bengal chamber of commerce.¹²³³ Hardinge pointed out that the permanent ostracism of Germany in commercial matters would be impossible. He would be very delighted, he emphasised, to close down German business houses in Calcutta and elsewhere but he would do it with much greater readiness if he felt certain that British enterprise would step into its shoes. But he was not fully convinced by the fact of the situation. He was uncertain about the initiative and enterprise of the Calcutta merchants. He contested the assertion of the chamber and insisted that in the business that had been shut down Japanese enterprise had been making matching strides to fill the vacuum. Hardinge was trying to impress upon the chamber of commerce that the danger from Japanese competition was far more tangible and real and that adequate defensive steps ought to be taken against Japanese commercial offensives while the German houses may be generally ignored. Evidently, the Japanese with their characteristic enterprise were trying hard to replace the Germans in order to effect a "peaceful penetration into India".¹²³⁴ Hardinge maintained that it would be one of the greatest dangers of the future. He feared that behind this commercial inroads "there are undoubtedly political motives concealed".¹²³⁵ The whole commercial community of India was driven to a state of alarm by the diabolical commercial rivalry of Japan which was in full swing and had assumed alarming proportions assisted by the latest and most up-to-date German methods of dumping, subsidising etc. "To impose duties on foreign imports is", Hardinge was determined, "as far as I can see at present, the only means of checking this."¹²³⁶ Concession with regard to cotton duty was, however, to hang fire; vested interests were far too strong to sweep the duties

away. Hardinge grumbled as he snapped his fingers and looked on helplessly at that "selfish bit of English party legislation".¹²³⁷

The bureaucrats and governors in India were uneasy about the proposed political and constitutional concessions to educated India. Willingdon from Bombay approved of Hardinge's offer. He would have gone, he claimed, far beyond.¹²³⁸ Pentland from Madras reported that he was not disposed to any improvement of India's status in the empire which "would arouse bitter controversies".¹²³⁹ About the legislative councils he thought that it was too early to begin to amend the Morley-Minto reforms. "If you set the ball rolling", he warned, "you may not be able to stop it." Responsible government in the true sense, "is out of question for India". Meston from UP took a sharper, though somewhat restrained, line in his official communication. The guiding principle of the change, he maintained in an attempt to derail the discussion, must be gradual and steady with a view to enable India to take its suitable place in the empire. Meston maintained that India's wealth and military resources were ahead of its political development and it would not thus hope yet to rank among the self-governing communities. "But it has a place of its own, and our gift after the war", Meston claimed, "should be to make that place more honourable and more assured."¹²⁴⁰

Hailey from Delhi pleaded not to deal with the Indian intelligentsia which "represents nobody but itself and voices no views but its own".¹²⁴¹ He reminded that among the articulate classes there had been, of late a tendency to repudiate the tacit assumption that the east was inferior to the west. Writers on religion, he maintained, both Hindu and Muslim, emphasised the "great spirituality" of the eastern religions; writers on morality denied the materialism of European ethics; and commercial men extolled the rapid advance of Japan. There was a growing belief, Hailey noted with alarm, in the possibility of a social, moral and political *resorgimento* of the east.¹²⁴²

However, illogical these sentiments might be, they were powerful impulses in politics and Hailey saw no reasons to appease these political thinkers. He advocated the necessity to fire the imagination of the ordinary men of India—the small landowners, cultivators, traders etc. having a durable stake in the empire. “But until we can be certain that the ordinary man in India is strongly with us, extremist agitators will always be an anxiety. They cease to be so as soon as we have secured the active, instead of the passive and apathetic goodwill of the class to which I am referring”.¹²⁴³ Educated India, according to him, was much less on the ascendant than it had been before the war.

In their private correspondence, however, the administrators and publicists were outspoken and their statements were more explicit. They were relieved to note that the principle of the representation of classes, communities and interests had been almost universally upheld with the exception of the Bengal government which favoured a territorial system.¹²⁴⁴ On the subject of an elected majority Meston desired an element of flexibility. He would support any move to reduce the number of nominated non-official seats.¹²⁴⁵ But Carmichael's suggestion advocating an absolute majority for the elected members with unqualified executive power provoked official indignation. As a way out of possible administrative impasse consequent upon an elected majority, he maintained that resolutions carried against the government ought to be ignored.¹²⁴⁶ Craddock almost went berserk at Carmichael's inane irresponsibility. A government, he scolded the governor sharply, could not remain unaffected by resolutions carried against it.¹²⁴⁷ “It will take only a few years”, he emphasised, “before the demand will be so insistent that resolutions must be acted upon and that Government will be obliged to climb down.”¹²⁴⁸ Robertson, Gait, O'Dwyer and Earle were carried away by Craddock in favour of an official majority while, paradoxically, Roos Keppel, who ruled with “a rod and iron”, decided to opt for a relatively liberal position.¹²⁴⁹ Craddock was convinced

that nobody, not even an Indian outside the rank of a few ambitious politicians, would like to witness the unhappy eclipse of the government at the "mercy of agitators." If radical reforms were ushered in "we shall have ruined", Craddock prognosticated, "the whole system of administration in order to gratify the ambition of a few agitators."¹²⁵⁰ Chirol commended his forebodings. He maintained that concessions ought to be quite clearly and categorically conditional upon the moderates giving the government their full and public cooperation in opposing the extremists and their methods of agitation.¹²⁵¹ Such a course of policy, if adopted, would offer the moderates the necessary lead and assist them to resist the helpless drift towards extremism. He emphasised the need of pronouncing without any ambiguity "that we are against the goats and if we are willing to provide new and rare pastures for the sheep, we don't mean to let the goats into them until they have shed their horns and hoofs."¹²⁵² He urged Hardinge to sweep away the sentimental self-complacency which had been smothering the realities of life.¹²⁵³ He would rather create an Indian territorial army "which could be a real reward to the India that has done its bit in the war" than make concessions to an India "which had contributed little more than lip loyalty."¹²⁵⁴

Meston was somewhat more practical and prudent. As a seasoned administrator he would not waver from the policy already adopted. He was prepared to contribute his best self in drafting a constitution for India. He was circumspect nevertheless. Instead of philosophising on the mission of British rule he touched a tender, and perhaps the most sensitive, spot of the imperial psychology. The harassed and hard-worked district officer in the future, he counselled, "will have to bear the brunt of any mistake that we make".¹²⁵⁵ To plunge into a model of elective majority, he admonished, would make the executive government impossible. But he was scared that it might come, and to mitigate the evil he would recommend that "the landed classes

ought to be brought on our side". This could only be achieved by giving them, he advised, separate representation "just in the same way as has been promised to the Mohammedans".¹²⁵⁶ He had no trust in the territorial idea of Hill and Meyer. He harked back to his theme and harped on the stability and utility of the landed classes. They "seem to me our only stand by; they are probably a feeble reed, but they have material interests to protect and if we do not go mad with philanthropic schemes for the benefit of the tenants, they must see that their salvation lies with us rather than with the hungry professional mob."¹²⁵⁷ By then Meston had begun to despise the moderates. They were being constantly allured into the extremists camp. This trend was not owing so much, as he put it, "to the want of courageous policy on the part of the Government as to the logicity of the extremist position".¹²⁵⁸ Pushed around by local squabbles, national politics and "the mild theoretical radicalism which at present surrounds the throne",¹²⁵⁹ the administrators had to review their stances. By and large they agreed to follow the leadership of the viceroy.

Hardinge had begun to appreciate somewhat belatedly the positions held by the spokesmen of Indian civil services. Willingdon had made a passionate plea for strengthening the hands of the moderate sections of the Congress by an articulate approval of the political maturity exhibited by the Indians during the war.¹²⁶⁰ Hardinge was firm against such an open public posture. He was convinced that it would be of little consequence. He had, on more than one occasion since the commencement of the war, made friendly overtures to the Indians in the council but his gestures had been treated with callous indifference by the Indian public opinion and his verbal appreciation as facile platitudes calculated to please the moderates.¹²⁶¹ Wedderburn, unconcerned as ever of the fast moving panorama of Indian political scene, suggested that the government should broadcast that Indian aspirations for self-government and for a fitting position in the empire would receive sympathetic

considerations.¹²⁶² Hardinge's response to Wedderburn's sophistry was both negative and categorical. "It would, in my opinion, be of the greatest possible mistake", he betrayed no sign of ambivalence as he wrote, "since... the day of self government is still far distant", and such hopes should not be nursed especially when it would be impossible to satisfy them.¹²⁶³ Now that Gokhale was dead Hardinge recognised his worth. The moderates, without that shephard, were being tactfully carried away by the extremists led by Tilak and Besant.¹²⁶⁴ The extremist combination of the League around Mazharul Haque had developed into a "dangerous" and "disloyal" cabal.¹²⁶⁵ Besant, though "thoroughly discredited by orthodox Hindus",¹²⁶⁶ was a "political charlatan", given to violent speeches in principal towns. Hardinge was pondering over the idea that she might be quietly dealt with "by internment under the Defence of India Act".¹²⁶⁷ Tilak, "the too astute Maratha, with a Machiavellian touch about him",¹²⁶⁸ had agreed to become "a *pujari*" at the "imposter shrine of Besant."¹²⁶⁹ The *entente cordiale* between the two powerful factions could no longer be slighted. It was a credible political force and it held out forlorn prospects for future.

Meston was to confirm Hardinge's opinion that the atmosphere was one of eerie speculations and misleading hearsay. The political spectrum, he viewed with a sense of weird dejection, offered the possibility of "greater unity among all classes of Indian advanced opinion".¹²⁷⁰ Of course, Tata and Sinha, still important in the Congress *pandal*, were exerting their moderating influence in the Congress camps. But they constituted a declining force. Officials, however, continued to amuse themselves by their fanciful belief that the "Lucknow patriots" would soon realise that the Sunnis could not be dragged at their tails.¹²⁷¹ But even loyal Mahmudabad was plagued beyond redemption. He complained of Willingdon's machinations to divellicate the tenuous unity within the League whose conference in Bombay was dispersed by the commissioner of police and

his "hired *badmashes*".¹²⁷² Mahmudabad was fairly depressed and foresaw a bleak future. He was astounded to learn that Chintamani wanted independence.¹²⁷³ He was amazed by the fact that a liberal viceroy, Hardinge, had been unable to keep Bengal quiet. He was flabbergasted by the faded vision of his youth. A disillusioned Mahmudabad could merely visualise the gradual drift of the political society towards either of the two completely antagonistic administrative systems: self-government or martial law.¹²⁷⁴

The administration looked askance as they were confronted with unorthodox views from their very loyal men. Even a person of Aga Khan's vintage had thought it worthwhile to put down "forward ideas" of provincial autonomy and elected non-official majority in the assemblies and sought the favourable attention of the government after the war to avert the possibilities of a general unrest.¹²⁷⁵ The quest of Meston and Lovett to bring together the orthodox Hindus and Muslims and fuse them into a formidable challenge to radical views had been a futile gesture. In the United Provinces, where an attempt was being made to forge a unity through reconstituted representation and separate electorates, a renewed counter-agitation was being launched by Chintamani and Raja Rampal Singh.¹²⁷⁶ Both Lovett and Meston detected an innate dislike of the Muslims which the orthodox Hindus "entertain, always have entertained and inspite of all that we can do, will always entertain".¹²⁷⁷ What the Hindus would forever stick at, Lovett wrote, "is representation in excess of their proportionate population, unless some quite new sort of politician arise, with patriotism and backbone, a genuine prophet of Israel".¹²⁷⁸ He was care-worn and dispirited. His friend, Meston, though wide-eyed, sounded far more chagrined. He lamented the "outspoken refusal of the orthodox Brahmanical party to give Mohammedans an ounce of flesh, not to mention the traditional pound, which they had been promised and which they have every reason to

expect".¹²⁷⁹ It is useless, he whined, trying to please two sides of a topsy-turvy world. Probably it was possible, he thought, to create a buffer of *talukdars* and other landed aristocracy between the professional politicians and the government. Both Butler and Meston were convinced that as a body the *talukdars* were distinguished by their loyalty to the British government although they were somewhat jealous of the interference by the state between them and their tenants.¹²⁸⁰ Meston was toying with the idea that if on the basis of a resolution of the UP legislative council the government was empowered to appoint ex-officio chairman of the district and municipal boards and if influential *rajas* were appointed in the boards it might become impossible for professional politicians to secure seats in the council as divisional representatives.¹²⁸¹ Everywhere, Meston lamented, it was self interest that compelled members of the landed aristocracy to become "unwilling followers of the so-called progressive party"; but if the course of action, suggested by him, was adopted, the government "would work out for them a free and unfettered career." But no one, and not even Meston, could demonstrate or verify in equivocal terms the infallibility of the proposed experiment.¹²⁸²

The Indian situation was full of strange but hazardous possibilities. The Anglo-Indian was becoming increasingly quixotic; he was unable to locate the political booby-trap laid before him. His proverbial confidence began to wane as he tried frantically to safeguard his own future. The recrudescence of "Hindu bomb cult", the success of Abdul Hamid's pan-Islamic propaganda, the desperate adventures of an extremely "reckless element amongst the Sikhs who have been indoctrinated with revolutionary anglophobia" in California, the possibility of trouble in Persia, the threatened aggression by Afghanistan and the periodical tribal inroads all along the live frontier on the north-west chilled the zeal and numbed the enthusiasm of even the most optimist champion of the empire.¹²⁸³ Lionel Curtis

had sought to add fresh vigour to the imperial concept through his group of *Round Table* men; he had roped in administrators and politicians in India with a view to curve out a place for her in the new equilibrium of relationships between Britain and her various colonies; Meston and Marris worked hard to tilt the official mind in India in favour of the 'eggs' and 'omelettes' of the *Round Table* 'moots'.¹²⁸⁴ They had decided not to entertain the problems posed by the black colonies. But the demands of colonial *swaraj* had been harassing their tired minds. "I will not waste", warned Marris, "your time with mere theorising: or I should still urge the unwisdom of re-fashioning the upper story of the house, the very foundation of which you intend simultaneously to re-lay. If we could do as we would, then I do myself believe that the true remedy would be to hark back, and therefore to readvance more slowly and patiently."¹²⁸⁵

The statesmen, however, had to look forward to the future. It was almost unanimously held that India was not loyal to the empire in any real sense. It was conceded by all that she had an amazing personal devotion to the king, but that was more in the nature of a religious sentiment.¹²⁸⁶ She was merely acquiescent and indifferent to the future of the empire. The cry of her politicians, Buchan reminded, was self-government within the empire. At the same time India was developing at a rate of progress that would become steadily faster. She was becoming self-conscious and the powers that had been stimulating her self-consciousness were the 'Asiatic' ones like Japan and China. "If she is allowed", Buchan minced no words, "to grow apart from the Empire, there is real danger that she may set her face towards independence and separation. It is for us to bring her into touch with the Empire, to make her think impartially and realise that she is and must always be an integral part of the empire and that by that connection her best interests will be served."¹²⁸⁷ It was indispensable for India to retain a firm imperial connection

despite her "inferior" political status, race and civilisation and in the face of the obvious opposition of the colonies.¹²⁸⁸ Where India was concerned, the art of circumspection was considered to be the supreme test of statesmanship.

Everyone agreed on one point that the problem of integrating India within the frame-work of an imperial super-state was essential; but there was serious divergence of opinion with regard to the definition of India's goal.¹²⁸⁹ Meston seemed to feel, Chirol confided to Curtis, that the goal ought to be Indian self-government and Kerr was inclined in the same direction. But one was expected to be careful about the use of the word "self government" in relation to India. Unlike India the dominions were bound together by a common race, creed, civilisation and common sets of interests. Chirol, with his characteristic clarity of mind, examined the hesitant moves of British statesmen. "In my humble opinion", he wrote, "it is inconceivable that within any reasonable period of time, be it generations or centuries, India could occupy any position" as was occupied by the dominions. It was possible, he argued, that India attained a new civilisation and a new harmony. But that harmony ought to be achieved "within western civilisation" and "not simply by developing sentimental ties with it."¹²⁹⁰ What was feared was the probability of a paralysis of government. It was evident that every now and then the executive would have to get through a Defence of India Act or a Press Act or even an amendment of the criminal procedure code, a tenancy bill or possibly a police bill. But these "perfectly humdrum administrative reforms" might happen to hit "vested interests or to jar on Indian sentimentality"¹²⁹¹ and a fuddy-duddy administrator might not even gauge the significance of the delicate situation. It was argued that consequently "bit by bit, modestly at first but with frequency increasing with confidence, the government measures will be emasculated or killed".¹²⁹²

There was an endemic official panic as the prospect of an

effective elected majority threatened to erode their time-honoured privileges. A positively vicious measure, it was argued, could be, in the last resort and with much trouble, neutralised by the use of veto. But one could not supplement by notification or ordinance a merely ineffective law. Nor could one use the power of legislation by ordinance to do the very thing which the established legislature had declined to do. That would not be an exercise in practical politics. The official atmosphere was quite gloomy. The mist of a nationalist agitation, despite its religious, linguistic, regional, caste and sub-caste particularisms, factional infightings and personal ambitions of traditional and modern elites, began to cloud the vision of the custodians. The uncertainties of inevitable compromises with the nationalists unnerved them. They were aware that they would have to shrug their shoulders, to hope for the best and to try to carry on with a futile and unworkable system. In sheer desperation Marris threw his hands up: "This would happen once, twice and again: but at last there would come a time when the narcotic word 'compromise' would be uttered, and a baffled and impotent executive, weary of seeing its reforms defeated, would snatch at the illusive relief held out to it. You would get a bargain struck, doubtless of quite minor importance: an amendment of the law about searches and sanctions, for example, purchased at the price of more travelling scholarships or a new university. But that would be the beginning of the end."¹²⁹ Chirol simply echoed the doubts of Marris. He was indignant at the failure of the British parliament to recognise the responsibility of Britain towards the Indian masses and to distinguish between the voice of the Congress and the interests of India. He defended the responsibilities of the British *mufassil* officials who were more closely in touch with the masses than the *Congresswallahs*.^{129a} Dunlop Smith felt that the reforms had already led to a sore feeling among the Muslims, that there had been an ascendancy of the Hindus under the aegis of British rule while the orthodox Hindus had developed a morbid fear of

the impending political triumph of what was known as the *vakil raj*.¹²⁹⁵ The civil service pleaded unanimously that "the real interests of the masses will find but little voice—except amongst the British officials".¹²⁹⁶ And yet, the government felt obliged to move forward. It was not feasible to stand still.¹²⁹⁷ The constitutional machinery, as Meston summed up, had been started on an inclined plane in the middle of which it could not be halted. It ought to go on until one reached the stage at which the legislative powers passed on to the people subject to the supremacy of British rule.¹²⁹⁸ That supremacy, it was assumed, ought to be defended by the executive veto exercised by the governors and the governor-general. This was the only course open to the bewildered administration in search of a fresh equilibrium of political forces. To expect that the non-vocal millions would rise and help the British in their dilemma was a vacuous claim and an idle dream. Meston, Craddock, Pentland, Butler and Hardinge were conscious of that reality. The *Raj* was still full of life, but there was marked decline in its self-confidence. The 'highnoon of the empire' was past. The prospect of a gloomy evening must have disturbed the minds of the administrators in their pensive moments. They were hesitant, circumspect and suspicious. They were anxious, shaky and offensive. As the political horizon darkened imperial India was preparing itself to make another adjustment with nationalist India.

*India To Indians:
Down With The Imperialists:
Long Live The International:*

Publication of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

Blue Book

Collection of Secret Documents

*From the Archive of the Former
Ministry of External Affairs*

Edited by K. M. Troyanovskii
with an Introduction

Moscow 1918.

INTRODUCTION TO BLUE BOOK

IF THERE IS any country which is both rich and poor at the same time, it is *India*—a country rightly referred to as “the pearl of the East”. This sounds rather paradoxical; it is nevertheless true. This country, which is self-sufficient in all respects, is riddled with chronic wants and famines which assume alarming dimensions at times. This is mainly due to crop failures resulting from unpredictable climatic factors. The most terrible crop failure was that of 1876-78 which affected an area of two hundred thousand square miles with a population of 36 million. It claimed two million human lives and reduced the number of births by 800 thousands. Only Russia has experienced a calamity of this magnitude (famine of 1891-92), while West Europe is unaware of such situations and has never had any serious phenomenon of famine during the last fifty years or more in spite of its high density of population.

Why this is so and how can such a strange paradox be explained?

It would be erroneous to attribute this phenomenon exclusively to natural causes like floods, droughts etc. West Europe, though weighed down by innumerable difficulties, does not experience such calamities. Certainly, it is not that they have evolved any magical science that can forest all natural catastrophies or has devised means to control and regulate the monsoon. It is the economic and industrial advancement of West Europe that counteracts nature's unforeseeable antics.

After the terrible crop failure of 1876-78, mentioned above, the British government in 1880 set up a special Parliamentary Commission to investigate the causes and examine the effects of crop failures in India. But it proved abortive as the recommendations were mere *palliatives*. The only rational way of fighting crop failures in India

consists of a radical change in the system of land relations and the creation of a reserve fund of grain. But Britain is certainly not interested in leaving behind corn reserves in India as it has been flourishing on the exploitation of its colonies and, more so, of India. This attitude dictates not only its economic policy in India but also its entire governmental and administrative policies which is best characterised by the word *despotism*. However democratic England may be, British rule in India is no less despotic than the tzarist regime of pre-revolutionary Russia.

It is neither in the vagaries of nature, nor in "the hand of god" nor in the defects in the character of the Indian people, who are very gifted and hard-working, but in the despotic and *egoistic* will of their ruthless rulers, the British imperialists thriving on the blood of this unhappy country for more than a century, that the impoverishment of one of the richest and oldest civilisations may be traced. The policy of exploitation adopted by the British government has transformed this once-free country with an ancient culture into one devoid of self-reliance in the economic as well as administrative, political and cultural fields.

The government of Soviet Russia fighting against every manifestation of imperialism, whatever may be its origin, has already published a number of secret documents exposing the policy of exploitation by the imperialists in other countries. It is now initiating the publication of a collection of new documents concerning India and Afghanistan and it would consist of consular reports, reviews and coded telegrams, extracted recently from the archives of the former Ministry of External Affairs. In these despatches the consul-generals of a colonial power (Russian) not only describe the imperialistic policy of its rival imperial power (Britain) with sufficient candour but also give many valuable material which can offer the reader a fair idea of the intensity and character of the dissatisfaction of Indians with British rule,

their favourable attitude towards Russia in general and the growing revolutionary movement in India.

To simplify the intricacies and the complex relationships of world politics, the People's Commissariat considered it useful to add in the form of an introduction to the present work a small essay on India concerning the geographic, ethnographic, economic and political life of this interesting country for the reader.

The role played by and the influence of the Russian revolution on India will be studied in the context of the international revolution against imperialism—more so in the case of India, where the exploitation by the British has assumed inhuman dimensions. Insufficiency of space compels the author to be brief and it is hoped that readers will excuse him for this.

The peninsula of Hindustan occupies an area of 4 million and 86 thousands square kilometres—an area equivalent to all the states of Europe except Russia—on which about 315 million people live, i.e., 1/5th of the whole of mankind—once again more than the population of Europe including Russia as well. India has a big sea board equipped with excellent ports having tremendous importance for world trade. The famous ports are Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Colombo in the island of Ceylon.

While this vast Asiatic peninsula is washed by the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Great Indian Ocean from west, east and south, it is protected from the north by the inaccessible and snowclad ranges of the Himalayas. The Himalayas feed the large rivers of the plains which irrigate the vast country and make it fertile and navigable. Of all these rivers the Ganges, Brahmaputra and the Indus are the largest.

Most of Indian territory having a population of 230 mil-

lion is under direct British rule and a small portion with a population of 70 million is administered by their own princes, who are virtually dependent on the British as they function under the strict supervision of British regents and officers.

On the south-eastern board of the Hindustan peninsula lies the island of Singapore with a strategic port of the same name. The princedoms of Singapore and Malaya are administered nominally by their rulers, but they are also indirectly ruled over by the British political agents. The beautiful island of Ceylon is under the total and complete rule of the British, who control it directly and not through the government of India. It is considered a "Crown colony" of Great Britain.

The soil content and climatic condition of India is rich and varied. In general, India can be divided into *three* regions. The first region is the Himalayas and its foothills. It is so long that if measured in terms of Europe it would stretch from England to the Caspian sea. Its lofty ranges protect this country from the severe north winds and serve as the most magnificent natural boundary, protecting the peninsula from foreign attack. Further down, the slopes form subhorizontal plains, covered with succulent grass, which serve as the pastures for herds. Still lower are the coniferous and deciduous forests of temperate countries and the fertile fields sown with wheat and barley. In the foothills, the vegetation is more lush and there are abundant flowers and fruits.

The second region is the river valley. This is called the Gangetic plain. It is the most fertile and most thickly populated part of India and occupies an area equal to France, Germany and Austria put together. The large provinces of Bengal, Assam, Oudh, Punjab, Rajputana etc. with a population of 160 million i.e., more than half of the entire population of the country, are situated here. Particularly fertile

is the so-called "granary" of India—Bengal, where in a year two crops and, at places, even three are harvested. Wheat, barley, millet, peas and beans are grown along with plantation of sugarcane, cotton, indigo and tobacco. There are belts of plantations of tea and mocha from which opium is extracted. The whole territory is favourable to agriculture. The innumerable rivers serve as cheap and convenient mode of communication and transport which helps industry and facilitates irrigation. Often, these very rivers cause grave disasters by their terrible floods, when cattle and livestock, reserves of corn, and the rickety mud-huts with their miserable inhabitants are swept away.

The *third* region is the Deccan plateau occupying half of Hindustan. The main wealth of the Deccan is in its mineral deposits but they are worked comparatively little in India. Large deposits of coal, iron, manganese and copper are found here in abundance. The gold mines and the famous Golconda diamonds are also located here. The Deccan plateau includes the Central Province, Bombay and Madras Presidencies, Hyderabad, Mysore etc. and the two large ports of Bombay on the west coast and Madras on the east. While the Indo-Gangetic region is agrarian, the Deccan plateau is mostly a mining and commercial area.

India was finally annexed politically and subjugated by Great Britain in 1858-61 after the famous Sepoy mutiny. The conquest of India was formalised through the well-known India Act. Till that time, for about 50 years, India was, so to speak, under the rule of the East India Company which enjoyed unrestricted rights given to it by the central British government. In 1876, the queen of England and Ireland assumed the title of the empress of India. The royal representative in India is called the viceroy or governor general of India. There is a council of five or six members (a kind of cabinet) with him, but when from 6 to 12 additional members are added by a process of nomination by the governor-general this council is converted into a

legislative organ where a small section of honourable natives are accommodated primarily for decorative purposes.

The council has no competence to discuss the questions of the organisation of the administration of India nor does it concern itself with the prerogative of the parliament or the crown. All laws should be ratified not by the council but by the governor-general or viceroy. In Britain, the affairs of India are entirely in the hands of a special secretary of state who also has a council of 15 members, nominated by the secretary for 10 years and some of them even for life. This is an advisory body rather than an executive one. The actual authority rests in the hands of the government of India. The main task of the secretary of state and his Council is to watch the actions of and advise the Indian government, to establish principles and to work out the instructions for guidance etc. To perpetuate its despotic policy the government of India needs material strength. Such a strength is found in the army and the police. The coercive apparatus of the state is so constituted that its weight is definitely tilted on the side of the British. Besides, the army has been so formed that for each European not more than two natives are recruited and the entire artillery is reserved exclusively in the hands of the Europeans. In no case, can a native get promoted to the rank of an officer, which is a significant fact especially when during the present world war the Indians have been fighting for the empire with great valour.

So far as the police is concerned, it does not serve its true purpose at all: it is organised on a semi-military basis and it is an intimidatory rather than a protecting element in the rural and urban life. It is very low paid and this has resulted in recourse to bribery and extortion, exactly, as was the case in our Russia under the czars.

The political process of ruling the country corresponds closely with the economic interests of British imperialism.

in India. It is quite understandable that this vast country with its abundant natural resources should be a lucrative proposition. Aided by its monopoly of political power in India, Britain has been trying to hold this market as much as possible for itself and to exploit it exclusively for its own interest. If we compare the figure of India's imports from various countries, we find that lion's share belongs to Great Britain. Of the total import to India in 1912-13 worth 2,284,614,343 rupees (rupee equal to fifty-copeck of old) England's share is 1,014,420,915 rupees, i.e., almost the half of the entire Indian import, while during the same year Germany exported to India goods worth 103,033,995 rupees and Russia worth 5,168,265 rupees only. During the same financial year England imported from India only about half the amount that it exported to India. Again, the major portion of the import from India consists of raw-materials, mainly cotton, which in its finished form is again returned to India.

The economic policy followed by Britain is aimed at restricting the development of *manufacturing* industry in India itself, although it has all the pre-requisites for industrialisation (raw-material, cheap labour, means of transport, ports and a large market). From the very beginning, it systematically engaged itself in the destruction of native industry and economy. Under such conditions the country naturally could not develop and exploit to any significant extent its productive forces and if we add to it those large sums which the British annually extorts from this miserable country in the form of taxes, fines etc. (about half a billion) — then the picture of ruin, poverty and exploitation of the Indian people becomes very clear. Moreover, India spends annually about 14 million pound sterling for feeding 8,000 British officers, while 130,000 Indian soldiers get a pay of only 3½ million p.

Owing to this policy of the British, India is in a state of perpetual stagnation. Need for reform, above all for radi-

cal political reform followed by reforms in agriculture, fiscal policy etc., has become obligatory and is felt by all the living minds of the country. As a consequence we find that the freedom movement assumes in India a more and more threatening posture. It is, first of all, directed to the overthrow of the hated British rule; and for the time being it has assumed an exclusively *national* character uniting *all* conscious classes and strata of the population. For Britain to relinquish its hold over this richest colony on earth would mean a complete explosion of its claims to be considered as an imperialist country. England without India is nothing—and especially without a subservient India, which can be milked as a milch cow. This is why it opposes in strongest terms any yearning of India for independence or even for modest autonomy. Even the main reason for British involvement in this war is to preserve the middle eastern sea route to India. In view of the dangerous prospect of the presence of Germany and Austria in the Near East, (*Mesopotamia being the second “reserve” route to India after Egypt*) Great Britain did not stop even at goading half of Europe against its other half and finally at dragging the entire civilised world into this holocaust.

As it is already evident to the reader of this cursory survey, the importance of India for Britain is immense. Therefore, the liberation of India is significant not only for India but also for the liberation of the entire down-trodden East, mainly agrarian, from the British and also from the clutches of world imperialism.

For us, the Russians, threatened by the fatal danger of being converted into a colony of west European and in all probability of American and Japanese imperialism as well, it is essential to get oppressed India, which resembles us in many respects, as a natural ally on the basis of the struggle against the common enemy. The Indian revolution, however, will have a *worldwide* significance, for there cannot be a universal peace without a free and inde-

pendent India and there cannot be a social catastrophe in the west so long it can live and enrich itself at the cost of the east and the east continued to remain a submissive object of exploitation. India, being the main object of imperialism, will become the first citadel of revolution on the eastern hemisphere. Let the British parliament give autonomy to India and watch how the clever plans of Germans are shattered! The new Indian government and its executive will be able to repulse the German attack and stop their invincible *Drang nach osten* (yearning for the east). This is of course, not the place to dwell on how such a damage to the German plans will influence the course of the war and, particularly, that on the western front.

The salvation of Britain lies in immediate recognition of the claims of all nationalities oppressed by her. This action should not be deferred indefinitely after the war, as it is, in our opinion, the sure means of not only ending the war earlier but also ending it successfully. Let Britain announce today a federation of all nations subjugated by it, and tomorrow, there will not be any threat from Germany either for Britain or for the entire world. Britain should not hesitate to arrive at this decisive step.

Great Britain should learn to pronounce without ambiguity the words "self-determination" and "Home Rule" and to throw away from its lexicon the word "colony", humiliating for herself and for others. This is our warning to the British imperialists as well. We, the Russian revolutionaries and internationalist socialists, should not only greet the revolution in India but also support it directly and indirectly with all resources. We should unite with India in the name of the struggle against imperialism, help her in getting freedom from the hated British yoke and caution her against the no less dangerous and greedy German imperialism which is sharpening its teeth for quite sometime.

Let this "collection" serve our eastern friends for the

time being as the first modest expression of our solidarity with the long-suffering Indian people and as some sort of a pledge that our revolutionary paths will gladly converge in the near future not only on the basis of the struggle for national liberation from foreign rule but also on a far wider ground of class struggle and social construction.

M. M. Troyanovskii

Moscow, June 1918.

FROM THE SECRET INSTRUCTION TO THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN CONSUL-GENERAL IN INDIA

So far as your future activity is concerned, you should, first of all, adopt all possible measures to establish a very cordial relation with the Anglo-Indian government and local rulers. In spite of the agreement signed by us with Britain in 1907, in India perhaps the distrust of the Russian Middle Asia policy as well as of the activities of the Russian representative has not as yet been shaken off.¹ Therefore, *you have to take, like your predecessors, utmost care in collecting data of political and military character as well as in your dealings with the natives,** so that you do not attract any suspicion or dissatisfaction from the side of the local rulers.

Lately, in India a fairly serious national movement has been noted.² To a considerable extent it is an echo of similar movement taking shape in Turkey and Persia.³ At times, it is even assuming a revolutionary character. It is widely believed by the native population of India that a clash between Russia and Great Britain is un-

* The emphasis is put by myself in this book. M.T.

avoidable and that this fight will result in the liberation of India from the British rule. It is evident that any attempt by the natives to enter into some sort of discussions with you on this topic should be rejected by you in a most determined manner. On the other hand you must closely follow the course of events in India particularly the impact of *Japanese propaganda* since the period of the Russo-Japanese war. You must also study the increasing penetration of *Pan-Islamic*⁴ propaganda among the Muslims of this country.

According to our information, the Anglo-Indian government is somewhat less concerned to carry out the plan of defending the north-western border of India, which was worked out by the former commander-in-chief, Lord Kitchener.⁵ This is probably due to the noticeable improvement in recent years of our relations with Britain. Nevertheless, all strategic roads towards Afghanistan and the Pamirs are gradually being advanced, thus strengthening considerably the military position of the British on the northern frontier of India. Owing to the military importance of this communication link, it is essential for you to observe the progress of the indicated works and report on them to the imperial government.

During the past years under the special patronage of the Anglo-Indian government petroleum exploration is being fast developed in Burma. This will probably affect quite unfavourably in the near future our export of kerosene not only to India but also to other Asiatic countries and so you are recommended to follow attentively further progress of the kerosene business in this part of India and report the results of your observations in time to the Ministry of External Affairs. It is also desirable that you should personally get acquainted with the petroleum fields of Burma and give us a detailed description of them.

The attitudes of Russia and Great Britain towards Per-

sia, Afghanistan and Tibet have been regulated, as is well known to you, by the convention signed with Great Britain on 18/31 August 1907. Although the Anglo-Indian government has not so far obtained the endorsement from the Amir of Afghanistan of the terms and conditions outlined in the part of the convention concerning Afghanistan, it has been decided by our private agreement with the London cabinet to follow the resolutions of this convention, *considering it to be already in effect.*⁶ Consequently, the aforesaid convention puts on the British government certain obligations, particularly regarding Afghanistan and Tibet, *which are placed under the immediate direction and influence of the viceroy of India.*⁷ You have to ensure that the Anglo-Indian government is carrying out accurately the articles of the agreement. In case you find any deviation on the part of that government from the exact interpretation of the convention, you must immediately bring it to the notice of the imperial government without entering into any negotiation with the local administration.

Though we have confirmed in point 1 of our agreement of *Afghanistan* that we consider this Khanate outside our sphere of influence, our direct neighbourhood with them puts on us the obligation of *keenly observing* the happenings there.⁸ In this respect everything stated in the above mentioned instruction to your predecessor remains in full strength.

Recently, information has been pouring in more and more frequently *about the penetration of Turkish influence in Afghanistan.*⁹ There are, by the way, indications that several Turkish officers are instructing the Afghan army and that Turkish emissaries are disseminating pan-Islamic ideas in this Khanate. You should direct particular attention to this, try to clarify the truth and find out the extent of Turkish propaganda in Afghanistan.

In the course of your practical work there may be cases

when Russian citizens will turn to you on their own business in Afghanistan or when you will have information of some violence done by Afghan rulers to Russian citizens, who are at times thrown into prison on the spot without any basis. In such cases, specially in those requiring immediate interference, you may turn for friendly cooperation to the Anglo-Indian government simultaneously informing the Ministry and the Embassy in London of the incidents.

In addition to what has been stated in the instruction of 1900 regarding your dealings with our other consular institutions and with the authorities in the empire, it is essential that you send copies of all your reports concerning Tibet and China to the imperial mission in Peking as well.

When you reach Calcutta you must immediately take care to find out the best way of sending your secret reports to Russia and to London. On our part, we are approaching the French government with a request to permit you to utilise for this purpose the courteous mediation of the French consulate general in Calcutta just as is done, at present, in Bombay. From Simla you may possibly have to send your secret correspondence to Calcutta with trusted persons. You may even utilise the services of one of the officials of the consulate general entrusted to you. Regarding the secret parcels, addressed to the imperial mission in Peking, you may send them to our vice-consulate in Colombo for forwarding them through Russian express ships.

*St. Petersburg,
7 January, 1910*

REPORT OF CONSUL-GENERAL AT CALCUTTA

14/27 OCTOBER, 1913, NO. 25.

Events, following the disorders in Kanpur caused by the demolition of the extension to the mosque in the town.

took a somewhat more dangerous turn than what could have been foreseen.¹⁰ I had the honour of reporting to your excellency that in the present case there had been actually no basis for serious convulsions among the Muslims and I expected that the central government would take necessary measure to curb this agitation. My expectation was not fulfilled. For three months the Muslim press of extremist character kept alive an angry and sharp agitation while the government remained completely indifferent. In all large cities crowded "protest gatherings" took place where the government was condemned, openly and unequivocally, and the restoration of the demolished part of the mosque as well as immediate release of all persons accused of rioting were demanded. The passive attitude of the government understandably encouraged the agitators who sent a deputation in Simla to place their demands before the viceroy himself. By that time the governor of the United Provinces was on a holiday in Britain. His deputy was hurriedly summoned to Simla and as a result of discussions with him the viceroy took a sudden decision to start his usual tour round India one day earlier and rushed off to Kanpur. The decision was so unexpected that on the day of departure of the viceroy not even all the members of his cabinet knew about it. On arrival at Kanpur, Lord Hardinge went straight to the mosque and visited the spot. Later, he received a deputation from the Muslims of Kanpur, listened to their grievances and delivered a speech regarded by the Muslims, to quote the local newspaper, "with a feeling of highest satisfaction".

Both the address and the reply of the viceroy are so characteristic of Hardinge that I would like to place them before your excellency in the enclosed paper cutting.

Lord Hardinge found the way out of the difficult situation. He permitted the restoration of the demolished extension to the height of eight feet over the level of the

street. Persons under trial were released on the order of the viceroy and cases against them have been withdrawn. The official newspaper, *Pioneer*, writes, "The problem of the Kanpur mosque is solved fully and finally within two hours of the arrival of the Viceroy in Kanpur."

Undoubtedly the Muslims have reasons to be glad. *They were able to create out of a trifling incident an affair of such political importance that the viceroy thought it necessary to personally visit the spot and take the decision, almost fully in accordance with their desires and demands.* Agitation regarding the Kanpur mosque should now cease. But it is clear that *there will not be any deficiency in creating similar pretexts for sedition.* The softer and more accommodating will the government be, the higher the agitators will raise their head. Lord Hardinge created a dangerous precedent and undoubtedly undermined the authority of local governments.¹¹

The Muslims are satisfied for the time being. But I doubt very much whether the peace mission of the viceroy (as he himself expressed it) was liked by the Englishmen in India and particularly by the soldiers. The Calcutta press is commenting on the decision of Lord Hardinge with a bitterness stronger than ever and without faltering says that the viceroy bowed down to force, struck a fatal blow to the prestige of Britain and that his kindness cannot be interpreted by the Muslims as any thing other than a connivance at rebellion and mutiny.¹²

With all his intelligence, uprightness of character, sincere warmth and the best intentions Lord Hardinge has a significant deficiency—his extreme conceit and, what is more serious, his conviction, not proved by facts, that he knows India better and understands the psychology of the natives, be they Hindus or Muslims, better than persons living here for years.

As your excellency is aware from my earlier reports,

*the whole policy of Britain in India for the last few years has been replete with examples of the tendency to giving way to the natives. A careful analysis of the political events in India during the last years leads me to conclude that in this policy Lord Hardinge has gone too far. The native press is unbridled; all possible meetings and gatherings of a clearly anti-governmental character are taking place without hindrances. In the reformed Legislative Councils, viceregal and provincial, the native element will increase over time and may become dominant. In his personal relations and dealings with the ruling princes, maharajas and native members of the Legislative Council, the viceroy, in general opinion, is going farther than the correct and somewhat haughty courtesy with which all his predecessors tackled these people. It may seem that there is nothing surprising in it—such an attitude is in complete harmony with the general trend of the present policy.*¹³

The point is that this line of behaviour is giving rise to an increasing indignation among the British administrators and specially in the military service. I had to hear repeatedly from the soldiers—from generals down to second lieutenants—open criticism of the viceroy that, "if the Government and the Viceroy continue to 'pat on the back' of the natives, receive them with greater honour than the generals of the British Army, dissatisfaction may arise in the army which would be difficult to contain." This mood may not be given much importance, but Lord Hardinge is undoubtedly committing a mistake by his determined refusal to recognise it. There may be a moment when the army would no longer remain a passive observer of events.¹⁴ In this respect, it may be recalled that Kanpur is a very dangerous place. As is well known, several hundreds of British soldiers, women and children were tortured by the rebels during the uprising of 1857. The place, where the massacre occurred, is honoured by the British as a holy one; it is guarded by soldiers; and inside the fence, the natives are denied access. The history of the Kanpur

massacre is known to every British soldier and therefore here, more than anywhere, riots between the natives and Englishmen are frequent. It is difficult to say if it would be possible to hold the British garrison back if the agitators succeed in causing larger disturbances in Kanpur after being flattered by the indulgence of the viceroy.

The military men are going too far in their criticism of the action of Lord Hardinge and predicting, as I have already noted, that his love for peace will unavoidably lead to serious complications. An opinion is often expressed that only the immediate appointment of Lord Kitchener in place of Lord Hardinge will be able to save the situation.¹⁵ It is also maintained that the prestige of Britain has suffered enormously by the weak policy of the viceroy. This opinion is apparently an extreme view point. The critics of Hardinge forget that in the questions of the high policies of the state the decisive voice belongs to London and only the local "orientation" is dictated from here. There was a rumour in Simla, which I could not verify, that the trip of the viceroy was organised according to the "instructions" of Lord Crewe and the latter acted under the influence of the Muslim leader in London, *Mohamed Ali*, publisher of the newspaper *Comrade*, which represents, if it can be put that way, *the left wing of the Muslim population*. If it is so, (and the circumstances under which Lord Hardinge left Simla lend some basis to this rumour), then the calmer critics of the present regime are right. They say that to rule India from London means to lead the British rule to its *slow but sure death*.

In Simla, as in every bureaucratic centre, all possible rumours as well as intelligence about appointments and replacements in the composition of the highest authority are constantly circulated. One of the interesting rumours is the one about replacing Hardinge with Kitchener immediately. But Kitchener, it is reported, placed his own terms that he would act, not "according to the instructions from

London" but on his own understanding, dictated by his extensive and real knowledge of India. People close to Lord Hardinge categorically told me that he was not even thinking about leaving. *But the possibility of new attempts on his life is not ruled out and then, of course, he will have to offer India an iron hand without the least trace of velvet gloves despite the protests of the worker-leaders in the House of Commons.*

With deep regards etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

REPORT OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN CALCUTTA
DATED 19 NOVEMBER

2 DECEMBER, 1913, NO. 37

While touching upon in my earlier reports the question of the slow development of national consciousness in India I had casually mentioned about the *recent political programmes both of the intelligent Hindus and Muslims who are making an attempt to fill up a deep chasm that separates the followers of these two religions dominant in India for over several centuries.* From both sides there is undoubtedly an effort by the party leaders to unite on a purely political basis and around the slogan of autonomous India. A true unity is however still distant and it is hampered by ideological differences, as for example, the followers of Pan-Islamism would be hesitant in adopting the national programme in its present form. It is also impeded by the out-dated traditionalism of the masses.¹⁶

Such superstitions include the fanatical intolerance of the Hindus to the slaughter of animals and particularly of cows. In localities with a mixed population the British administrator has to be very cautious as cow-killing riots

are a common occurrence in several towns. For Mpham-medans cattle meat is not forbidden. In certain localities and towns, however, cow slaughter unfailingly gives rise to a storm of fanatical hatred on the part of the Hindus and is accompanied by street fights with casualties on both sides, which can be suppressed only by the energetic intervention of the police and at times even of the army. One of the most intolerant places in this respect is Ayodhya in the United Provinces, a small township on the banks of the Ganges. This place is very sacred to the Hindus as according to Hindu mythology it was the seat of the "Sun Dynasty" and the great Buddha once lived and preached there. Some months back a very serious clash between the Hindus and the Muslims took place at Ayodhya on account of cow slaughter by the Muslims. The army had to be called in. The Hindu instigators were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment.

The administration have only taken half-hearted measures to prevent recurrence of such disorders. Now, it is recognised that no repression is able to serve as a lesson and more effective care should be taken. Thus, a few days ago with the approaching Muslim festival, when cows are generally slaughtered, the district magistrate issued an order banning the movement of cattle through the locality for ten days.¹⁷

After the kind decision of the viceroy in the Kanpur mosque affair and the release of the rioters, the Hindus (in the press and in various gatherings) hoped to get the guilty people involved in the disorders at Ayodhya condoned and sent a number of petitions to the viceroy to this effect. Meanwhile, as it appears from the native press owned by Hindus and Muslims, the question of cattle sacrifice has assumed prime importance for the two religions in their socio-political life thus preventing united political combination of the communities. The Hindu press is clamouring that the Muslims should refrain from cow slaughter as it

is essential for the maintenance of internal peace and demands that the government should intervene and ban for all times to come the custom which is insulting to the religious feelings of the Hindus. This sort of religious bickering should be stopped by mutual compromises. In the name of nationalism the Muslims should, it is demanded, refrain from sacrificing cows and eschew beef-eating instead of using this issue to further the principles of proportional representations and pan-Islamism. These sacrifices, according to the Muslims, are too great and cannot be justified by what the Hindus are prepared to offer as a *quid pro quo* for the sake of realising a distant ideal.¹⁸

The hue and cry raised by the Hindus on the Ayodhya fights has thus harmed than served the interests of nationalism. An extremely uncompromising mood is noted on both sides and it may be assumed that the young leaders of the Muslem League after the eclipse of Aga Khan and Amir Ali would not confer soon with the militant leaders of the Hindus, irritated as they are by the "Kanpur Victory". This irritation may, however, as I think, have another consequence which is more serious. *The lenience towards some rebels and severity towards others will, of course, be used for anti-governmental propaganda and among the Hindus such propaganda may find favourable soil.* On the other hand, to yield this time and release the culprits once again would be an act of weakness which, one should think, Lord Hardinge will hardly embark upon.¹⁹

I allowed myself to dwell in detail on the above mentioned question which, at present, has been alarming the native press, as it seems to me that in spite of its apparent triviality it throws light on the present difficult and complex internal situation in India.

With the highest regards, etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

DISPATCH OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN CALCUTTA
DATED 19 NOVEMBER

2 DECEMBER, 1913, NO. 27

It is almost impossible to understand the heap of telegrams and articles (and the Indian press is full of them), regarding the refusal of His Majesty, the Aga Khan to be the president of All-India Muslem League and of Amir Ali to actively participate in the work of this League. The self-denial of these two honoured leaders and founders of the League with tremendous prestige here and in Britain was caused by an incident trivial by itself: the refusal to be present at the dinner in London.

This dinner was to be given soon after the Kanpur victory, as the Muslims call the decision of the viceroy on the mosque extension in Kanpur, described in my report No. 25. The editor of the paper, *Comrade*, Mr. Mohamed Ali and secretary of the League, Wazir Hasan were to be present at this dinner and speeches of a political character were expected.

The Aga Khan and Amir Ali thought it incompatible with their position and prestige to listen to these speeches the tone of which could easily be anticipated. The refusal resulted in a very sharp letter from the extremist representatives. The correspondence fell in to the hands of newspapers and as a result the Indian Muslims lost the active leadership of the two most energetic, honest and honoured leaders.²⁰

The Aga Khan and Amir Ali had known for long that under the present conditions it will be difficult for them to control the League, and the London incident served only as the last drop in an otherwise overfilled cup.

Commenting on the Muslim split as this incident is called, the paper *Pioneer* remarks with wit: "In December

1912 the Bulgarian Army was stopped at Chatalji and the allies were ready to conclude the peace with the Turks. The Great Wazir was the 'Grand old man' Kiamil Pasha, and Nizam Pasha was the War Minister, who was possibly the only capable general. But the 'young Turks' killed Nizam Pasha and removed Kiamil. The war continued, Yamina was surrendered to the Greeks, Adrianopol to the Bulgars and Skutari to the Chernogors. (That the Bulgars could not hold Adrianopol is due to their own fault and not to the valour of Turkey.) Till now the Muslem League was headed by two men who were respected by the Christian and Mohammedan communities. His Majesty the Aga Khan is a prince of aristocratic descent and the head of a religious sect, the members of which are spread over the whole of Asia and few persons can be found in Asia, both among the elite and the commoners, who can equal him in breadth and wisdom of political views. Amir Ali is a descendant of the prophet, a member of the British Privy Council and his opinion is respected in political circles in Turkey and Persia. But among the Indian Muslims, as among the Turks, there is a 'young' party and by its efforts these two statesmen, whose advice was sought by kings and ministers, were removed." The analogy is remarkable and the moral is clear.

I quoted these lines fully as it appears to be a correct evaluation of the picture. If the Muslem League goes further along this way which it has now taken and does not turn back the moderates will move away from it. The latter alone are for the time being capable of supporting the existence of the League materially as they belong to the aristocratic class. *It is apparent that the attitude of the government towards the activities of the League will also change if the revolutionary trends within it come at the top.*

From the British view point the imminent disintegration of the League should be greeted, if it leads to a situation

where the government will not have to bother about it and its claims to being the representative of the entire Muslim population of India. May be, *the young extremist party shorn of a reliable leadership and not containing a wise man at its head will cause more troubles and, in future, give rise to sedition against which the peace loving methods of the present viceroy would be utterly helpless.*²¹

The next general gathering of the All-India Muslem League is proposed to be held at the end of December in Agra and I shall report without fail to Your Majesty about the turn this session might take.

With the deepest regards, etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

REPORT OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL AT CALCUTTA DATED 19 NOVEMBER

2 DECEMBER 1913, NO. 28

The stoppage of payments by one of the native banks in Punjab about two months back, an insignificant fact by itself, caused a serious crisis in the economic life of North India of an unpredictable magnitude.²² Major corruptions were found out in the administration of the bank. The depositors of the numerous native banks, always living under the fear of exaggerated bazar rumours, rushed to draw their money out and, as a result, there followed a number of collapses. About ten banks were compelled to undergo compulsory or voluntary liquidation. As a consequence, there was a considerable reduction in credit. The crisis occurred at the time of crop harvesting and almost on the eve of Diwali celebrations, when all the native firms were to draw their annual balances. Thus tension in the money market led to the spread of the panic to the trade and industrial circles. In Karachi, the collapse of a number

of sound firms followed and in Bombay, panic gripped the share bazar. The government, quite indifferent to the collapse of banks, could not however allow the crisis to develop in such large centres as **Karachi and Bombay** and was forced to take some measures: the share bazar in Bombay was closed for three days, and perhaps owing to the crisis, the presidency banks got a short-term loan from the government out of the so-called cash balances. At present, the acute period of the crisis is over though liquidation is still continuing. It is difficult to indicate the accurate figure of damages but it can be said with authenticity that almost exclusively it was the middle strata of the population who suffered most. The British trade and industry is not connected with the native banks while the wide circles of feudal population still remain, to a considerable extent, in the hands of the money-lenders.

I am not going to bother Your Excellency with the detailed description of the facets of the crisis but would like to touch upon several questions thrown up by it.

The large growth of native banks in recent years undoubtedly indicates that the quickly developing economic life of the country needs a wide and flexible credit. The existing methods of the native banks do not satisfy the present demands and the European banks, concentrated in large centres, cannot and do not want to go out of the narrow but reliable sphere of their operations. The government committed a big mistake by allowing the banks to develop independently and restricting its control within the frame of the existing legislation on companies, though an intelligent and careful Bombay financier, Mr. Dinsha Wacha, predicted long ago that the rapid growth of native banking on the European premises will unavoidably lead to the crisis. Meanwhile, it was found out that the directors of the native banks had a very distorted idea about the European banking operations.

In the recent speech at Madras the viceroy said that

the government should not stand aside from such an important movement in the economic life of the country. At present, changes are proposed in Indian Companies Act regarding the opening of new native banks. There is no doubt that the bank crisis will strengthen the position of the supporters of the State Bank of India in the Finance Commission in London.

Besides the direct losses, the present crisis is threatening the economic life of India with another consequence, which was also indicated by Lord Hardinge in the above mentioned speech. *The cautious Indian capitalists would return to the earlier method of accumulations after losing trust in the banks organised on the European model and, as a result, commercial, industrial and agrarian India would lose for long years the capital necessary for its further development. The crisis will undoubtedly tell upon the fast developing cooperative movement.*²¹

As like all major events in India, the bank crisis will undoubtedly be taken into account by both the supporters and opponents of home rule. The former will be saying that under the present centralisation the government cannot tackle its tasks and keep such a major aspect of the economic life of the country as banking without supervision and control. They will criticise the fiscal policy of the government for being easily amenable to superficial pressures. The opponents of home rule will insist, with full basis for it, that the crisis is a sufficient evidence to establish that India is not as yet ripe for autonomy and she needs steady guidance.

With deepest regards etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

REPORT OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL AT CALCUTTA
DATED 23 NOVEMBER

6 DECEMBER, 1913, NO. 33

As a supplement to my report dated 19 November (2 December, No. 29) regarding the condition of Indians in South Africa, I consider it my duty to describe briefly the events of the last few days which not only failed to settle the crisis but perhaps made it more acute.

Extremely sensitive to the interests of the Indian subjects of the British crown, Lord Hardinge telegraphed the secretary of state for India recommending a thorough *investigation of the news that the Indians on strike are being subjected to heavy tortures in the prisons.*²⁴

Though in reply to these telegrams Lord Gladstone issued a categorical denial of the rumours about the bad treatment meted out to the strikers, Lord Hardinge telegraphed again insisting on the appointment of a commission. While replying to an address of one of the native deputations at Madras, the viceroy delivered a speech in which he expressed on behalf of the people of India a deep and burning sympathy with the strikers and said that in spite of the denial of the South African government, he considered the actions of that government wrong. In his opinion, the only way to "clarify or disprove before India and the whole world" the accusation would be to appoint for dispassionate investigation of the affairs a commission in which Indian interests were properly represented.²⁵

The speech of the viceroy was severely attacked by some London papers indicting him for having "poured fat into the fire" by his sharp expressions. The press here finds that the intentions of Lord Hardinge have been misinterpreted. Without doubting the integrity and truthfulness of the assertions of Lord Gladstone, it maintains that Lord Hardinge only allowed the possibility that the gov-

ernment itself was not fully aware of the facts. Besides, the viceroy recognises that *excitement in India has assumed such serious proportions* that only the decision to appoint a commission with the participation of Indian delegates would be able to quell popular feeling.²⁶

Gokhale published the report in the local press which indicted that the announcement of Lord Gladstone was completely without proof and cited, on the basis of information obtained from more authoritative sources, a number of arguments to prove that severe measures were adopted while dealing with the strikers. He repeated almost word by word the statement of the viceroy that India will be insisting on an impartial investigation of the events.

For the time being only one thing is clear: the British government is not at all prepared to put pressure on the colonial government as any encroachment on its constitutional rights would give rise to much irritation and may threaten the very existence of the empire with grave consequences. It is beyond doubt that Indian workers are needed in South Africa and apparently here lies the key to the peaceful solution of the present crisis. But it is difficult to envisage to what extent the excitement which has reached extreme proportions both here and in South Africa will be able to permit or restrain the responsible heads of both the governments from finding a just and satisfactory way out. The question of principle is being relegated now to the background. Public opinion has been demanding a full and thorough exposure of the events of the last few days. It is not possible to deny the absence of "diplomatic restraint" in the speech of Lord Hardinge but, I think, under the present conditions he could not have said anything else.²⁷

With deepest regards etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

LETTER OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN CALCUTTA
DATED 22 NOVEMBER

5 DECEMBER, 1913, NO. 33

The viceroy started his usual autumn trip round India this year from Kanpur where he resolved the affair about the demolition of a part of the mosque. From Kanpur, he along with Lady Hardinge and the retinue went to Bikaner, and later visited Hyderabad, Mysore, Madras, Orissa and finally, to some places in the central provinces for seeing their wonderful antiquities.²⁸ I had the opportunity to mention that the Maharaja of Bikaner is not only one of the leading princes, but also a sincere friend and admirer of the British.²⁹ His dealings with the Indian government as well as his personal relations with the members of the viceregal council and with the viceroy himself bear the imprint of true friendship. In a very hearty speech delivered by the viceroy at the lunch in Bikaner, where only the court and persons close to the Maharaja were present, Lord Hardinge stressed the informality of the reception and said that in Bikaner he felt as if he was actually resting among friends far away from the labour and worries so much associated with his high position and busy schedule.

In Hyderabad and Mysore, the viceroy had to again face the solemn atmosphere of parades, receptions and banquets and he showered praises on the wisdom of the rulers of these two princely states. And the praises are deserved as the actual data summed up in the speeches of the viceroy prove that the Nizam of Hyderabad and Maharaja of Mysore really did quite a lot in improving the social welfare and administrative order in their states. In Mysore, the viceroy did not restrict himself to praises alone but announced that the British government had been considering a new treaty with Mysore or, in other words, a new status determining the relations between this independent princely state and the British crown.³⁰ This announcement is criticised by some segments of public opinion in India. Among the Indian *rajas* there always existed a keen com-

petition on the question of rank or salutes and similar external signs of honour, to which they attach an enormous significance. To give the Maharaja of Mysore the right for an extra shot at the time of salute was to invite the envy and irritation of many other independent princes. The new treaty has been already approved but has yet not been made public and so it cannot be judged whether the criticisms of Lord Hardinge are right in this case or not.

The trip of the viceroy ends today. He is returning to Delhi and will remain in the capital till 21 December. On 23 he is coming for four days to Calcutta where he has not been since the spring of 1912.

Already in the beginning of November the police started taking urgent measures to ensure the security of Lord Hardinge in Calcutta. These measures are, however, adopted everywhere; and I know that during the voyage of Lord Hardinge even the persons in his retinue were shadowed by the police. But in Calcutta, one of the centres of anarchist movement, these precautions are essential. The police took up the matter with vigour and its labour was successful. *Some days back a complete arsenal of bombs was discovered in a house in Calcutta along with a lot of subversive literature. About 30 persons have been arrested* and there are indications that the unearthing of this anarchist den will help in tracing the individual or the organisation which hurled the bomb at the viceroy last December. The newspaper reports give the names of arrested persons but about the contents of the correspondence the reports understandably keep silent. As Your Excellency is aware from my earlier reports, the antipathy of Bengal against Lord Hardinge is still alive and my guess of last year that the attempts on his life came from there perhaps might prove correct.³¹

The police conscientiously performed the task of investigating about the identity, address, profession and hobbies of all the inhabitants of Calcutta. This enquiries were marked by some curious incidents. The French con-

consul-general, for example, was formally interrogated by police officials who sought satisfactory answer to some trivial questions. The consul-general was told that the police thought that these informations were necessary in view of the forthcoming visit of the viceroy to Calcutta. My French colleague answered the interrogation instead of teaching the Bengal police, with the necessary rebuff, how to respect foreign diplomats.

With deepest regards etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

REPORT OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN CALCUTTA

DATED 16/29 DECEMBER, 1913, NO. 34

In my report on the last autumn trip of the viceroy I had the honour to mention that Lord Hardinge announced in Mysore the imminent conclusion of a new treaty between the British crown and this princely state. This treaty is now made public.

Mysore was a British province till 1881 and this rule was a successful one. Although the throne was returned to the father of the present Maharaja by a treaty, the government retained a wide control over the finances, the collection of taxes, the judiciary, the development of trade, agriculture and industry, i.e., over all those departments of internal control in which full freedom of action on the part of the *Durbar* and Maharaja would have harmed the interest of the population. For more than thirty years since the conclusion of this treaty the independent principedom continued to develop and get enriched thanks to the wise and competent Maharaja. Lord Hardinge thought the time was ripe for loosening control of the central government over the administration. According to the earlier treaty the Maharaja was "obliged to act always according to the instructions" of the government in the above mentioned departments and in case of non-fulfilment of this obligation

by him Mysore would have again returned to the crown. In the new treaty the Maharaja and his successors are named the rulers of the principedom for all time but the viceregal government, without wanting to curb the freedom of the Maharaja in the internal rule, except in the specially marked departments, keeps the right of interference, if necessary, on the ground that sovereignty rests with the crown.

Without analysing the articles of the treaty in detail, it may be argued that it is well compiled. After recognising the merits of the Maharaja, the central government recognises *him in the dignified place* and thereby protects itself from the risk of complications in case the successors of the Maharaja cannot cope with the responsible position as the ruler of this independent princely state which is second in India after Hyderabad in area, population and wealth. It should be noted that according to the new treaty the *Durbar* of Mysore must pay the Indian government 35 lakhs annually (three and half million rupees) for external defence.³²

With deepest regards, etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

REPORT OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN CALCUTTA

DATED 16/29 DECEMBER, 1913, NO. 36

On 23 December (incidentally, last year on the same day an attempt on his life was made), the viceroy came to Calcutta and stayed for five days. His arrival and subsequent stay was celebrated with great solemnity as the police measures adopted for his security were unprecedented in the history of India. Wherever he went all the paths were covered by hundreds of policemen and the wide streets of the European part of the city were closed to all vehicles without exception for about half an hour, which aroused the indignation of the inhabitants. All this constituted gross excess,

but the overzealous police does not deserve the reproaches hurled at by the *Englishman* as there is no doubt that there was a great danger of the repetition of the last year's attempt.

During these five days Lord Hardinge had the opportunity to deliver a number of speeches in reply to the ovations of various societies and corporations and the Calcutta Club (he dined not in the exclusively British Club but in one where the natives have access equally with the British). All of them were calculated and carefully worded to ease the fuming anger of Calcutta on account of the transfer of the capital to Delhi, and to convince the local trade circles that this measure, taken in compliance with the state interests, would not be reflected on the advancement and further development of the material welfare of Calcutta and that for the government the interests of the former capital are as close as they were earlier.³³

In spite of the external glow and solemnity it could be clearly seen that *Calcutta received Lord Hardinge with much restraint*. Besides, the feeling of bitterness consequent upon the fact that the viceroy is "not an inhabitant but a guest of Calcutta", as one of the orators expressed it while welcoming him, he is also reproached for his yearning for popularity among the native elite. At the lunch and reception the governor's (formerly viceregal) house several *maharajas*, their courtiers and an unprecedented number of natives were present and the viceroy showed noticeable attention to them. In the Calcutta Club he spoke on rapprochement between the native and the Englishmen and on his deep sympathy for this cause. This trend was not liked at all by a large number of Englishmen who unjustly accuse Lord Hardinge for his unsympathetic attitude and, in their opinion, his fatal policy.³⁴ They do not want to understand that such a course of policy towards the natives is supported, if not dictated, by London.

The viceroy categorically denied all news and rumours about his impending departure and declared that this idea

has never been entertained by him. He hoped that with the complete recovery of his health he would be able to stay in India till the end of his term, i.e., till November 1915. He said: "A Bombay correspondent announced that I am resigning in February. I wish he could have accompanied me about a month back in Mysore—thirteen hours without rest on the run after the bison! Then, we would have seen who will resign first in February."³⁵

The rumours about the arrival of Lord Kitchener will perhaps stop now. I think that to send him here with a free hand would denote a sharp turn in the policy with respect to the natives. The British government has gone so far in the direction opposite to the political outlook of Kitchener's admirers that to return from this path without generating some sort of a serious threat from the natives, a catastrophe like a new attempt on the life of the viceroy, would be difficult. Personally for Kitchener it would be a mistake to accept the post of the viceroy as he would disappoint his British supporters under the present internal conditions in India and alienate many loyal natives from the *crown*.³⁶

With deepest regards etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

REPORT OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN CALCUTTA

DATED 16/22 DECEMBER, 1913, NO. 37

Some days back an act of unmatched bravery was performed at the north-western border.³⁷ About thirty Pathans armed with guns, stopped the Express going from Peshawar to the south at about two in the night several versts from Peshawar and near Naushera, the camp of the cavalry brigade. The driver and his assistant were killed. Luckily for other passengers, there were four British officers in the train. They, with their usual presence of mind

and courage, collected immediately the soldiers who were in the train and with the help of a platoon of native guards, by chance approaching the point on their way, repulsed the attack. Chasing the dacoits in the darkness was impossible and measures were taken at dawn and a detachment was despatched to the mountains to follow the footprints of the dacoits along the mountainous tracks. This did not, of course, lead anywhere.

This incident, recognised as *unprecedented in the history of the north-western borders* during the last few years, possibly caused a strong upheaval in Peshawar and served as the object of extensive official reports to the viceregal government. It indicates that the peace prevailing at the border during the recent years is very unstable and the security is far from sufficient. It is possible that it would lead the highest authorities in India to understand the idea expressed by me in one of the earlier reports that for protecting the peaceful population of the border strip from periodical and repeated attacks, at times assuming a serious character, by the nomads armed with modern weapons who know the locality well and take free refuge abroad the Indian government will have to advance this border sooner or later to the other side of the mountain ranges, separating the North-Western Province from Afghanistan.³⁸

With deepest regards etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

DISPATCH OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN CALCUTTA

DATED 10/23 JANUARY, 1914, NO. 1

The Indian government approved the *project organising a Central Aviation School* at Sitapur (in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh). The project will come in effect

from 1 October 1914. The aim of the school is to initiate an experimental study of aviation under the existing conditions. Later it would be transformed into an institution for training pilots. The school will be exclusively in the hands of the chief who in his turn will get all directives straight from the army headquarters. The staff of the school will be the chief and three pilot officers with the necessary number of medical personnel and assistants. The assistants, both British and native, will be selected from civilians on contract for a definite period. As they are not obliged to participate directly in the flights, the latter would not have the rights of awards and special pensions, meant for persons crippled during the flights.³⁹

With deepest regards, etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

REPORT OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN CALCUTTA

DATED 10/23 JANUARY, 1914, NO. 2

Last year I had the honour to report to Your Excellency on the formation of Public Service Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Islington for "investigating administrative methods for improving it".⁴⁰ The composition of the commission, including several Indians as well as journalists and members of London parliament not having the least administrative experience and knowing India only from heresay and newspaper satires, give little hope for fruitfulness of its work.

In the first year of its existence the commission like a mobile troupe toured the Indian towns, large and small, and listened to hundreds of witnesses both Englishmen and natives in service. *The results of these sittings were totally negative and caused general dissatisfaction and bewilderment.*⁴¹ This year i.e., from November to April, the commission restricted itself to visiting the four main

administrative centres, Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, and staying for about a month in each of these cities. The volumes of stenographic reports are increasing not from day to day but by hours, and now, it is fully clear that this entire Sisyphean toil would lead nowhere. Everyday almost two pages of the newspapers are devoted to the reports of the usual sittings of the commission but nobody is interested in them and it seems that even the members of the commission themselves are the least interested. This is so because there is nothing new at all in all this heap of newspaper material. There is nothing which was not well-known to any administrator of some experience.

The phenomenon recorded by me last year is being repeated: the natives are fighting for gaining access to the administrative posts and the British are trying to prove that the access of native to them in larger proportions would uproot British rule. And this "tale of the white bull-calf" is being repeated a hundred times and is being listened to with remarkable patience. The situation may be partially explained by the fact that though the members of the commission do not get any salary for their work in India, their "travelling expenses" are paid very liberally.⁴² From the conversations with some of the members of the commission I had the impression that they have already understood the pointlessness of the whole venture and they are impatiently waiting for the day when they can leave for Britain with their bag and baggage.⁴³

One of the members of the commission, Ramsay MacDonald, the labour leader, has already left India. On his return to England he published in one of the newspapers a letter on "New Delhi". This letter is so typical that I would like to enclose its paper cutting with the present report. MacDonald says: "We wanted and plugged our ears not to hear the voice of Bengal and so decided to gild again the throne of the Great Mogols and to sit on it." This is followed by a sufficiently lively and truthful description of the present state of the territory, where the

new capital will be erected, and the surrounding tombs and ruins of ancient forts. The Calcutta Press naturally took up with joy this anti-patriotic pamphlet written in bad taste and is again repeating the old arguments about the "useless expenditure of money and that Delhi would never attain the significance of the first city of India."⁴¹

It is true that the construction of the official capital would cost about four times more than it was thought. It is also true that Delhi cannot become a commercial centre. But the critics of "New Delhi" forget, in my opinion, the historical symbol in the idea of the imperial capital. The British rule in India passed through three major stages: from the first penetration into India, the first concession gifted to them by the great Mogols, till the declaration of the transfer of India to the crown; from 1858 till the coronation durbar of Lord Curzon and from 1903 to December 1911, when the king-emperor himself with the queen was present and was declared, at the festive durbar in Delhi, as the emperor of India. The British empire in India was specially founded on those ruins of the empire of the great Mogols, the obvious and substantive sign of which lies in the piles of rocks, the remains of destroyed forts and palaces, the monuments of the earlier rulers of Hindustan, which has covered the locality round Delhi. And the erection of a new capital among these ruins is historically necessary. It is a declaration and confirmation of the principle of legitimacy. I think that the next step on the historical path will be traversed with the appointment of a member of the royal family as the viceroy. From the time when the British gave to the natives the access to legislative councils, the competence of which is certainly bound to increase with time, the viceroy is no longer as before the independent bearer of the "supreme rule on appointment". And, at present, it is possible to have a combination of the viceroy invested with the state rights belonging to the ruling dynasty with a responsible chairman of the viceregal council, the actual head of the government under the control of India Office.⁴²

Macdonald's letter not only proves his lack of under-

standing, as a representative of a considerable part of public opinion, of the historical tasks of Great Britain in India, but also strongly damages the prestige of the British and it may only serve to retard the course which they cannot reject as it would be tantamount to suicide. It is strange that this historical symbol of the "restoration of the throne of the Great Moguls" is more intelligible to the natives than to most Britons. There exists a version and now I have the basis to believe it that the last year's attempt on Lord Hardinge was made not by a Bengali, as it was guessed earlier, but by a Mohammedan who was angered by the "solemn entry to the Imperial Capital of Delhi" which signalled that all hopes for the rebirth of the rule of the Great Moguls had been extinguished.⁴⁶

The work on the ruins is however proceeding in full speed. Tens of thousands of coolies under the guidance of engineers are laying the roads and levelling the territory where the capital would be built. It is guessed that within five years the viceregal palace and the governmental buildings would be ready.

With deepest regards etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

DISPATCH OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN CALCUTTA

DATED 5/18 FEBRUARY, 1914, No. 3

The first two months of the new year in India did not have any major event which needs a separate report. At the same time a number of insignificant facts, about which I, being in Calcutta, can judge only from the newspapers, give some generalisations and throw light both on the general condition inside the country (or at least in some parts of it) and on the situation along the border.

After this raid of the train near Peshawar, about which

I wrote on 16/19 December last year, a series of armed attacks were committed in the province on the north-western border on both servicemen and private individuals and every time the same story was repeated: *the bandits successfully fleeing by the mountainous tracks to Afghanistan*. Particularly active are the tribes populating the Khost valley. Your Excellency can remember from my earlier reports that in essence complete anarchy has been reigning in this district for more than two years. It could not have been otherwise as it is clear from the cumulative information I have on the basis of newspaper reports that *in the buffer state one finds complete lack of administrative system. One is confronted with a feeling of helplessness amidst the sporadic signs of coarse cruelty. The local governors are as savage as the nomads over whom they rule.*⁴⁷

I find a glaring example of this in the Karachi paper, the *Sind Gazette*, where the Afghan correspondent says: "The governor of Kandahar province, recently fallen into disgrace and removed after 14 years' control, has accumulated huge treasures. On the way to Kabul from Kandahar his caravan was looted not only with impunity but in all probability with instigation by the Amir." Then follows a laconic note, "it is said that on arrival at Kabul, the Amir, wants to blow him up with cannon". *And the British government deals with such a ruler "diplomatically" and sends him through the native agent representations, warnings and requests that he should ensure law and order in the border regions. Though, I have no direct indications, it is fully clear from the newspaper reports that the recent frequent banditry gave rise to energetic "diplomatic" correspondence between the Indian government and Kabul, which is understandably as futile as all the earlier efforts of dealing with the Amir as a responsible head of the state.*⁴⁸ The indecision and weakness of the British policy regarding Afghanistan seems to me to be fully obvious. *A major military expedition which would result in occupation of all the passes and the setting-up of*

a number of military posts along the Kandahar-Kabul line would have been the only remedial measure protecting the north-western province from attacks with impunity. But as is correctly indicated by some authorities this would mean paying too large a price for the security of the border as the rocky and sandy deserts which cannot even feed their savage nomads, if annexed to the British empire, would be too heavy a burden on the Indian treasury.⁴⁰

Another measure is to compel the Amir to accept a British resident in Kabul with his military expert. It was already tried unsuccessfully by the British.⁵⁰ I think it would necessarily and forcefully be adopted when it would be clear that dialogues with the *darbar* of Kabul are leading nowhere. I even think that such a measure would have been completely in line with our interests. Once we have accepted the British in principle as our solicitors with the Amir till our political interests in Middle Asia do not clash with those of the British, the stronger is the authority of government of India in Kabul the easier it would be for us to achieve the safety of our interests and fulfilment of our demands.⁵¹

I am allowing myself to give some examples in support of this idea. If the authority of Britain in Kabul is so strong that it would not be necessary to ask the Amir but to dictate to him an international question then it would be relatively easy to end the unchecked run of the deserters from our regiments on the Afghan border from where they go to Afghanistan and get cover from the Amir. I am convinced that the Indian government is seriously worried by the present situation on the Indo-Afghan border and that, in the near future, serious complications are possible.⁵²

I have little information on what is happening in the north-east; hence, I have to go only by guess work. Some days back on way to Calcutta from Darjeeling the British commercial agent in Giantse, Mr. Gould, at present the

acting resident in Sikkim (Mr. Bell, the resident in Sikkim, is still in Delhi, at the Tibet Conference) was robbed. The telegram in the local press, reporting about this robbery, mentioned that important secret documents, for example, the correspondence regarding the organisation of the north-eastern frontier province were taken away from Mr. Gould. Officially, nothing is still known about this measure but it is probable that the idea of such separation for the north-eastern frontier strip is timely. This is so as it needs an administration which is closely familiar with the local conditions and able to control the dealings with Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim and Tibet more or less independent of Delhi.⁵³

Whatever may be the results of the conference on Tibet it is beyond doubt that for strengthening the new orientation of the relation between Tibet and India, which is now being worked out, *the British have to first of all worry about holding the regions on the Tibet-India border within the sphere of its influence. There are some indications that in this direction vigorous work has been going on.* It is reported from Kalimpong that the merchants from Nepal and Ladakh were attacked by the Seri and Dropong monks at the time of the Lhasa riots and their property was looted. These merchants are now demanding compensation to the tune of about four million rupees. The Chinese affirm that this money was paid by the Chinese government. Apparently, this dispute would be resolved by the conference. *An agreement was signed already in 1910 between Bhutan and the British government, by which the subsidy to Bhutan was increased two-fold (to 100,000 rupees) and its external relations were put under the control of Britain.* At the same time, the British government declared that it would defend Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan from any sort of aggressive action on behalf of the Chinese army located in Tibet. Now, of course, Britain will take full advantage of the opportunity by playing the role of the chief patron of these border states defending them, if necessary, from the probable dangers

from the side of Tibet and reap all possible dividend owing to the submissive loyalty of these states to the benevolent control of the British residents. She would, at the same time, be successful in isolating Tibet. This task will be easily fulfilled in Sikkim. The old Maharaja of Sikkim died some days back. His successor was in England for two years, studied in Oxford and went round the world with Mr. Claude White, who served for long on the north-eastern border. He was a former political agent in Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan and participated in the Lhasa expedition of colonel Younghusband in 1904. It can be expected that the young Maharaja would be under the direct and strong influence of the British. The aspiration for defending Lhasa from "outside" influences and the fear of Russia are expressed naively by the local administration. The semi-literate pilgrims to Lhasa, the Siberian Buryata, are stopped at the border and every time my personal interference is required for getting them permission.⁵⁴

From the events of the internal life of India it should only be mentioned that after the Kanpur incident the Hindus (23 persons out of 30), arrested for the disorders in Ayodhya which occurred between the Hindus and the Muslims on account of the slaughter of cattle (about which I mentioned in the report dated 19 November/2 December 1913, No. 30), have also been shown mercy. Mercy should be bestowed on both—such is the justification of the tolerant and benevolent governor of the United Provinces. This explanation confirms the indisputable fact that Lord Hardinge committed an error by interfering in the Kanpur case having shattered the respect of the native population towards the authority of the ruler and his dispassionate judicial decisions.⁵⁵

The agitation against New Delhi is assuming a more and more significant posture. I was told that the members of Public Service Commission and the chairman himself, Lord Islington, are going to support it in Britain. Questions on this will, of course, be asked in the house in the near

future. And here, it is believed that with the departure of Lord Hardinge at the end of 1915 the present grandiose plans would go into oblivion and in the new capital activities would be reduced to a minimum. I am burdening the attention of Your Excellency with the frequent mention of this question as *I consider it as one of paramount importance in the general political scene*. I personally do not believe that the government would capitulate before the agitations of the Calcutta businessmen and the amateur experts on India in the British parliament. The main strength of the British lies in their doggedness in completing a project, once started, despite all hurdles. And in the present case, for preserving the prestige of the king-emperor himself and the truthfulness of his word (as it is most important in the eyes of the natives), heavy monetary sacrifice has to be made willingly or otherwise.⁵³

There is drought, famine and loss of cattle in the United Provinces, but the government is fighting very energetically with the calamity and the enormous assistance, given to the population, is an eloquent evidence of the British government's concern for the welfare of India.

With the deepest regards etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

139 NKH. s. zh. Pers. Sr. Az. Otd.

16 February, 1915

Simla dated 17/30 July, 1914

Sir, Anatolii Anatolievich,

I had the honour to report to Your Excellency that simultaneously with the settlement of the question regarding the position of Hindus in South Africa, greeted here by all as a major achievement of Lord Hardinge, *a conflict between Canada and India aggravated on the same lines*.⁵⁷

The arrival of the ship "Komagata Maru" at Vancouver with hundreds of Indians and the refusal of the Canadian government to let them land served as a pretext for serious misunderstanding. I do not want to enter into any details of this incident about which in all probability Your Excellency is well informed by the reports of our consul-general in Canada. However this affair is interesting in principle as it led the Canadian government to take a decision *on the basic principles of equality of the British subjects*. The Canadian court gave a ruling that the colony has full rights to refuse admission to 'undesirable' persons even if they are the subjects of the British crown. The Indians from "Komagata Maru" were put in this category of "undesirable" elements because (1) they came to Canada not by a "continuous journey"; (2) they did not have two hundred dollars each and (3) since they do not come under the definition of skilled labourers.

Formally, these restrictions are fully justified and it is beyond doubt that the Canadian government would be observing them strictly as they are caused more by economic motives than by racial antagonism towards the Indians. And, it seems that the latter would have to take it lying down as nothing indicates as yet the readiness of the local government for actively backing their rights as British subjects. *However, this incident exposes, in my opinion, a quite definite political stance of the British.* Were the detained passengers of "Komagata Maru" Australians or inhabitants of the metropolis and not Indians, the Canadian government would have undoubtedly faced more difficulties and a severe campaign would have been started in the Press against curbing of the rights of the British subjects.

I considered it a duty to note this incident as it may serve a strong argument if sometimes in the future there arises a conflict with England on the basis of our passport system and restrictions put on foreigners who are considered by us as "undesirable" from the point of view of the state.

With deepest regards and loyalty, I have the honour to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/-
Nabokov

161 Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. Az. Otd.

26 February, 1915
Delhi, dated 18/31 December, 1914

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich,

The Indian secretary of External Affairs Sir Henry McMahon is appointed as high commissioner in Egypt. From 1885 his career has been confined in India. In 1893 he participated in the Durand mission at Kabul and later in the commission for delineating the Durand and Seistan borders (1902-1903). From 1907 to 1911 he was the British agent in Baluchistan and then, secretary of External Affairs. In this capacity, he was the British plenipotentiary at the Tibet Conference.

As I already reported to Your Excellency, McMahon belongs to the group with an age-old and incorrigible hostility towards us and he could not shake off the prejudices, suspiciousness and mistrust of the traditional school to the policy of Russia. So his departure from India can only be greeted with relief by us.⁵⁸

How he will fare in the Egyptian situation is difficult to predict. In my own opinion he is a painstaking worker, a good expert on Baluchistan and the entire border strip. He is clever rather than being intelligent and is not so well equipped with wide political knowledge.⁵⁹

With the deepest regards and perfect loyalty I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/-
Nabokov

To

HIS Excellency A. A. Neratov
162 Vkh. S. zh. Pers. Sr. Az. Otd.

26 February, 1915
Delhi, dated 18/31 December, 1914

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich,

Having obtained the secret telegram from executive state councillor for Klemm dated 24 October expressing the desirability of my getting the information from the Indian government on the events in Afghanistan, I came immediately from Calcutta to the capital of India. In my talk with the head of the foreign department (Sir Henry McMahon was on leave and was appointed recently as the high commissioner in Egypt) I explained that the information wanted by the imperial ministry from the Indian government might be directly handed over to me only if I was at Delhi. I expressed the hope that under the present extraordinary circumstances the government might temporarily deviate from the principle which forbids the stay of a consul at Delhi.⁶⁰

The same day the head of the foreign department briefed the viceroy about our talk. Lord Hardinge replied that he thought that it was quite convenient to keep me

informed about the happenings in Afghanistan and did not find any difficulty in my staying in Delhi. Along with this he asked me to report to the imperial ministry that such a departure from the system should not serve as a precedent and my political communications with the Indian government should not bear an official character. The new procedure was only an expression and a manifestation of his conviction that at present the handing over of information to the imperial ministry through me is the most reliable way of achieving the results in conformity with the interests of our mutual policy. Such caution on the part of the government is explained partly by the concern that following me other consuls of the allies and friendly powers would also seek to come to Delhi which is not appreciated here. There is also a strong desire to avoid frictions with London over the present departure from the principle of non-interference of consuls in international policy. The viceroy at the same time asked me to inform the imperial ministry about his views on the situation in Afghanistan. I had the honour to place briefly these views before Your Excellency by the secret telegrams dated, 29 October, 8 and 29 November.

I consider it a duty to add that in a friendly talk with me two or three days after my arrival in Delhi, the viceroy again emphasised that the exception from the general rule was motivated both by the present extraordinary circumstances and by his personal desire to make my work comparatively easier.⁶¹

More than one and a half month has passed since I came to Delhi and till now nothing happened to consider the viewpoint of the local government as too optimistic. In reply to the letter sent by the viceroy after the declaration of war by Turkey, the *Amir expressed his friendship towards Britain and his intention not to actively oppose her.*

He also expressed his regret over the action of Turkey. Information on the military preparations in Afghanistan

reaches here as rumours and with uncertain exactitude. The only agent of Britain in Kabul is a native and the government here has to depend on his reports. In this context it *should not be forgotten that Afghanistan is a political entity only in name* and that Kabul cannot always direct and control what happens on the border. This was very evident from the disorders that took place two years ago and I had the honour to report about it to Your Excellency.⁶²

Understandably, it is difficult to predict whether the wisdom of the Amir would overrule the fanaticism of his subjects in the near future. However, there are no signs till now of any remarkable success of the ridiculous attempts of German-Turkish provocateurs in Afghanistan. About a month back there was a commotion among the Mashuds on the border and it threatened to take serious proportions. Led by the local *mullah*, the armed crowd of Mashuds attacked an English border post believing in the sermon that the enemy guns would be rendered harmless by the prayers of this *mullah*. The garrison on this small border fort was however ready and after the first volley, razing twenty men, the holy soldiers ran away in panic. That was the end of it.⁶³

I was informed without inhibition during the course of a private conversation in military circles that *an offensive war with Afghanistan is impossible at the present moment*. This is, by the way, self-evident if we take into account the number of soldiers available for service of the Indian government. All measures regarding the dispatch of soldiers to Europe, Africa and Mesopotamia have been kept in guarded secret and the newspapers maintain a discreet silence. *But I came to know that in India at present only an insignificant part of the garrison is left*. From Bombay and Karachi not less than 175,000 soldiers, including both Englishmen as well as natives, were sent. The territorial regiment to replace them consists of not more than 60,000 men from Britain and they are only raw material. It is proposed to train

them in India and, then in the ensuing spring it would be decided, depending on the turn of events, whether to hold them here till the end of the war or to send them to Europe. The latter is more probable as it would be very difficult for these soldiers to bear the hot summer in the army camps on the Indian plains. It is quite evident that these ill-trained soldiers are not suitable for military actions on the north-western border.⁶⁴

*Therefore, all efforts of the Indian government are directed to avoid any complication on the Afghanistan border. As far as I can judge from conversations with members of the government, they understand the importance of impressing upon the Amir that Russia and Britain are acting in complete unity; that, therefore, he is situated between the hammer and the anvil and that the wisest behaviour on his part would be to sit still and not to imitate the folly of the Turks. In order to strengthen this policy it would be desirable on our part, in my opinion, to place before the Amir through the Indian government our firm conviction that Russia has no intentions to disturb the existing peaceful relations with Afghanistan; but in case of any aggressive attempts on his part, both the powers would offer the Amir a co-ordinated rebuff. I think that the viceroy had this in mind when he asked me to tell the imperial ministry that it would be desirable not to exaggerate the significance of small conflicts which can arise on our border. If the need arises for asking the mediation of the government of India for handing over to the Amir our remonstrance on any incident this opportunity could be utilised to indicate to him our full solidarity with Britain.*⁶⁵

As I had the honour to report to Your Excellency, the dispatch of soldiers from India was somewhat chaotic in the beginning and was undertaken with hesitations. But it has been now regularised and at present there are Indian soldiers in Europe in considerable number and they are able to give a solid support to the armies of the allies. Your Excellency is undoubtedly aware from the

reports of the European newspapers that the native soldiers participating in the fights have so far conducted themselves splendidly and with remarkable valour which was beyond all expectations. Their spirit was undoubtedly elevated sufficiently by the abolition of the humiliating regulation which precluded *the natives from the right to receive the highest military honour—the Victoria Cross*. Already several native soldiers have been awarded this order and several regiments have earned the thanks of the commander-in-chief. There is no doubt that this in part explains the flow of volunteers into the native army beyond all optimistic calculations.⁶⁶

A complete calm is reigning inside the country and the government has adequate reason for facing all future contingencies without fear.

The main task lies ahead. *The participation of the native soldiers in the European war side by side with the British would be reflected on the inner structure of the army after their return to India*. My personal observations of the local army and the intimate life of the native regiments permit me to predict that the British officialdom would be able to adapt themselves to the new pattern of mutual relationship, *which may emerge as a consequence of the present war*. The details of the guidelines of this new pattern would depend on the talent and the creativity of the army leaders.⁶⁷

In the telegram dated 23 October I took the liberty of expressing my opinion that the war, "will not cause any complications here". I had in mind those "complications" for which the Germans dragged Turkey into war—complications arising out of a threatened Muslim loyalty. Our joint declaration with Britain and France on the sanctity of the holy places of Islam played a large and precious role. Unexpectedly for the Germans, among the intelligent Muslims the appreciation of the true interests of Islam appeared to be stronger than blind fanaticism. Attempts to inflame them by bribery and propaganda have failed.

Feeble attempts in a spirit hostile to us were made by some newspapers including the Persian *Habl-ul-Matin* published in Calcutta but the campaign in the native press did not have, in general, any success.⁶⁸

It is believed, however, that the difficulties with the Muslims are still ahead. Now the tone of all gatherings and newspapers is as follows: "Yes, Turkey committed a mistake by allowing itself to be dragged into this war against Britain. But Britain is a friend of Islam and we hope that it would be able to save the interests of Turkey following the long tradition and to preserve its sanctity etc." They are talking what they do not believe themselves, but they are preparing the psychological atmosphere for the eventual transformation of the mood and the tone of the Muslim public opinion. That moment would arrive when it would be found that the friendship of Britain for Islam would not take those forms as it did in 1878. Let me repeat what I had honour to report to Your Excellency: the policy of Lord Hardinge towards the Muslims is being carried out with true statesmanship and there is a basis to think that the present Indian government clearly understands the tasks before it and would be able to resolve them.⁶⁹ From this viewpoint it is desirable in the interests of Britain that the viceroy should extend his term after November 1915. Keeping in mind the new heavy blows on him including the death of his eldest son some days ago, it is difficult to say whether he would have enough physical and mental strength to undertake this responsible and difficult duty especially if we remember that the present moment demands a vigilant and tense attention from the head of the Indian government.⁷⁰

With the deepest regards and perfect loyalty I have the honour to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Nabokov

To His Excellency A. A. Neratov.
311 Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. Az. Otd.

16 April 1915.

Delhi, dated 6/19 January, 1915

No. 1. One annexure.

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich,

Opening the session of the legislative council in Delhi on 12 January the viceroy made a speech, the text of which I am enclosing herewith in the form of a paper-cutting for the information of Your Excellency. This speech was well-planned, excellent in form, succinct and interesting. In as much as it reflects the present-day situation in India it is worthy of our attention. Starting with a brief review of the past relations between Britain and Turkey and of the circumstances under which the Turks had to go against us, the viceroy stated that the Indian Muslims recognised the folly of the Turkish adventures and remained faithful to the British crown and to the principles of freedom, honour and justice. It was to defend these principles that we have been jointly fighting against Germany and her allies.

This part of the viceroy's speech is understandably directed mainly to the Muslim intelligentsia. This is why *Lord Hardinge emphasised that the war with Turkey, who had deserted the traditional friendship of Britain in favour of Germany for money and cloudy promises, is not a war against Islam and that the sacred places in Arabia and Mesopotamia would not be touched.* He also indicated that the Russian, French and British armies have tens of thousands of Muslims, while the German army has none in their ranks.⁷¹

The confidence that the native population of India, both

Muslims and the followers of the other religions, would remain loyal, permitted the government to send about 200,000 soldiers from India to France, Egypt, South-East Africa, the Persian Gulf and China, while sufficiently strong garrisons are left at the border for its defence against a possible aggression.

It is interesting to note that about four months ago in Simla, the viceroy announced in his speech to the legislative council that he desires to send 200,000 soldiers from India and this part of the speech was *prohibited by the censor*. The feeling of deep satisfaction in the viceroy's words, about *the waves of patriotism and loyalty surging throughout India from one end to the other*, is quite natural. As I had the honour to report repeatedly to Your Excellency, the policy of Lord Hardinge considerably helped in bringing about this heartening phenomenon, the symptoms of which were far from exaggerated in his last speech.⁷²

The same day on 12 January I spent the evening with the viceroy in his private chamber and had a prolonged conversation with him. He repeated to me what he had earlier passed through the secretary of external affairs i.e., *there are no indications till now of the possibility of hostile activities from Afghanistan*. During the past few months conflict between the British and the nomads flared up only twice. I have already reported the first case. About a week ago there was another attack on the border post. A crowd of nomads, nominally subjects of the Amir, attacked in thousands the North Waziristan police post in the Spina-Khaisora locality on the Tochi valley. In the fight one British officer and five native soldiers were killed and with a toll of about 80 amongst the nomads the crowd dispersed. In the conversation with me the viceroy mentioned this incident and said that behind the cordon of these advanced posts there was a second line of soldiers and that the latter were quite sufficient for inflicting *exemplary punishment on the Afghans if further*

attacks take place. In this connection the government is in correspondence with the Amir having placed before him the weakness of his centralised rule as revealed in such flare-ups. The Amir replies with expressions of friendship and promises to punish the guilty. *Under the present circumstances this "diplomatic correspondence" fully satisfies the interests of the British policy the aim of which is not to give any pretext to the Amir for snapping relations with British India.*⁷³

Touching upon the measures the government wants to take for preventing the crisis in cotton and grain markets, the viceroy called for unity in the council and underlined the undesirability of discussing such questions of internal policy as may give rise to differences in the council. Though even the unanimous opposition in the viceroy's legislative council is powerless against the governmental veto, the fact that all the members of the council, both British and native, approved of the necessity of avoiding the pretexts for differences and adopted without any objection the resolution to this effect cannot but be accepted as a portentous symptom of the mood of the country.⁷⁴

This was clearly revealed at the sittings of the National Congress in Madras at the end of December. The Congress in normal time functions as some sort of a "parliament of the native opposition". At its annual gatherings the policy of the government is exposed to criticisms which is at times very sharp. The speeches of the protagonists of the Congress reflect the aspirations of the intelligent sections of the population which go far beyond the pale of practical (*from the English standpoint*) possibilities.⁷⁵ In Madras, the Congress fully approved the president who, on the opening session, made an eloquent appeal to unite and render all help and assistance to the government in its fight against the enemy and to prove their loyalty to the throne instead of criticising the government and express-

ing its aspiration and desires in the sphere of internal policy.⁷⁶

That India is fully loyal is being proved adequately enough by the readiness with which the native soldiers took part in the fight against the common enemy. There is not the least sign of discontent in the native army and this is more important than any of the resolutions of the League and the Congress. But even the latter are by no means meaningless as they serve to indicate the mood of the intelligentsia. There are grounds for thinking that the government would retain the confidence of the people and in counting upon a "general insurrection" in India the Germans have been severely disappointed.⁷⁷

With the deepest respect and a similar loyalty I have the honour to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Nabokov

To

His Excellency A. A. Neratov.*
356 Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. — Az. Otd.

Confidential
Delhi dated 6/19 January, 1915

Sir,

Sergei Dmitrievich !

In November this year the five year term of the viceroy will be over. Your Highness definitely remembers that during the Japanese war the former British ambassador

* . Possibly through him the letter to Sergei Dmitrievich was sent.

in Petrograd, Lord Hardinge did much to avoid the snapping of ties between Russia and Britain, the threat of which was very close and that as assistant secretary of external affairs he took a dominant, if not the main, part on the British side in working out the basis of our agreement of 1907. As a viceroy, he continued by all means to strive for the preservation and strengthening of friendly relations with Russia. As I had to personally evaluate more than once during my tenure in India the fruitful endeavour of Lord Hardinge in this direction, I dare hope that Your Highness would not consider me guilty if I am allowed to place before your consideration the desirability of adorning Lord Hardinge with a sign of the *all merciful emperor's goodwill*. Lord Hardinge has the order of St. Alexander Nevskii and the Order of St. Andrei Pervozvannii would thus suit the high post now occupied by him. If Your Highness finds it possible to have the imperial approval of awarding Lord Hardinge the order, it could be done on the auspicious occasion of king George's birthday, celebrated in Simla with special solemnity.⁷⁸

Requesting to be excused for my boldness in directly addressing Your Highness due to the impossibility of official communication with the imperial embassy in London, I have the honour to be,

Yours Highness's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Nabokov**

** On the original it is written by hand : "Minister's friend ordered to leave it unanswered".

M. T.'s NOTE

276 Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. Az. Otd.

Delhi dated 17 February/
2 March 1915*Confidential*

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich !

Having obtained the secret telegram of DSS for Klemm dated 14/27th February which directed me to verify from the Indian government the alarming informations of the military preparations in Afghanistan, I had a conversation on this issue with the secretary of external affairs and the contents were sent to Your Excellency by a secret telegram on the same day. In addition to this I consider it my duty to report the following item.

On my arrival at Delhi in the beginning of November the secretary of external affairs told me that *the special agent (native) of the Indian government is following up the armament issue of Afghanistan* and that as soon as any alarming symptom is noted he will let me know. This agent has not reported as yet about any considerable preparation, or the replenishment of military reserves or about the reinforcement of cadres. It is quite possible that garrisons are placed on the northern border of Afghanistan. The feeling here is that this measure, if ever taken, would be in the nature of a preventive act. As I have already said in my telegraph the government continues to have the usual correspondence with Kabul about the unending attacks of the Afghan nomads at the border and maintains extraordinary restraint.

The secretary of external affairs read a rough copy of the long letter from the viceroy to the Amir, in which the

viceroy tells him about the true situation on the war theatres denying both the rumours about the German victories and the fable that the German emperor has taken to Islam. Apparently this fable is believed in Afghanistan. The viceroy writes: "It is self-evident that no sensible Afghan can believe this fiction but even if it was true that the emperor Wilhelm adopted Islam, the orthodox Muslims should have looked at it as an assault on the religious feelings as it is clear that this step was taken from purely political considerations."⁷⁹

Then I enquired from the secretary of external affairs that if it would be expedient to give the Amir a fresh warning and to explain to him without harshness that Russia and Britain are in full solidarity and that in case of an attempt on his part to oppose Russia he would find himself between the anvil and the hammer. The secretary of external affairs rang up the viceroy in my presence, read to him my short memorandum and asked if the viceroy desires to add a separate paragraph in the form suggested by me to the letter which was ready for his signature. The viceroy replied that he considered such addition quite appropriate.

At Delhi I also saw the high commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province Sir George Russ Keppel who returned recently to Delhi to meet the viceroy.⁸⁰ He confirms fully the stand of the foreign department on the situation in Afghanistan. He believes that the Amir is not thinking about a war with us but that local conflagrations are always possible as the so-called governors of various provinces of Afghanistan are inclined to act on their own and the authority of Kabul over them is not strong. About the happenings in Kabul Sir George Russ Keppel keeps himself informed with the reports of official native agents as well as all possible bazar talks. One of these rumours gives the feeling that Nasirullah has lost his popularity and influence on the course of affairs once and for all.

My meeting with Sir George was to my regret only flitting, as he was the guest of the viceroy merely for three days. But in the beginning of April, if circumstances permit, I am planning to go to Peshawar for three-four days and then, I hope, I would be able to talk with him in more detail.

With the deepest respect and much loyalty again I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's Most
Obedient Servant

Sd/- Nabokov/

277 Vkh. s. zh. Per. Sr. — Az. Otd.

Delhi dated 17 February/
2 March 1915

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich !

The trip by the viceroy to the Persian Gulf, which ended some days ago, is an event with an undoubted political significance and so I consider it my duty to give a short report on it to Your Excellency.⁸¹

On his way to Basra Lord Hardinge stopped at Kuwait where he had an official audience with the royal sheikh as well as the sheikh of Bahrein and later visited the petroleum sites of Anglo-Persian Company on the Abadan island. The third brief stop was at the mouth of the Karun river, where the viceroy met the sheikh of Mohammerra. At Basra, the viceroy stayed several days and visited the front positions of the British soldiers several versts away from the town.

Replying to the address of the British colony at Basra the viceroy said among other things: "*The occupation of Basra by our soldiers would raise administrative problems demanding immediate discussion and decision and I have come here to investigate personally on the spot those measures which are necessary for its security. We are not fighting alone and so we cannot take decisions without discussing them with our allies; but in any case, we are confident that a more enlightened and beneficial administration would restore to Iraq the welfare based on its unbounded natural resources which have remained unutilised owing to the corrupt and inefficient Turkish administration.*"

The clear intention of Britain to strengthen its control over Basra and the Shat-el-Arab valley is expressed by Lord Hardinge quite *cautiously* without even a distant reference to the form proposed for the purpose.⁸² I think that the viceroy restricted himself to the general statement not only as the military operations are still continuing and full agreement with the allies has not as yet been reached on the questions regarding the fragments of the half-ruined citadels of the Turkish empire, but also as the British government itself has hardly worked out any definite plan on this score. It is, however, thought as more than probable that the southern Mesopotamia and the northern coast of the Persian Gulf would be under the direct control of the Indian government and that *the staff of the new administration would be collected from among the Englishmen prepared for it by their services in the Punjab, at the northern border and at Baluchistan. Their familiarity with the customs and characteristics of Muslim nomads and their knowledge of dialects, having striking similarity with Arabic and Persian languages, would be some added advantages.*

The new problems, administrative, financial and political, which Britain would have to solve, if the *Shat-el-*

Arab valley is joined to its territories, are so vast and so closely connected with the fate of the rest of Turkey that, at present, it would be misleading to guess a possible solution.

Here, it is clearly recognised that an important political result has been achieved: *The victories of the Russian arms and, to a considerably lesser extent, the occupation of Basra has put an end once and for all to the design of Germany expressed in the formula "Constantinople-Baghdad-Indian Ocean".* The fact that Russia and Britain have already removed in effect the true enemy, Germany, by common efforts serves in the eyes of the government as well as the press as the most reliable foundation of the belief that means would be found to regulate all seemingly conflicting problems among the present allied powers and to safeguard our mutual interests.⁸³

Persons accompanying the viceroy in this trip told me that *particularly this political result is much more significant than the possible material advantages from annexing Mesopotamia to the British territories.* The climatic and natural hurdles, which would have to be faced to utilise the fertile soil, are almost insurmountable. Besides, the population is so sparse that there would always be a dearth of working hands. The idea of creating Indian colonies in Mesopotamia by their resettlement from the Punjab, advanced by some newspapers, is considered here as a difficult proposition to realise. Above all, the Punjab have enough land for its population and with the development of the irrigation system there may be dearth of labour in that province itself. Further, *the direct overland communication link of India with Europe—the Karachi-Basra-Baghdad line—seems to be less practicable than the Quetta-Nushki-Persia route.* In connection with the question of communication with Europe by land I have to hear more often the regret that (for the time being) *the shortest way through Afghanistan cannot be used.* Here it is being

consciously felt that the buffer would soon stand in the way of peaceful settlement of problems and regrets are being expressed that it was created for defence against imaginary threats.⁸⁴

The government is not still coming forward with its intentions and the press is not informed about the contents of the prolonged conversations which the viceroy had with the sheikhs of Muskat and Mohammera. In the official reports it was only mentioned that the sheikhs received high British orders which certainly indicates the friendly character of the conversations and the confidence in the peaceful disposition of the sheikhs.⁸⁵

On his way back from Basra the viceroy came to Muscat where he exchanged visits with the Sultan. Returning the visit, the viceroy mentioned, in reply to the short ovation of the Sultan, the help rendered recently by the British soldiers during the attack of the rebel Arab leader on Muscat and noted with satisfaction the thanks expressed by the Sultan for this assistance. In spite of all this the viceroy and the government are, however, clear that these expressions of friendship and loyalty on the part of the Arab sheikhs should be taken with caution and that *the possible success of Turkish arms could easily shake their loyalty*.⁸⁶

Concluding this brief report on the viceregal trip it should be noted that not only was this the first visit to Basra by the head of the Indian government but also the fact that the viceroy was absent from India for about three weeks. This is nothing but an additional proof of the fact that the Germans would have to part with their hope of a possible "general insurrection" in India.

Lately, in Bengal, several political crimes, murders and robberies were committed, while in Punjab there were commotions, caused by immigrants after they had been refused permission to land. These purely local phenomena certainly worried the government seriously, as it would

have to take stricter measures with respect to the regions which are not immune from the revolutionary spirit.⁸⁷

With the deepest regards and much loyalty I have the honour to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant
Sd/- Nabokov

278 Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. — Az. Ot. No. 2.

Delhi dated 17 February/
2 March 1915

Sir,

Anatolli Anatolievich !

The nationalist party in India suffered an irreparable loss in the recent death of Mr. Gokhale, the member of the Imperial Legislative Council. He was undoubtedly the most leading social workers of the natives for many years and his death has caused universal grief.⁸⁸

After several years' of professorship in the departments of history and political economy, he became a member, first of the Bombay and later of the Imperial Legislative Council and for the last three years he was also associated with the commission for the reorganisation of the civil services, in the work of which he took an active part.⁸⁹ At the same time, he continued to work first as the secretary and then, as the president of the National Congress. During the last year Mr. Gokhale led the moderate party of nationalists and his *restraining influence*, which elicited angry attacks from the extremists, *rendered great help to the government in fighting these elements*.⁹⁰ During the period of constitutional reform by Lord Minto and Lord Morley, the advice and instructions of Gokhale had been very valuable. In the Imperial Legislative Council he played an important

role and everybody, including Lord Kitchener who is intolerant of the interference from the natives, listened to him. Gokhale always opposed allocations for the army. Without foreseeing the possibility of India's participation in the European war he considered that any extravagant expenditure on the army takes away funds from more essential fields of administration and mainly from the people's education. But even his ill-wishers agree that he had a sufficiently wide political outlook to admit his own mistakes and that, at present, he would have undoubtedly supported all the governmental measures in toto.

The news of Gokhale's death was received two or three days before the renewed session of the legislative council, which was adjourned due to the viceregal trip to the Persian Gulf. At the opening ceremony Lord Hardinge made an expansive speech dedicated to the memory of Gokhale and then proposed to close the sitting as a sign of mourning. In his speech, the viceroy characterised the deceased as a talented and tireless fighter for the welfare of the natives and for the improvement of their mode of life and declared that he used to turn to Gokhale for advice in many cases. Particularly on the Indian immigration to South Africa he "gave a loyal and useful co-operation to the Government", as Lord Hardinge put it.⁹¹

The speech of the viceroy and the show of respect to the memory of the native leader would undoubtedly create a very beneficial impression in all quarters. This could be felt already at the next sitting of the council, when a number of native members expressed their loyal feelings and complete solidarity of India with Britain in the present crisis.

With deepest regards and loyalty I have the honour to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant
Sd/- Nabokov

568 Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. — Az. Otd.

Highly Confidential

Simla dated 21 March (2nd April) 1915

Received 2 May 1915

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich!

I had the honour to inform Your Excellency by a telegram yesterday that in reply to his last letter to the Amir of Afghanistan, *the viceroy received from Habibulla Khan an assurance of his determined stand to maintain strict neutrality in the present war.*⁹² The Amir's letter was sent through the new Afghan ambassador (as he calls himself) the only diplomatic representative with the viceregal government.

The arrival of this diplomat coincided with the transfer of the government from Delhi to Simla for the summer and the departure of the viceroy on a short rest trip.

On receiving the letter of the Amir, Lord Hardinge telegraphed the secretary of external affairs instructing him to tell me confidentially about its content and to add that he is attaching much importance to this letter and has faith in the sincerity of the Amir's promises.⁹³ Your Excellency has undoubtedly noted the unusually optimistic tone of the viceroy in his conversation with me, the content of which I gave in the secret telegram dated 7/20 March. The viceroy was evidently much worried by the reports from the north-western border about *a considerable accumulation of nomad tribes in Tochi valley* and about the imminent attack. It was being apprehended that the attack was being organised with the knowledge of the Amir. These fears are now being allayed. On 25 March the nomads, mainly the Zadrans and Mangals, numbering from 8 to 10 thousands, crossed the border (the so-called

Durand Line) several versts away from the Miran Shah post. On the 26 morning 2 squadrons of Indian cavalry, one mountain battery and 2 Indian regiments as well as the Waziristhan police under the command of a brigadier-general attacked the nomads and forced them to run. The losses of the tribes were 200 dead and 300 wounded. Many prisoners and a huge quantity of arms was also seized. The government thinks that this will have a beneficial effect not only in the Tochi valley but also along the whole border of Afghanistan itself. The fact that a comparatively small battalion consisting exclusively of native soldiers easily faced the tens of thousands of nomads would undoubtedly stop for sometime further attempts of aggression into Indian territory as well as serve as an extra warning to the Amir against any intention on his part to allow his soldiers to participate in such attacks inspite of his repeated declarations to the contrary.

The British have enough forces on the border to stall the Afghan army and in a minute, if necessary, the territorial army can move there from their present stations in the Punjab and the Central Provinces. This army underwent rigorous training during the winter and is now ready as a fighting force. Therefore, there would not be a serious danger of an Afghan attack for India. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that *for maintaining internal peace in the northern provinces where the Muslim population dominates, the war with Afghanistan should be avoided as far as possible.*⁹⁴ My information from completely private sources at Peshawar indicates that Sir George Russ Keppel is convinced that the Amir would not start military operations. But he as well as the secretary of external affairs think that it is quite desirable on our part to avoid conflicts which can give a pretext to the Amir for "having been dragged into the war".⁹⁵

Information coming from Bukhara on the military preparations in Afghanistan is summarily denied by the

agents of the British who are well-informed according to the secretary of external affairs. None of this information has been, however, corroborated by facts and in spite of the forebodings peace with Afghanistan is still not broken.

In his last conversation with me before leaving Delhi the viceroy again confirmed that he would be sending me all information which can be of use to us. By the way, he expressed a desire in a very friendly manner that I should remain in India till the end of his viceroyalty. I replied that under the present emergency conditions I do not think it proper to leave India till the end of the war.

With the deepest regards and loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant
Sd/- Nabokov

567 Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. — Az. Otd.
No. 3 Received on 25 May, 1915.

Simla dated 24 March/
6 April 1915.

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich !

In my preceding report I mentioned that recently robberies and murders with political motives have become more and more frequent in Bengal and that there were serious disturbances in the Punjab caused mainly by the agitation of the returned immigrants, who had been denied access to Canada and compelled to return to their homeland.⁹⁶ Though these problems are purely local and did not find any favourable response in other regions of an

otherwise loyal India the government recognised the necessity of adopting extraordinary measures for fighting the evil which is beginning to assume serious proportions particularly in the Punjab.⁸⁷

In the middle of March the lieutenant governor of Punjab, O'Dwyer came several times to meet the viceroy and represented in a very energetic manner that *the form of investigation and trial of political crimes ought to be changed by legislation to uproot the agitation of the unsuccessful immigrants and to ensure quick reprisal.*⁸⁸ The arguments of O'Dwyer were considered so weighty that within a few days a legislation for rapid trial, called The Public Safety Bill which is enclosed herewith, was introduced into the legislative council. *Actually our 'Enhanced Security' corresponds closely to this law.* Its essence lies in changing the procedural norms of normal times to permit a quick reprisal of the criminals. Thanks to the energy and informations of the Criminal Intelligence Department and the Punjab police *about 400 conspirators were caught, a bomb factory and store of weapons was unearthed.* Under normal laws the trials of these persons would have prolonged for months and it would have tantamounted to such a Sisyphean toil due to local conditions of summoning the witnesses, selection of defendants etc. that no court could have managed it.⁸⁹ Besides, in the Punjab the anti-government agitation was also launched on the ground of a temporary rise in the grain price and found a favourable response from the peasants suffering from the price rise. Quick radical measures to end this agitation became an immediate necessity.

The viceroy could have taken these steps as measures undertaken during special circumstances of the war from a fully administrative angle. But as the session of the legislative council was to be summoned shortly he wisely prepared to place them before the council for approval.

As I had the honour to point out repeatedly, the Viceroy

gal Legislative Council has only a very distant resemblance to the Parliament.¹⁰⁰ The nominated native members, representing all the provinces of India confer there but they are in a minority. For any measure introduced by the government a majority is guaranteed by the members of the viceregal government, the nominated European members, and the representatives of the merchants. Nevertheless, by giving the natives a possibility of expressing their opinion on a bill and accepting some of the amendments proposed by them, the viceregal government attains to a certain extent the sanction of "the people's voice".

Thanks to my stay at Delhi during the past session I had an opportunity to be personally present at the sittings of the council and to acquaint myself closely with its work. Such a direct observation was of much interest and it formed my conviction that the time, when the native intelligentsia would assimilate the forms of West European political institutions and would achieve the capability of using them, is rather far. Undoubtedly, the legislative council contains (with a few exceptions) the most educated and prominent personalities. All the same they play a truly pitiable role in the meetings of the legislative council. Not only do they lack a talented orator (except the late Gokhale), but also in most cases their efforts to imitate the British parliamentarians produce a comic effect. Almost all of them prepare their speeches earlier and even when they say only a few words, they read their speeches from notes, which are subsequently handed over to the clerk of the council and the press. Curious things also happen causing ironical animation amongst the governmental majority and thus breaking the ill-concealed yawn on these benches. One of the orators, delivering his speech some days back, loudly declared at the end of an alluring phrase: "The italic is orator's". The viceroy presides over the council when some serious state matters are considered. But all members of the government are

quite conscious in their heart of hearts that *this council is only at the stage of infancy*. To permit the native to participate in legislation and administration was a political exigency and a concession to the pressing solicitations of the native intelligentsia.¹⁰¹ But, at present, this participation is nothing more than illusory. I am enclosing in this report a stenographic account of the meeting where the bill on the "Enhanced Security" was considered. A close study of it confirms the general characteristics of the legislative council given by me.

During the closing day of the current winter session all the elected members thought it fit to speak. With a rare unanimity they thanked the viceroy on behalf of the whole of India for his attentive and well-wishing care about the needs of the population and expressed the hope that Lord Hardinge would not leave his post till the end of the war. His viceroyalty ends on 15 November and it would be certainly desirable to avoid the change of head of the state during war time.

All the orators touched upon the negative vote of the House of Lords on the introduction of the "Executive Council" in the United Provinces.¹⁰² This measure was proposed by the Indian government and approved by the secretary of state for India and so the voting in the House of Lords was both unexpected and frustrating. *The native members of the council expressed this disappointment in a very sharp manner*. Not only did the viceroy refrain from stopping any one of them but to everybody's surprise he himself spoke on the issue in a decisively disapproving tone at the time of summing up. Even the official organ *Pioneer* openly criticised Lord Hardinge the next day in a strong editorial for his speech before the natives against the House of Lords and it should be conceded that there is a great deal of truth in this criticism. The well-wishers of the viceroy are watching with concern the reaction of the house to this rather inapt speech.

It is also interesting to take into account another note heard in the speeches of all the natives. Touching upon the "heroic feats" of the native soldiers in France they expressed a confidence that the sacrifice of India for defending the empire would result in a further rapprochement between the British and the Indians and in an extension of the political rights of the latter in their homeland and that after the war India would occupy a more respectable place in the empire similar to Canada and Australia.¹⁰³ As is well known to Your Excellency, the Indian soldiers, though they had some valiant feats, revealed in some cases an insufficient resistance against the unprecedented severe pressure of the enemy. This is, however, not talked about here but, all the same, it is beyond doubt that the role of the native soldiers in the battle fields is not so much as to justify the premature demands of the Indian intellectuals.¹⁰⁴

As I have already observed, a series of new problems would be created in India after the victorious end of the war and to resolve them the British would have to labour hard. There can be no doubt that the demarcation between the conquerors and the subjugated races is being worn out bit by bit.¹⁰⁵ But it is still a long way to its final disappearance and an autonomous India, where the natives would have equal rights with the British, is still a Utopia unattainable without major shake-ups which would be fatal for the future of the empire.

Another important measure, adopted during this session, is the take-over of the grain trade by the government. In spite of the excellent crop, the grain traders used the situation, created in the European market by the temporary stoppage of the Russian export, for an artificial price rise and the possible political consequences of this crisis forced the government to take this drastic step, the beneficial effects of which were felt almost immediately.

With the deepest respect and loyalty I have the honour to be, Sir, Your Excellency's most obedient servant.

Sd/- Nabokov

No. 4 :

Simla dated 24th April (7 May) 1915.

761 Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. — Az. Ot.

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich,

In the middle of the last month the British soldiers on the north-western border had to repulse again an *attack by quite a large crowd of nomads*. On 8 April about 4000 Mohmand approached Hafiz-Kora to the north of Shabkadar (about 30 versts from Peshawar) and opened fire on the British sentry posts. The flying column from the Khyber Pass immediately moved up to meet them. Within several hours it succeeded in dispersing the nomads who lost about 150 persons killed and wounded. On the British side three British and two native officers and nine men were killed and three officers and 54 men were wounded.

The Mohmand tribe lives partly in the British territory and partly in Afghanistan as well as in the border strip where they are independent.¹⁰⁶ Among them fanatic *mullahs* appear from time to time and their propaganda meets with partial success as in the present case. The last attack was however caused, according to the declarations of the high commissioner of the north-western province, mainly by predatory motives. *Mullahs* are convincing the nomads that there are no more British soldiers on the border and so it would be easy to loot the villages in the British territory. Only a small portion of the Mohmand participated in the attack. According to Sir George Russ

Keppel the Afghan administrators did not permit the inhabitants of the Afghan territory to join the attack. A number of "khans", as the leader of the tribal groups in the outskirts of Peshawar call themselves, offered their help to the government for suppressing the attempts to create disturbances on the border and some influential *mullahs* refused to support this raid.

At present, it would be impossible to expect complete calm in this part of India and the affairs of 18 April as well as the raids of Zadrans about which I reported recently, should be considered purely as local phenomena. It is noteworthy that this time the Afghan rulers definitely interfered energetically in the interests of peace and order. The latest information from Afghanistan confirms again the pacific disposition of the Amir. Some days back Habibullah Khan had a crowded *Durbar*. For two hours he talked about the weather and various alien topics. By the way, he explained in detail the construction of the barometer to those who were present. According to persons who visited Kabul he takes a lively interest in the modern applied sciences. Later, he dwelt on the war and declared that this war is a colossal disaster, that the hostile states did not yet come to any result in spite of the heavy losses incurred on both sides. He said: "It is evident that at present only the neutral states are happy and that a strict neutrality is the greatest boon for Afghanistan." This phrase he repeated twice.

Some days back two sons of the late Sardar Ayub Khan, living on a pension from the government of India secretly left Lahore for the Afghan border to *hatch a conspiracy against the Amir and provoke Afghanistan to a war with British India*.¹⁰⁷ They were caught on the way and sent back. The government would be, of course, able to use and exhibit this incident as a fresh proof of friendship to the Amir.

From what I have stated above I cannot but share the

optimism of the Indian government on the situation at the north-western border and I continue to think that no serious danger is threatening us or India from Afghanistan.

But the optimistic mood inside the country, which reigned so far and found expression in the viceroy's speeches is not justified by circumstances. As I had the opportunity to indicate more than once that the dream of the enemies to repeat 1857 is absolutely unrealistic in the present Indian situation. Even if that impossible happens and the native soldiers rebel, such a mutiny can be suppressed without doubt much more quickly than in 1857. A general insurrection is difficult to envisage at present. *The native soldiers are quite satisfied with their position and the officers are carrying on with integrity and vigour.* From the native regiments with a comparatively small number of British officers large numbers of troops have gone to the war and so the number of British officers is reduced to the minimum and in certain cases, to six or ten persons. In one of the regiments of the Indian cavalry, the position of which is known to me, there are only six officers including the commander, the adjutant and four junior officers.¹⁰⁸

Under such conditions the native officers have to bear a heavy responsibility in the organisation and in training the new recruits. Till now there was not the least sign of discontentment. So to me a serious and major mutiny seems to be utterly impossible.

In spite of this the government is not speaking the whole truth, while assuring that "all is quiet in India". At the present moment, more than two hundred conspirators are being tried at Multan and Lahore.¹⁰⁹ These are being tried by special courts appointed by the newly introduced "Defence of India Act" of which I have already reported. It has been found out that there existed an

extensive conspiracy aimed at the native soldiers urging them to rise in rebellion and hand over the arms and ammunitions to the conspirators. They have been trying to collect money for buying arms by plundering institutions and the treasury. Their programme of the conspiracy also included the murder of police officials and all European servicemen as well as the replacement of the British government by the natives, derailments of trains, destruction of railway bridge, murder of British soldiers. In other words, something like the 1857 mutiny is envisaged. The mutiny should have started, according to the plan of the conspirators, simultaneously at Lahore, Ferozepur, Meerut and other army camps.¹¹⁰ This conspiracy was hatched in America by the same immigrants about whom I reported more than once to Your Excellency. One of the most active members of this band is perhaps the same native who headed the Delhi Conspiracy and who could not be still apprehended by the police.¹¹¹ Counteracting the conspiracy, the police as well as chiefs of several military units planned their moves, acted carefully and often risked their lives. After several weeks of persistent labour all the threads of the conspiracy were in their hands. The propaganda for an armed rebellion did not have much success in the native armies. Bombs were found out in several regiments, but in each case one of the soldiers, initiated into the conspiracy, betrayed his comrades and became police informers. The soldiers who had succumbed to the exhortations of the conspirators were placed under court martial. In one regiment four of them were hanged some days ago. The Press is silent about other cases for the time being but I know from private sources that several hangings took place as directed by the court martial.¹¹²

At last, the government has understood that only the strictest punitive measures against the conspirators under trial can stop the revolutionary movement. It has succeeded, though sporadically, in the Punjab and part of the

United Provinces. There is no doubt *that at Multan and Lahore all the leaders would be sentenced to death. Only these two provinces of the north appeared to have been affected by the revolutionary propaganda.* There are no alarming signs in the rest of India.

There is no "general insurrection" in India in spite of the predictions and desires of the Germans and there is no serious threat to the British domination. It is beyond doubt that *the local administration has to keep a sharp eye and ear to detect and assess the mood of the native population.* This does not concern the central government which usually retires for summer to the Himalayas at a distance from the centres of possible commotions.

With the deepest regards and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant,
Sd/- Nabokov

Personal

SIMLA DATED 29 JUNE (12 JULY), 1915

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich !

From the beginning of March till mid-July I had no opportunity of sending the bag in view of the absence of a Russian ship. The knowledge that the reports being sent now would reach Your Excellency after two months and may be even later increases the difficulty of my work. This is an abnormal situation and, by necessity, I should restrict myself to those phenomena which are not transitory in character and are capable of having lasting influence on the internal life of the country. I hope, therefore, that Your Excellency would not accuse me for sending limited

number of reports this year in comparison with the preceding three years of my service in India. Moreover, now I am slowly recovering from typhoid which confined me to bed for about six weeks.

Allow me now, Your Excellency, to request you to permit me to go on leave in November approximately a month or two after the return of the viceroy and the government from Simla to Delhi. As I had the honour to report, Lord Hardinge agreed to my stay at Delhi last winter as an exceptional case made under the special circumstances of the war. He emphasised the desirability of my stay at Delhi as "a representative of Russia, with whom he can have confidential dealings",¹¹³ but without giving my stay the significance of a precedence. If in the next few months there is no serious complication at the north-western border of India, if *Afghanistan remains indifferent to the fall of Constantinople*, my contact with the viceroy and the Indian government on political questions would lose its importance. Under such conditions my departure from India, handing over the charges of the consulate-general to the acting vice-consul Lisovskii at Calcutta in winter would become possible and I dare hope that Your Excellency will not refuse me the necessary permission. By that time Lisovskii will be able to cope with the situation. His remarkable adaptability and exceptional capacity for work would serve as a guarantee for this.

With the deepest respect and perfect loyalty I have honour to be, Sir,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant,
Sd/- Nabokov

REPORT OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN INDIA

DATED 30 JUNE/13 JULY, 1915, NO. 5

The announcement of the decision of Lord Hardinge some days ago to extend his term as viceroy till the end of

March in accordance with the wishes of the London Cabinet came here as a surprise. Already 3 to 4 months ago signatures to a collective petition for extending the term of viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge were being collected among the native intellectuals in several provinces of India.¹¹⁴ At various gatherings resolutions were passed expressing the same desire and soliciting the attention of the king. In certain cases, where Lord Hardinge answered these petitions, he invariably confirmed his desire to leave India in November. He communicated the same more than once to the members of the government and to persons close to him. At our last meet at Delhi before his departure for Simla he gave me to understand that he wants to participate in the framing of the terms of peace, which ought to be dictated by us to Germany and her allies. In this connection, he remarked that his tenures of office at Constantinople, Persia and India gave him the right to think that during the discussions on the fate of Turkey his advice might be useful to his government.¹¹⁵

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the post of viceroy is at present a burden for him. During the last year he suffered two heavy shocks—he lost his wife and the beloved eldest son. Therefore, his desire to part with the surroundings that remind him every minute of the mental sufferings he went through is quite natural.

I am, therefore, persuaded to conclude that the London government had very serious grounds for insisting on keeping at the post of viceroy a person whose five-year experience would be a guarantee for successful regulation of the internal and foreign policies of India during the difficult period as yet to come.

I had already the opportunity to report that the present war did not cause quakes in India. The only phenomenon, causing the government serious worry, is *the ferment in the Punjab*. How persistent was this ferment and how strong

was its organisation is evident from the fact that till now out of the 4044 persons tried in various towns and localities of Punjab about 500 are already found guilty, about 2500 are acquitted and the trial of others is still not over. At Rawalpindi, one of the largest centres of the Indian army a real panic reigned for several days among the European civilians and this panic was not completely baseless. A mutiny was organised in the native armies and it was stopped only thanks to the exceptionally energetic police activity and good management by the army chief. Now that the threat is over, the instigators of the rebellions would be caught and an end would be put to their propaganda.¹¹⁶ The governor of the Punjab is as usual at Simla for the summer stay. If calm did not prevail in the province entrusted to him and if it was threatened by new turmoil he would have hardly remained at the Indian Olympus. There is complete peace and tranquility in other provinces which are only occasionally disturbed.

Thus, recently in the small town of Jhansi in the United Provinces two native Muslim soldiers killed three officers of their regiment and wounded one along with two soldiers of the artillery. The murderers were shot during the pursuit. This incident is hushed up in the official circles or ascribed to sudden frenzy of fanaticism. The Press is silent over the success of the propaganda in the army.¹¹⁷

The main interest at the present moment in India, as always, centres round the prospect of sufficient rainfall for the coming crops. This is actually an important talking point. If millions of Indian peasants are able to harvest the grain the task of the government would be considerably eased. On the other hand, if India is visited by the disaster of a crop failure, it is difficult to predict the catastrophic consequences it would bring with it.

Only scanty news on the slowly advancing operations at the Dardanelles trickles through the local press leaving perhaps the Muslim population of India indifferent.

No alarming signs are visible on the *north-western border*. Rumours spread from time to time about a fresh and imminent raid by Mohmand or Mashuds, but for about three months these savages are sitting quietly. I know from private sources that the local military as well as civil administration do not foresee any extraordinary difficulty. This year the situation is strangely quiet in this "hornet's nest" *which is eternally in turmoil*. It would be, however, dangerous to predict anything with certainty as both the neutral belt as well as *Afghanistan are still unknown regions for the British*.¹¹⁸

Hence, Your Excellency, allow me to state that there are no special circumstances for considering the replacement of the viceroy in November as untimely. Yes, there were efforts to organise a mutiny and there were serious disturbances in Punjab, but all these phenomena are local and they were investigated into and suppressed by the local administration. The personality of the viceroy does not matter here.

So I think the term of viceroyalty has been extended for Lord Hardinge to give him the opportunity to conduct the legislative session. In my report, dated 24 March (6 April), I attempted to characterise the legislative council of the viceroy. It is clear from these characteristics, what difficulties the new viceroy would have to face while presiding over this council. *Undoubtedly, the claims of the Indians for equal rights and participation in the administration on equal terms with the British would be growing with every month of the war in which the native soldiers are fighting on three fronts*. Very extraordinary tact and stiffness would be needed to hold these claims within permissible limits.¹¹⁹ And if the present viceroy, an experienced diplomat and person spending four and a half years in India, can make such a major mistake as the speech in the legislative council on the veto of the House of Lords on the law introducing an Executive Council in the United Provinces, what more major and incorrigible blunders the

new viceroy would be risking after two months' stay in India. But coming to India by the end of March the new viceroy would be able at least to orient himself in the affairs of India before the brief and purely formal session of the legislative council in September. Though the complex questions of military administration are to be solved by the commander-in-chief, the authority and opinion of the viceroy will be relied upon in these matters as well. Thus, even on these matters an experienced person and not a novice would be needed. Lord Hardinge had insisted on the dispatch of the native soldiers to France and it is quite natural for the government to desire that he would be still in India when these soldiers would return.

The present war opened the eyes of the local businessmen to the danger of the successes achieved by the Germans in capturing a series of trade items in their hands. *It was suddenly discovered that one cannot take a single step in India without stumbling over 'made in Germany' products.* The government had to assume the task of liquidating the German firms and it proved to be colossal. The principle of short-term liquidations till the end of the war has been adopted. But already healthy voices are being heard in the press for full and final liberation of India from the German firms, bankers and goods, by encouraging trade with Britain and friendly powers.¹²⁰ I consider it my duty to say in connection with this newspaper agitation, undoubtedly supported by the British commercial circles, *that it would be extremely desirable on our part to send here at the end of the war specialists capable of studying the needs of the Indian market and recommending with authority to our government measures to develop exchange of goods between Russia and India.*

With the deepest respect etc.

Sd/- Nabokov

971 Vky. s. zh. Pers. Sr. — Az. Otd. No. 6

26 October, 1915

SIMLA DATED 22 AUGUST (4 SEPTEMBER), 1915

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich!

In the secret telegram dated 13/26 August I have briefly informed Your Excellency of the contents of the confidential communication received by me from the Indian secretary of external affairs *on the band of Turkish and German agitators who have penetrated into Afghanistan*.¹²¹ As soon as the government of India got the information that this band succeeded in crossing over to Afghanistan in spite of the vigilance on the Persia-Afghanistan border, the viceroy wrote to the Amir informing him about the composition of this detachment and the aims behind its movement. In this context, Lord Hardinge expressed the confidence that the Amir should prove in practice the sincerity of his repeated promise to maintain strict neutrality. In the same letter the viceroy gave to the Amir a review of the war events of the last months. He indicated that though Germany was waging an offensive war and the fact that its soldiers were fighting inside the enemy territories might create an illusive impression of the success of its campaign. But the powers of the tripartite agreement did not doubt for an instant that this success was very transient. The Amir has again been given to understand in a friendly manner that any attempt at hostile action against us would be fatal for Afghanistan.

The Amir replied that "armed detachments of foreigners have never been permitted to move about freely inside Afghanistan", and "that he is fully aware of the obligations put on him by his profession of neutrality." While the Amir was writing his reply positive information on the German band had not reached him through his own official

sources. But he solemnly promised that as soon as it would arrive, he would order to disarm and arrest all of them. The Amir added by hand a postscript to the official letter thanking Lord Hardinge for friendship and trust and again repeated the above-mentioned promise. The secretary of external affairs confidentially told me that London had advised them to influence the Amir and to force him to send the whole band to India. But the viceroy felt that such a step would be at variance with the general nature of the policy pursued by him with success till now towards the Amir and with the tone and conduct of the entire preceding correspondence. The more frequently the Amir is impressed that he is looked upon here as a monarch, whose word is believed, the surer his loyalty will be. Such is the stand of the viceroy and the secretary of external affairs and I think they are fully justified. At least, till now this diplomatic posture achieved its purpose. To what extent the propaganda of these agitators would succeed and whether they would be able to cause a stir in the regions bordering Persia and cash on the support of the population before they are arrested are some of the problems which cannot be predicted accurately.¹²²

However, there are grounds to expect that any further attempt to associate Afghanistan with the war would stop by itself when Constantinople falls.

Sporadic raids at the north-western border have been faced by the British with complete equanimity. The nomads are allowed to come down to the valley where they are shot at, but are not pursued in the mountains as the latter course would involve dangerous and somewhat superfluous risk. There are enough soldiers at the frontier and these conflicts, accompanied by insignificant damage are, in a way, favourable for the British as they help to maintain the spirit and discipline in the army.¹²³

The last raid, which I reported in the above-mentioned secret telegram, was repulsed almost without any loss. The

nomads left 20 dead men in the battleground. It is concluded here that the casualty was heavy resulting in severe panic. It is noted with satisfaction that for these fanatics the fact that the deceased were left behind without burial according to their religious rites meant that they were condemned to suffer eternal torment in the next world. In the present case, perhaps heavy firing from the British caused such demoralisation that the nomads ran in disarray and were forced to leave behind a substantial part of the casualty.

The government of India and the commander-in-chief of the Indian army would face difficult and complex tasks *at the end of the war*. The reproach of some English newspapers that the material resources of India have not as yet been drawn upon to ease the financial burden of the war borne by Britain is, of course, justified. *But the military help in the direct sense rendered by India is enormous and more substantial than the British themselves could have dreamt of*. The native soldiers were sent not only to France but also to Mesopotamia, Gallipoli, and Africa and it should be agreed that they acted more efficiently than was expected of them. In France, unprepared cavalry regiment lay in trenches one after another and I know from private letters from the front that the native soldiers withstood the heavy and unwonted tests quite steadily. In Mesopotamia, the British and native armies had to fight under truly terrible climatic conditions confronted as they were by a moist heat of over 40° C in the shade. Your Excellency knows about the successes of the British arms in this field from official accounts. The commander-in-chief told me that London is demanding from him fresh contingents every day, that he would have to send soldiers to Gallipoli, to Africa and to the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia and that the depleted military strength of India might pose an insurmountable problem after some time. At present, however, India can be rightly proud that it has done and is doing its share in the common task with honour.¹²⁴ This very fact would un-

doubtedly influence to a large extent the future structure of the Indian army after the war. In particular, it would be difficult for the British to tackle a series of problems in the inner order of the army in the years following the war. It would be hardly an exaggeration to say that nearly one-third of the officer rank in the native regiments (I have the European officers in mind) are already out of action, and towards the end of war, even half of them would not be there. In addition, a very large number of senior officers, serving in the units but not participating in the war, intend to retire at the first chance. *The problem of the replacement of the vacancies of officers would perhaps become very acute.* For promotion to the officer ranks in the native army the candidates should undergo more difficult tests than in the British army. Moreover, a basic knowledge of one or even two native languages is required from them. Hundreds of young men, leaving private services or independent trade or industrial institutions, joined the regiments of the native army as officers and they would return at the end of the war to their occupations. This is only one of the many difficulties which would have to be tackled in the future.¹²⁵ Perhaps I assigned too much importance to this question. But one is very closely placed with the realities of the situation and the future of India is largely conditioned by this problem.

The internal situation in India is satisfactory for the present. The major trial of the conspirators in the Punjab, mentioned by me in the preceding reports, is nearing an end. I was privately told that out of the total number of the sentenced probably about 50 persons are to be hanged. One of the main instigators, who is said as well to be the inspirer and the organiser of the attempt on the life of the Lord Hardinge in 1912, has not yet been traced, though a reward of something like 100,000 rupees has been promised for his capture. The British judge in the Lahore trial is evidently quite conscious that his judgement should be equally inspired by principles of justice and "internal security" and that it should produce a terrifying impression.¹²⁶

Though it is already the end of August, there has not been as yet sufficient rainfall in many large territories and local crop-failures are inescapable. The government is ready for it and timely measures would undoubtedly be taken to prevent a major disaster and the danger of disturbances connected with it. In this connection the Calcutta newspapers again raised the question, with intensified passion, about the irrelevance of further expenditure for building a new capital. However, I conclude from the conversations with engineers, engaged in constructing "Imperial Delhi" or rather in preparing the foundation for it, that the government of Lord Hardinge pays not the least attention to the agitation of the Bengal press.¹²⁷ If, however, the crop failure assumes this year alarming proportions, willy-nilly the works will have to be temporarily suspended as there will not be free money for it in the treasury.

I consider it my duty to point out that the successes of Russian arms are met in official circles and in the English press of India with a feeling of most animated delight. And, it seems that, at present, only a very insignificant minority of Englishmen, including the officialdom, are maintaining their earlier mood of mistrust and unfriendliness towards Russia. It would depend on us to utilise this favourable mood for developing our trade relations with India in future.

With the deepest respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Nabokov

No. 125 Vkh. t. zh. Sr. Az. St. 29

3rd Political Section
5 September, 1975

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE CONSUL-GENERAL
IN INDIA

DATED 5 SEPTEMBER, 1915

The viceroy personally asked me to inform you that yesterday he received a letter from the Amir of Afghanistan about *the German gang being caught at Herat* and sent to Kabul under guard. There they would be held answerable to the *Durbar* for having crossed into the Afghan territory.¹²⁸

The essence of the letter lies in the Amir's guarantee that the attempt of German propaganda for Jihad in Afghanistan is bound to fail. On the advice of Hardinge, King George would write a letter in his own hand to the Amir expressing his gratitude for the well-intentioned neutrality and this letter would *undoubtedly* create the expected impression.¹²⁹

Sd/- Nabokov

London, 27 December, 1915/
9 January, 1916

Sir,

Court Aleksandr Konstantinovich!

Though more than a month has elapsed since I left Delhi, news reaching England from India does not indicate any significant change or any striking event in that country. I think it is time that one should review briefly the internal situation in India. It will also be in-

structive to assess the effect of the war on the affairs of India and to examine the responses of the government of Lord Hardinge towards the massive participation of the Indian empire in fighting Germany and its allies.

In the few reports I could send to Petrograd by a circuitous path through Siberia during the last year, I covered the serious ferment in Punjab. After the application of the Defence of India Act (owing to the insistence of the talented and energetic governor of this province, Sir Michael O'Dwyer), all the threads of the major anti-governmental *conspiracy* were discovered and its leaders apprehended. So it may be taken for granted that the direct menace of sedition, outrages and anarchy has been routed.^{1:0}

Just before my departure the viceroy, however, caused some confusion in popular imagination with regard to the outcome of the trial of the conspirators in wide sections of the population. He utilised his right to grant amnesty and repealed the death sentence approved by the governor in respect of sixteen persons including their foremost leaders and exiled them to the Andaman Islands. As I gathered from conversations with a number of the Punjab civilians, this measure was met with open censure in official circles. I know that Sir Michael O'Dwyer agreed to remain at his post only owing to the emergency conditions of wartime. Lord Hardinge is not much popular among the British officials in India, who blame him for his misplaced leniency towards the natives. In the present case, one must regretfully agree that the sharp criticism of his policy is correct, because it is beyond doubt that the softening of the punishment to persons accused of the gravest crime against the state would be interpreted by the natives as a sign of weakness. I think, however, that he did not take this step without serious grounds for it. His action was opposed by one of his best colleagues, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, and the entire civil service of the Punjab, but the future can only show whether he was right. Throughout the rest of India

internal peace is undisturbed and this should be definitely ascribed to the merit of the enlightened and farsighted viceroy.¹³¹

In the recent annual gathering of the Muslem League, in the press, in the resolutions etc. *one hears the same note with ever-increasing clarity: after the war the natives have to be given a wider share in the government of the country.* It appears that the Indian intelligentsia has been seeking some form of freedom from the tutelage of London. *In principle*, Lord Hardinge agrees with this and here lies the basis of his difference of opinion with a vast majority of his subordinate administrators.¹³²

At the recent farewell luncheon, given to him at Simia in the United Service Club, the members of which are all bureaucrats, the viceroy delivered a "programmatic" political speech, where he expressed quite definitely this very guiding principle of the future internal policy—more access be given to the natives for administration of the country.

The British started this process before the viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge. They had permitted the natives in large numbers to go to Europe for education. The legislative councils have been instituted with nominated native members participating in the debates. Thus, they have given an impetus to the movement which cannot be stopped now. To retrace is still less possible. How to reconcile the dominant tendency of arbitrary rule, which is still very strong amongst the British officialdom, with the new principle of equality is a matter reserved for discussion by the future generation. It is too complicated to be discussed in detail within the framework of the present review.¹³³

The contribution of the soldiers, both British and natives, in the present war surpassed all expectations. The plan of gradual and partial replacement of the soldiers sent to France, Egypt, Mesopotamia and East Africa by

the territorial army from Britain has been worked out successfully.

Thanks to my intimate relations with the representatives of all ranks of the army, starting from generals to junior officers, I *personally* know how much is assiduously hidden from the press and wide circles of the population. However, it is beyond doubt that *the agitation in the Punjab infected the native soldiers as well.*

The military administration, however, took vigorous measures and stopped all attempts at mutiny at the very start. The majority of the regiments, which showed signs of rebellion, were sent immediately to the front and it helped in raising their spirits, thus finally snapping the influence of the emissaries from the Punjab. The present commander-in-chief in India had to face a stupendous task in removing more than 200,000 soldiers from India and at the same time guaranteeing internal security. Among the officers left behind in India a strain of discontentment was noticeable as there is no British officer who would not have liked to opt for an operational army. General Sir Beecham Duff had to disappoint many of them and it cannot be said that he was particularly popular. However, in general, it should be agreed that he carried out his business quite successfully.^{1,24}

The foreign policy of the Indian government consisted this year in preserving friendly relations with the Afghan Amir and repulsing the raids of nomad tribes at the north-western border. From April to October there were several raids by the nomads who were at times 10,000 in number. The British force stationed at various points on the frontier was prepared and repulsed the attacks of the ill-armed tribes without much ado and with insignificant losses. So far as Afghanistan is concerned, in spite of the alarming rumours reaching Petrograd from Bukhara, the peaceful and friendly relation with the Amir is not yet disturbed and this is largely due to the merit of the vice-

roy. His statesmanship is not quite recognised here.¹³⁵ The Indian government was no less disturbed than us by the appearance in Afghanistan of two distinct bands of agitators led by the Germans in favour of the holy war. Before my departure the Indian government had been convinced that German adventurism in Afghanistan had ended in a fiasco.

It may be noted, however, that any prediction with regard to tribal depredation is quite dangerous. In spite of their knowledge of the events and politics of Kabul the British government does not rule out possible inroads. Anyway, during the eighteen months of war, the neighbourhood of Afghanistan did not cause any serious concern either for us or the British. This is largely due to the wise policy of the viceroy.¹³⁶

Lord Hardinge repeatedly expressed the hope that the convention and the consequent unity between the two powers would be much stronger after the war. He believes that the fate of the East is in the hands of Russia and Britain who should work out an agreement for the successful accomplishment of our mission and should not leave any scope for differences of opinion. By the way, he indicated several times the desirability of appointing a Russian consul-general to India, who can utilise the present favourable situation for preserving and strengthening the friendly and frank relations established between the two governments.¹³⁷

With the deepest respect and loyalty I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Nabokov

No. 6 Vikh. t. Zh. sr. Az. 20.

3rd Political Section

18 January, 1916

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DELHI DATED 19 JANUARY/1 FEBRUARY, 1916

To

His Excellency V. O. Fon-Klemm.

Sir

Vasilii Oskarovich!

As a supplement to my secret telegram dated 16/29 January last I have the honour to furnish Your Excellency with the information I received from the secretary of external affairs at Delhi.

Considering the present situation in Afghanistan satisfactory in the context of any possible upsurge against the allies, the secretary of external affairs emphasised the special goodwill of the Amir who has himself been making all efforts to prevent any hostile action against Russia and Britain. The Amir has been fairly successful in this but not without difficulties, especially if we take into consideration the presence of German-Turkish emissaries in Afghanistan, who are trying to drag him into a military operation against the allies. It is evident that the activities of the Amir and his endeavours to cultivate friendly relations with Russia and Britain, are arousing hostility from the foreign agents, who, as a result, have been working for the humiliation of the Amir in the eyes of the local people.

From the conversation with the secretary of external affairs I gathered the impression that the Indian government is somewhat worried about the security of the Amir on whose life attempts may be made by the most fanatic elements of the population. The Indian government has full trust in the neutrality of Afghanistan under the pre-

sent Amir. But Mr Grant did not express the same confidence in case the Amir is dethroned in any manner. It would be difficult in such a contingency to predict the turn of foreign policy of Afghanistan.¹³⁸

It can be concluded from all this that German propaganda in Afghanistan is being conducted freely and the Amir has not enough determination to terminate the presence of the Germans and Turks on his territory. On the other hand, the Indian government does not want to deal with the Amir more firmly apprehensive as it is of the possible repercussions in India itself. They are reluctant to demand categorically from the Amir the expulsion of the German emissaries from Afghanistan. According to available information the home government was in favour of such a move some months ago but Lord Hardinge did not agree with the instructions and he restricted his course of action merely to giving friendly counsels to the Amir and treating him as a fully independent and self-reliant ruler of Afghanistan.¹³⁹

Lord Hardinge and the Indian government have sufficient grounds to act so carefully as it can be confidently said that in case of open military actions against Afghanistan the Muslim population would not remain quiet and India would be threatened by an internal crisis. The government does not possess enough British soldiers to face that crisis.

The Persian consul-general, Daud Khan Miftahus-Saltane, an inveterate Anglo-phobe, repeatedly told me here about this. Pointing out the absence of the necessary organisation among the Muslims of India, Daud Khan clearly suggested that in case of the action in Afghanistan the Indian Muslims would hardly limit themselves only to the platonic expressions of sympathy towards their co-religionist in Afghanistan. I am quoting the opinion of the Persian consul-general to Your Excellency because this man is definitely talented and has acquired a wide familiar-

ity with the Indian Muslims during his prolonged stay in India.¹⁴⁰ For the time being, however, no ferment is noted among the Indian Muslims. According to available information no Muslim name is encountered among the undertrials in a number of political cases.

The people here and in Afghanistan are sobered by news of and reports on the situation on the north-western frontier, where the British have been suppressing in a most determined manner the attempts of nomads to cross the border and disturb peace. The vigorous actions of the British soldiers at the frontier have inflicted a shocking blow to the nomads about four months back and it has resulted in ensuring complete calm. Nothing is now heard about new attempts or raids by the nomads.¹⁴¹

The Indian government was worried that *the news of the failures of the British army at Gallipoli and Mesopotamia might encourage Afghanistan and the Indian Muslims*,¹⁴² but these worries have not materialised till now. But the news of our routing the Turks on the Caucasian front have created a strong impression and it should be thought that the Amir is refraining from actions hostile to the allies, not so much from some feelings of friendships as from the fear of being crushed from the side of Turkistan.¹⁴³

It should be hoped that our determined actions in Persia will serve as a demonstrative lesson to the Amir and will cool the militant ardour of the protagonists of action against Russia and England.¹⁴⁴

With the deep regards and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Lisovskii

No. 325. Vkh. s. zh. Pers.—Sr.-Az-Otd.

* No. 2

22 March, 1916

CALCUTTA DATED 26 JANUARY (8 FEBRUARY), 1916

To

His Excellency V. O. Fon-Klemm.

Sir,

Vasilii Oskarovich !

The most important event in India during the last month was *the appointment as the new viceroy of Lord Chelmsford*, the former governor-general of Australia.

This appointment was a complete surprise for all. Even during Lord Chelmsford's stay at Calcutta for Christmas and later at Delhi nobody including the persons closest to the viceroy knew anything of his imminent appointment. The news was officially published only on 16 January when Lord Chelmsford boarded the ship at Bombay for England.

The news of this appointment was greeted with great satisfaction by the British Society and the Anglo-Indian Press. Most of the papers hope, on the basis of the former administrative experience of the new viceroy, that India has at last found a man under which the country would progress with a healthy policy and in accordance with the basic interests of Great Britain. Greeting the appointment of Lord Chelmsford, *the Anglo-Indian Press* particularly at Calcutta, *has been celebrating with a rare malicious joy the departure of Lord Hardinge as if his policy was extremely dangerous for India.*

One should be astonished at the lack of restraint and

modesty, so unusual for the English Press, with which the attacks are launched on Lord Hardinge, who did so much for India and endured here a series of personal loss and mental agony. At present, all the merits of Lord Hardinge in initiating a number of cultural activities in India are forgotten. Along with it all the difficulties of administering the country under such extra-ordinary circumstances are also ignored.¹⁴⁵

Calcutta, the centre of industry and trade in India, with its large British population cannot forgive Lord Hardinge for the transfer of the capital to Delhi. The European population considers this measure a disaster for India. Its government, they maintained, tore itself away from the essential healthy interests of the country by its stay at Delhi and doomed itself in perpetual stagnation instead. Besides, there was a huge expenditure involved in the transfer of the capital.¹⁴⁶

In the opinion of British social circles, the second defect in Lord Hardinge's policy lies in his search for popularity among the natives. It is maintained that he totally succumbed to the influence of a set of flattering natives who guided the policy of the viceroy exclusively to further the interests of their fellow-men and to play down those of the British.¹⁴⁷

But the main mistake of Lord Hardinge, which helped to make him unpopular among the British was an apparently insignificant event. The viceregal orchestra was headed by a German conductor Buchner, whom Lord Hardinge was reluctant to remove after the war with Germany started. Quite a storm of indignation was let loose among the British society. Some social and welfare organisations collected protest signatures; Englishmen demonstratively avoided visits to viceregal receptions; there were cases of insolent replies to invitations; some members of The United Service Club at Simla openly proposed not to give the traditional farewell luncheon to the viceroy and

the matter even went as far as almost to lead to a question in the House of Commons. In short, a scandal was the outcome and it helped in making Lord Hardinge unpopular more than any administrative failure or comparatively more important political issue.¹⁴⁸

In his attitude to the Imperial Consulate General Lord Hardinge showed a rare courtesy and attention and so from the point of view of our interests his departure should be regretted.

It should be hoped that time will calm down the passions and the British public opinion will evaluate his activities on a worthy plane after recalling many contributions of Lord Hardinge, as in the case of Lord Curzon who had been hated by the British during his viceroyalty but whom they remember now with a feeling of great respect and thankfulness.

With deep respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Your Eycellency's
Most Obedient Servant
Sd/- Lisovskii

No. 46 Iskh. t. zh. Sr. Az. Ot. 15.

3rd Political Section
28 March, 1916

No. 405

FROM THE HEAD OF THE THIRD POLITICAL SECTION
TO THE HEAD OF THE CONSULATE-GENERAL IN INDIA.

PETROGRAD, DATED 28 MARCH 1916. NO. 1458.

(Coded telegram)

2 Indians, carrying a letter from the Raja of Hathras¹⁴⁹

in the United Provinces, who arrived at Kabul with the Germans, reached Tashkent from Kabul.

Raja, securing promise of cooperation from the Germans and the Turks, considers the moment favourable for realising the dream of the Indian nationalists and seeks Russian assistance against England. There are grounds to believe that the *Afghans sympathise with the action against India*, if not the Amir himself. The messengers handed over a letter in the name of the emperor as well and its content is still unknown.

You may report to the Indian Government (No. 3).

Sd/- Klemm.

No. 71 Vkh. m. zh. Sr. Az. st. 15.

3rd Political Section
2 April, 1916
432

SECRET TELEGRAM OF THE HEAD OF THE CONSULATE-GENERAL
IN INDIA

SIMLA DATED 1 APRIL, 1916

The telegram No. 1458 has been received.

The report created the most favourable impression on the Indian government which received from the Ambassador at Petrograd the information *on the arrival of the Indians in Tashkent*, but did not know the content of the letter and were perhaps much worried on this score. The secretary of external affairs assures categorically that the Amir himself is not involved but the participation of the Afghan supporters is beyond doubt. According to the

available private information of confidential nature, *the Amir is wholly on the side of the British; the annual subsidy to him is considerably increased and perhaps further addition has been promised on condition that his neutrality will be maintained.*

The capture of Erzeraum created here a grand impression and grander still in Afghanistan; according to the available information, it is paralysing the activities of the German emissaries.

On receiving the information on the *Raja of Hathras* within some days, as promised by the secretary of external affairs, I shall report again.

Sd/- Lisovskii

No. 595. Vkh. s. zh. Prs.—Sr. Az. Otd. No. 3.

12 June, 1916.

SIMLA DATED 28 APRIL/11 MAY, 1916

To

His Excellency V. O. Fon-Klemm.

Sir,

Vasilii Oskarovich!

I have the honour to report in time to Your Excellency telegraphically on all the information I could receive on the situation in Afghanistan. The Indian government is optimistic enough as before and hopes to hold the Afghan Amir back from any hostile action against Russia and England.

Worried by the arrival of German-Turkish emissaries in Afghanistan, the government here has been trying to discredit them by all means in the eyes of the Amir and so it misses no opportunity to point out to him the dangers of any further deals with the Germans. The information, received by the government from us and the British consuls in Persia, about the intention of the German-Turkish agitators to kill the Amir and stage a coup in Afghanistan if there is further delay in acting against Russia and England, are forwarded to the Amir with the necessary comments by the foreign department here.

The Indian government simultaneously took more active steps to restrain the Amir from hostile actions and to attract him to its own side. According to the available information of very confidential nature the annual subsidy to the Amir, paid by the Indian government, has been substantially increased and further addition has been promised if he maintains his neutrality.¹⁵⁰ The same information was received by me through a third person from the Afghan agent staying at Simla, whose duties consist of trips to Afghanistan from time to time for handing over the contributions paid by the Indian government to him.

It is quite evident that the Indian government is assiduously hiding this fact owing to an apprehension that it would compromise the Amir before the Afghan population as well as destroy the faith of the Indian natives in the military might of Britain. Owing to the secretive attitude of the local government to this question I decided not to verify this fact by directly asking the secretary of external affairs. This is the main reason why the Indian government is so confident about the neutrality of Afghanistan so long as the present Amir, who is materially interested in maintaining peace, is at the helm.

It may be believed that the news of the capture of Erzerum and Trebezond by Russian soldiers are to a large extent holding back the Amir himself as well as the

militant party in Afghanistan from activities hostile to us. At least in India this news created a grand impression not only on the native population but also in British circles. This impression has been more satisfying for Russia especially in view of the unsuccessful operations of the British at the Dardanelles and later, the surrender of the British detachment at Qut-ul-Amara, which dispirited India.¹⁵¹

Under such circumstances, I think, that the claim that *Afghanistan is afraid of the British may be ruled out as it did not pay adequate attention to the demands of the latter. If one is asked to speak about Afghanistan's fear, one must turn towards Turkestan.*

From a series of talks with Mr Grant, secretary of external affairs and some persons in the headquarters of India I gathered the impression that the Indian government is trying by all means to dispel the possibility of a conflict with Afghanistan primarily due to its *unwillingness to allow Russia to resolve the Afghan question* which would be unavoidable if the neutrality is disturbed by Afghanistan. Apparently it is, as before, one of the main tasks of India's foreign policy.

*Keeping in mind this circumstance, I think the optimistic declarations and denials of the government here on the informations obtained by our frontier administration from Afghanistan ought to be viewed with care though it should be noted that till now facts justify the optimism of the Indian government.*¹⁵²

The extent to which the latter still look at any interference by us in the affairs of Afghanistan with jealousy and suspicion is revealed by the nervousness shown by the local foreign department when it received the news about the arrival of two messengers in Turkestan with letters from the "Raja of Hathras". Informations on this were received at Simla from the British ambassador in Petro-

grad some days before my receiving the secret telegram from Your Excellency dated 28 March, No. 1458. Our open declaration on the appearance of the messengers at Tashkent and letters carried by them, the contents of which were not known to the government here, created a wonderful impression and set at rest the excess of unrest at Simla.

The government of India was not less alarmed by the suspicion of Your Excellency that one of the messengers at Tashkent is Mirza Mohammed Ali Khan, the son of Khosdil Khan, serving as the head of Amir's office. This was quite understandable, as the appearance of such a senior official as a messenger would have meant that the dispatch of the letters would not have taken place without the knowledge and participation of the Amir and his government.

I reported to Your Excellency in time that the secretary of external affairs had denied the participation of the Amir himself in this dispatch but agreed that the Afghan supporters of action against Russia and England were definitely involved in this affair.

Taking into account of the fact that the Indian government has, of course, the possibility of being well-informed about the situation in Afghanistan and that it is quite confident of the loyalty of the Amir himself on the above-mentioned grounds, we must, all the same, be ready, I think, for all kinds of surprises. The fact of the continued stay of German-Turkish emissaries and their unfettered propaganda within Afghanistan remains. Besides, the Amir, not being able to expel them from his territory, may not also be in a position to restrain his subjects from an armed move against Russia and British India.^{152a}

With deep respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant
Sd/- Lisovski

No. 69 Iskh. t. zh. Sr.-Az. St. 320.

3rd Political Section

29 April, 1916

405

FROM THE HEAD OF THE THIRD POLITICAL SECTION
TO THE HEAD OF THE CONSULATE-GENERAL IN INDIA

PETROGRAD DATED 29 APRIL, 1916, NO. 1990

(Coded Telegram)

Informations received from the messengers from Kabul :

The Germans and the Austrian captives who ran away from Russia arrived in large numbers in Afghanistan. The attitude of the Amir, soldiers and the people towards them is good and that of the men of religion is somewhat mistrustful. The Amir is not so much desirous for the war as his brother. The world of the Afghans is hostile, as it were, only to the British and the firman, seen by the messengers, talks only about the war with the latter. The armament factories of Kabul are operating under the guidance of the Germans, who are again the instructors in the armies and guides in the fortifications. Kabul possibly has a radio-telegraph. Import of arms through Persia has stopped.

Copy to M. Shed.

Sd/- Klemm

596. Vkh. s. zh. Pets. — Sr. — Az. Otd. N. 4.

12 June, 1916

SIMLA DATED 29 APRIL (12 MAY), 1916

To

His Excellency V. O. Fon-Klemm.

Sir,

Vasilii Oskarovich!

As I had the honour to report to Your Excellency by the secret telegram dated 23 April, the secretary of external affairs asked me if it is possible for the imperial ministry of external affairs to inform the foreign department more often through the Imperial Consulate-General on all events and intelligence which may be of concern to the Indian government.

Not to speak of the utility of such intelligence in the form of common advantage and coordinated actions the receipt of information by the consulate-general would make it possible to enter into a closer relationship with the authorities in India and give our representatives a more significant and definite position in this country.

Even now, it can be said with confidence that the position of the consulate general is far better than what it had been four to five years ago when the Indian government persistently refused to enter into any negotiation of a political nature with it thus sticking only to the questions of routine consular practice. It may be noted with a feeling of great satisfaction that the Imperial Consulate-General occupies at present a distinct position among the consular organisations of other powers and enjoys the exclusive attention of the government here. This attention is reflected in a number of small matters which are nevertheless typical.^{152b}

On questions of consular practice, when any affair goes up to the central government, the consulate-general has as yet not received any refusal and all his requests are granted with unusual speed.

On questions of a political nature—on the situation in Afghanistan, Mesopotamia and even in India itself—the government of India does not think it necessary to avoid any frank discussion with the consulate-general and inform the latter without any reserve and without pointing out that these questions are purely diplomatic. The consulate-general owes much to the former consul-general, Nabokov, for such a position. Of course, the present events also helped in bringing about such a happy change in the views of the Indian government on our representatives in India.

There is no doubt that on his arrival at Delhi the new consul-general would not face much difficulty in staying at Delhi. At Calcutta, where with one regular assistant and a non-staff vice-consul, the presence of the consul-general himself has become completely superfluous. Of course, it is very difficult to hope that the Indian government would recognise his stay in Delhi as the consul-generals of other powers would request similar favour and it would violate the principle laid down in Britain of retaining foreign consuls only at the port towns. However, it may be hoped that the semi-official stay of the Imperial Consul-General at Delhi does not change the essence of the matter to any extent and does not interfere with the consolidation of the position of the Russian consulate-general in India.

No. 92. Wkh. m. zh. Sr. Az. st. 15.

3rd Political Section

2 May, 1916

405

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE DIPLOMATIC OFFICER
TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF TURKESTAN

DATED 1 MAY, 1916, NO. 486

Yesterday, before the departure of the messengers from Kabul I was able to have an open-hearted conversation with them. Without repeating the well-known accusations against British policy in India and Afghanistan, I am putting down the essence of their declarations. The present political situation has furnished an exceptional opportunity for overthrowing the British yoke in India. The ground is quite ready for the fight and all necessary means are available. Coordinated action of Afghanistan, smarting under the British oppression and incapable of looking indifferently on the holy war of Islam, is already guaranteed. *It is necessary to know if Russia would remain neutral in this struggle*, but, we are reminded, even our hostility would not be able to stop this irrevocable war of liberation.

I pointed out the obligations of our alliances and the hopelessness of the final triumph of our enemies. The Indians said that the success of their struggle, particularly against a weakened Great Britain in India, is beyond doubt. I remarked that Britain was endowed with sufficient forces in India for suppressing such a revolt and moreover, could receive prompt support from Japan, if necessary. The last remark was met with distrust. In conclusion, they asked if they would be permit-

ted to go through Siberia in pursuance of their mission to Japan. To this an evasive answer was given.

The lack of a reply from the governor-general seemingly upset the messengers, who undoubtedly went away with a sense of frustration.

The Indians talked with a great deal of enthusiasm, conviction and an evident sincerity.

I am reporting the above-mentioned as entrusted by the governor-general.

Copy to the Asiatic sections of Headquarters.

Sd/- Chirkin

No. 120. Vkh. t. zh. Sr.—Az. st. 15. Copy

3rd Political Section

13 June, 1916

405

SIMLA DATED 11/24 JULY, 1916

To

His Excellency V. O. Fon-Klemm.

Sir,

Vasilii Oskarovich !

As I had the honour to report to Your Excellency by my secret telegram dated 8/21 July the Indian government considers the present situation in Afghanistan quite satisfactory. Despite the influence of the tempting circumstances the Amir, it seems, could restrain his subjects from all aggressive moves in defence of Islam. The efforts

of German emissaries to create difficulties for us and the British from Afghanistan should be considered a failure as their position in that country is worsening day by day. It seems that their prolonged agitational activity without any concrete results bored the people, assumed the character of tall talks, and failed to act on the fervent fantasy of the emotional Asiatics. Partly due to this and partly due to the improved political and military position of the Amir, the German-Austrian-Turkish emissaries, hostile to us, started leaving Kabul. They seem to have left the capital of Afghanistan in full strength with the intention of going back to Persia. However, this information given to me by the secretary of external affairs, was found to be somewhat exaggerated, as according to private intelligence attained from the Afghan agent at Simla one German and one Turkish officer with several junior staff are still staying in Kabul. In his opinion, however, the position of the persons staying back is far from enviable and they are kept in Kabul rather as hostages under the strict vigilance of the guards posted by the Amir.

By the way, the Indian government took a number of significant steps to ensure the external security of their Indian territories after being alarmed by the surrender of the British detachment at Qut-ul-Amara, which undoubtedly hit the prestige of the British among the Indian Muslims.

Several detachments in full combat readiness were drawn to the north-western frontier to strengthen the garrisons at Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, etc. Most of the officers, remaining in various organisations of the war department at Simla, were sent back to the regiments and they were replaced partly by old officers, who have ended their term in India and yet kept back in service, and partly by volunteers. The generosity with which the officers in active service at the frontier were being granted leave in earlier years is hardly noticeable now.^{182c}

Regarding the Amir the government here is continuing its earlier policy: while dealing with him as an independent ruler of Afghanistan and showing him all possible signs of attention, the Indian government considers it necessary to support him materially as well. According to information obtained by me from a private but quite reliable source, secret negotiations are going on at present in Simla between Mr Grant, secretary of external affairs, and the agent of the Afghan Amir on a further increase of the annual pension to the latter from 18 lakhs (1,800,000) rupees to 24 lakhs. The Indian government has set to the Amir only one condition for such an increase: that all German agitators have to be expelled from Afghanistan.¹⁵³

Recently, a curious event was noted here which was related to me by a colonel from the general headquarters. Lord Chelmsford, who is carrying on a lively correspondence with the Amir informed the latter that His Majesty the king has sent a letter, in which he has asked to give his sincere thanks to the Amir for his goodwill towards Britain. On receiving the viceregal letter the Amir sent a express courier to Simla with a request to give him the original message, so flattering for him, from His Majesty. As actually there was no such letter, the viceroy was put in a awkward position and sent an express telegram to London seeking such a letter from the king. Until the arrival of the letter, the courier of the Amir was kept back at Simla as an honourable guest.

In the opinion of the Indian government, the peace efforts of the Amir have ensured an atmosphere of tranquillity on the north-western frontier where the nomadic tribes are not disposed to organise hostile actions as happened last year.

The situation in Afghanistan and the favourable position adopted by the Amir towards Great Britain provide the Indian government with sufficient reasons to view the

political prospects in this country, optimistically. As a result, the government is inspired to look forward to a successful liquidation of German adventurism.

With deep respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Lisovskii

4 October, 1916

No. 939. Iskh. s. zh. Pers. — Az. Otd. No. 6.

SIMLA DATED 12/25 JULY, 1916

To

His Excellency V. O. Fon-Klemm.

Sir,

Vasilii Oskarovich!

The most interesting feature of the Indian syndrome is the rumour of an imminent departure of the commander-in-chief, Sir Beecham Duff, from India and the possible appointment in his place, of general Birdwood, an associate of Lord Kitchener during his Indian days and the commander of "Anzac" in Gallipoli in the present war.

The main reason behind the commander-in-chief's resignation is the events at Mesopotamia, which resulted in the surrender of the British detachment at Qut-ul-Amara. It should be noted that the British Press in India has been paying little attention to the discussion of this unfortunate incident and is rather inclined to interpret this surrender as a heroic feat of the British Army. However,

soon after this event, rumours about the blunders, failures and omissions of the department of commissariat with regard to the supply of medicines and foodstuff to the Mesopotamian detachment were given currency in British social circles in India. The wounded officers, who returned to India, are quite caustic about the strategic plan as well, which had been worked out under the main guidance of Sir Beecham Duff.¹⁵⁴

Much to the bitterness of the commander-in-chief about a month ago there occurred a lamentable episode affecting a territorial detachment coming from England. A part of the new arrivals, not in the least used to the local climatic conditions, was sent by a train from Karachi to Peshawar. Owing to the lack of organisation and failure of the local military administration the new arrivals, not equipped with ice, underwent unimaginable sufferings and, as a result, twelve persons died of sunstroke and about fifty others have been hospitalised in a serious condition.¹⁵⁵

This incident has aroused a burst of public indignation and the military administration is being seriously censored. Though an official investigation was immediately instituted to locate the true culprits, the public opinion has been accusing Sir Beecham Duff for his weakness of character and lack of organisational talent. It should be noted that the present commander is generally distinguished by his unsociability and is not popular among the Englishmen. More dispassionate persons, familiar with the military situation in India, assure that Sir Beecham Duff is quite fit and handled wonderfully the difficult task of sending soldiers to different war-theatres and that the surrender of the detachment in Mesopotamia was very little to do with him. Nevertheless, the retirement of Sir Beecham Duff has been decided upon and an official communication on this subject is expected in the near future.

The opening in September of the session of the legislative council, where the new viceroy would deliver a

speech, is awaited here with great impatience. This would be his first address of importance, as till now Lord Chelmsford has delivered only the most ordinary speeches on various insignificant events of daily life.

The most conservative elements of the English society in India pin great hopes on the new viceroy, who would, it is believed, terminate the dangerous policy of Lord Hardinge of giving the natives a wide share in ruling the country.¹⁵⁶

More sceptical persons doubt the talents of the new viceroy. He is considered to be an insignificant political personality for the requirements of today and they assign for him the role of an unquestioning instrument of London following the tradition of Lord Minto. Moreover, according to the opinion of the majority, Lord Hardinge went too far in his liberal policy and in stimulating higher education among the natives. As a result, it is now almost impossible to quench the thirst of the natives.

Whatever may be the case, the number of natives attending the usual viceregal luncheons and receptions is already far less than what had been observed during the tenure of Lord Hardinge. Englishmen note with approval that Lord Chelmsford has not as yet expressed the desire to have private advisers or friends from among the obsequious natives as had been done by his predecessor.

The internal situation in India should be considered satisfactory for the time being barring sporadic anarchist attempts in Bengal, mainly on the lives of police officials. *According to the well-considered opinion of both Englishmen and natives, who are known to me, significant events will mark the internal life of India only at the end of the war.*¹⁵⁷

If the removal of about 200 thousand native soldiers from India during the war to various fronts was a wise

measure calculated to maintain peace in India, the prospect of their return after the war, having experienced different systems and different attitudes in France, has been causing alarm. The British government, as a result, is inclined to look at them as future insurgent and revolutionaries.¹⁵⁸

While the British have been pointing out, with malicious joy, the indifferent fighting qualities of the native soldiers as exposed in Mesopotamia, the native politicians are disposed to consider the war-efforts of the native soldiers as a great service of India to Britain and even credit them with the distinction of being the main phalanx of Britain on the European battlefield.¹⁵⁹

But the main carrier of new idea and demands from the government is at present the native intelligent proletariat, consisting of a large number of graduates from the various universities of India and England. They compare their pitiable position as ill-paid and third-class officers with the Englishmen in the Indian Civil Service enjoying fat salaries (though they are simply semi-literate in most cases). Consequently, the young generation of India feels humiliated and bypassed as it joins the ranks of the conscious opponents of British rule in India.¹⁶⁰

This is why the policy of Lord Hardinge, who laboured hard during his stay here to promote higher education and openly declared that the time was ripe for the British to relinquish many of their privileges in India, is so hated by the Englishmen of the old school.

Following the accounts of the budget discussion of various provincial councils one finds with unfailing regularity the vigorous criticism of the actions of the government by the native representatives and their insistence on the reduction of allocation of funds on many items in favour of public education.

The question of self-government is a not theme for all

sorts of national gatherings in India. At such a session in Madras, which ended some days back, a resolution to this effect was passed and was subsequently sent to the viceroy. The basic demand of their resolution consists in the wide and unfettered participation of the local elements in the administration of Indian on equal terms with the British.¹⁸¹

With deep respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Lisovskii

No. 138. Iskh. t. zh. Sr. Az. st. 10.

3rd Political Section
23 August, 1916
405

FROM THE HEAD OF THE THIRD POLITICAL SECTION
TO THE CONSUL-GENERAL IN INDIA

PETROGRAD DATED 16 AUGUST, 1916, NO. 3746

(Coded Telegram)

According to the information of Turkestan security department soldiers are being concentrated in North-Afghanistan and high spirits are observed in connection with the offensive of Turks in Russia and the commotions in Turkestan caused by the conscription of labour for the western front. The verification of this information through the Indian government is desirable. Immediately inform us and Tashkent about everything you know on the situation in Afghanistan.

Sd/- Kiemm

No. 144. Iskh. t. zh. Sr. Az. st. 15.

3rd Political Section
405

FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER
TO THE AMBASSADOR AT LONDON

PETROGRAD DATED 19 AUGUST, 1916, NO. 3788

(Coded Telegram)

The governor-general of Turkestan reports, on the basis of information from various sources, *that military preparation of the Afghans on our border is afoot and that considerable excitement exists in Afghanistan in response to the advance of the Turks in Persia.* The presence of German instructors in North Afghanistan seems to be beyond doubt.

Please verify this information as soon as possible through the British government and, in case of confirmation, request the London cabinet to influence the Amir. It is quite desirable that the Indian government should inform general Kuropatkin through our consulate-general about their intelligence on the political situations in Afghanistan.

Sd/- Shtyurmer

No. 141. Lakh. t. zh. Sr. Az. St. 15.

3rd Political Section 405.

FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER
TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF TURKESTAN

PETROGRAD DATED 19 AUGUST, 1916, NO. 3790

(Telegram)

Telegram Nos. 6349 and 6350 received.
(In code)

The consulate-general in India had been entrusted to verify through the Indian government the information on the military preparations in Afghanistan and to telegraph the results both to you and this ministry. At present, we are pursuing the same matter with London requesting the Indian government to influence the Amir, if necessary. It is possible that the Afghan government is taking some measures at the border only to forestall the mass exodus of our natives running away from labour conscriptions.

Sd/- Shtyurmer

No. 217. Vkh. t. zh. Sr. Az. st. 12.

3rd Political Section

16* August, 1961

405

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE ACTING DIPLOMATIC OFFICER
TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF TURKESTAN

22 AUGUST, 1916, NO. 859

My second attempt to use the radio Tashkent-Kushka-Quetta did not produce a satisfactory result owing to distortions in the code.

I am giving below the beginning and the end of Lisovskii's telegram dated 19 August, which I could decipher.

"Please inform Klemm the following in reply to the telegram no. 3746.

"The Indian Government has no information on the concentration and the high spirits in North Afghanistan.

The date is possibly misprinted in the original. It may be 26.

Enquiries are being made. I shall report the result. The Secretary of External Affairs says that some military preparations were going on in Kabul about which the Indian government received information from the Amir himself who was taking measures in order to face internal troubles. The distorted text follows. An armed action by Afghanistan is possible.

Sd/- Sekretarev

3rd Political Section
4 September, 1916
405

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM STATE COUNSELLOR, NABOKOV
LONDON DATED 25 AUGUST, 1916, NO. 525

Telegram No. 3788 received.

The Indian government did not report any alarming change in the mood of Afghanistan recently. The Germans have been removed from Kabul and are under strict observation. Here, the repeated declared determination of the Amir to maintain neutrality so long as he is in power, is not doubted. The Indian government has been instructed to continue to keep the consulate-general informed about Afghanistan as was the practice since the beginning of the war when I was in India.

Copy to Calcutta.

Sd/- Nabokov

No. 153. *Ish. t. zh. Sr. Az.* — St. 12.

3rd Political Section
25 August, 1916
405

FROM THE HEAD OF THE THIRD POLITICAL SECTION
TO THE ACTING DIPLOMATIC OFFICER
TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF TURKESTAN
PETROGRAD DATED 25 AUGUST, 1916

No. 3883
(Coded Telegram)

The telegram from the governor-general No. 6638 sent through the office, should be communicated (especially, the parts concerning Afghanistan) to the consul-generals in India and at Meshed as well as to the political agent at Bukhara for verification. If this has not yet been done, report without delay. Demand the repetition of the undeciphered part of the radio-telegram of Lisovskii, referred to in your telegram No. 859, in which seemingly important words are involved.

Sd/- Klemm

No. 154. *Iskh. t. sh. Sr. Az. st. 10.*

3rd Political Section
26 August 1916, 405

FROM THE HEAD OF THE THIRD POLITICAL SECTION
TO THE ENVOY IN TEHRAN

PETROGRAD DATED 26 AUGUST, 1916

No. 3899

(Telegram)

Reference: telegram from General Kuropatkin No. 6350
(*In colle*)

The ambassador in London has quoted Lord Hardinge

RC-24

that the situation in Afghanistan is not beset with danger. The Anglo-Indian government is in constant touch with Amir Habibulla Khan and does not see any alarming sign. The prisoners-of-war, running away from Turkestan, arrived in Kabul but Amir did not permit them to stay there and entrusted to them the task of instructing his army, which is completely disorganised. According to Lord Hardinge these officers would have been more harmful in Kabul than in the Afghan army where they cannot do anything. Lord Hardinge insisted that it was important not to show any temper in dealing with the Amir. *Any threat to the Amir would be dangerous* as it would ensure the penetration of hostile influences in the court.¹⁰² All information about Afghanistan is being collected for our representative in India by the Indian administrators. Copy to Bukhara, Tashkent and Meshed.

Sd/- Klemm

No. 228. Vkh. t. zh. Sr. — Az. st. 15.

3rd Political Section
30 August, 1916:
405

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE HEAD
OF THE CONSULATE-GENERAL IN INDIA

1 September, 1916:

I am telegraphing the following item to Tashkent with reference to Sekretarev's telegram No. 900.:

The Indian government has reported that it has no information on any intensified military preparation in Afghanistan and it positively denies any knowledge of the return of Germans to Kabul, where, as before, only one German and one Turkish officer are present with several junior staff.

According to information, obtained recently, the most energetic German agent Henzerkig has left Afghanistan for China.

Within a few days the Indian government will give me a full report on the situation in Afghanistan which shall be transmitted by me by telegram.

Sd/- Lisovskii

No. 223. Vkh. t. zh. Sr. — Az. St. 15.

3rd Political Section
2 September, 1916
405

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE ACTING DIPLOMATIC OFFICER
TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF TURKESTAN

1 September, 1916
926

With reference to your telegram No. 3883 and No. 859 of mine, Lisovskii has repeated the undeciphered part of the radiogram :

“While considering the situation in Afghanistan as quite satisfactory at present the Indian government does not conceal that the present offensive of the Turks in Persia is affecting the mood of the Afghan population ominously both for us and for the British. If the Turks are able to capture Tehran or to make their way into Afghanistan in large number then, in the opinion of the Indian government, a hostile move on the part of Afghanistan would not be impossible.”¹⁶³

Sd/- Secretary
15 December, 1916

No. 1093. *Vkh. s. zh. Pers.* — *Sr. Az. Otd.* No. 7.

SIMLA DATED 22 SEPTEMBER/5OCTOBER, 1916

To

His Excellency V. O. Fon-Klemm

Sir,

Vasilii Oskarovich!

As I had the honour to report to Your Excellency in my letter dated 12/25 July, No. 6, Indian public opinion has been engrossed with the reported news of the replacement of the commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, Sir Beauchamp Duff. The official notification to this effect was received in the beginning of August. It sparked off various rumours dwelling on the corruptions and failures of the military operations in Mesopotamia.

The official communication received a few days later on the appointment of a special enquiry commission in London for investigating the actions of the military administration in India and the immediate withdrawal of the C-in-C commanding him to leave India without waiting for the arrival of his replacement, General Monroe (Sir Charles) gave rise to a lot of gossips on possible hypotheses etc. and they are far from flattering for Beauchamp Duff and his assistants in the department of commissariat.

This news together with the discussion in the Press produced a startling impression on Sir Beauchamp Duff himself. A few days after receiving the order for immediate departure from India, a colonel of the general Headquarters confidentially told me that the ex-commander-in-chief was showing signs of mental imbalance and that the Indian government was worried about sending the sick Sir Beauchamp Duff to Britain.

Two days later, more alarming news reached Simla. On his arrival at Delhi, Sir Beauchamp Duff, it was reported, sent the two assistants, accompanying him, over to Bombay and himself moved on to a small locality near Delhi, where he announced to the military administrators, who came to meet him, that he intended to engage himself in drafting soldiers for the British army. By the orders of the viceroy, two doctors were immediately sent from Simla with instructions to take the sick commander-in-chief to Bombay and accompany him in the ship up to London. After great efforts the doctors could convince the patient to start for Bombay and, it is said, that there was a suicidal attempt on his part during the journey.¹⁶⁴

The Italian consul-general received from Bombay a telegram of Sir Beauchamp Duff with a request for endorsing his passport for a trip to Italy, where he would have liked to acquaint himself with the course of the war on the Italian front. Only on 17/30 September could the sick Sir Beauchamp Duff be made to board on a ship which was departing the same day from Bombay for London.

The newly appointed commander-in-chief of the Indian army, General Monroe, one of the prominent figures of the present war, is expected here after a month. At present, he is engaged in inspecting Indian soldiers on all the fronts of the war. Many changes are expected with his arrival both in the personnel of the military administration and in the entire military affairs in India.

With deep respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour Sir, to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Lisovskii

No. 1094. Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. — Az. Otd. No. 8.

SIMLA DATED 23 SEPTEMBER/6OCTOBER, 1916

Sir,

Vasilii Oskarovich!

On 23 August/5 September the new viceroy Lord Chelmsford delivered the first speech on the projected policy in India, in the legislative council. This speech was awaited in India with great impatience, as the public opinion of India was much interested in the course of the internal policy of the Indian government and expected clarifications on the military debacles in Mesopotamia.

In a long speech lasting about three hours Lord Chelmsford painted the general picture of the internal situation in India and the policies intended to be initiated by the government. But to the disappointment of all, he avoided giving any clarifications on Mesopotamia pointing out the impropriety of such discussions owing to the establishment of a special commission in Britain for investigating the whole affair.

In his speech, Lord Chelmsford also dwelt on the foreign policy of India, pointing out that the relations between the Afghan Amir and the Indian government continued to be most amicable and hearty. The unprecedented calm on the north-western frontier should be partly, in the opinion of the viceroy, ascribed to the goodwill of the Amir and, partly, to the lesson given last year to the nomads by the British soldiers. It was also maintained that a conviction was being strengthened among the tribes that the present war cannot threaten their religion in any way despite the most articulate German propaganda to that effect. Relations with Persia were never so harmonious as at present. As a result, the Indian government *could regu-*

larise the question of instruction to the Persian detachments in the south of Persia by British officers having enormous importance and significance for future.

Summing up the general mood of this Indian masses, Lord Chelmsford did not mince words that *despite the background of general welfare and peaceful mood of the country, Bengal stands out as an exception. The anarchist actions, police assassinations and numerous armed raids on private property have been worrying the Indian government considerably.* It has been decided to adopt energetic measures to terminate the politics of violence in that province. The India government assisted by the local administration, has been working out a number of stern steps to combat the law-breakers. In contrast, the viceroy points out, with a feeling of satisfaction, that the situation of the Punjab has been eased and the agitational activities of the emigrants have calmed down.

In his expansive speech the viceroy paid sufficient attention to a review of the economic situation of the country and of the proposed reforms for a more intensive exploitation of the natural resources of India.¹⁶⁵ There is a general satisfaction about the viceregal declaration that the Indian government has decided to uproot German and Austrian influence in the country by *patronising domestic industry* and establishing a new economic order in which commercial competition of hostile countries will become impossible. According to the declaration of Lord Chelmsford, the foreigner will not have the right to participate in the elections in any municipal or district boards.

Listing a number of significant government decisions in the field of public education, railway constructions, agriculture, irrigation and public works, the viceroy remarked that the execution of these proposals would have to wait till the end of the war owing to the paucity of necessary resources.

Replying the attacks in the British Press and the Parliament castigating the comparatively insignificant share of India in fighting the enemy, Lord Chelmsford devoted much of his speech to a review of what India has done in carrying out a difficult task that was assigned to her in dispatching the Indian soldiers to various fronts of the war.

This is the general outline of the viceregal speech. It should be stated *that public opinion in India was somewhat disappointed by it*. It was considered very weak devoid of any general direction to the policy and inadequate as an answer to the living problems of the day.¹⁴⁶

Only a very few newspaper of Calcutta approved of the speech of the viceroy primarily to spite Lord Hardinge who was particularly hated by Calcutta. Accordingly, *The Englishman* characterised the speech as "refreshing" after "the spasmodic furies and enthusiasms of his predecessor".

With deep respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant
Sd/- Lisovskii

No. 1059. Vkh. s. zh. Pers. — Sr. Az. Otd. No. 9.

15 December, 1916

SIMLA DATED 24 SEPTEMBER/7 OCTOBER, 1916

To

His Excellency V.O. Fon-Klemm.

Sir,

Vasilii Oskarovich!

As I had the honour to report to Your Excellency by a number of secret telegrams, the situation in Afghanistan,

according to the information of the Indian government, did not worsen recently to any dangerous extent. The Indian government remains unchanged in its views as it pins great hopes on the Amir who spares no effort to maintain neutrality. The news on the *Turkish* offensives in Persia caused some alarm; it has *undoubtedly been affecting the mood of the Afghans* adversely.

The Indian government does not make bones about the fact that the arrival of a Turkish detachment, numbering at least four to five thousand, into Afghanistan may completely alter the situation to the disadvantage of the allies. According to the assurance of Mr Grant, however, it may be noted with satisfaction that the German agitators have lost all prestige in Afghanistan. There cannot be any question of their being entertained at Kabul. All their activities were concentrated in the outskirts of Herat where they are engaged in prodding the population unsuccessfully on to a holy war. Perhaps, the most active of them are frustrated by the lack of success of their enterprise. Their sole concern, at present, has been to find a way to get out of Afghanistan. One of the parties under the command of lieutenant Henzerkig, who was, if I am not mistaken, in the German Mission at Tehran till the beginning of the war, managed to get into China, from where they intend, according to rumours, to go to America,

Whatever may be the cause, the Amir has taken a number of military measures ostensibly to meet internal complications of his state and to improve his military organisation. Ammunition reserves have been increased and rearmament of the Afghan army has been ordered. The Indian government has accumulated vast amount of information on all these measures from the Amir duly supplemented by reports from numerous agents posted at different places in Afghanistan by it. According to the secretary of external affairs, the Indian soldiers on the border are in full combat readiness. It is held with certainty that

even if the war-party in Afghanistan disturbs its neutrality *the hostile move is destined to fail*. As I reported earlier to Your Excellency, this is perhaps one of the main tasks of the foreign policy of India. This is why the government of India is so insistent in its denial of any information from Turkestan especially when it is inconsistent with the declared statement of its secretary. The Indian government has always promised to keep me posted with its knowledge of the Afghanistan situation.¹⁶⁷

With the deep respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- Lisovskii

COPY FROM THE LETTER FROM STATE COUNSELLOR KALRMY ROR
TO PETRYAEV, EXECUTIVE STATE COUNSELLOR
DATED 14 NOVEMBER, 1916, NO. 189

From purely Russian interests the construction of a railroad to India is still necessary as Kushka-Herat-Quetta line is only about 500 miles. If the Afghan Amir permits the construction of a road through Kabul the distance would be halved. We can get from India Cinchona, tea, coffee, rubber, cotton and ammunition. India has a population of 300 million who did not undergo almost any military conscription (one-twelfth of a per cent are armed as against more than ten per cent in Europe). Vehicular transport can be immediately started. All necessary measurements have been completed by the British. India has a surplus of rails and rolling-stock. There is no insufficiency of labour hands. Communication with India would ease the work of Murmansk and Siberian magistrates. This is probably the only route which has still

remained open for Russia and is not threatened by submarines.¹⁶⁸

Secretary

Sd/- M. Zenov

70. Vkh. s. zh. Pers. — Sr. — Az. Otd. No. 10.

30 January 1917

DELHI DATED 29 NOVEMBER/12 DECEMBER, 1916

To

His Excellency A. A. Neratov.

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich!

From the reports of the court counsellor, Lisovskii regarding the situation in Afghanistan, Your Excellency must have gathered that the views of the government circles over here are very optimistic.

In the course of a discussion with the secretary of external affairs I drew a similar conclusion. In an attempt to make his optimism more convincing Mr Grant specially stressed the salutary impact of *our military successes on the Caucasian front, resulting in the pacification of the Afghan chauvinists*. During the conversation I obtained from Mr Grant a confirmation of the reported presence of undesirable elements in Afghanistan. As it follows from the secret telegram of the collegiate counsellor, Chirkin dated 9/12 November, No. 1152, the main accomplices of *the Raja Pratap*, Barakatullah and the Turkish officer *Kazam Bek*, are at Herat, where along with Wagner, the artillery officer of the German service, *they are engaged in*

disseminating subversive propaganda among our Muslims. The Anglo-Indian government is not unfamiliar with this fact and the secretary of external affairs confided to me that this gang of conspirators is being closely observed.

The story runs as follows:

*Pratap is an impostor and hardly a Raja. His capture by our administrators would have provided great satisfaction to the Amir himself. The latter's position is fairly delicate. As present, his absolute rule is more a legal fiction and largely illusory. He is in a somewhat difficult position. This is primarily due to the fact that he has to manoeuvre his way between the exigency to oblige the Anglo-Indian government (from which he receives an annual subsidy and which has, of late, been increased) and the demands of the war-party at the Kabul court around the person of Nasirullah Khan, the Amir's own brother.*¹⁶⁹

There are almost four hundred tribes in the Afghan population and their fanatic leaders view the Amir Habibullah Khan, with suspicion and, in most cases, *obey him only in name*. The Amir himself belongs to the mighty Durrani tribe. As the head of this tribe, Habibullah is in constant conflict with the demands of the *sardars* of other tribes and, at times, he is compelled to accept their opinions.¹⁷⁰

These warlords are sensitive about all the events connected with the world war, in general, and about the events on the Mohammedan west, in particular. *Although they are technically subordinate to the Amir they are ready to exploit any omission on the Amir's part to accuse him of anti-Mohammedan policies and use the opportunity to dethrone him and capture power.*¹⁷¹

Thus despite all his good intentions, *the role of the Amir*

consists in pleasing all and sundry. The ever-shifting trend of the Amir's policies depends largely on the progress of the military actions of the allies.

With the deep respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant
Sd/- V. Tomanovskii

72. Vkh. s. zh. Pers. — Sr. — Az. Old. No. 12.

30 January, 1917

DELHI DATED 1/14 DECEMBER, 1916

To

His Excellency A. A. Neratov

I consider it my duty to give a hurried review of the local situation since the appointment of Lord Chelmsford to the post of viceroy.

The new viceroy, Baron Napier Lord Chelmsford, has been getting familiar with his new sphere of activity and, at present, he is taking a trip round the various towns and provinces of North India. All possible deputations are being presented to him. He is being greeted with profession of loyalty to the throne, contributions for the war-fund and expressed feelings for its successful conclusion. Lord Chelmsford is, at present, in Burma, at the fringe of the empire. In its chief town, Rangoon, there was a large *Durbar* where the viceroy, while replying to the address, emphasised the loyalty of the population to the crown which was experienced during the entire war-period despite all possible temptations offered by the German emissaries.¹⁷²

That the German propaganda was not inactive with

respect to India is proved by the Lahore case in which seventeen persons, accused of attempting to overthrow the existing regime and rouse the people against the emperor, are being tried. I am not going to burden the attention of Your Excellency by describing the separate phases of this conspiracy. It would be sufficient to mention that the entire trial is replete with geographic names beginning from Berlin and passing through Buenos Aires, Riode-Janeiro, Geneva and then to New York, San Francisco, Shanghai and Bangkok. The German agents worked extensively and encircled the whole world by a net-work of intrigues. The victims of this conspiracy would have been the people fighting against Germany resulting in the capture of world-rule by the Germans.¹⁷³

The English Press has been repeatedly publishing opinions criticising the Indian government for sharing a small fraction of the burden in sharp contrast to the efforts by other parts of the British empire. I should not like to judge how far this criticism corresponds to the true situation. But the participation of Indian forces in the Egyptian and Mesopotamian fronts, where the striking power of Great Britain consisted exclusively of Indian native soldiers, armed and equipped by local resources, should not be minimised.¹⁷⁴

In conclusion, it should be agreed that though the government of India declared that, in the near future, it would reduce the passenger movement owing to an increasing demand for railway rolling-stock, reduce and prohibit the export of coal etc., the war with all its consequences, as it is felt in Europe, is almost non-existent and hardly sensed here.

With deep respect and perfect loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Yours Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant
Sd/- V. Tomanovskii

No. 2150. Vkh. t. zh. Pers. st.

3rd Political Section
10 December, 1916.
405

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE ENVOY IN TEHERAN
7 DECEMBER, 1916, NO. 1113

General Baratov informs us of the arrival at Hamadan, of the son and the brother of the Afghan Amir, probably with the purpose of concluding some agreement with the Turks who received them warmly.

Copy to the governor-general of Turkestan.

Sd/- Etter

No. 272. Vkh. s. zh. Pers. —Sr. — Az. Otd. No. 1.
21 April, 1917

DELHI DATED 27 JANUARY, 1917

To

His Excellency A. A. Neratov.

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich!

On 25 January and 7 February of this year the viceroy opened here the session of the Imperial Legislative Council.

Many people came to the first sitting expecting the speech of Lord Chelmsford and their hopes were not belied. Immediately after the oath-taking ceremony for the newly appointed members, the viceroy delivered an exhaustive speech on the political, military and economic situations of the country during the existing emergency

condition and stressed the pressing need for greater sacrifice on the part of India to the world struggle and its ultimate success.

The viceroy emphasised that everybody in India is aware of the importance of this struggle. The question, he clarified, is how and by what means the common purpose, followed by the entire British empire, could be best achieved. He was convinced of the final triumph of the allied forces.

Lord Chelmsford insisted that there was the immediate necessity of concentrating the efforts of one and all for this purpose. Then, he read the resolution of the council of 8 September, 1914 expressing its unfailing loyalty to emperor together with the determination to support war-efforts by all means, both military and financial. He insisted that the resolution should now find expression in the form of open hearted and extensive contributions to the war-loan.¹⁷⁵

Reviewing the foreign policy of India, the viceroy noted with concern the repeated attempts of the empire's enemies to foment a revolt among the indigenous population of the country and those of its neighbours. He stressed the loyalty of the Siamese King and Afghan Amir who spurned German intrigues and offers. He also paid homage to the Anglo-Indian frontier administration for guarding with alertness and vigilance the interests entrusted to them and praised their attempts to frustrate the Teutonic schemes by adopting prompt and adequate measures.¹⁷⁶

Further, in his speech, Lord Chelmsford pointed out the combined action of the land and sea forces to whom the defence of Indian borders and coasts are entrusted and paid special attention to the Mesopotamian army, whose efforts undoubtedly have helped in setting the Middle East situation in order. He touched upon the activities of the Indian princes and other semi-department rulers

with affection and hinted that their loyalty *would be remembered in future.*

Reviewing the policy of the general-register, published recently, which is compulsory for all European subjects, the viceroy did not conceal that this measure would undoubtedly lead to a general military conscription in India, although it would not affect the native population.

The viceregal speech was listened to with great attention and was greeted with general applause.

With perfect respect and loyalty I have the honour to be Your Excellency's most obedient servant.

Sd/- V. Tomanovskii

No. 275. Vkh. s. zh. Pers. — Sr. — Az. — Otd. No.2.

21 April, 1917

DELHI DATED 29 JANUARY, 1917

To

His Excellency A. A. Neratov.

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich!

Recently there was a lecture here by Colonel Lord Montagu on aviation and its future. It dealt with the perfections achieved in this field during the war and the possibility of establishing mail and passenger communication by air between India and Great Britain. It was pointed out by the lecturer that one of the two air-paths connecting these countries passes through Russia. I think

it would not be without interest for us to be acquainted with the essential contents of the lecture.

Lord Montagu thinks that during the ensuing decade *air-communication between London and its colonies would be established.*

*

*

*

The *air-route to India through Russia is the shortest* and it could be covered within 36 hours, by aeroplanes. For passenger transport, the fourteen hour rest ought to be taken into account. Thus the entire distance from Delhi to London would be covered in about 59 hours. Here, the lecturer mentioned favourably the *Russian air-ship, Sikorskii*, with room for sixteen passengers. Its air-worthiness has already been examined. With the possible improvement of the plane including essential comforts for the passengers, such as heating system for flights at a height of seven to ten thousand feet and facilities for illumination at night, the plane may turn out to be an ideal one. With regard to air currents disturbing the course of the flight Lord Montagu is convinced that the continental path through Russia would be free from currents having adverse effects on aeroplanes with a speed of 120 to 130 miles per hour.

In conclusion he sought to convince those listeners who might think that his plans were fantastic. The lecturer recalled that not more than eight years have passed since Wilbur Wright completed his first flight and since then striking successes have been achieved and they are sufficiently weighty to enable one to speculate confidently that there is nothing impossible any more in this field.

The viceroy and Lady Chelmsford as well as the commander of the army, Sir Charles Monroe, were present at this lecture in a large auditorium. The lecturer sent me an invitation.¹⁷⁷

With perfect respect and loyalty I have the honour to be Your Excellency's most obedient servant.

Sd/- V. Tomanovskii

No. 320. *Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. Az. Otd.* No. 5.

15 May, 1917

DELHI DATED 14 FEBRUARY, 1917

To

His Excellency A. A. Neratov.

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich!

Last week the commander-in-chief, Sir Charles Monroe, introduced the Indian Defence Bill in the legislative council.¹⁷⁸ The creation of Indian defence forces has been awaited for years. Presiding over the council, the viceroy prefaced the introduction of this bill quite impressively. He emphasised the importance of the measure for mastering all the forces in the country with a view to localising the world struggle and achieving peace, so insistently longed for by the whole mankind.

Concluding his speech Lord Chelmsford said: "A demand has been made that the Indian Government should create a striking force by local resources sufficiently viable to defend the country all by itself and thereby releasing all garrisons in India for their dispatch to the war-theatres."

After the viceroy, Sir Charles Monroe took the floor. He began his speech by painting a bright future of the efforts, which are being carried out by the allied powers and the prospects of the projected offensive in the ensuing spring. The commander-in-chief did not fail to appreciate the dis-

tinguished service of Indian soldiers who excelled themselves on many fronts.

Owing to the recent successes in Mesopotamia this part of his speech was greeted with special warmth by the huge crowd in the public gallery. Then General Monroe described the bill and the programme for its implementation. Compulsory conscription covers only Englishmen of European origin. The newly mobilised forces are subdivided into three categories: the called-ups between 18 to 41 years old from the contingent of active service, those in the 41-50 age group from the reserve and the 16-18 age group, the so-called cadets, undergoing military discipline and preparatory training. The called-ups of the first category are absorbed in the service over the entire territory of the Indian empire and they are exclusively meant for local garrison service.

The compulsory military service for all Englishmen has excited the imagination of the young generation of the native population who are eager, as representatives of the new India, to exhibit their militant spirit. They declared, more than once in the past, their indomitable desire to fight for their country's defence and take part in the world-struggle.

In the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, the young Indians are eagerly looking forward to a possible opportunity in the military services. This may be due to the fact that their population is more numerous than that of the other regions of India. It may not be doubted, however, that thanks to the influence of the intellectual centres of Lahore, Delhi and Calcutta, they show a great interest in the socio-political life of the country.

The government wisely decided to reject the demand for general military conscription for the native population of the empire on the pretext that the draft of more than 300 million would bring the war-expenditure to an undesir-

able limit. It was calculated, however, that an enormous native army might develop into, under certain circumstances, a double-edged weapon and hence, could become undesirable.¹⁷⁹

With the deepest respect and loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be Your Excellency's most obedient friend.

Sd/- V. Tomanovskii

No. 319. Vkh. s. zh. Pers — Sr. — Az. Otd. No. 4.

15 May, 1917

DELHI DATED 13 FEBRUARY, 1917

To

His Excellency A. A. Neratov.

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich,

As is not unknown to Your Excellency, the Madras chamber of commerce took the initiative in prompting the Indian government to send a deputation to Russia for investigating the ways along which direct trade between the two countries could be started, strengthened and developed further.

The Indian government agreed to place the mission under D. T. Chadwick, who was the director of agriculture for the last four years in South India and has the reputation of being an authority on matters of trade as well as agriculture. His name had been recommended by the Madras chamber of commerce.

After three months' stay and hard work investigating the needs of both the countries and assessing the poten-

tialities of the local markets in Petrograd and Moscow, the commission has recently returned. It has presented significant data and urged the establishment of direct trade relations in the near future. Such a course of action was insistently demanded by the economic interests of both the states.

While discussing this, the local Press remarks that the long-existing mutual mistrust between England and Russia in Asia had a paralysing impact on trade relations as well. It stresses, with satisfaction, the fact that since the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 export from India to Russia had increased although it remained somewhat insignificant in view of its potentialities provided the *Russian firms were equipped with the means of modern commercial techniques to compete with the German counterparts*. Actually, with the exception of tea interests in Calcutta, there is no point of Russian commercial contact in India. The only Russian credit establishment is a branch of the Russo-Asiatic Bank at Bombay (the branch at Calcutta is at present closed).

Without serious opposition from us the Germans captured, as has been noted more than once, the entire export trade of Russia in their own hands by playing the role of the honest broker and maintained it exclusively in their own favour. One can get easily convinced about the extensive field of commerce awaiting Russian exporters. There is scope for abundant profit if export from India to Russia is handled directly and energetically.

Both these states are agrarian countries although they differ much in their climatic conditions. Great opportunity, however, exists for trade in raw materials needed for the future development of our industries and also, in manufactured goods.

I am citing some statistical figures of the growth of our trade during the years immediately before the war. Direct

export from India to Russia increased and reached 1,636,000 pound sterling in 1913-14. In 1914-15, there was a noticeable decline due to the war; but in the next year, there was again a substantial rise to about 3,623,000 pound sterling.

Of the commodities, which may dominate import items to Russia, particular mention should be made of tea, rice, material for the spinning industry and dyes. Direct export of tea, partly through the Black Sea and partly through Vladivostok, suffered various ups and downs during its 20 years of existence before the war. In 1905-06, it amounted to Rs 284,000 pound sterling, and in the last pre-war year, it reached a figure of 1,110,000 pound sterling.

A further increase in tea export can be expected in the future because of a simple reason. Even if we consider the delightful phenomenon of a complete ban on alcoholic drinks merely as a temporary affair, tea-drinking has already become popular during the war. There will also be at the end of the war large demand in our country for oil-seeds particularly those suitable for soap-boiling.

Among the goods for spinning or textile industry, the first place is occupied by raw jute, the export of which in 1913-14 was worth about 266,000 pound sterling. Russia, however, does not need the import of cotton, as it is expected that with the development of irrigation in Turkestan the demand for cotton, especially that of the best sorts, would be easily supplied locally. Of the dye stuffs, import of which from India is quite considerable, indigo occupies the dominant place as our handicraftsmen use this extensively. Its supply to our markets, under more favourable conditions after the war, may be confidently anticipated.

Favourable conditions would undoubtedly help in the increase of direct export to us. This export would include rice, pepper, cinamon and other spices which are found in

abundance in this country. In conclusion, it is necessary to mention the huge rubber plantations in South India and Burma. The inferior sorts of rubber are needed by us in huge quantity owing to the increasing production of galoshes and other rubber articles.

With the deepest respect and loyalty I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Your Excellency's

Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- V. Tomanovskii

Confidential

No. 321. Vkh. s. zh. Pers. Sr. Az. Otd.

DELHI DATED 17 FEBRUARY, 1917

Sir,

Anatolii Anatolievich!

However soothing the current formula, "All is quiet in Afghanistan" may sound (and one hears it constantly from the secretary of external affairs in India) it is beyond doubt that if there exists any ground for alarm at present it is this territory in the Middle East—the only one that belongs neither to the Anglo-Indian influence nor to the Russian.

At present, the rumours on the situation in Afghanistan are being disseminated with typical exaggeration. These rumours successfully compete with telegraph agencies as

sources of information and, strangely enough, people react to all kinds of gossips.

Thus, recently at Calcutta apocryphal rumours were rampant in the *bazars* about a palace coup in Kabul. That the Anglo-Indian government does not feel confident as the master of the situation on the border may be indicated by the extreme caution, and at times almost to the point of weakness, with which they deal with the government of the Amir. For the government of India the only important consideration is the maintenance of neutrality by Afghanistan.

* * *

It is evident to everybody observing the political atmosphere in the Middle East that *it will not be possible to accord such an extraordinary position to Afghanistan in the future.*

Without taking recourse to unrestrained lyricism it may be asserted that this country, the last citadel of Asiatic autocracy and arbitrary rule in the Middle East, can easily be compared with *an electric power-station which constantly stimulates the political passions of the Muslims.* This is amply illustrated by the *recent disturbances in the Turkestan territory, the roots of which still survive in Afghanistan.* This is remembered by all.

Judging the situation from an objective point of view it is not difficult to come to the conviction that *for peace in the Middle East it is necessary to do away with the independent political entity of Afghanistan, the breeding ground of all sorts of revolts and ferments.* Our allies in London as well as in India have to be convinced that it is time to reject, to our mutual satisfaction, the quite superfluous conception of a buffer state. It is not feasible to foreglimpse the exact form this agreement will assume. But a political and military settlement on these lines alone can remove

all misunderstandings in the Middle East between the two largest empires.¹⁸⁰

With deepest respect and loyalty I have the honour,
Sir, to be,

Your Excellency's
Most Obedient Servant

Sd/- V. Tomanovskii.

No. 42. Vkh. t. zh. Sr. Az. st. 12.

3rd Political Section
20 February, 1917
405

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE DIPLOMATIC OFFICER
TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF TURKESTAN

18 February, 1917
No. 210,

Reporting to Tomanovskii by radio telegraph:

Directing the attention to the newspaper "Seraj-ul-Akhbar", *hostile both to us and the English*, published at Kabul and sold even in Bukhara and Turkestan area, General Kuropatkin wants to know if any pressure on the Afghan Amir by India is possible so that the *harmful publication is stopped*.

I am asking most humbly to reply by radio telegraph.

Sd/- Chirkin.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Introduction

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351. 'Viceroy's note', encl. Butler to Hardinge, 10 February, 1912, H.P.

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354. Hardinge to Crewe, 9 May, 1912, H.P.
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364. Hardinge to Crewe, 2 April, 1914, H.P.
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368. *Ibid.*
369. Hardinge to Holderness, 13 May, 1914, H.P.
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374. Hardinge to Chisolm, 14 February, 1914, H.P.
375. Hardinge to Crewe, 18 May, 1912, H.P.
376. Hardinge to Crewe, 16 July, 1912, H.P.
377. Hardinge to Crewe, 11 July, 1912, H.P.
378. Hardinge to Crewe, 22 August, 1912, H.P.
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380. Hardinge to Crewe, 8 October, 1912, H.P.
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382. *Ibid.*
383. *Ibid.*
384. Hardinge to Crewe, 22 August, 1912, H.P.
385. Butler to Hardinge, 25 August, 1912, H.P.
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387. Crewe to Hardinge, 5 June, 1912, H.P.
388. *Ibid.*
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391. *Ibid.*
392. 'The New Delhi', from a correspondent in India, June 1912, H.P.; Hardinge to Crewe, 6 January, 1912, H.P.
393. Butler to Hardinge, 1 August, 1912, H.P.
394. 'Note by the Viceroy', 30 July, 1912, H.P.

395. 'The New Delhi', from a correspondent in India, June 1912, H.P.

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398. 'Imperial grant for education', by Hardinge, 29 June, 1911, H.P.

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401. *Ibid.*

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404. *Ibid.*

405. Hardinge to Crewe, 2 February, 1911, H.P.

406. Sydenham to Hardinge, 30 June, 1911, H.P.

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408. Sydenham to Hardinge, 21 July, 1911, H.P.

409. *Ibid.*

410. Butler to Hardinge, 10 July, 1911, H.P.

411. Creagh to Hardinge, 1 August, 1911, H.P.

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413. *Ibid.*

414. 'Imperial grant for education', by Hardinge, 29 June, 1911, H.P.

415. Sydenham to Hardinge, 21 July, 1911, H.P.

416. 'Imperial grant for education', by Hardinge, 29 June, 1911, H.P.

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418. *Ibid.*

419. *Ibid.*

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422. Hardinge to Butler, 9 April, 1911, H.P.

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426. *Ibid.*

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428. Butler to Hardinge, 10 June, 1912, *Butler Papers* (hereafter B.P.).

429. Butler to Hardinge, 12 June, 1912, B.P.

430. Butler to Hardinge, 15 May, 1912, B.P.

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436. *Ibid.*
437. Butler to Hardinge, 28 July, 1912, H.P.
438. Hewett to Hardinge, 13 August, 1912, H.P.
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441. *Ibid.*
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443. *Ibid.*
444. *Ibid.*
445. Butler to Hardinge, 20 August, 1912, H.P.
446. *Ibid.*; Carmichael to Hardinge, 23 August, 1912, H.P.
447. Chirol to Hardinge, 22 December, 1912, H.P.
448. *Ibid.*
449. Hardinge to Rameshwar Singh Bahadur, 30 July, 1912, H.P.
450. *Ibid.*
451. Hardinge to Butler, 30 July, 1912, H.P.
452. Hardinge to Butler, 16 August, 1912, H.P.
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456. Hardinge to Ali Imam, 14 November, 1912, H.P.
457. Sydenham to Hardinge, 6 March, 1913, H.P.
458. *Ibid.*
459. *Ibid.*
460. *Ibid.*
461. Chirol to Hardinge, 12 March, 1913, H.P.
462. Hardinge's marginal note on Butler to Hardinge, 7 January, 1911, H.P.
463. Sydenham to Hardinge, 18 March, 1913, H.P.
464. Butler to Hardinge, 23 April, 1913, H.P.
465. Butler to Hardinge, 3 April, 1913, H.P.
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475. *Ibid.*
476. *Ibid.*
477. Roos Keppel to Hardinge, 24 April, 1913, H.P.
478. Butler to Hardinge, 29 April, 1913, H.P.

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480. Ameer Ali to Crewe, 7 March, 1913, H.P.
481. Pvt. Secy. to the viceroy to Craddock, 9 February, 1913, H.P.
482. *Ibid.*
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484. Hardinge to Sydenham, 2 March, 1913, H.P.
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487. Hardinge to Butler, 9 April, 1913, H.P.
488. Hardinge to Sydenham, 2 March, 1913, H.P.
489. Butler to Sydenham, 5 June, 1913, H.P.
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493. *Ibid.*
494. Hardinge to Butler, 11 February, 1914, H.P.
495. Butler to Hardinge, 27 July, 1914, H.P.
496. Hardinge to Butler, 20 July, 1914, H.P.
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498. Butler to Hardinge, 27 July, 1914, H.P.
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500. *Ibid.*
501. Meston to Butler, 25 July, 1914, *Meston Papers* (hereafter M.P.)
502. *Ibid.*
503. Hardinge to Crewe, 11 November, 1914, H.P.
504. Butler to Hardinge, 7 November, 1914, H.P.
505. Hardinge to Crewe, 11 November, 1914, H.P.
506. Butler to Hardinge, 7 November, 1914, H.P.
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509. 'Memorandum on schemes for the improvement of University Education in India' by Ramsay Muir, 18 March, 1914, H.P.
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512. *Ibid.*
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514. Crewe to Hardinge, 20 June, 1911, H.P.
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516. Craddock to Hardinge, 5 July, 1912, H.P.
517. Hardinge to Crewe, 6 January, 1912, H.P.
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519. Sydenham to Hardinge, 17 July, 1912, H.P.
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525. Sydenham to Hardinge, 29 July, 1912, H.P.
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527. Sydenham to Hardinge, 20 July, 1912, H.P.
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529. Chirol to Hardinge, 21 December, 1912, H.P.
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531. *Ibid.*
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533. Hardinge to Sydenham, 25 July, 1912, H.P.
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535. Hardinge to Sydenham, 26 September, 1912, H.P.
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537. *Ibid.*; Hardinge to Crewe, 6 February, 1912, H.P.
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546. O'Donnell to Hardinge, 28 February, 1913, H.P.
547. Hardinge to Montagu, 7 February, 1913, H.P.
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549. Chirol to Hardinge, 19 January, 1913, H.P.
550. Chirol to Hardinge, 10 January, 1913, H.P.
551. *Ibid.*
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553. Chirol to Hardinge, 28 January, 1913, H.P.
554. Chirol to Hardinge, 2 March, 1913, H.P.
555. Sydenham to Hardinge, 6 March, 1913, H.P.
556. Hardinge to Carmichael, 28 March, 1913, H.P.
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581. Hardinge to Holderness, 14 August, 1914, H.P.
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596. Hardinge to Crewe, 27 June, 1912, H.P.
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598. Hardinge to Crewe, 10 August, 1911, H.P.
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602. Hardinge to Crewe, 3 October, 1911, H.P.; Butler to Hard-
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607. Quoted in 'Opinion of the Advocate General', 12 February, 1910, H.P.
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615. Hardinge to Sydenham, 25 November, 1910, H.P.; also, Hardinge to Baker, 30 January, 1911, H.P.
616. Crewe to Hardinge, 26 January, 1911, H.P.
617. Hardinge to Chirol, 28 May, 1911, H.P.
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620. *Ibid.*; Hardinge to Baker, 25 March, 1911, H.P.
621. Hardinge to Chirol, 28 May, 1911, H.P.
622. Jenkins to Pvt. Secy. to the viceroy, 27 July, 1911, H.P.
623. Crewe to Hardinge, 13 January, 1911, H.P.
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628. *Ibid.*
629. *Ibid.*
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632. Hardinge to Butler, 31 July, 1913, H.P.
633. Meston to Hardinge, 24 July, 1913, H.P.
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637. *Ibid.*
638. Meston to Hardinge, 26 July, 1913, H.P.
639. *Ibid.*
640. Meston to Hardinge, 25 August, 1913, H.P.
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642. Meston to Hardinge, 25 August, 1913, H.P.
643. Craddock to Hardinge, 15 August, 1913, H.P.
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647. Craddock to Hardinge, 16 September, 1913, H.P.
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660. *Ibid.*
661. Craddock to Hardinge, 19 October, 1913, H.P.
662. Peter Hardy, *op cit*, p 188.
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667. *Ibid.*
668. O'Dwyer to Hardinge, 6 December, 1913, H.P.
669. Hailey to Hardinge, 17 September, 1913, H.P.
670. Hardinge to Butler, 15 October, 1913, H.P.
671. *Ibid.*
672. Hardinge to Willingdon, 6 November, 1913.
673. Hardinge to Willingdon, 14 November, 1913, H.P.
674. Ali Imam to Hardinge, 17 August, 1913, H.P.
675. Meston to Hardinge, 17 August, 1913, H.P.
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680. Hardinge to Butler, 10 October, 1913, H.P.
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682. Craddock to Hardinge, 12 October, 1913, H.P.
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684. Meston to Hardinge, 25 October, 1913, H.P.
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717. D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, vol I, Delhi, 1960, p 145.
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728. Hardinge to Crewe, 23 July, 1913, H.P.
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731. *Ibid.*
732. Hardinge to Crewe, 23 July, 1913, H.P.
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734. See pp 277-78 below.
735. Hardinge to Willingdon, 11 December, 1913, H.P.
736. *Ibid.*
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 738. Crewe to Hardinge, 31 October, 1913, H.P.
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 740. H. Kunzru to Gokhale, (undated) December, 1913.
 741. Crewe to Hardinge, 20 November, 1913, H.P.
 742. Crewe to Hardinge, 27 November, 1913, H.P.
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 746. Crewe to Hardinge, 14 December, 1913, H.P.
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 773. Crewe to Hardinge, 16 January, 1914, H.P.
 774. Hardinge to Crewe, 11 November, 1914, H.P.
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780. Hardinge to Crewe, 23 September, 1914, H.P.
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782. Hardinge to Crewe, 10 October, 1914, H.P.
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790. Hardinge to Willingdon, 6 October, 1914, H.P.; Hardinge to Duff, 20 September, 1914, H.P.
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874. *Ibid.*; Roos Keppel to Hardinge, 13 March, 1916, H.P.
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876. Hardinge to Crewe, 13 May, 1915, H.P.
877. Hardinge to Crewe, 30 May, 1915, H.P.
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894. See pp 348-49 below.
895. Stanley Reed to Steed, 19 June, 1915, S. Reed; also, Henry. W. Nevson, *The New Spirit of India*, *op cit*, p 327
896. Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I Know it, 1885-1925*, London, 1925, p 248.
897. Hardinge to Chirol, 28 May, 1911, H.P.
898. *Ibid.*
899. Hardinge to Baker, 29 May, 1911, H.P.

900. Hardinge to Chirol, 28 May, 1911, H.P.; also Chirol to Hardinge, 9 June, 1911, H.P.

901. Hare to Hardinge, 7 July, 1911, H.P.

902. Craddock to Hardinge, 1 September, 1912, H.P.

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904. Jenkins to Hardinge, 9 July, 1911, H.P.

905. Private Secretary (viceroy) to Tagore, 9 July, 1911, H.P.

906. Chirol to Hardinge, 15 November, 1910, H.P.

907. Butler to Hardinge, 22 January, 1912, H.P.

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909. Butler to Hardinge, 24 January, 1912, H.P.

910. Hardinge to Crewe, 27 March, 1912, H.P.

911. Sharp to Pvt. Secy. to the Viceroy, 12 February, 1912, H.P.

912. Bayley to Hardinge, 12 February, 1912, H.P.

913. R.K. Das to Chief Secretary to the government of East Bengal & Assam, 11 February, 1912 in Butler to Hardinge, 15 February, 1912, H.P.

914. Quoted in Butler to Hardinge, 15 February, 1912, H.P.

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916. Duke to Hardinge, 1 April, 1912, H.P.

917. Hardinge to Duke, 28 March, 1912, H.P.

918. *Ibid.*

919. Hardinge to Earle, 28 May, 1912, H.P.

920. Hardinge to Carmichael, 15 June, 1912, H.P.

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923. Carmichael to Hardinge, 5 August, 1912, H.P.

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925. Hardinge to Butler, 5 August, 1912, H.P.

926. Craddock to Hardinge, 1 September, 1912, H.P.

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928. *Ibid.*

929. *Ibid.*

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931. Note by governor of Bengal, encl. in Craddock to Hardinge, 1 September, 1912, H.P.

932. *Ibid.*

933. *Ibid.*

934. *Ibid.*

935. *Ibid.*

936. *Ibid.*

937. Craddock to Hardinge, 27 April, 1913, H.P.

938. Hardinge to Carmichael, 5 October, 1912, H.P.

939. *Ibid.*

940. Craddock to Hardinge, 27 April, 1913, H.P.

941. Butler to Hardinge, 30 November, 1912, H.P.

942. *Ibid.*

943. Craddock to Hardinge, 27 April, 1913, H.P.
944. *Ibid.*
945. Sydenham to Hardinge, 25 April, 1913, H.P.
946. Wilson to Hardinge, 10 April, 1913, H.P.
947. Craddock to Hardinge, 27 April, 1913, H.P.
948. *Ibid.*
949. Hardinge to Crewe, 20 March, 1913, H.P.
950. Craddock to Hardinge, 27 April, 1913, H.P.
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952. Meston to Craddock, 5 March, 1913, H.P. in Craddock to Hardinge, 7 May, 1913, H.P.
953. Hardinge to Carmichael, 20 March, 1913, H.P.
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956. Hardinge to Carmichael, 4 July, 1914, H.P.
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958. Wilson to Hardinge, 7 July, 1914, H.P.
959. *Ibid.*
960. Hardinge to Sydenham, 30 March, 1914; Hardinge to Crewe, 3 April, 1913, H.P.
961. Hardinge to Wilson, 30 March, 1913, H.P.
962. Hardinge to Wilson, 15 April, 1913, H.P.
963. Hardinge to Carmichael, 10 May, 1913, H.P.
964. *Ibid.*
965. *Ibid.*
966. Hardinge to Crewe, 8 May, 1913, H.P.
967. Hardinge to Carmichael, 21 May, 1913, H.P.
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969. Hardinge to Carmichael, 10 May, 1913, H.P.
970. Hardinge to Crewe, 22 May, 1913, H.P.
971. Hardinge to Birdwood, 6 June, 1913, H.P.
972. Hardinge to Crewe, 12 June, 1913, H.P.
973. Carmichael to Hardinge, 1 June, 1913, H.P.
974. Hardinge to Crewe, 12 June, 1913, H.P.
975. Craddock to Hardinge, 7 November, 1912, H.P.; also Craddock to Hardinge, 7 May, 1913, H.P.
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978. *Ibid.*
979. *Ibid.*
980. Hardinge to Carmichael, 7 June, 1913, H.P.
981. Bayley to Meston, 22 September, 1914, H.P.
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997. Hardinge to Carmichael, 20 August, 1913, H.P.
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999. Hardinge to Butler, 18 August, 1913, H.P.
1000. Hardinge to Crewe, 8 May, 1913, H.P.
1001. *Ibid.*
1002. Hardinge to Carmichael, 1 August, 1913, H.P.
1003. Hardinge to Carmichael, 13 February, 1914, H.P.
1004. Hardinge to Carmichael, 13 February, 1914, H.P.
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1006. Hardinge to Bishop of Lahore, 8 October, 1913, H.P.
1007. Hardinge to Carmichael, 11 October, 1913, H.P.
1008. Hardinge to Carmichael, 23 February, 1914, H.P.
1009. *Ibid.*; Hardinge to Crewe, 5 February, 1914, H.P.
1010. Hardinge to Crewe, 10 March, 1914, H.P.
1011. Hardinge to Crewe, 26 March, 1914, H.P.
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1013. Hardinge to Crewe, 31 March, 1914, H.P.
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1017. Hardinge to Carmichael, 9 May, 1914, H.P.
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1020. Butler to Hardinge, 27 July, 1914, H.P.
1021. Willingdon to Hardinge, 11 July, 1914, H.P.
1022. Butler to Hardinge, 27 July, 1914, H.P.
1023. Dadabhai Naoroji to Hardinge, 10 August, 1914, H.P.
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1030. Carmichael to Hardinge, 10 October, 1914, H.P.
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1033. *Ibid.*

1034. Hardinge to Holderness, 9 December, 1914(I), H.P.
1035. Hardinge to Holderness, 9 December, 1914 (II), H.P.
1036. O'Dwyer to Hardinge in Hardinge to Crewe, 1 January, 1915, H.P.
1037. *Ibid.*
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1039. Hardinge to Holderness, 3 June, 1915, H.P.
1040. *Ibid.*
1041. Hardinge to Crewe, 29 April, 1915, H.P.
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1043. *Ibid.*
1044. *Ibid.*
1045. *Ibid.*
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1047. Hardinge to Holderness, 3 March, 1915, H.P.
1048. Carmichael to Hardinge, 12 October, 1914; see the intercepted letters of Gurdit Singh.
1049. *Ibid.*
1050. Hardinge to Holderness, 9 March, 1915 and also its enclosure, 'Home Dept. On recent evidence of conspiracy against British Rule', H.P.
1051. *Ibid.*
1052. *Ibid.*
1053. *Ibid.*
1054. Hardinge to Crewe, 27 May, 1915, H.P.
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1058. Hardinge to Crewe, 3 June, 1915, H.P.
1059. *Ibid.*
1060. *Ibid.*
1061. Holderness to Hardinge, 15 July, 1915, H.P.
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1063. Hardinge to Holderness, 25 July, 1915, H.P.
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1066. *Ibid.*; also Adamson to Hardinge, 25 June, 1915, H.P.
1067. Roos Keppel to Hardinge, 14 July, 1915, H.P.
1068. Adamson to Hardinge, 14 July, 1915, H.P.
1069. Hardinge to Chamberlain, 5 November, 1915, H.P.
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- 1078. *Ibid.*
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- 1081. *Ibid.*
- 1082. Crewe to Hardinge, 26 January, 1914, H.P.
- 1083. *Ibid.*
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- 1085. Crewe to Hardinge, 4 March, 1914, H.P.
- 1086. Craddock to Hardinge, 25 April, 1914, H.P.
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- 1089. *Ibid.*
- 1090. Hardinge to Crewe, 3 June, 1914, H.P.
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- 1092. *Ibid.*
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- 1094. Crewe to Hardinge, 27 June, 1914, H.P.
- 1095. Hardinge to Crewe, 9 July, 1914, H.P.
- 1096. *Ibid.*
- 1097. *Ibid.*
- 1098. Hardinge to Holderness, 30 July, 1914, H.P.
- 1099. For the note see, enclosure in Sydenham to Hardinge,
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- 1100. *Ibid.*
- 1101. Sydenham to Hardinge, 27 April, 1912, H.P.
- 1102. *Ibid.*
- 1103. *Ibid.*
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- 1106. *Ibid.*
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- 1110. *Ibid.*
- 1111. Hardinge's minute on Government of India's despatch,
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- 1112. Hardinge to Crewe, 15 May, 1912, H.P.
- 1113. *Ibid.*
- 1114. Butler to Hardinge (a note on the Delhi despatch) un-
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- 1115. *Ibid.*
- 1116. Butler to Hardinge, 1 July, 1912, H.P.
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- 1119. Craddock to Hardinge, 7 July, 1912, H.P.

- 1120. *Ibid.*
- 1121. *Ibid.*
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- 1123. *Ibid.*
- 1124. *Ibid.*
- 1125. *Ibid.*
- 1126. Sydenham to Hardinge, 11 September, 1912, H.P.
- 1127. Hardinge's minute on Government of India's despatch, 25 August, 1911, H.P.
- 1128. *Ibid.*
- 1129. Butler's note on Delhi despatch (undated) B.P.
- 1130. *Ibid.*
- 1131. *Ibid.*
- 1132. Hardinge's minute on Government of India's despatch, 25 August, 1911, *op cit*, H.P.
- 1133. *Ibid.*
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- 1135. Hardinge to Crewe, 15 April, 1915, H.P.
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- 1144. Craddock to Hardinge, 23 April, 1914, H.P.
- 1145. *Ibid.*
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- 1149. Charles Bayley to Craddock, 27 February, 1914, H.P.
- 1150. *Ibid.*
- 1151. *Ibid.*
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- 1154. Craddock to Hardinge, 25 April, 1914, H.P.
- 1155. *Ibid.*
- 1156. Meston to Craddock, 19 April, 1914, M.P.
- 1157. *Ibid.*
- 1158. Meston to MacDonnel, 18 April, 1914, M.P.
- 1159. *Ibid.*
- 1160. *Ibid.*
- 1161. *Ibid.*
- 1162. *Ibid.*
- 1163. *Ibid.*
- 1164. Hardinge to Crewe, 24 March, 1915, M.P.

1165. *Ibid.*

1166. *Ibid.*

1167. *Ibid.*

1168. Chamberlain to Hardinge, 21 July, 1915, H.P.

1169. For a perceptive analysis of the new combination from the official point of view see, Stanley Reed to Steed, 8 July, 1916, S. Reed.

1170. See, Stanley Reed to Steed, (received on) 29 June, 1915, S. Reed., for the background of the initiative taken by the Muslem League.

1171. Judith M. Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power. Indian politics, 1915-1922*, Cambridge, 1972, pp xiii-xvi.

1172. See pp 369-83 below.

1173. For a definite conservative reaction, see Wacha to Stanley Reed, enclosed in Stanley Reed to Steed, 11 October, 1916, S. Reed.

1174. *Ibid.*; also pp 374-76 below.

1175. Craddock to Hardinge, 4 March, 1915, H.P.

1176. *Ibid.*

1177. Roos Keppel to Meston, 5 November, 1916, M.P.

1178. Stanley Reed to Steed, 8 July, 1916, S. Reed.

1179. *Ibid.*

1180. The trend was visible. By October, 1916, 19 members of the viceroy's legislative council had already presented a memorial for constitutional reform. See an official reaction in S. Reed to Steed, 14 October, 1916, S. Reed.

1181. Hardinge to Crewe, 24 March, 1915, H.P.

1182. Wacha to Meston, 4 December, 1916, M.P.; also, Meston to Wacha, 8 January, 1917, M.P.

1183. Lovett to Meston, 5 December, 1916, M.P.

1184. *Ibid.*

1185. *Ibid.*; Lovett to Meston, 6 December, 1916, M.P.

1186. Mahmudabad to Lovett, 6 March, 1916 in Lovett to Meston, 6 December, 1916, M.P.; also see, Stanley Reed to Steed, 24 June, 1915, S. Reed.

1187. *Ibid.*

1188. *Ibid.*

1189. Lovett to Meston, 6 December, 1916, M.P.

1190. Meston to Lovett, 23 December, 1916, M.P.

1191. 'Memorandum by H.E. the Viceroy upon questions likely to arise in India at the end of the War.' (confidential), October, 1915, H.P.

1192. *Ibid.*

1193. *Ibid.*

1194. *Ibid.*

1195. *Ibid.*

1196. For Chamberlain's somewhat reserved reaction on the

subject see, Chamberlain to Hardinge, 23 July, 1915, H.P.

1197. Hardinge's memorandum on questions likely to arise after the war, *op cit*, H.P.

1198. For Chamberlain's adverse reaction to the proposal, see Chamberlain to Hardinge, 6 August, 1915, H.P.

1199. Hardinge's memorandum, *op cit*, H.P.; also, Hardinge to Crewe, 3 September, 1914, H.P.

1200. *Ibid.*

1201. Hardinge to Chamberlain, 8 October, 1915, H.P.

1202. *Ibid.*

1203. *Ibid.*

1204. *Ibid.*; Hardinge to Chamberlain, 26 November, 1915, H.P.

1205. *Ibid.*; Hardinge to Chamberlain, 8 October, 1915, H.P.

1206. *Ibid.*; Hardinge to Chamberlain, 26 November, 1915, H.P.

1207. *Ibid.*

1208. *Ibid.*

1209. Hardinge to Chamberlain, 8 October, 1915, H.P.

1210. Hardinge to Crewe, 3 September, 1914, H.P.

1211. Hardinge's memorandum on questions likely to arise after the war, *op cit*, H.P.

1212. *Ibid.*

1213. *Ibid.*

1214. *Ibid.*

1215. *Ibid.*

1216. *Ibid.*

1217. *Ibid.*; also, Hardinge to Holderness, 22 October, 1915, H.P.

1218. Hardinge's memorandum on questions likely to arise after the war, *op cit*, H.P.

1219. Hardinge to Chamberlain, 20 August, 1915, H.P.

1220. For Chamberlain's opposition to Hardinge's view on the subject see, Chamberlain to Hardinge, 28 May, 1915, H.P.

1221. Andrews to Hardinge, 5 July, 1913, H.P.

1222. Hardinge to Andrews, 12 July, 1913, H.P.

1223. *Ibid.*

1224. Chamberlain to Hardinge, 23 July, 1915, H.P.

1225. Hardinge to Chamberlain, 16 November, 1916, H.P.

1226. *Ibid.*

1227. *Ibid.*; Hardinge's memorandum, on questions likely to arise after the war, *op cit*, H.P.

1228. Hardinge to Chamberlain, 16 November, 1916, H.P.

1229. *Ibid.*; Hardinge's memorandum on questions likely to arise after the war, *op cit*, H.P.

1230. Hardinge to Chamberlain, 16 November, 1916, H.P.

1231. *Ibid.*; Hardinge's memorandum on questions likely to arise after the war, *op cit*, H.P.

1232. Hardinge to Holderness, 24 September, 1915, H.P.

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1234. *Ibid.*

1235. *Ibid.*

1236. *Ibid.*

1237. Hardinge to Holderness, 15 October, 1915, H.P.; for Chamberlain's opposition to Hardinge's perspective, see, Holderness to Hardinge, 17 September, 1915, H.P.

1238. Opinion of Willingdon, 10 September, 1915, appendix in Hardinge's memorandum on questions likely to arise after war, *op cit*, H.P.

1239. Opinion of Pentland, 10 September, 1915, appendix in Hardinge's memorandum on questions likely to arise after war, *op cit*, H.P.

1240. Opinion of Meston, 7 September, 1915, appendix in Hardinge's memorandum on questions likely to arise after war, *op cit*, H.P.

1241. Opinion of Hailey, 17 September, 1915, appendix in Hardinge's memorandum on questions likely to arise after the war, *op cit*, H.P.

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1254. *Ibid.*

1255. Meston to Chirol, 10 September, 1916, M.P.

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1259. Chirol to Meston, 15 September, 1916, M.P.

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1261. *Ibid.*

1262. Hardinge to Holderness, 12 November, 1915, H.P.

1263. *Ibid.*

1264. Wacha to Meston, 12 January, 1917, M.P.

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1268. Wacha to Meston, 12 January, 1917, M.P.

1269. *Ibid.*

1270. Meston to Chirol, 10 September, 1916, M.P.;²⁰ also, Meston

to Wacha, 8 January, 1917, M.P.

1271. Willingdon to Hardinge, 9 January, 1916, H.P.

1272. *Ibid.*

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1274. Meston to Hardinge, 31 January, 1916, H.P.

1275. Stanley Reed to Steed, (Received)) 29 June, 1915, S. Reed.; Hardinge to Holderness, 18 March, 1915, H.P.; also, its enclosure, 'Aga Khan's document'.

1276. Lovett to Meston, 6 December, 1916, M.P.; Meston to Lovett, 23 December, 1916, M.P.

1277. *Ibid.*

1278. Lovett to Meston, 6 December, 1916, M.P.

1279. Meston to Lovett, 23 December, 1916, M.P.

1280. Butler to Wilson, 7 December, 1914, B.P. As early as 1913 Fleetwood Wilson complained of the ascendancy of reactionary elements in the civil services, see Wilson to Morley, 6 January, 1913, W.P.

1281. Meston to Lovett, 23 December, 1916, M.P.

1282. *Ibid.*

1283. Reference may be made to the papers of the Round Table Group for the formation of official policy with regard to the reforms of 1919.

1284. See, C835, R.T.P.

1285. Marris to Meston, 13 September, 1916, *Seton Papers* (hereafter S.P.).

1286. Cf. Bampfylde Fuller, *Studies in Indian Life and Sentiments*, London, 1910, pp 354.

1287. Buchan to Curtis, 11 June, 1912, R.T.P.

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1289. Chirol, 'Memo. on India,' July 1912, R.T.P.

1290. *Ibid.*

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1292. *Ibid.*

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1294. Chirol to Coupland, (undated), R.T.P.

1295. Note by Dunlop Smith, 3 March, 1916, *Dunlop Smith Papers*; Craddock to Seton, 22 August, 1916, S.P. also, see O'Dwyer, *India As I Know it*, *op cit*, pp 403-05.

1296. Chirol, 'Memo. in India', 28 August, 1917, R.T.P.; Slocock to Seton, 28 August, 1917, S.P.

1297. Meston's note, 30 December 1916, M.P.

1298. *Ibid.*

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1. See Introduction above (hereafter Int.) pp 1-22.
2. Refer Int, pp 47-67.
3. Cf. the views of the Indian administrators, Int. pp 26-28.
4. See Int. pp 66-67 & 138-41.
5. See Int. pp 2, 6, & 11-17.
6. Int. pp 10-13.
7. See, for example, the views of the Indian government, Int. pp 12-13 & 16-17.
8. See Int. for traditional British susceptibilities and for British responsibilities in Afghanistan, pp 8, 10 & 11.
9. Int. pp 138, for the impact of the humiliation of Turkey on the Muslim world.
10. Cf. Int. pp 129-48.
11. Cf. the views of Meston, Craddock and others, Int. pp 131-35.
12. Similar views were expressed and entertained by civil servants, see Int. pp 140-46.
13. See Int. pp 28-30.
14. For the views of the ultra-reactionary forces, see Int. pp 25-26.
15. Int. pp 25-30.
16. For the new trend in the Congress and Muslim politics in favour of unity of action and consequent official uneasiness, see Int. pp 144-48 and 226-30.
17. See Int. p 146.
18. For official reaction to possibilities of Hindu-Muslim Unity, Int. pp 144-48.
19. Cf. the views of the officials, Int. pp 132-34.
20. For the decline of the old guards and the rise of the 'young Turks', See Int. pp 95-107.
21. For official reaction, see Int. pp 96-107.
22. See Int. pp 37-38.
23. *Ibid.*
24. For Gandhi, the South African movement and the role of Hardinge, see Int. pp 149-61.
25. See the views of Chirol and Andrews on the issue, Int. pp 150-51.
26. For an exposition of Hardinge's attitude on the issue, see Int. pp 153-54.
27. For the reaction to Hardinge's stand, see Int. pp 153-54.
28. For Hardinge's Policy towards the native states, Int. pp 43-47.
29. See Int. p 44.
30. Cf. M. Shama Rao, *Modern Mysore etc, op cit*, p 92.
31. Cf. Hardinge, *My Indian Years, op cit*, pp 89-90.

32. See M. Shama Rao, *Modern Mysore etc*, op cit, pp 249-50; also, Hardinge, *My Indian Years*, op cit, pp 89-90.

33. For the attempts on the part of Hardinge to appease the indignant feelings of Calcutta following the transfer of capital, see Int. pp 80-84.

34. For the reactions of the Indian civil servants against Hardinge's attitude towards Indians, see Int. pp 26-30.

35. Rumours about Hardinge's imminent resignation were floated by interested parties immediately after the Delhi outrage. See Hardinge's *My Indian Years*, op cit, ch. VI.

36. For a review of the conflicting strategies and policies for India, see Int. pp 216-26.

37. For a brief review of the tribal problems on the north-west frontier, Int. pp 177-84.

38. See Int. pp 21-22.

39. See, Government of India, *The Army and its Evolution*, Calcutta, 1924, ch. XXII.

40. For a review of the performance of the Islington Commission, see Int. pp 113-22.

41. Refer Int. pp 115-20.

42. Cf. Int. pp 116-17.

43. For a concerted opposition of the civil servants to the commission, see Int. pp 114-22.

44. See Int. pp 73 and 79-81.

45. For the imperial considerations governing the policy of the transfer of capital, see Int. 78-79.

46. See Int. pp 77-79.

47. Cf. Int. pp 180-84.

48. Cf. Int. p 14.

49. Cf. the views of the frontier administration, Int. pp 179-84.

50. Suhash Chakravarty, *From Khyber etc*, op cit, pp 232-60.

51. For the views of Sazanof, see Int. p 14.

52. Cf. the views of Sazanof, Int. p 16.

53. See, Leo E. Rose and M. W. Fisher, *The North East Frontier Agency of India*, California, (undated) pp 20-22; Robert Reid, *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam, From 1883 to 1941*, Shillong, 1942, pp 237-39.

54. For a study of the development of British interests in Sikkim and Bhutan, see, J. Claude White, *Sikkim and Bhutan: Twenty-one year on the North-East Frontier, 1887-1908*, London, 1909.

55. See Int. pp 132-34.

56. Cf. Hardinge's opinion, Int. pp 79-80.

57. For a discussion on the attitude of the government of India on the indentured labour and immigration, see Int. pp 232-34.

58. See Int. pp 7-22.

59. For Russophobia see, Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1884*, London, 1889; T. H. Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1890*, London, 1901; G. Younghusband, *Indian Frontier Warfare*, London, 1898; Henry McMahon, 'International boundaries', *Journal of Royal Society of Arts*, Vol. 84, 1935-36; Curzon, *Frontiers*, Oxford, 1907.
60. See Int. pp 21-22.
61. *Ibid.*
62. See Int. pp 179-80.
63. For the Mashhuds, see, Int. pp 183-84.
64. For a review of India's military contribution during World War I, see Int. pp 163-69.
65. Int. pp 178-80.
66. Int pp 163-66.
67. Int. pp 231-32 & 236.
68. For the apprehensions of the government about Muslim loyalty and the policies towards the various factions of the Muslim opinion, see, Int. pp 131-36, 138-48 & 210-13.
69. See Int. p 30.
70. Bomb attack at Delhi on 23 December, 1912; Lady Hardinge expired in London in July 1914; eldest son wounded on the front in August and died in December 1914.
71. For precautionary measures in case Turkey joined the war against Britain, see, Int. p 148.
72. For the explosive situation within India see pp 184-213.
73. See Int. pp 178-80.
74. For the business in the assembly, see Int. pp 39-43.
75. For example, see official attitudes towards the nationalists Int. pp 122-27.
76. See, Int pp 214-17 for the attitude of the civil servants towards the Congress.
77. Official optimism was often not very realistic, see Int. pp 206-25.
78. For an appreciation of Hardinge by the Russian council, see, Int. pp 29-30.
79. For such rumours, see Int. pp 177-78.
80. See Roos Keppel on the frontier policy, Int. pp 180-84.
81. For a review of this trip to the Persian Gulf and Busra, see Int. pp 170-72.
82. See Int. pp 174-77.
83. For the proposals of the foreign office, the war office, the India office and the government of India regarding the eventual partition of Turkey, the creation of a small Asiatic Turkish State and the annexation of Busra and Baghdad, see Int. pp 173-77.
84. There was a revival of interest on the part of the Russian government in this Kushka-Herat-Quetta region. This was one

of the sought-for prizes of the Great Game of the 19th Century in Central Asia, see Suhash Chakravarty, *From Khyber etc*, op cit, ch. I & V.

85. See Int. pp 170-71.

86. Int. pp 171-72.

87. For Bengal, see Int. pp 177-206; for the Punjab and Ghadar movement see Int. pp 206-14.

88. For a general review of Gokhale's role, see Int. pp 49-58.

89. For Gokhale and the Islington commission, see Int. pp 115-18.

90. Refer Int. p 58.

91. See Int. pp 155-57; also, Hardinge, *My Indian Years*, op cit, pp 81-82 & 115.

92. See Int. p 21.

93. *Ibid*.

94. See Int. pp 181-84.

95. See Int. pp 183-84.

96. For the Kamagatamaru incident and its repercussions, see Int. pp 206-12.

97. For government's reactions to revolutionary activity in the Punjab, refer Int. pp 207-13.

98. See Int. pp 207-09.

99. See Int. pp 208-11.

100. For the role of the council see Int. pp 39-43.

101. Cf. Hardinge's memorandum discussed in Int. pp 230-50.

102. See, Int. pp 221-25.

103. Int. p 226.

104. Similar views were expressed by officials like Craddock, Meston, Hailey etc., see Int. pp 240-43 & 246-50.

105. See Int. pp 25-30.

106. See Int. pp 179-84.

107. See Int. pp 179-80.

108. See Int. pp 208-09, 211-12.

109. See Int. pp 207-13.

110. See Int. pp 211-13.

111. See Int. pp 209-10.

112. See Int. pp 209-11.

113. See Int. p 22.

114. Hardinge, *My Indian Years*, op cit, pp 121-22.

115. For the views of Hardinge on the Persian Gulf and Turkish question, see Int. pp 169-77.

116. Int. pp 207-09.

117. *Ibid*.; also for the policy towards the native press, see Int. pp 136-37, 143-44, 200, 202 and 210.

118. For example, British attitudes towards Afridis took a favourable turn during the war; see, Int. pp 181-82.

119. See Int. pp 230-40 for proposals of Hardinge and for official reactions, pp 240-43 & 246-50.
120. For a discussion on the subject see Int. pp 238-40.
121. See Int. p 179.
122. See Hardinge's policy in Int. pp 179-80.
123. For the nature of tribal inroads and British policy towards the tribes, see Int. pp 180-84.
124. For India's military contributions during the first world war, see Int. pp 162-69.
125. For Hardinge's proposals to meet the situation, see Int. pp 231-32.
126. For the weakness of the high courts of India and of the high court of Calcutta, in particular, see official reactions in Int. pp 198-200.
127. See Int. pp 79-80.
128. See Int. p 179.
129. For the flexible policy of the British in this direction, see Int. pp 179-80.
130. For revolutionary activities in the Punjab, see Int. pp 207-11.
131. For Hardinge's attitude, Int. pp 213-14.
132. See Int. pp 228-50.
133. About the tactical differences between Hardinge and the civil servants, see Int. pp 213-26.
134. See Int. pp 162-69.
135. See Int. pp 177-80.
136. *Ibid.*
137. See Int. pp 21-22.
138. See Int. pp 178-79.
139. See Int. pp 179-80.
140. See Int. pp 147-48, 166.
141. See for British policy, pp 180-84.
142. For military reverses of British forces and their adverse effects in India, see Int. pp 164-65.
143. For British dilemma on the north-west frontier, see Int. pp 180-84.
144. For the revival of tension between British and Russia in Central Asia, see Int. pp 172-74 & 176-77.
145. Hostility of Calcutta's Anglo-Indian press was almost permanent. See Int. pp 73, 79-80 & 217-18. It reflected the opinion and attitudes of a powerful section of the British power elite in India.
146. See Int. pp 73-80.
147. See Int. pp 29-30, 122-29, 132-34, 190-91 & 241-47.
148. See Int. p 184.

149. This document together with seven following ones deals with Raja Mahendra Pratap's arrival at Tashkent for assistance against Britain, See Int. p 184.

150. See Int p 180.

151. See Int. pp 164-65; also British appreciation of Russian claims in Turkey, Int. pp 174-75.

152. Int. pp 179-80.

152 a. About the uncertainties of Afghanistan's policies, Int. pp 177-81.

152 b. Cf. Int. p 22.

152 c. Int. pp 163-65 & 177-81.

153. See Int. pp 180-84.

154. For the failure of the Mesopotamian operations and the resignation of the commander-in-chief, see Stanley Reed to Steed, 20 March 1916, S. Reed; Stanley Reed to Robinson, 28 April, 1917, S. Reed.

155. *Ibid.*

156. See Int. pp 126-27.

157. See Int pp 226-50.

158. For an attempt to satisfy the army, see Int. pp 231-232 & 236.

159. Int pp 162, 226-29.

160. Cf. the views of contemporary administrators. See Int pp 240-42 & 247-49.

161. For similar views of the civil servants, see Int. pp 117-120 & 214-15.

162. See Int. pp 179-80.

163. See Int. pp 177-80.

164. This account is corroborated by Stanley Reed; see Stanley Reed to Robinson, 28 April, 1917, S. Reed.

165. Int. p 227.

166. About the indefiniteness and uncertainties of the nature of the proposed reforms and the uneasiness in official mind, see Int. pp 227-42.

167. Int. pp 20-22 & 179-80.

168. See Note 84 above.

169. Int. pp 178-79.

170. Int. p 179.

171. Int. pp 177-79.

172. Int. pp 211-12.

173. Int. p 213.

174. See Int. pp 227-28.

175. Cf. Hardinge's resistance to the demands of the home government, Int. pp 165-69.

176. See Int. pp 211-14.

177. The future prospects of aviation was both anticipated and appreciated.

178. Chelmsford started his Indian career on a wrong foot. He hesitated, faltered and, finally, circumscribed the offer which had been proposed by Hardinge.

179. Chelmsford's appreciation of Indian realities was carefully confined to an appraisal of the army and the princes. Cf. Craddock's views, Int. p 224.

180. The proposal for doing away with the buffer state of Afghanistan and the prospects of increased trade and commerce between Russia and British India were nipped in the bud by the Soviet Revolution.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Abdul Latif Khan (1828-93): educated at the Calcutta Madrasah; joined the subordinate executive service in 1949; became a presidency magistrate; made a J.P., a Khan Bahadur, a Nawab and a C.I.E.; one of the founders of the Presidency College, Calcutta and a Fellow of the Calcutta University.

Aga Khan (1877-1957): the forty-eighth Imam of the Ismailis; closely associated with the All India Mohammadan Education Conference; led the Simla deputation, 1906; founder member and president of the Muslem League, 1907-1914; a leading delegate to the Round Table Conference, 1931-1932 etc.

Ahmad Khan, Sir Syed (1817-1898): educationist and social reformer; established the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, 1875; founder member of the Mohammedan Educational Conference, 1895; bitter critic of the Indian National Congress.

Ali, Mohmed (1878-1931): Indian nationalist leader; launched the Comrade, 1911; leading part in the Aligarh University movement; also in the pan-Islamic movement; interned in 1915-1919; president Indian National Congress, 1923 etc.

Ali, Shaukat (1873-1938): nationalist leader; pan-Islamic spokesman; in association with Abdur Bari founded the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 1913; interned in 1915-1919 etc.

Ansari, Mukhtar Ahmed (1880-1936): nationalist leader; led the Indian medical mission to Turkey, 1912-13; founded the Home Rule League in 1917 in Delhi; chairman, reception committee of the Muslem League, Delhi, 1918; etc.

Baker, Sir Herbert (1862-1946): architect, collaborated with Lutyens in New Delhi; other works include India House, London; Rhodes House, Oxford and government houses, Pretoria.

Banerjea, Surendranath (1848-1925): a moderate Congress leader of Bengal; associated with Gokhale; founded the Indian Association, 1876; toured all over India campaigning for it; ed-

tor, the Bengalee; president of the Congress, 1895 and 1902; in 1918 left the Congress.

Baroda, Sir Siyaji Rao, Maharaja of (1863-1939): chosen to replace an unsatisfactory ruling maharaja, 1875; invested with governing powers, 1881; despite some friction with the British, he raised Baroda from chaos to a model state.

Besant, Annie (1847-1933): theosophist, educationist and Indian politician; president, Theosophist Society, 1907-1933; from 1895 active in India; initiated Home Rule for India League, 1916; president Indian National Congress, 1918; one of the founders of the Hindu University movement.

Bikaner, Maharaja Sir Ganga Singh Bahadur (1880-1943): assumed ruling powers, 1898; noted for remarkable improvements in his administration; introduced representative assembly in 1913 and elected majority in 1937; first chancellor, Chamber of Princes, 1921-1926; served in France and Egypt, 1914-1915.

Botha, Louis (1862-1919): South African soldier and politician; first Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, 1910-1919; dealt with problems of Indian immigration and unrest on Rand; supported Great Britain during the great war, 1914-1918.

Butler, Sir Spencer Harcourt (1869-1938): member of the Indian Civil Service; in charge of education, 1910-1915; lieutenant-Governor of Burma, 1915-1918 and that of the United Provinces, 1918-1921 etc.

Cama, Madame Bhikaji (1860-1936): intellectual and revolutionary from a Parsee family; came in contact with Dadabhai Naoroji in London; met Bipin Chandra Pal in 1908; kept live contacts with Indian nationalists of various shades; corresponded with Lenin; from 1909, Paris became her headquarters; published pamphlets and appeals to her countrymen to rebel; became the moving spirit of the "Abhinav Bharat" activities of the Indians residing in Europe.

Carmichael, Sir Thomas David Gibson (1859-1926): overseas administrator and art connoisseur; governor of Australia, 1908-1911, of Madras, 1911-1912 and of Bengal, 1912-1917.

Carlyle, Sir Robert Warrand (1859-1934): Indian civil servant; chief secretary to Bengal government, 1904-1907; member, governor general's council, 1910-1915 etc.

Chamberlain, Sir Joseph Austen (1863-1937): British politician; liberal unionist M.P., 1892-1914; secretary of state for India, 1915-1917, etc.

Chintamani, Sir C. Y. (1880-1941): journalist and liberal politician; leader of the Liberal Party whose main instrument was the Leader of Allahabad; minister of education and industries in the United Provinces, 1921-1923.

Chirol, Sir Ignatius Valentine (1852-1929): traveller, journalist and author; in charge of *The Times* foreign department, 1896-1912; favoured Anglo-Japanese alliance, French entente and understanding with Russia; increasingly concerned with India (which he visited seventeen times); member of the royal commission on Indian public services, 1912-1914; etc.

Clark, George Sydenham, Baron Sydenham of Combe (1848-1913): administrator, governor of Bombay; 1907-1913.

Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry (1864-1937): Indian civil servant, home member, viceroy's council, 1912-1917; lieutenant-governor, Burma, 1917-1922 etc.

Creagh, Sir Garrett O'Moore (1848-1923): general; joined army, 1866; commander-in-chief, India, 1909-1914; etc.

Crewe-Milnes, Robert Offley Ashburton, Marquess of Crewe (1858-1945): British liberal politician, secretary of state for India, 1910-1915 etc.

Cox, Sir Percy Zachariah (1864-1937): soldier, administrator and diplomatist; political agent and counsel at Muscat, 1899-1904; acting political resident in Persian government and counsel-general, 1904-1909; resident, 1909-1914; chief political officer, Indian expeditionary force 'D' in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918; negotiated treaty with Ibn Saud, 1915; high commissioner, Iraq, 1920-1923.

Curtis, Lionel George (1872-1955): Beit lecturer on Colonial history at Oxford, 1912; public servant; headed the 'Milner's Kindergarten'; founded the *Round Table*; in 1916-1917 took a prominent part in India in discussions relating to the constitutional progress of that country.

Curzon, George Nathaniel (1859-1925): conservative British politician; a leading authority on Asian affairs; viceroy of India.

1895-1905; adopted adventurous policy in Tibet and Persian Gulf; held durbar in Delhi, 1903; secured partition of Bengal, 1905; a leading spokesman of the Empire in the house of Lords; lord privy seal in coalition cabinet, 1915; active member of Inner war-cabinet, December, 1916; foreign minister 'in interim', January 1919 etc.

Dutt, Romesh Chandra (1848-1909): Indian administrator, author, nationalistic politician; joined Bengal civil service, 1871; member, Bengal legislative council, 1871; president, Indian National Congress, 1899; minister, Baroda State, 1904-1907, 1909, etc.

Elliot, Gilbert John Murray Kynynmond, fourth Earl of Minto (1845-1914): viceroy of India, 1905-1910, etc.

Freeman-Thomas, Freeman, first Marquess of Willingdon (1866-1941): governor of Bombay 1914-1918; governor of Madras 1919-1924; governor-general of Canada, 1926-1930; viceroy of India, 1931-1936.

Fuller, Sir (Joseph) Bampfylde (1854-1935): Indian administrator; chief commissioner, Assam, 1902-1905; lieutenant governor, East Bengal and Assam (1905) etc.

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869-1948): Indian national leader and social reformer; in South Africa (1893-1914), as a prosperous advocate and leader of Indian opposition to racial discrimination, evolved technique of Satyagraha; secured a compromise agreement with Smuts, 1914; returned to India, 1915; entered the Indian movement and by 1919 became the undisputed leader of Indian nationalism; organised major non-violent movements against the British; insisted on the supremacy of means over ends; hailed by his countrymen as the Mahatma, etc.

Ghosh, Aurobindo (1872-1950): scholar, philosopher, revolutionary; political activity began in 1893; the partition of Bengal pushed him on to the forefront; principal of the newly set-up national college of Jadavpur; started the famous Bengali daily, *Yugantar* and joined the English daily, *Bande Mataram*; arrested in 1907; arrested in 1908 again; acquitted in 1909; resumed his work in two weeklies, the *Karmayogin* and the *Dharma*; in 1910 withdrew to Pondichery and from politics.

Ghosh, Rashbehari (1845-1921): a leading advocate, nationalist and educationist; in the question of social reforms he was a

gradualist; a staunch believer in Hindu-Muslim unity; from 1893-1895, president of the Faculty of Law of Calcutta University; presided over the Surat session of the Congress, 1907; prominent part in Swadeshi movement; member of the Indian legislative council, 1891-1896 and 1906-1907; generous patronage was given to the Calcutta University, Jadavpur Technical College, Hindu University and Carmichael Medical College.

Gladstone, Herbert John (1854-1930): British politician and administrator; first governor general and high commissioner of the Union of South Africa, 1910-1914 etc.

Gokhale, Gopal Krishna (1866-1915): moderate leader of the Indian National Congress; elected to the Bombay legislative council, 1899; member, imperial legislative council, 1901-02; appointed a member, Islington commission; founded the Servant of India Society, 1905; by conviction liberal, constitutionalist and nationalist; in 1906, came into contact with Morley; a determined enemy of extremism.

Grey, Sir Edward (1862-1933): British politician; liberal M.P. 1885-1916; foreign Secretary, 1905-1916; established a policy of friendship with France and the United States; principal author of Anglo-Russian agreement, 1907; renewed alliance with Japan, 1911.

Gurdit Singh (1860-1954): famous for the Kamagatamaru affairs 1914; surrendered to the British on the advice of Mahatma Gandhi; an orthodox Sikh with liberal outlook and fired by ardent nationalism.

Haldane, Richard Burdon (1856-1928): British politician; secretary of state for war, 1905-1912; sent by cabinet on an abortive mission to Germany, 1912; accused of pro-German sympathies; lord chancellor, 1912-1915; etc.

Har Dayal, (1884-1939): revolutionary who founded the Ghadar Party in the USA; while still at Oxford, came under the influence of Savarkar and Madam Cama; a close associate of Master Amir Chand, Mahendra Pratap, Rash Behari Bose, Barkatullah etc., all of whom devoted themselves to revolutionary work; founded a journal in 1913 in USA known as the *Ghadar*, in which violent anti-British propaganda was launched; started another paper at Switzerland: *Bande Matram*; by 1927 he somewhat changed his position; taught at USA etc.

Hardinge, Charles, Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858-1944):

British diplomat; under secretary of state 1903; participated in the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement 1904; ambassador to St. Petersburg 1904-1906; permanent under secretary of state for foreign affairs 1906-1910; closely connected with the conclusion of the Russian convention 1907; viceroy of India 1910-1916 etc.

Hasan, Wazir (1874-1947): one of the founder members of the Muslem League; asstt. secretary of the League, 1910-1912; secretary of the League, 1912-1919; sought closer cooperation with the Congress, 1919; member U.P. legislative council, 1916-1919.

Haque, Mazharul (1866-1930): president, All India Muslem League, 1915; important personality during the Lucknow congress in 1916; supported Gandhi in Champaran, 1917 etc.

Hewett, Sir John Prescott (1854-1941): Indian civil servant; chief commissioner, Central Provinces, 1902-1904; lieutenant governor, United Provinces, 1907-1912 etc.

Holderness, Sir Thomas William (1849-1924): Indian civil servant, permanent under secretary of state, India Office, 1912-1919.

Iman, Ali (1869-1932): jurist, administrator and politician, trustee of Aligarh 1909; president of the Bihar provincial conference, December 1908; president, All India Muslem League, 1908; member, viceroy's executive council, 1910-1915; judge, Patna high court, 1917, etc.

Iqbal, Sir Muhammad (1876-1938): Indian thinker and poet; his poems in Persian and Urdu on themes of development of individual personality within idealized Islamic community have been immensely influential.

Jenkins, Sir Lawrence Hugh (1857-1928): jurist; chief-justice of Bengal, 1905-1915; member of the judicial committee of the privy council, 1916.

Jinnah, Mohammed Ali (1876-1948): creator of Pakistan; represented Bombay Muslims on imperial legislative council, 1909-1919; a moving spirit behind Lucknow pact etc.

Kerr, Philip Henry (1882-1940): British journalist and politician; founder and first editor of the *Round Table*, 1910-1916; private secretary to Lloyd George, 1916-1921; member of Milner's 'Kindergarten'.

Khan, Hakim Ajmal (1863-1938): founder member, All India Muslem League, 1906; chairman of the reception committee of the League, 1910; trustee of Aligarh, 1911; president, All India Muslem League 1919, etc.

Kitchener, Horatio Herbert (1850-1916): a Field Marshal; commander-in-chief in India, 1902-1909; secretary of state for war 1914; went down with H.M.S. Hampshire off Orkneys on way to Russia.

Kipling (Joseph) Rudyard (1865-1936): author; joined staff of *Lahore Civil and Military Gazette* 1882; noted for his stories and poems dwelling on the theme of imperial race doing justice and upholding law.

Law, Andrew Bonar (1858-1923): British politician; unionist H.P., 1900-1906; supported Joseph Chamberlain's scheme of colonial preferences and tariff reform, 1903; most effective advocate of fiscal changes; denounced Lloyd George's budget of 1909 as socialism, pure and unadulterated, etc.

Lloyd George, David (1863-1945): British liberal politician; controversial chancellor of exchequer of the 'people's budget' fame 1909; introduced first war budget, November 1914; secretary for war July 1916; etc.

Lutyens, Sir Edwin Landseer (1869-1944): architect; built series of romantic country-homes in England, 1889-1909; architect for British pavilion, Paris Exhibition, 1900; architect of New Delhi.

MacDonald, James Ramsay (1866-1937): British labour leader and politician who became first labour prime minister; chairman, parliamentary labour group, 1911; member Islington commission, etc.

MacDonnel, Anthony Patrick (1844-1925): Indian civil servant and British politician; lieutenant governor, North-West Province and Oudh, 1895-1901; etc.

Mackay, James Lyle, first Earl of Inchcape (1852-1932): ship owner; served on Bengal legislative council, 1891-1899; served on the council of India, 1897-1911 and imperial defence committee, 1917; etc.

Meyer, Sir William Stevenson (1860-1920): Indian civil servant; finance member, government of India, 1913-1918 etc.

Malaviya, Madan Mohan (1861-1946): Indian politician, educationist and journalist; editor, *Abhyudaya*, 1907-1909; member, UP legislative council, 1902-1912; president, Indian National Congress, 1909, 1918, 1932 and 1933; member, imperial legislative council, 1910-1919; founder of the Hindu University movement, founder of Hindu Mahasabha etc.

Marris, Sir William Sinclair (1873-1945): Indian civil servant; under secretary, Indian home department 1901; intimately associated with Milner's 'Kindergarten' and the *Round Table* Group; Joint Secretary, home department, India, 1917; drafted parts of the Montagu-Chelmsford report; etc.

McMahon, Sir (Arthur) Henry (1862-1949): military and political officer; demarcated Baluchistan-Afghanistan boundary, 1903-1905; foreign secretary to Indian government, 1911-1914; negotiated with China and Tibet, 1913-1914; high commissioner, Egypt, 1914-1916, etc.

Mehta, Pherozeshah (1845-1915): liberal statesman; associated with Telang, Tyabjee, Ranade, Gokhale, Wacha, Bannerjee, Wagle etc; maker of modern Bombay municipal corporation; founded *Bombay Chronicle*, 1913, presided congress session in Calcutta, 1890; spokesman of moderate liberal evolutionary group etc.

Meston, James (1865-1943): Indian civil servant, financial secretary to Indian government, 1906-1912; lieutenant governor, United Provinces, 1912-1918; associated with Lionel Curtis.

Mohammad Ali Mohammad, Raja of Mahmudabad (1889-1931): politician; member UP legislative council, 1908-1909 and of governor-general's council, 1907-1920; president, All India Muslim League, 1915-1919 and of the British Indian Association, 1917-1921, etc.

Montagu, Edwin Samuel (1879-1924): British liberal politician; parliamentary under-secretary of state for India, 1904-1914; secretary of state for India, 1917-1922.

Mookerjee, Sir Ashutosh (1864-1924): educationist and jurist; for 35 years (1889-1924); the living spirit at the University of Calcutta for twenty years (1903-1924); a judge of the Calcutta high court for four years (1899-1903); a member of the Bengal legislative council.

Morison, Sir Theodore (1863-1936): educationist and writer;

professor, Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, 1899; principal of the same college, 1899-1905; member, council of India, 1906-1916, etc.

Morley, John (1838-1923): British liberal politician and man of letters; editor, *Fortnightly Review*; secretary of state for India, 1905-1910; etc.

Muir, (John) Ramsay (1872-1941): British historian and liberal politician.

Nicolson, Sir Arthur (1849-1928): diplomat; under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1910-1916; advocated policy of keeping Russia in *entente*.

O'Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (1864-1940): administrator; lieutenant-governor, Punjab, 1913-1919.

Pal, Bipin Chandra (1858-1932): firebrand extremist nationalist; started 'Paridarshak', 1880; asstt. editor, *Bengal Public opinion*, 1882; asstt. editor, the *Tribune*, 1887; attended Congress session of 1886; started *Bande Mataram*, 1907; an important role in the Swadeshi movement; joined the Home Rule League led by Tilak; conservative in social views.

Pelly, Fitzmaurice, Henry Charles Keith, Marquess of Lansdowne (1845-1927): under secretary for war, 1872-1874; under secretary of state for India, 1880; governor-general of Canada, viceroy of India, 1888-1894; leader of the house of lords, 1903, etc.

Poynder, Sir John Poynder Dickenson, Baron Islington (1866-1936): governor of New Zealand, 1910-1912; chairman, royal commission on Indian public services, 1912-1914, etc.

Rai, Lala Lajpat (1865-1928): politician and Congress leader; seconded boycott resolution at the Benaras Congress in 1905; deported to Burma in 1907; leader of the extremist faction of the Congress.

Rhodes, Cecil John (1853-1903): imperialist; cotton planter in Natal, 1870; moved to Orange Free State on the discovery of diamond, 1871; had commanding share in Kimberley diamond fields; directed the war with the Matabellas, 1893-1894; prime minister of the Cape, 1890-1896; encouraged the Uitlanders; resigned in 1896 after the failure of the Jameson raid.

Ritchie, Sir Richmond Thackeray Willoughby (1852-1912): civil servant, private secretary to the secretary of state for India, 1895-1902; secretary in political and secret department, India Office, 1902-1909; permanent under secretary of state, 1909.

Risley, Sir Herbert Hope (1851-1911): Indian civil servant, census commissioner, 1879, director of ethnography for India, 1901, etc.

Roos Keppel, Sir George Olof (1866-1921): soldier and administrator, chief commissioner North West Frontier Province, 1908-1919.

Russell, Arther Oliver, Baron Amptill (1869-1935): governor of Madras, 1900-1906; acting viceroy of India, 1904; opposed India bills of 1919 and 1935.

Sastri, V. S. Srinivasa (1869-1946): follower of Gokhale, president, Servant of India Society; secretary, Indian National Congress, 1908; nominated to the Madras legislative council, 1913; elected to the imperial council, 1915; denounced the repressive policy of the government of India, 1918; took an active part in formulating the Lucknow pact; founded the *Servant of India*, the organ of his society, participated in the Round Table Conferences, 1930s.

Sankaran Nair, Sir Chettur (1857-1934): Indian jurist, administrator and politician; member of the viceroy's executive council, 1915-1919, and of the India council, 1919-1921.

Shafi, Mian Mohammad (1869-1932): politician; president, All India Muslem League, 1913; president, All India Muslem Educational Conference, 1909-1919; education member, government of India, 1919-1922; etc.

Sinclair, John Baron Pentland (1860-1925) politician; secretary for Scotland, 1905-1912; governor of Madras, 1912-1919; liberal M.P. etc.

Sinha, Satyendra Prasanno, First Baron Sinha (1864-1924): first Indian member of Indian government; president, Indian National Congress, 1915; member, imperial war cabinet and conference, London, 1917, etc.

Smuts, Ian Christian (1870-1950): South African politician; minister of defence, Union government, 1910-1919. ²³

Spring-Rice, Cecil Arthur (1859-1918): diplomat, secretary to embassy, St. Petersburg, 1903-1906; British minister to Persia, 1906-1908 and to Sweden 1908-1913; ambassador at Washington, 1913-1918; etc.

Steed, Henry Wickham (1871-1956): editor of the *Times*; *Times* Correspondent in Berlin, 1896, in Rome, 1902; head of the foreign department; editor, 1919.

Sunderlal, Sir Pundit (1858-1918): a renowned *Vakil*, an associate of Motilal, Malaviya, Sapru, Gokaran Misra, Darbhanga and Annie Besant; judicial commissioner, Oudh; nominated to the imperial legislature 1915; an educationist; member of the UP legislative council, 1904, 1906-1909; conservative in social views.

Tagore, Rabindranath (1861-1941): writer, poet, educationist and artist; founder of an international school, Shantiniketan, awarded Nobel prize in 1919.

Tilak, Bal Gangadhar (Lokmanya) (1856-1920): leader of the extremist faction of the Congress; editor, *Kesari and Maratta*; conservative in social views; sentenced to imprisonment in 1907 and for six years in 1909; led the Home Rule League in 1914; joined the Congress in the Lucknow session, etc

Wacha, Dinshaw Edulji (1844-1936): associated with Dadabhai Naoroji and Pherozeshah Mehta for the peaceful political evolution of the country; founder member of the Indian National Congress; member of the Bombay legislative council (1915-1916), imperial legislative council (1916-1920); and council of state 1920; etc.

Wedderburn, William (1838-1918): joined the Indian civil services in 1860; retired as chief secretary to the government of Bombay in 1887; during his services he studied the problems of famine poverty, rural indebtedness and the ancient village system of India; formed the Indian parliamentary committee in 1893; presided over the 25th session of the Indian National Congress, 1910; chairman, the British committee of the Congress from July 1889-1918.

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